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French Socialist (SFIO) and German Social Democratic (SPD) responses to early European 
integration initiatives indicate that there was a postwar generation of SFIO and SPD leaders who 
were informed by similar experiences rooted in memories, policy proposals, and outcomes from 
the interwar period. They formulated similar visions of the postwar period that drew upon 
existing socialist ideology and narratives, but at crucial moments they were perplexed as to how 
to respond to dilemmas that placed different socialist objectives in conflict with one another. 
When devising proposals and responding to policies generated by other parties on European 
integration, French Socialists and German Social Democrats considered the potential 
repercussions of supranational institutions not only for processes of French-German 
reconciliation, but also for a wide range of domestic, geopolitical, economic, and at times 
regional party objectives. As they had to make choices between competing domestic priorities in 
the early postwar period, conflicts emerged between the SFIO and SPD, as was the case over the 
proposal to create a European Coal & Steel Community. 
 Conflict between the parties was paralleled by conflicts within the parties. The minority 
view in one party often shared the assumptions, logic, and viewpoint of the majority of the other 
party, as the raucous debate over the European Defense Community made clear. By 1954, 
however, French Socialist and German Social Democrat deputies in the Common Assembly of 
the European Coal & Steel Community had achieved a working relationship increasingly marked 
by good will, cooperation, and a mutual respect for each other’s positions. Inter-party 
cooperation at the supranational level created a form of Socialist consensus politics. These 
developments facilitated a SFIO-SPD entente in the form of European economic integration as 
embodied in the Treaties of Rome. Decisive for the parties’ support of these Treaties was the 
Socialist parties’ view that some form of trade liberalization within an organized market was a 
precondition for peace, economic expansion, and international competitiveness. Hence French 
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Socialist and German Social Democratic leaders developed a common approach to issues of 
European economic integration that created opportunities and conditions necessary for the 
success of the Treaties. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifty-seven years have passed since six European nations ratified the Treaties of Rome to set up 
the European Economic Community, the antecedent to today’s European Union. Much has 
changed over this time period. The Community has experienced several waves of enlargement 
and now incorporates much of the former Soviet sphere of influence in East-Central Europe. As 
it has done so, it has sought to strike a balance between proposals to “widen” its territorial 
borders and to “deepen” the Community’s competences. The challenges of enlargement, 
substantial in their own regard, have been accompanied by a series of challenges that have struck 
at core features of the ideals that the European Union purports to encompass: economic solidarity 
among rich and poor states, and a transcendence of nationalism in favor of a “European identity” 
that has proven difficult to inculcate in the minds of a reluctant public. 
Nonetheless, that the European integration process has survived despite the challenge 
posed by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s, monetary instability and the oil crisis 
in the 1970s, the rise of neoliberal economics in the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War in the 
1990s is a sign of its continued ability to elicit substantial support among political and economic 
elites or, at the least, indicates a fear among these elites of what might happen if the European 
project came to an ignominious end. The EU’s longevity has been in large part due to its success 
in sustaining a centrist political consensus that incorporates much of the principal political 
groups of “core Europe,” the Christian Democratic or People’s Party, the European Socialists, 
and, to a lesser extent, the European Liberals and Green Party.1 It is also widely celebrated for its 
success in creating a system that reconciled the French and German governments and stabilized 
Europe’s economic and political reconstruction after the cataclysmic period of 1914 to 1945. 
1 The strength of right-wing populist parties makes it possible that they will upend this consensus, but their steady 
rise in recent history is not the subject of this study. 
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The creation of the European Coal & Steel Community in 1952 after the ratifications of 
the Treaty of Paris and its successor, the European Economic Community in 1958, are generally 
considered children of postwar European Christian Democracy. This perception, present in 
public discussions and in scholarship, is correct but the disarray of the Socialist parties in this 
period has lead scholars to overlook how Socialist traditions, policies, and politicians were 
instrumental in the creation of important parts of the early Community’s features, as well as in 
channeling the European integration process away from areas that conflicted with some 
Socialists’ ideals, such as the European Defense Community, which failed to pass the French 
National Assembly in 1954. Here I examine the processes of policy formation and the 
transnational relations of the socialist parties of the two largest states of the early Community, 
the Section française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) or French Socialist Party and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) or German Social Democratic Party. I consider 
how the European integration process at times engendered an estrangement and, at other times, a 
reconciliation between the two parties and, in turn, how the Socialist parties themselves 
contributed at times to the estrangement, but more often to the reconciliation process that 
developed between the French and German governments and their peoples. 
In this introduction, I lay out the argument of this dissertation by placing it in an extended 
conversation with the most prominent literature in the field of European integration studies. The 
European Union has understandably attracted a great amount of scholarly attention due to its 
unique design and wide ambitions. In turn, scholars have long been fascinated by European 
socialism, though the European policies of the socialist parties have attracted less attention. 
Though the role of the SFIO and SPD in the early European integration is not terra nova, my 
combination of a transnational approach and attention to how continuities in the Socialist parties’ 
policies in concrete fields (heavy industry, defense policy, trade liberalization, etc.) influenced 
the parties’ participation in the creation (and rejection) of specific supranational European 
institutions allows me to offer an original account.  My intention is to revise existing scholarly 
narratives on the French Socialist and German Social Democratic roles in these processes that 
were often constructed before the relevant historical archives opened. As my account makes 
clear, at times historical arguments, like institutions, have developed their own forms of path 
dependency. 
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 1.1 FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN 
POSTWAR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN HISTORICAL ARGUMENT AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This study draws from a range of scholarly approaches to European integration, many of which 
are inspired by political science and sociological methodologies. A subject as important as the 
modern European Union encourages a diversity of methodological approaches but this has also 
created a field of research in which scholars from varying academic traditions needlessly 
polemicize with one another, dismiss each other’s conclusions without engaging in serious 
analysis, or simply ignore each other’s existence. Interdisciplinary research on European 
integration continues to face the challenge of moving from rhetoric to effective practice. Often 
this is because methodological differences are encouraged by the high academic walls erected by 
real pressures for disciplinary conformity, but also because many scholars also share the 
premises and world-views of their respective camps. Certain ontological and epistemological 
orthodoxies within political science are heretical to many historians, many of whom have been 
nurtured in the “cultural turn” that has so affected historical research since the 1980s.  
Historians of European integration have struggled to design research projects that 
successfully address, and hence evoke the interest of, the interdisciplinary audience of European 
integration studies and historians of contemporary Europe on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
detailed, at times monumental, tomes and edited volumes emerging from historians in the 1970s 
to the early 2000s, almost all of whom are based in Europe, have elicited only scant attention 
from political scientists, mostly working in the United States, whose primary interests are testing 
and contesting grand theories. Andrew Moravscik’s and Craig Parsons’ work here represents 
important, though only partial, exceptions. The differences in narrative technique, scope, and 
attention to minutiae between historical, political science, and sociological scholarships have 
encouraged the creation of a cacophonic field of research. In turn, modern political theory tends 
to make “political outcomes a function of three primary factors: the distribution of preferences 
(interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources (powers), and the constraints 
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imposed by the rules of the game (constitution).”2 In such a conception, history hardly plays any 
role at all.  
Yet these differences at time conceal ontological commonalities that the diplomatic and 
economic historians who have dominated historical studies of European integration share with 
researchers with a training and research agenda rooted in International Relations theory. Hence 
both political scientists and historians from the 1970s through the early 2000s, despite their 
different approaches, generally examine European integration through a “realist” lens that 
considers politics an arena in which states, politicians, and economic actors rationally pursue 
their interests. This has insulated an older generation of European integration historians from 
their younger disciplinary counterparts, who have largely abandoned realist approaches to 
understanding historical change. At the same time, the emergence in political science and 
sociology of constructivist and historical institutionalist approaches to European integration 
studies offers the possibility of bridging the gap between more widely accepted historical 
research approaches and the interdisciplinary literature on European integration studies. Recent 
rapprochements between younger historians and constructivists, though, risk isolating historical 
research within the wider interdisciplinary field. It is unlikely that the dominating paradigm 
within International Relations, which is steeped in various realist traditions, will accept historians 
crowning as victor a minority approach within their field. It is not the ambition of this 
dissertation to do so.  
The varying intra- and inter-disciplinary approaches or theories of European integration, 
however, do each elucidate an aspect or aspects of short- and long-term change and stability in 
the European Communities. The interdisciplinary cacophony is in part the consequence of the 
challenge of conceptualizing and analyzing complex social and political phenomena. The 
practitioners of each approach can successfully point to developments that seem to reflect the 
validity of their methodology and its superiority to its competitors. Though I have my own 
disciplinary and methodological preferences, my research draws upon and benefits from 
ontologies the presumptions of which I reject because they nevertheless assist me in 
understanding some of the processes that I examine. In the discussion below, I address a number 
of these methodologies, analyze the ways in which they assist my research agenda, and consider 
2 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” The 
American Political Science Review 78, 3 (1984): 739. 
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how my findings seem to point to some of the limitations of established methodologies in 
European integration research. After doing so, I discuss why I turn to concepts and 
methodologies that are just beginning to emerge within history to construct an original argument 
about the sources of French Socialist and German Social Democratic policy in the early stages of 
the European integration process.  
The primary foci of the scholarly debates on European integration have been meta-
questions that seek to explain the evolution of the European Communities as a whole. Such 
questions only partially intersect with my agenda because the bulk of my work examines the 
origins, rather than the development, of the European integration process. Specifically, I address 
the role of two political parties within these processes, rather than the policies of the member 
states’ governments in general, whether understood as “unitary actors” or fragmented into 
factions based on interests and world-views. One argument of this dissertation is that the SFIO 
and SPD played larger and more influential roles in the early European integration process than 
is generally recognized by scholars, but this is not my primary focus. Rather, I am interested in 
explaining the driving forces in the two parties’ processes of policy formation on European 
integration questions, examining how the policies of both were at times mutually constituted, and 
considering how they interacted with the parties’ wider political goals, ambitions, and world-
views.  
Though I write of the actions or policies of the SFIO and SPD, as this work makes clear, I 
do not consider them to be unitary actors, nor do I consider the French or German governments 
to have been or to be unitary actors. In fact, a primary finding of this dissertation is that not only 
were the parties not unitary actors, but in a number of important cases factions of one party 
shared more in common with the vision and policies represented by the official position of the 
other party than they did with their own party leadership. When I write that the “SFIO did” or the 
“SPD argued,” I do so to simplify what would otherwise be a burdensome narration. I intend this 
phraseology to mean the party policies as set out in resolutions of party congresses, formally the 
sovereign institutions within the two parties, in meetings of the party executives, formally 
charged with interpreting how to enact congressional resolutions but which often crafted their 
own policies, and in meetings of the parties’ parliamentary factions, which at times competed 
with the party executives in an attempt to carve out an independent voice in the parties’ affairs, 
as was particularly the case in the French Socialist Party.  
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The unitary actor thesis has strong support in International Relations theory. Though the 
term is a neologism of the twentieth century, it picks up on a presumption that has guided much 
of historical research since its inception. The term premises a Hobbesian international arena in 
which cohesive states rationally pursue geopolitical objectives in competition with one another. 
Much of diplomatic history reflects this view, in part because its primary source base often 
captures governments’ foreign policies after they had already been crafted and hence overlooks 
asymmetric domestic contests the outcome of which are cemented in governmental policies. 
Some scholars highlight the importance of Cold War and other balance of power considerations 
to argue that European union was a geopolitical imperative of the postwar era.3  
No doubt the potentially apocalyptic geopolitical uncertainty following the Second World 
War was a structural factor that contributed to the launch of the European integration process. 
With the exclusion of the French Communist Party (PCF), there was a domestic political 
consensus in France by 1949 that a large U.S. and British troop presence on the European 
continent was necessary to deter the Soviet Union, which maintained an overwhelming 
conventional military advantage in Europe. In addition, recent revisionist accounts in diplomatic 
history, as discussed in chapter four, argue that many important French officials in the Foreign 
Office and military came to view the potential Soviet threat to French security as greater than the 
German threat far earlier than what had been the scholarly consensus of an older generation of 
diplomatic historians. However, these more recent “realist” depictions at times rely on a 
questionable reading of sources and exaggerate the degree to which the “German question” lost 
valiance within the internal politics of the French Fourth Republic. There is also a normative 
tendency at work in this scholarship that depicts West German rearmament to counter the Soviet 
military advantage in Europe to be the “rational” and hence, superior, policy to that of 
emotionally-driven politicians and officials who fretted about the potential threat of German 
rearmament to West German democracy and to the stability of the western alliance. This is the 
case not only in the treatment of French politics, but also in the scholarship on the SPD, which 
realist scholars often treat as an irreconcilable nuisance to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s 
realistic appreciation of the necessity of binding West Germany to the western alliance to ensure 
3 Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” 
Daedalus 95, 3 (1966): 862-915. See also, Michael Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The 
Geopolitical Imperative (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).  
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West German security and to reconstruct the bases for German sovereignty. Nevertheless, not 
only government officials but French Socialists and German Social Democrats also worried 
about the capabilities and intentions of their massive neighbor to the east, and this did affect their 
policies on defense, though their perception of the geopolitics of the early Cold War also led 
them at times into conflict with their governments and with one another.  
Perhaps more compelling have been realist arguments rooted in economic imperatives. In 
the following chapter, I argue that the French Socialist Party considered an economic balance of 
power between France and West Germany to be a constitutive part of French security. This 
argument would come as no surprise to Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik, each of whom 
places economics at the center of their analyses.  In their accounts, the governments that formed 
the European Economic Community negotiated in terms that would be understood by scholars 
who focus on the dynamics of inter-state bargaining. The governments of France, Germany and 
the other member states brought their national economic interests to international negotiations 
and institutions, and the deals that they made represented optimal outcomes for the participants.  
In Milward’s view, rational and able mid-level bureaucrats correctly assessed the economic 
challenges of the postwar era and, in international negotiations with their counterparts, built a 
European system that “rescued the nation-state” by supranationalizing policy fields that could 
not be adequately addressed at the national level.4  
Moravcsik constructs a more complex picture of the driving forces of European 
integration. More so than Milward, he sees the domestic sphere as a setting of conflict between 
various economic interest groups. His theory of liberal intergovernmentalism posits that national 
preferences are derived from a competition among these domestic interest groups, the outcome 
of which reflects “primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and 
secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions.”5 National 
governments then bring these domestically-produced preferences to intergovernmental 
negotiations. The resulting treaties between the states reflect the varying weight of each state’s 
bargaining power. Like Milward, Moravcsik argues that states cede sovereignty reluctantly and 
only do so after a careful cost-benefit analysis. The supranational authorities constructed by the 
intergovernmental negotiations that have so defined the European integration process are the 
4 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992). 
5 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 3. 
7 
 
                                                          
result of the member states’ determination to have binding “credible commitments” that the other 
states cannot back-slide and will be forced, if necessary, to fulfill the obligations to which they 
agreed in the intergovernmental negotiations. Moravcsik theorizes about the origins and content 
of the most important treaties as “critical junctures” that have marked the European integration 
process from the Treaties of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. His purpose is to analyze 
large-scale, purposeful changes to the European integration system rather than to make claims 
about the internal functioning of the institutions set up by the treaties. 
I have learned much from Milward and Moravcsik, and the reader will notice their 
influence in this text. Milward’s work demonstrates how material shortages of raw materials, in 
particular of coal, became determining factors in the foreign policies of European governments 
after the Second World War. A struggle over raw material supplies for European reconstruction 
played an important role in the dispute that broke out between the French Socialist and German 
Social Democratic parties, and contributed to their inability to craft a common socialist policy 
towards the Schuman Plan. In addition, Milward provides an excellent analysis of how the 
western European governments’ chronic dollar deficits created persistent economic pressures on 
the governments to devise a medium-term economic policy that would restructure their nations’ 
foreign trade patterns away from dependency on the United States and towards some sort of 
European preferential trade arrangement.6 However, Milward provides a static, somewhat 
anachronistic portrait of inter-state bargaining that does not adequately explain why European 
leaders opted to erect a supranational set of institutions to achieve goals that could perhaps have 
been attained through more traditional forms of international cooperation.  
Moravcsik’s study encouraged me to conceptualize governmental policies as an 
interactive process of exchange between producer groups and policymakers. In a sense, 
Moravscik fills in some of the loose ends left by Milward by designating precisely those interest 
groups that governments needed to defend or promote in order to attain their macroeconomic 
goals. Nonetheless Moravcsik’s work leaves the reader perplexed as to exactly why the French 
government, which was the most reluctant of all negotiating governments to engage in a binding 
system of trade liberalization, decided to sign the Treaties of Rome. Moravcsik also freely admits 
that his theory does not apply to the creation of the European Coal & Steel Community. Hence 
6 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
1984). 
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he leaves the origins of the process open to debate and focuses instead on the dynamics pushing 
the process forward. It was only when I read Matthias Kipping’s excellent book that I came to 
appreciate the political-economic importance attained in French politics by French steel-
transforming industries, such as machine-tools and automobiles, which, unlike in West Germany, 
were engaged in a domestic war with French steel producers.7 Kipping fills some of the gaps left 
open by Moravcsik, but his study ends in 1952. In addition, a team of historians has scrutinized 
Moravcsik’s influential study and called attention to significant problems in his citations and 
references to primary source materials, which has cast a pale over his work in the eyes of many 
historians, for whom a close critical reading of primary sources is a prerequisite for assessing a 
work’s scholarly validity.8  
These geopolitical and economic accounts both pre-suppose the existence of a “national 
interest” that leaders correctly perceive and act upon. The “national interest” in their view is 
fixed, given, and leaders’ merits or demerits result from their capacity to understand, promote, 
and defend it. Moravcsik’s theory is only a partial exception because, though the national interest 
may be domestically contested, governments are generally responding to the domestic balance of 
power between economic interest groups. Mark A. Pollock has noted “signs of a convergence 
around a single rationalist model which assumes fixed preferences and rational behavior among 
all actors in the EU (including individuals as well as member governments and supranational 
organizations)” that has made the rationalist approach “the dominant approach to the study of 
European integration in international relations theory...”9 Some political scientists, while 
accepting much of the premise of this approach, offer certain qualifications. George Tsebelis and 
Geoffrey Garrett, for instance, have argued that, “If actors operate under complete information 
(that is, they know all relevant information about each other), they will design institutions that 
best promote their preferences—subject to the constraints that every other actor will behave 
similarly.”10  
7 Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen 
Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
8 Robert S. Lieshout, Mathieu L. Segers, and Johanna Maria van der Vleuten, “De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The 
Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 6, 4 (2004): 89-139. 
9 Mark A. Pollock, “International Relations Theory and European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 
39, 2, (2001): 222. 
10 George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and 
Supranationalism in the European Union,” International Organization, 55, 2, (2001): 386. 
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Milward’s “European rescue of the nation-state,” Moravcsik’s theory of liberal 
internationalism, and the reassertion of realism in European integration scholarship emerged in 
large part as a critique of neofunctionalist theories of European integration formulated as 
contemporary analyses of the impulses that led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome.11 Political 
scientist Ernst B. Haas applied sociological theories to the study of the young supranational 
community. In Haas’ analysis, sectoral integration develops internal dynamics that push the 
actors involved in the process to support a further extension of integration into neighboring 
policy fields, a process called spill-over. His form of neofunctionalism de-emphasizes the role of 
states and formal politics in favor of civil society actors and technocrats whose supranational 
entrepreneurship combines with feedback between sectors to, in effect, compel the regional 
integration process forward regardless of the wishes or intent of the national governments. James 
G. March and Johan P. Olsen write that a functionalist approach is “inclined to see history as an 
efficient mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria [and is] less concerned with the 
possibilities for maladaptation and non-uniqueness in historical development.”12  
Though Haas and his successors present a more nuanced and rigorous theorization than 
traditional functional analyses, neofunctionalism still tends towards teleology. There is a 
predictive logic inherent to the theory (as there is in most political science theories), and Haas’ 
presentation gave to the expansion of supranational governance and the Community’s areas of 
competence an air of inevitability that was in large part shattered by subsequent events, as Haas 
subsequently admitted. Theories of European integration have evolved in a dialectical 
relationship with changing contemporary forms of integration and scholars’ and policymakers’ 
perceptions of these changes. His theory therefore suffered as a consequence of the perceived 
stalling of the European integration process in the 1960-1970s.  
Nonetheless, I find Haas theory quite fruitful in my examination in chapter five of the 
interaction of the Socialist parties in the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel 
Community. My analysis suggests the possibilities and limitations of a neofunctionalist theory of 
European integration. While a spill-over dynamic did indeed occur in widening the scope of 
Socialist parties’ policy proposals, which by 1955 called for an extension of the Community to 
11 For a useful overview of neofunctionalism and the literature on European integration up to 1995, see James A. 
Caporaso and John T. S. Keeler, “The European Union and Regional Integration Theory,” in Carolyn Rhodes and 
Sonia Mazey, eds., The State of the European Union, Vol. 3, Building a European Polity? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: 1995): 29-62. 
12 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism,” 735-37. 
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cover all fields of energy production and to expand the executive’s power into social policy, 
these reflected in part pre-existing ideological commitments. In addition, the parties’ ambitions 
were only partly satisfied through collaboration with the supranational High Authority executive 
body. Under Socialist pressure, the High Authority did gingerly step into the realm of the 
Community’s social policy as advocated by the Socialists, but it also evoked restraints codified 
in its founding Treaty as well as opposition from some of the member-state governments to 
claim an impotence to pursue many of the Socialists’ stated objectives.  
In part as a result of a relance of European integration in the 1980-1990s, 
neofunctionalism has experienced a revival in European integration studies. Perhaps the most 
promising theory to emerge based in part on neofunctionalist reasoning has been historical 
institutionalism. Scholars have increasingly focused on the role that institutions play in politics 
and society because their number and powers have considerably expanded over the last century. 
Such a focus is most fruitful in the field of European integration studies because the “EU has 
become the most highly institutionalized international organization in history...”13 Peter A. Hall 
and Rosemary C. R. Taylor define institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy.”14  They argue that an institutional perspective views “the institutional organization of 
the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and 
generating distinctive outcomes.”15 Institutionalists unite around an argument that institutions 
play a causative role in political and economic life, but they then divide over methodologies 
based on rational choice, sociological, and historical approaches. 
13 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International 
Organization 52, 4 (1998): 967-68. 
14 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political 
Studies XLIV, (1996): 938. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen write that, “In a general way, an ‘institution’ can be 
viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of 
actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of 
interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them. 
Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it possible for 
individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and sanction those who 
wander from proper behavior.” Ibid., 948. 
15 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 937. Tsebelis and Garrett give a more 
expansive definition. They write that, “Since institutions determine the sequence of moves, the choices of actors, 
and the information that they control, different institutional structures affect the strategies of actors and hence the 
outcomes of their interactions. Consequently, institutions can be studied as independent variables...to see how they 
influence outcomes, or as dependent variables to see how particular institutions are chosen.” Tsebelis and Garrett, op 
cit., 384-85. 
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Political scientist Paul Pierson coined the term historical institutionalism as an alternative 
theory of the dynamics driving European integration to Moravcsik’s theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.16  The basis for the theory is Pierson’s claim that, after an institution has 
been created, there develops “significant divergences between the institutional and policy 
preferences of member states and the actual functioning of institutions and policies,” which 
Pierson calls “gaps.” Over time, these gaps allow supranational actors autonomy to pursue their 
own policies, which then develop a “path dependency” that combines with the investments that 
governments have already made in erecting the institutions (“sunk-costs”) to “lock-in” certain 
policies and make it difficult for the member states to alter institutional forms and practices. 
Historical institutionalism shares with neofunctionalism a view that “unintended consequences,” 
“learning,”17 and “spill-over” are internal to the European integration process. Unlike the realist 
and neofunctionalist approaches outlined above, though, theorists inspired by historical 
institutionalism make change over time and an attention to the influence of historical 
developments integral components of their analyses. Pierson’s “gaps” result in part due to “the 
short time horizons of decision makers [and] the prospect of shifting member-state policy 
preferences” that constrain the ability of the member states to control the Community’s 
institutions. His theory also breaks with neofunctionalism by not positing a “zero-sum game” 
between the member-state governments and supranational institutions for power. Rather, it 
blends well with recent advances in European integration studies that focus on the EU polity as a 
system of multi-level governance.18  In a sense, historical institutionalism, like neofunctionalism, 
de-politicizes history, but it is a much more flexible methodology capable of borrowing 
approaches and influences from other fields of scholarship.19  However, the theory, while quite 
compelling, is only marginally relevant to this study because the dynamics that it analyzes come 
into play only after the creation of the institutions the origins of which are my focus of study. 
Nonetheless, I do see the dynamics that it posits at work, in part, within the Common Assembly 
of the European Coal & Steel Community, in particular in the ability of actors, in this case 
16 Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative Political 
Studies 29, 2 (1996): 123-63. 
17 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism,” 745. 
18 For a seminal work on the theory of multi-level governance, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level 
Governance and European Integration (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2001). 
19 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 942. 
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German Social Democrats, to “learn” and adapt to an institutional environment that turned out to 
be quite different from the negative image conjured in SPD critiques of the Treaty of Paris.  
Historical institutionalism’s focus on the impact of institutional rules and norms, and its 
openness to incorporate the impact of “socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas” 
has presented an opening for an intellectual cross-fertilization with recent constructivist 
approaches emerging in political science that challenge neorealist paradigms. Constructivists 
start with the premise that interests are socially constructed and that ideas play an autonomous 
role in political developments in interaction with “material reality [and] organizational 
arrangements.” Craig Parsons argues that, “Any choice is predicated on assumptions about 
causal relationships, the prioritization of costs and benefits, and the normative legitimacy of 
various actions.” In doing so, Parsons reintroduces a focus on the “ideology of European 
integration” that marked early historical research on European integration.20 This early research, 
epitomized by the work of Walter Lipgens, celebrated the role of the transnational European 
federal movement in encouraging governments to integrate the nations of Western Europe after 
World War II.21 Realists successfully challenged his claims by noting that the European federal 
movement had little impact on the decision-making processes of governing elites, who tended, in 
their view, to mobilize European rhetoric to achieve other goals.  
Parsons offers a more sophisticated analysis of the role of ideas in the origins and 
development of the European project. The basis of his model is a claim that scholars can isolate 
beliefs as causative factors when ideas “cross-cut” political lines of “shared material interests.”22 
He acknowledges that there may be psychological or historical factors to explain why actors 
come to hold certain ideas, but he does not investigate the formulation of ideas.23 Rather, he is 
interested in examining the causative impact that ideas have on political processes after they 
have already become fixed. In propitious circumstances, leaders are able to use their powers to 
set agendas and have recourse to issue linkages and side payoffs to assemble coalitions in favor 
of their ideas. In his account, Christian Democratic French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
and Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet were two such leaders during our period of study. 
Parsons argues that the existence of cross-cutting political coalitions around European 
20 Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 5-9. 
21 Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 1945-47 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
22 Craig Parsons, “Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union,” International Organization 56, 1 
(2002): 48. 
23 Ibid., 51. 
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integration within French politics created the possibility for a supranational solution to the 
problems of the postwar period, and that well-positioned and (to surmise from the tone of his 
book) well-intentioned leaders exercised political will to create a supranational institutional 
structure that reflected their ideas. Hence, it follows that were it not for the power of ideas, 
French politicians likely would have chosen to pursue more traditional forms of interstate 
bargaining and organization.  
Parsons’ assertion that the origins, failures and successes in creating supranational forms 
of European integration can be traced to an ideological battle among federalists, confederalists, 
and traditionalists within French politics that cut across the party structure and cleavages 
between right and left is an ambitious and compelling argument. His focus on the importance of 
Mollet, a figure who is often overlooked compared to Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, is a 
welcome and appropriate contribution to the literature on the policy of the postwar French 
government. Like Moravcsik, Parsons covers a fifty-year span of history and his account, again 
like Moravcsik’s, is ahistorical in its methodology, if not also in its presumptions. In addition to 
some factual errors (Léon Blum died in March 1950 and could not have opposed the Schuman 
Plan), there are deep flaws in Parsons’ analysis. For instance, the SFIO did not oppose 
“liberalization” if by that Parsons means trade liberalization.24 He also underestimates 
ideological cohesion within the French Christian Democratic Party, the Mouvement républicain 
populaire (MRP), as Wolfram Kaiser has pointed out.25 More importantly, one gains the 
impression that Parsons forces historical actors into ideological straitjackets that many of them 
would not have recognized. Hence Parsons neatly divides French Socialists (and the other French 
parties) into federalists, confederalists, and traditionalists without exploring the range of factors 
affecting individuals’ motivations. He assigns people to ideological factions based on their votes 
on each treaty. If one is to maintain his thesis, it would be necessary also to explain why some 
people moved from supporting one treaty to opposing another. While side payoffs and issue 
linkages can account for some of these individuals’ shifts, this needs to be empirically 
demonstrated, not simply asserted.  
Parsons is certainly correct that trans-party coalitions formed on European integration 
treaties and that cooperation of actors across party lines was a prerequisite for the creation of the 
24 Ibid., 70. 
25 Ibid., 61-62. 
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European Economic Community. For instance, the “federalist” Radical President René Coty 
selected his “federalist” counterpart Guy Mollet to be Prime Minister in January 1956 over a 
more popular candidate, the “confederalist” Pierre Mendès-France. The “federalist” Guy Mollet 
then selected a fellow “federalist,” Maurice Faure of the Radical Party, to lead negotiations for 
the Treaties of Rome. Without these trans-party ideological affinities on European integration, 
the French government may well not have agreed to the creation of the European Economic 
Community. However, Parsons’ portrayal lacks depth and complexity, and presents a superficial 
over-simplification of the French Fourth Republic at odds with the historical record.  
First, it is not true that, “Prior to 1947, French elites across the political spectrum shared a 
fairly stable consensus on a traditional model of European policies, aimed at dismembering 
vanquished Germany, building military and economic alliances to balance German power, and 
defending French sovereignty.”26 Here Parsons should examine again Lipgens’ older account of 
European integration, which highlights how French Socialists and others explicitly rejected this 
“consensus” during the war and in the immediate postwar period.27 Second, to claim that, “These 
[by which he seems to mean all] actors uniformly described their debates as ideological,” is 
questionable.28 It seems to retrospectively lend credence to the argument of “federalists” who 
accused their opponents of being anti-European in an effort to de-legitimize their arguments 
against specific treaties.  
Most importantly, Parsons does not consider how ideas intersect not only with material 
interests and institutional constraints, but also with other ideas. One gains the impression from 
his book that the question of Europe was the only, or at least the primary, ideological battle 
occurring within France in the 1950s. Colonial issues, Cold War politics, and other matters of 
domestic dispute become secondary in the political process; they were addressed through payoffs 
and issue linkages. A tendency towards European myopia leads Parsons to fail to address the real 
causes of division in the French Socialist Party, within which there was a battle between different 
sets of ideas that each had their own logics and histories, and hence also constituted autonomous 
factors in the political process. For Parsons’ model to be correct, he would have to also 
investigate how other ideas, such as conceptions of the trajectory of German democracy and 
26 Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 23 
27 Walter Lipgens, “Innerfranzösische Kritik an der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944-1946,” Vierteljahrhefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 24, 2 (1976): 136-198. 
28 Parsons, “Showing Ideas as Causes,” 65. 
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perceptions of the Soviet Union, cross-cut established political coalitions while others did not. 
Then he would have to consider how his cross-cutting ideological coalitions on European 
integration interacted with cross-cutting (or non-cross-cutting) ideological coalitions based on 
other issues. Hence, Parsons hardly addresses concerns about West German democratic stability 
within French politics even though this was a central axis around which the political debate 
revolved.  
Parsons also claims that there were 70 “confederalists” among the French Socialist 
deputies during the debates on the European Defense Community. He describes them as 
“confederalists” because they “favored plans [for defense integration] within two weak 
organizations under Franco-British direction.”29 The problem with this argument is that many of 
these figures shared a preference with most Socialist “federalists” and even “traditionalists” for a 
strong organization under Franco-British direction. Quite often, as I demonstrate, French 
Socialists agreed on their ideal vision. Disputes broke out when they could not gain their 
maximum objectives. In such cases, they had to choose between options that placed certain ideas 
that they supported, supranational institutions for instance, against other ideas that they also 
supported, like British membership. Mollet, a “federalist” in 1956 due to his support for the 
EEC, was a “confederalist” in 1950 due to his insistence on British participation as a condition 
for his party’s approval of the Schuman Plan. It is perhaps a dubious proposition to “isolate the 
ideational filter from its contexts,” though I recognize that this is necessary for Parsons’ claims 
to be falsifiable and convince political scientists of the vigor of his model. However, Parsons 
also isolates ideas from other ideas, which then exit (or never enter) the picture, and here his 
model breaks down.  
Recently, a younger generation of European integration scholars, including Wolfram 
Kaiser, Michael Gehler, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, has sought to overcome the 
interdisciplinary divide between political science and history by pairing a pragmatic use of social 
science theories with the close textual and contextual analyses intrinsic to history as a discipline. 
Wolfram Kaiser has called for a conversation between “theory-sensitive historians and history-
sensitive political scientists” on the origins and trajectory of European integration. Whereas 
Parsons assigns causation to domestic cross-cutting ideological coalitions, Kaiser argues that 
transnational networks have played “a crucial controlling role in the process of European 
29 Ibid., 59-60. 
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integration...”30 He and others draw on the work of Manuel Castells on networks to claim that 
transnational networks predated the creation of European institutions and that, without their prior 
existence, the European integration process would likely not have led to the creation of the 
strong institutional structure embodied in today’s European Union.31 These scholars encourage 
European integration scholars to examine the “growth and character of the transnational political 
society in the making.”32  
Kaiser’s research intersects well with “multi-level governance” theories that have 
emerged in political science to explain policymaking in the modern EU, but Kaiser argues that 
elements of this system predate scholars’ focus on the 1980-90s. Networks allow a “transfer of 
ideas and policy solutions between national and sub-national actors below the supranational 
level” through an informal political process that often includes non-state actors operating within 
multiple institutional contexts that are far more flexible than formal political structures, which 
are based on hierarchical systems and power struggles.33 He argues that the creation of Christian-
Democratic networks facilitated the building of “social trust in the form of normative-emotional 
bonds between [transnational] party elites” that allowed them “to define common policy 
objectives”34 based on a “shared social system for interpreting the world.”35 Through 
transnational contact in informal settings, Christian Democrats were able to learn about and 
empathize with the domestic challenges facing their counterparts in other nations, and to 
mobilize their transnational alliances to strengthen their position within their domestic spheres. 
Kaiser’s work offers a promising path forward for historians disillusioned with the 
cognitive dissonance that often marks interdisciplinary European integration research and with a 
30 Wolfram Kaiser, “Transnational Networks in European governance: The informal politics of integration,” in 
Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen, eds., The History of the European Union: Origins of a 
trans- and supranational polity 1950-72 (Oxen: Routledge, 2009), 13; Wolfram Kaiser, “History meets Politics: 
Overcoming Interdisciplinary Volapük in Research on the EU,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, 2 (2008): 
300-313. 
31 Wolfram Kaiser, “Plus ça change? Diachronic Change in Networks in European Integration Governance,” in 
Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, eds., Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: 
Governing Europe 1945-83 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Wolfram Kaiser, “Co-operation of 
European Catholic Politicians in Exile in Britain and the USA during the Second World War,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 35 (2000): 439-464.  
32 Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, “Origins of a European polity: A new research agenda 
for European Union history,” in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen, eds., The History of the 
European Union, 4. 
33 Kaiser, “Transnational Networks in European governance,” 17. 
34 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
35 Kaiser, “Transnational Networks in European governance,” 21. 
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historiography overly reliant on antiquated state-centric presumptions. In this dissertation, I seek 
to examine how transnational contacts between French Socialists and German Social Democrats 
shared some of the features of the Christian-Democratic networks analyzed by Kaiser, but I also 
explicitly address the question as to why they tended to be less successful in crafting common 
policies. Here I pick up on avenues of research suggested by Kaiser and associated historians. 
Kaiser’s recognition of “multiple actor identities” breaks with Parsons’ rigid system of 
categorization, and helps scholars to conceptualize historical actors as three-dimensional beings 
who are at times forced to make decisions between competing priorities that tug at varying 
aspects of their identity.36 In addition, I take up his suggestion that historians “re-conceptualize 
the possibly fundamental impact of collective experiences that have the potential of uniting 
people of the same generation, class, confession, or political belief across borders...”37  
In this dissertation, I argue that an analysis of SFIO and SPD responses to early European 
integration initiatives indicates that there was a postwar generation of SFIO and SPD leaders 
who were informed by similar experiences rooted in memories, policy proposals, and outcomes 
from the interwar period, who formulated similar visions of the postwar period that drew upon 
already existing socialist ideology and narratives, and who were at crucial moments perplexed as 
to how to respond to dilemmas that placed different socialist objectives in conflict with one 
another.38 I am following in part on the recent work by Talbot Imlay, who considers Socialists a 
“counter-society to the one dominated by states” in the postwar period.  Imlay defines a counter-
society “as a distinct group whose members developed organized and persistent patterns of 
relations with one another that, viewed as a whole and over time, offered an alternative social 
model.”39 When devising proposals and responding to policies generated by other parties on 
European integration, French Socialists and German Social Democrats considered the potential 
repercussions of supranational institutions not only for processes of French-German 
reconciliation, but also for a wide range of domestic, geopolitical, economic, and at times 
36 Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, “Transnational Networks in European Integration 
Governance: Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon,” in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael 
Gehler, eds., Transnational Networks in Regional Integration, 9. 
37 Kaiser, “Transnational Networks in European governance,” 19-20. 
38 Here I follow Alain Bergounioux in arguing that age, while a factor, need not be the only factor defining a 
generation, but rather that a generation can be defined by a modification of its social composition or, in this case, the 
ideology and “mental universe” of its members. Alain Bergounioux, “Générations socialistes?,” Vingtième Siècle. 
Revue d’histoire 22 (1989): 93-102. 
39 Talbot Imlay, “Exploring What Might Have Been: Parallel History, International History, and Post-War Socialist 
Internationalism,” The International History Review 31, 3 (2009): 524, 529. 
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regional party objectives. I also emphasize the importance that experts in the parties gained over 
areas within their fields of knowledge, including industrial, defense, scientific, agricultural and 
trade policy. I consider these individuals’ expertise to be autonomous factors as well in the 
development of party policies, but also point to how their advice at times reflected general 
ideological trends or narratives within the parties. Ideologies of European integration interacted 
with and at times came into contradiction with other ideologies, forcing Socialists to make 
choices between competing priorities. This was the case more often for Socialists than Christian 
Democrats in the early postwar period in part because they were less likely to be directing 
government policy.  
Much of the scholarship on socialist internationalism emphasizes the superficiality of the 
parties’ commitments to this principle and claims that it generally constituted little more than a 
reflexive rhetorical exercise.40 The starting point for such a view is a focus on the polemics on 
first-order issues that broke out among the various parties. Indeed polemics were important 
features of inter-socialist relations and there were at times severe crises of trust between the 
parties’ leaderships that do not seem to have had a parallel in the smaller transnational network 
of Christian Democrats analyzed by Kaiser. In addition, unlike the case for the Christian 
Democrats, these parties often represented domestic or electoral burdens for their fraternal party, 
which in part de-incentivized their efforts to come to consensus. However, as this dissertation 
demonstrates, conflict between the parties was paralleled by conflicts within the parties. Scholars 
to date have overlooked how the minority view in one party often shared the assumptions, logic, 
and viewpoint of the majority of the other party. That transnational cross-party coalitions 
emerged despite formidable obstacles suggests that it is proper to think in terms of a single 
generation of postwar French Socialists and German Social Democrats who, despite their 
40 Guillaume Devin, L’Internationale socialiste: Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945-1990), 
(Paris: Presse de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993); Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und 
Internationalismus: Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas, 1944-1950  (Stuttgart: Dt. 
Verlag-Anst., 1977); and Rudolf Steininger, Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg: Die deutsche Frage, die Internationale und das Problem der Wiederaufnahme der SPD auf den 
internationalen sozialistischen Konferenzen bis 1951, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Labour Party (Bonn: 
Neue Gesellschaft, 1979).  Nicolas Dohrmann, on the other hand, demonstrates how the SPD used its networks and 
contacts with SPD figures, who had spent time in France, to gain SFIO support to free SPD POWs after the war, and 
to aid other SPD goals. In this and in other areas, Dohrmann shows that socialist internationalism was alive and well 
after the war as a functioning and supportive international network. Nicolas Dohrmann, “Les relations entre la SFIO 
et le SPD dans l’immédiat après-guerre (1945-1953),” dissertation, Écoles des chartes, 2003.  Talbot Imlay criticizes 
this older scholarly consensus as well. Talbot Imlay, “‘The policy of social democracy is self-consciously 
internationalist’: The SPD’s Internationalism after 1945,” Journal of Modern History 86, 1 (2014). 
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disagreements with each other and among themselves, tended to ask similar questions, to make 
reference to similar narratives and traditions, and to face similar dilemmas when ideas and 
objectives important to Socialist goals and identities came into contradiction. Hence quite often 
Socialists agreed on a set of (in)dependent objectives, but then came into conflict over which 
objective to prioritize over others when they had to to set concrete policies for developments 
over which they often had only partial control or influence.  
That such processes of transnational exchange and contact did not always result in a 
consensus between the party leaderships does not mean that such processes were not occurring, 
though it does suggest that the parties’ commitment to socialist internationalism needs to be 
weighed in the context of other party objectives as well as contextualized within the institutional 
constraints of their domestic spheres. They also have to be contextualized within the economic 
and geopolitical constraints of an increasingly globalizing economy in the context of a Cold War 
between East and West. It is the objective of this dissertation to do just that, so as to provide a 
holistic analysis of the ideas, experiences, and constraints within which French Socialists and 
German Social Democrats set policies on European integration initiatives from 1948 to 1957.  
To set the stage for this generational argument about the sources of postwar French 
Socialist and German Social Democratic policy on European integration, it will be useful to 
introduce readers to the parties’ most important figures in the postwar period. That their visions 
and ideas shared so much in common despite wide differences in personal backgrounds and 
experiences (both among individuals within and between the parties) strengthens my thesis that 
their identity as socialists and their conception of the meaning of this identity had a causative 
influence over their designs for and reactions to postwar European integration proposals.  
 
1.2 PROFILES OF LEADING POSTWAR FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND  
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
  
There was a great diversity of personal experiences represented within postwar French Socialist 
and German Social Democratic leadership circles. Below I focus on a group of individuals who 
had the most influence over their parties’ general policies. For specific policy areas, such as 
heavy industry, agriculture, etc., the parties tended to defer to the expertise of individuals who 
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had a wealth of experience in their specific sector. I introduce these actors within the chapters 
themselves in order to have their backgrounds fresh in the minds of the reader.  
Léon Blum and Kurt Schumacher were the most powerful forces in the reconstruction of 
their parties after the Second World War. They could hardly have been more different in 
temperament and background. Born in 1872 into a bourgeois Jewish family, the soft-spoken and 
bookish Blum began his career as a literary and theatrical critic. A great admirer of the German 
romantic poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Blum made his name around the turn-of-the-
century through his lyrical pen. The tumult surrounding the Dreyfus affair politicized Blum and 
galvanized him to identify with France’s splintered socialist movement. Too old to be mobilized 
for the First World War, Blum entered the Union sacrée government as cabinet director of 
Socialist Marcel Sembat’s Ministry of Public Works. When the war ended in 1919, the 
foundational generation of the SFIO had either died (Paul Brousse, Jean Jaurès, Édouard 
Vaillant), were too elderly to lead the party into the postwar era (Jules Guesde, Marcel Sembat), 
or had lost their seats in the nationalist electoral wave of 1919 (Jean Longuet, Ludovic-Oscar 
Frossard). Pierre Renaudel and Albert Thomas, for their parts, had effectively disqualified 
themselves through their continued support of ministerialisme. The party leadership fell to Blum, 
who adopted a centrist position within the SFIO and led an anti-communist resistance against 
advocates of associating with the new Communist International.  
Kurt Schumacher, born in 1895 to a bourgeois Protestant family in Eastern Prussia, was 
twenty-two years Blum’s junior. At the age of eighteen, he volunteered to fight in the First 
World War. Sent to the Eastern front, he had an arm amputated as a result of a gunshot wound. 
After recovering from a life-threatening illness, Schumacher threw himself into the violent world 
of Weimar street politics. By 1924, he had moved to southeastern Germany and was active in 
paramilitary groups associated with the SPD. He became a sensational speaker who, in contrast 
to Blum, relied on short, declarative statements and an aggressive, polemical speaking style. His 
success haranguing audiences gained him national prominence, but he was too young to 
challenge the leadership of the aging SPD of the Weimar era. Vehemently anti-Communist, 
Schumacher pushed an intransigent attitude against concessions to the “bourgeois” parties as 
well. 
Léon Blum was the leader of the party’s parliamentary faction through most of the 
interwar period and became France’s first SFIO, and first Jewish, Prime Minister as the head of a 
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Popular Front government in 1936.41  Through much of the interwar period, his primary focus 
was the preservation of unity within a party that experienced factional infighting and a series of 
schisms. He tended to support SFIO participation in center-left Radical-led governments or 
parliamentary support for Radical governments against a party base insistent that the SFIO 
maintain doctrinal purity. After right-wing riots appeared to threaten the republican government 
in February 1934, Blum steered his party towards an anti-Fascist coalition with left republicans 
and Communists. Riding a wave of excitement, Blum unexpectedly ascended to Prime Minister 
in 1936 as the leader of the strongest party within the Popular Front coalition. As Prime Minister, 
Blum had to balance an ambitious social program fueled by high expectations amidst a wave of 
strikes and social agitation with a steadily deteriorating geopolitical situation, which included the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and rearmament and increased aggression from fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany. Vilified by anti-Semites in the French press, Blum increasingly advocated a 
more bellicose response to Nazi provocations. This stance led him into conflict with the party’s 
secretary-general Paul Faure, who represented the party’s pacifist wing. The battle within the 
SFIO came to a head with the French military defeat against German forces in the Second World 
War. Faure and others adopted a policy of accommodation in the initial stage of Marshall 
Philippe Pétain’s “National Revolution,” while Blum and his supporters opposed the new anti-
democratic French collaborationist government.  
Facing clear danger as prominent political dissidents against the Nazi and Vichy 
dictatorships, Schumacher and Blum both made the conscious decision to remain in their home 
nations. Schumacher went underground in 1933 to help orchestrate clandestine party operations 
until the Gestapo captured him that summer. He spent the next ten years in a concentration camp, 
from which he emerged physically broken in 1943. When the July 1944 coup against Adolf 
Hitler failed, Schumacher found himself again subject to detention but managed to evade the 
authorities until the end of the war. Blum, for his part, was arrested by Vichy authorities in 
September 1940 but was allowed to correspond, to receive visitors, and to read and write. He 
used his time to write À l’Échelle humaine, which became the political testament of the Socialist 
underground. Blum urged Socialists to overcome their suspicions and join Charles de Gaulle’s 
Free French struggle against the Vichy government. After Vichy cut off Blum’s prosecution mid-
41 Some former deputies of the SFIO had already become Prime Minister, but only after having broken with the 
party.  
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trial, Blum wound up in the hands of the Gestapo, which flew him to Germany and placed him 
under house arrest outside of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Transferred to Dachau in the 
final months of the war, Blum was marched to Innsbruck and, as the Nazi empire collapsed, was 
lucky that the Gestapo officers accompanying him decided to allow him to fall into the hands of 
U.S. soldiers.42  
The two men barely survived the war. Many of their Socialist colleagues did not have 
such good fortune. A number of the titans of the interwar SPD had either died in Gestapo 
custody (Rudolf Breitscheid and Rudolf Hilferding) or had died in exile (Otto Wels). Hermann 
Müller died in 1931, in the twilight of the Weimar years. Kurt Schumacher’s energy and drive 
made him the force around which the SPD rallied during its resurrection in 1945-1946. His 
uncompromising struggle against the Nazis, his martyred figure, and his balance of charisma and 
inflexible determination lent him a moral force that few within the reconstituted party could 
challenge.  
Paris welcomed Blum home as a martyr and hero in 1945. However, his advanced age 
and a subterranean struggle between the resistance SFIO and the party at large meant that while 
his was the most authoritative and respected voice within the party, powerful factions arose from 
within to contest his position. The secretary-general of the SFIO, Daniel Mayer, and his 
resistance cohort had constructed the policies of the SFIO resistance under the guiding hand of 
Léon Blum, and looked to him for inspiration.43 Nonetheless, a young, inexperienced and 
relatively unknown figure, Guy Mollet, through a combination of tactical maneuvering and an 
insistence on doctrinal purity, succeeded in placing Blum in the minority at the 1946 party 
congress, and wrested leadership of the party from Daniel Mayer. While the blumiste faction 
continued to be central to the party’s development in the postwar period, supplying ministers, 
expertise, and casting a critical eye on Mollet’s leadership, Mollet was able to secure an 
unprecedented longevity as secretary-general (1946 to 1969) through an alliance with the largest 
party federations.  
In addition to a stint as Prime Minister, Blum’s voluminous editorials for the party organ 
Le Populaire from 1947 to 1950 provided him the opportunity to continue to influence the 
42 For Blum’s biography, see Serge Berstein, Léon Blum (Paris: Fayard, 2006). For Schumacher’s, see Peter 
Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1995).  
43 Daniel Mayer, Les socialistes dans la Résistance: Souvenirs et documents (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1968). 
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party’s positions on foreign and economic policy. Léon Blum died in March 1950. For his part, 
Schumacher suffered a series of illnesses, including an amputation of a leg in 1948, before 
succumbing to tuberculosis in summer 1952. The era of heroic and larger-than-life leaders of the 
SFIO and SPD came to an end with their deaths. Guy Mollet and Schumacher’s second-in-
command, Erich Ollenhauer, stepped into the shoes of two of the giants of twentieth-century 
socialism. To some, they hardly appeared up to the task. Both skilled primarily as internal party 
operators, they lacked the stature and charisma of their predecessors. Their long stints as leaders 
represented a compromise between various wings of the parties.  
Whereas Blum and Schumacher came from social milieus that for the most part kept 
distant from socialist ideas, Mollet and Ollenhauer came from more humble origins. Mollet grew 
up the child of workers in Normandy, and Ollenhauer in the SPD bastion of Magdeburg. They 
embodied the rise of an age cohort that was too young to be mobilized for the First World War. 
Ollenhauer, born in 1901, and Mollet, born in 1906, experienced the war from the vantage points 
of their domestic households. Both of their fathers were mobilized for war. Ollenhauer had to 
take care of his family while his father was at the front. Mollet’s father survived a gas attack and 
returned home a broken man. Mollet then experienced the trauma of watching his father 
deteriorate physically and mentally over the next ten years, an experience that solidified an 
unyielding pacifism within him during the interwar period.  
Mollet conquered his party as a relative outsider in 1946; Ollenhauer in effect inherited 
his party in 1952. Mollet was steeped in local politics and taught English to high school students 
in Arras, a small city in the north of France. He supported pacifist positions and likely favored 
the Munich accords of 1938. Mobilized and captured by German armies in 1940, he was released 
in 1941, was in contact with the Socialist underground resistance by 1942, and had joined a 
paramilitary group in 1943. Sought by the Gestapo in 1944, he went into hiding and was on the 
move for the rest of the occupation period.44  
Ollenhauer, on the other hand, rose through the ranks of the SPD apparatus in the 
interwar period. At the age of nineteen, he was elected to the leading committee of the SPD’s 
youth congress, and was at the center of the European socialist youth movement through the 
1920s. Closely aligned with the SPD’s moderate center, in 1928 he was elected to head the 
44 For Guy Mollet’s biography, see François Lafon, Guy Mollet: Itinéraire d’un socialiste controversé (1905-1975) 
(Paris: Fayard, 2006). 
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SPD’s youth movement. On the eve of the Nazi seizure of power, he joined the SPD Central 
Committee in late April 1933, at the last Central Committee meeting that the SPD held in 
Germany before the party leadership went into exile. Ollenhauer was at the center of the party’s 
activities in exile, residing first in Prague and, after 1938, in France. Due to his role as head of 
the European socialist youth movement, he rubbed shoulders in exile with the principal SPD 
leaders of the Weimar period, including with Otto Wels, Rudolf Hilferding, and Rudolf 
Breitscheid, as well as with international socialists. In addition, he worked closely with Fritz 
Heine, who served as editor and led the exiled party’s correspondence, a task he continued for 
the SPD leadership after the war. Ollenhauer and his family experienced the Nazi bombing raid 
on Paris in 1940, were separated when Erich was taken into police custody, and then reunited in 
the south of France. Through a U.S. diplomatic intermediary, Ollenhauer and his family were 
able to receive permission to escape France through Spain and Portugal, before making their way 
to Great Britain in January 1941. There Ollenhauer remained with the SPD-in-exile for the 
duration of the war. In fall 1945, he travelled back to Germany. He quickly developed a close 
relationship with Schumacher, and became his right-hand man upon his definitive return to 
Germany in February 1946.45  
Ollenhauer and Mollet were rather unremarkable personalities who rose to power through 
a clear understanding of party sensibilities and rank-and-file sentiment. André Philip and Carlo 
Schmid, in contrast, were two of the leading intellectuals of postwar western European socialism. 
They exerted considerable influence in the postwar era, but never felt fully at home within the 
socialist movement. Both were in a sense “heretics” who rejected Marxism, promoted 
cooperation with “bourgeois” parties, and advocated reconciliation between socialism and 
Christianity. They were also two of the most assiduous supporters of the European integration 
process through the entire postwar period. 
Carlo Schmid was born in Perpignan, France, in 1896 to a French mother and a German 
father. Though he moved with his family to southwestern Germany, all of his life he spoke 
French better than German and was an aficionado of French literature. In 1914, he was mobilized 
and served on both the Western and Eastern fronts. After the war he embarked on a career in law 
and received a doctorate in 1923. Though sympathetic with the moderate SPD in the initial 
45 For a biography of Erich Ollenhauer that ends with his return to Germany in 1946, see Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, 
Ollenhauer: Biedermann und Patriot (Berlin: Wolf Siedler, 1984).  
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postwar period, he kept a distance from Weimar politics and seems to have moved somewhat to 
the right, though he was always a steadfast critic of national socialism. He put his services to 
work for the German government’s legal assaults on the Versailles treaty, an effort he later 
regretted. He had a long interest and training in classical studies, and began offering courses at 
Tübingen University, where led him to a career as a professor. His classical training contributed 
to his distinctive speaking style as a SPD politician after WWII. His lyricism, replete with 
references to classical history and littered with ancient Greek and Latin, made his speeches 
among the most learned of the period, which at times elicited frustrated reactions from his 
audience.  
André Philip was born in 1902 in the Gard and then moved to Marseilles as a youth. Too 
young to fight in the First World War, he moved to Paris to pursue university studies at the 
Sorbonne, from which he received a degree in law and philosophy. He was awarded a doctorate 
in law in 1924, and was certified in economics in 1926, which henceforth became his life 
passion. Philip cast a wide gaze on the world, writing economic texts on Great Britain, India, and 
the United States, before turning his attention to Africa and the economic problems of the 
developing world in the 1950s. Like Carlo Schmid, he became a popular professor, working at 
the university in Lyon. In 1936, he was elected to the National Assembly in the Popular Front 
wave. There he was a steadfast supporter of Léon Blum, who valued Philip’s expertise. After 
casting his vote against Pétain’s investiture in 1940, he returned to teaching. Philip plunged 
himself early into the socialist resistance movement, and his activity caught the attention of the 
Gestapo, leading him to flee France and join de Gaulle’s Free French in London. There he 
developed a close friendship with de Gaulle that continued after the war. He played a central role 
in de Gaulle’s war-time entourage and became a leading force within the provisional government 
in exile. He emerged from the war at the center of policymaking on issues of postwar political 
economy.46 
Carlo Schmid, on the other hand, spent most of the war in Lille, where the Nazi 
government appointed him head jurist in the Occupation government headquartered there. Prior 
to his appointment, Schmid had become increasingly isolated within his university before being 
released due to his political views, which were known to oppose national socialism. However, 
46 For André Philip’s biography, see André Philip, André Philip par lui-même ou les voies de la liberté (Paris: 
Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1971). 
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the Nazi government believed his knowledge of international law and French would prove useful 
in the occupation administration. In Lille, Schmid worked subtlety to sabotage the most 
egregious aspects of Nazi occupation. He cultivated ties with resistance groups, warned resisters 
of upcoming arrests, gave secret advice to defendants coming before occupation courts, annulled 
execution orders, and helped a number of Jews obtain false documents. In the final months of the 
war, there was a Gestapo order to murder Schmid, and he went into hiding before successfully 
travelling back to Germany. Upon his return to southwestern Germany, he cultivated ties with 
the French military occupation that gave him the reputation among some as a puppet of the 
French occupation. He became a primary force in the political reconstruction of Baden-
Württemberg. In January 1946, he joined the SPD, and was quickly considered a potential rival 
to Kurt Schumacher.47 
Nonetheless, his efforts on behalf of the French resistance were often unknown within 
Lille, a situation that had the advantage of delaying Gestapo suspicions. It also meant, however, 
that he could not avoid signing execution orders that others had already decided, and he acquired 
a reputation as “the butcher of Lille,” which led him into a personal conflict after the war with 
Guy Mollet, who was active in the resistance movement in the area. In 1949, Mollet went so far 
as to notify the SPD that he would refuse to sit in the same room as Schmid. The SPD leadership 
defended Schmid and the international socialist movement served as a mediator in the conflict, 
exonerating Schmid, who then developed close ties with a number of French socialist leaders.  
Christian Pineau and Herbert Wehner were two fairly prominent figures who first joined 
the socialist parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Their influence 
climbed steadily during the period under study. In the second half of the 1950s, Pineau served for 
several years as French Foreign Minister and Wehner was part of a three-person team that was in 
effect directing the party (with Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler). Pineau was born to a middle-class 
family in the northeast of France in 1904. He graduated with a degree in economics from 
Sciences-po and made a career as a banker during the interwar period in Paris. In 1934, he joined 
the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) trade union and became active in the revolutionary 
47 For Carlo Schmid’s biography, see Petra Weber, Carlo Schmid, 1898-1979: Eine Biographie (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1996). For Schmid’s relationship with the French occupation authorities, see Hellmuth Auerbach, “Die politischen 
Anfänge Carlo Schmids: Kooperation und Konfrontation mit der französischen Besatzungsmacht 1945-1948,” 
Viertelsjahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 36, 4 (1988): 595-648; and Edgar Wolfrum, Französische Besatzungspolitik 
und deutsche Sozialdemokratie: Politische Neuansätze in der “vergessenen Zone” bis zur Bildung des 
Südweststaates 1945-1952 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1991).  
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syndicalist movement, developing close personal ties with CGT leader Léon Jouhaux. Pineau 
was dismissed from his job at the bank Paribas for participating in a strike in 1938. He was close 
to Albert Gazier and Robert Lacoste in the CGT movement, each of whom followed Pineau’s 
path into the SFIO in the postwar period.  
When the Nazi occupation began, Pineau was the primary impetus for the founding of the 
Liberation-Nord resistance network and became the editor of a resistance journal. He secretly 
travelled as a leader of the French resistance to meet with de Gaulle in London. Unlike Philip, 
Pineau’s relationship with de Gaulle was rocky from the outset. In 1942, Pineau left Liberation-
Nord to organize resistance in the Vichy south, where the Gestapo arrested him in 1942. Though 
he escaped, he was arrested again in 1943 and transported to the Buchenwald concentration 
camp. Upon his release with the liberation of the camp in 1945, Pineau was immediately 
appointed to de Gaulle’s cabinet and became a member of the SFIO’s Directing Committee. In 
the following years, he became one of the party’s principal financial experts and was several 
times the President of the National Assembly’s Finance Commission. Though he supported 
Mayer against Mollet for secretary-general in 1946, he quickly became one of Mollet’s most 
important allies within the party. Mollet tapped him to become Foreign Minister in his 1956-57 
government, a position he retained under the coalitional governments that followed Mollet’s fall 
until the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958.48  
Herbert Wehner was born in 1906, a year after Christian Pineau, to a working-class 
family in the heavily social-democratic milieu of Dresden. His father was mobilized for war in 
1914 and returned a changed man. Alcoholism and unemployment haunted his father and 
Wehner found himself having to work a series of odd jobs to help his family while also 
continuing his education. By 1925-26, he was participating in Bohemian reading groups and 
espousing a sectarian form of left anarchism. He shifted course in the late 1920s and became 
active in local communist groups. He joined the German Communist Party (KPD), became a 
steadfast defender of Stalinist Russia, and adopted the KPD’s mantra that the SPD represented a 
form of “social fascism.” In 1930, he was elected to the Saxon parliament and became the 
second-in-command of the regional KPD faction. After narrowly escaping arrest in 1933, 
Wehner organized Communist activity in the Saarland and then spent the rest of the Nazi period 
48 For Pineau’s biography, see Alya Aglan and Denis Lefèbvre, eds., Christian Pineau: De Buchenwald aux Traités 
de Rome (Paris: Editions Bruno Leprince, 2004).  
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in exile. He was elected to the Directing Committee of the exiled party and became a rival of 
Walter Ulbricht, the KPD leader. Against his will he was forced to go to Moscow, where he 
became caught up in the dramatic party purges of the late 1930s. In 1941, he was sent to Sweden 
to organize activities there, but was arrested by the Swedish police and sentenced to hard labor.  
His writings in prison reveal that he had broken with Soviet communism and favored 
alliances with socialists and liberals to create a parliamentary democracy. There was no concrete 
date when Wehner abandoned the Communist Party. Rumors swirled around him that he had 
betrayed his comrades in Moscow and again in Sweden. After his release from prison in 1944, 
Wehner spent the rest of the war in Sweden, a country for which he developed a lifelong 
devotion. Impressed by Schumacher’s speeches over the radio, he successfully sought contact 
with the SPD. After a detailed briefing on his experiences, Schumacher and the SPD leadership 
accepted Wehner into the leadership circle and his influence grew steadily over the course of the 
1950s. He became the party’s principal expert on relations with East Germany and the Soviet 
sphere. Nonetheless, his long career was plagued by continuous accusations about his political 
past, which descended frequently into innuendo and slander.49  
 Despite these figures’ differences in age, background, temperament, and experiences, it is 
the contention of this dissertation that they by and large emerged from the Second World War 
with a similar vision for the postwar world. That they were soon to come into conflict on the 
issue of European and, in particular German, heavy industry was not a reflection of a lack of 
commitment to the principle of socialist internationalism, to the ideal of European unity, or to 
cooperation with one another. The dispute that then emerged over the European Coal & Steel 
Community and the European Defense Community had more to do with perceptions of German 
democracy and the pressures of geopolitical, economic and institutional constraints upon the 
French Socialist leadership and with the impact of the regional politics of the Ruhr on the 
national SPD than with fundamental disagreements on perceptions of world developments, 
though these then emerged. Such disagreements at times taught French Socialist leaders that a 
sizable number of their party’s members had a vision more in common with that developed by 
the German Social Democratic Party than with their own leadership. It is to these developments 
that we now turn before considering how the parties succeeded in overcoming the disputes of the 
49 For Wehner’s biography, see Christoph Meyer, Herbert Wehner: Eine Biographie (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006).  
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1948 to 1954 era to promote a common vision of European integration from 1955 to 1957. In 
those later years, the parties succeeded in constructing a common policy within the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community and towards the Treaties of Rome that 
established a common European atomic energy agency (Euratom) and the European Economic 
Community. That they were able to do so demonstrates the parties’ will to reconciliation, and 
their mutual dedication to a shared socialist vision of European economic cooperation. 
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2. VISIONS OF THE POSTWAR ORDER: EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION, 
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF 
HEAVY INDUSTRY, 1944-1948 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets the context for the dispute that erupted in 1948-1951 between the French 
Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties on the integration of European heavy industry 
by investigating the place that heavy industry had within each party’s conceptions of a postwar 
European future in 1945-1948. It demonstrates how domestic political imperatives shaped by 
material necessities and party narratives about what went wrong during the interwar period led 
the two parties into conflict with one another.  
As the following chapter shows, the French Socialist and German Social Democratic 
Parties proved capable of compromising amongst themselves and formulating a common vision 
in favor of European coal and steel integration through transnational contact and discussion prior 
to the announcement of the London Accords of June 1948, which set West Germany on the path 
to statehood. It was in the Socialists’ reactions to these Accords negotiated by the Allied 
governments and their aftermath that the dispute broke out. As had occurred so often in the 
interwar period, Socialist designs and compromises on heated issues of French-German relations 
did not come to fruition in the frenzied work of international diplomacy. It was in response to the 
marginalization of their proposed compromises on coal and steel that French Socialists and 
German Social Democrats fell back onto defensive positions of protecting core domestic 
priorities related to coal and steel policy.  
The rationale behind these SFIO and SPD domestic objectives is the subject of this 
chapter. These domestic political priorities reflected core socialist objectives that were not 
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necessarily at odds with either party’s goals of achieving a transnational consensus with their 
cross-Rhine neighbor. However, geopolitical and domestic developments outside of the parties’ 
control placed the principle of socialist internationalism into contradiction with other goals 
central to these parties’ visions for the postwar order. With traumatic memories of the interwar 
French invasion of the Ruhr industrial valley fresh in their minds, SPD regional and national 
leaders considered the allegiance of the Ruhr working classes to be a central front in their 
struggle to, first, eliminate German Communist Party (KPD) influence from western Germany 
and, second, reorder property relations in the region to satisfy the yearnings of the Ruhr’s 
workers and to break the military-industrial complex that had contributed so much in their view 
to the wars of the recent past. The region’s SPD leaders exerted a disproportionate influence on 
SPD national policymaking in the initial postwar period, an influence that present scholarship 
overlooks. In this context, it is more appropriate to speak of a regionalization, rather than a 
nationalization, of SPD policy on heavy industry from 1948-51.  
Such an approach allows one to revise much of the literature on postwar SFIO-SPD 
relations that views the breakdown of relations between the parties on heavy industry integration 
as proof of the hollowness of each party’s commitment to internationalism. As discussed below, 
Kurt Schumacher plays a central role in this scholarly narrative as an exemplar par excellance of 
the nationalization of postwar European socialism.  I argue that efforts to create a Socialist 
consensus on the geopolitical issues of the period competed with domestic goals that also were 
as much part of German social democracy’s sense of historical exigency as was internationalism.  
The same holds true for the SFIO. This chapter shows how the SFIO pursued a campaign 
similar to the SPD to gain the support of industrial workers in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais 
regions, and to battle against the influence of the local French Communist Party (PCF). 
However, the PCF emerged from the Second World War far stronger than did the KPD of 
Western Germany and was able to gain hegemony over the workers of France’s key industrial 
regions. The SFIO, in part due to this outcome, did not come to represent French coal miners in 
the same way that the SPD became the mouthpiece of the Ruhr valley’s coal miners and steel 
workers.  
The source of SFIO policies on heavy industry lay not in a defense of a key regional 
constituency, as was the case for the SPD. Rather, SFIO industrial policy was part of an 
ambitious program for national economic transformation. The SFIO was an important impetus 
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for the “planning consensus” that emerged in the initial postwar period.50 This consensus held 
that a large-scale industrial modernization program as proposed in Jean Monnet’s Plan for 
Modernization and Reconstruction was necessary to overcome French economic and military 
decline, which had become evident to all in the French military defeat of 1940 and the 
continent’s eclipse between the emerging super powers in 1944-47. This program required raw 
material imports from the Ruhr Valley, hence making SFIO domestic policy dependent on a 
satisfactory resolution of the postwar European economic order and on Germany’s place within 
it.  
To understand why a harsh dispute erupted between the two parties in 1948-51, it is 
necessary to transcend the facile dichotomy of “internationalism” and “nationalism” and to place 
the parties’ sincere desires for a Socialist consensus on the geopolitics of European heavy 
industry within the material and economic realities of the period and the galaxy of domestic 
priorities pursued by postwar French socialism and German social democracy. Practitioners of 
politics have to juggle a constellation of priorities, which they often find contradict one another. 
In order to understand the world in which they operated and the decisions that they made, so do 
we.  
 
2.2 NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM AND  
POSTWAR GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
One of the few areas of agreement between the German Communists, U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, the French and parts of the German press, and a diverse set of international 
political and diplomatic figures was that the policy of the SPD after WWII was driven by the 
“nationalism” of its leader, Kurt Schumacher.51 After first meeting Schumacher, French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman told the French Foreign Affairs Commission that Schumacher was “an 
50 William I. Hitchcock employs the phrase “planning consensus” to describe French economic policymaking in the 
initial postwar period. William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership 
in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 2.  
51 Frankfurter Neue Presse, 21 April 1951. Acheson said that Schumacher had a “harsh and violent nature with 
nationalistic and aggressive ideas” and that he was “a fanatic of a dangerous and pure type...” Thomas Alan 
Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 80. Talbot Imlay makes a similar argument to my own. Talbot Imlay, “‘The policy of social 
democracy is self-consciously internationalist’: The SPD’s Internationalism after 1945” Journal of Modern History, 
86, 1 (2014: 81-123). 
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infinitely respectable man who has suffered enormously for his ideas, but [he] is driven by 
passion and is a violent person who does not like France.”52 A denunciatory international press 
campaign against Schumacher’s “nationalist” tone and policies reached a climax during the last 
years of his life in the period 1949-1952. During the French Assembly debates on the “German 
question” during this period, Schumacher symbolized the bête noire of German politics, a 
Prussian bogeyman whose possible ascent to political power seemed to threaten the bases of 
French security.  
His reputation as a nationalist extended into Schumacher’s fraternal party, the SFIO, the 
leaders of which complained in internal discussions of the SPD’s nationalist policies. Party 
leader Guy Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee in 1948 that, “It is necessary to denounce 
the nationalist point of view of the German socialists.”53 SFIO deputy André Philip drew 
particular ire from Schumacher when he made the “nationalist” claim in public fora.54 This 
characterization was also present at times among the SPD’s usual domestic allies. During the 
SPD’s campaign against the Schuman Plan, for instance, an official of the national trade union 
federation, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) complained to the SPD Central Committee 
about the “nationalist accents” coming from SPD leaders that risked ruining “our international 
reputation.”55 
Nor have historians been particularly kind to Kurt Schumacher. I agree with Talbot 
Imlay’s claim that most scholars have reproduced uncritically the widespread contemporary 
portrayal of Schumacher as a nationalist.56 Most view the postwar SPD’s nationalism to be more 
pronounced than its socialism or internationalism. V. Stanley Vardys writes that, “After World 
War II, the SPD freed itself from indecision, abandoned its proletarian internationalism and 
frankly embraced nationalistic views,” and that, “The Party not only had become nationalistic; it 
52 Commission des affaires étrangères, 29 November 1951, C/15591, Archives nationales (AN).  
53 Comité directeur, 20 October 1948, Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste (OURS).  
54 Schumacher said of Philip in a letter to Hermann Brill dated 4 September 1951 that, “The most pernicious 
[Übelste] is surely André Philip, who in the most infamous manner agitates against German social democracy and 
against me.” Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und der europäische Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der 
sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik (Niebüll: Verlag videel, 2003), 33. 
55 Werner Bührer, “Les syndicats ouest-allemands et le Plan Schuman,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman 
dans l’histoire: Intérêts nationaux et projet européen (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 2004), 322. 
56 Talbot Imlay, “‘The policy of social democracy is self-consciously internationalist’: The SPD’s Internationalism 
after 1945,” The Journal of Modern History 86, 1 (2014): 81-123. Dietrich Orlow characterizes Schumacher’s 
position on the Schuman Plan as “convoluted reasoning.” Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny: A Comparative History 
of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 179. 
Wolfram Kaiser is more nuanced. Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Integration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 220-21.   
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also wanted to wrap itself in the flag for all to see, and the German public correctly discerned 
that the SPD was more often motivated by nationalism than by socialistic arguments.”57 William 
Paterson agrees that Schumacher was “anti-French” and that his “relations with other countries 
were normally colored more by his nationalism than by his internationalism.”58 Dietrich Orlow 
writes that, “Schumacher’s blowing of the nationalist trumpet” made him “sound like Bismarck” 
and that, “the SPD under Schumacher appeared to present itself as a postwar edition of the 
German Nationalists.”59 Only recently have historians begun to challenge this depiction.60 
Scholars correctly point out that the SPD’s intransigent attitude in the initial postwar 
period resulted at least in part from the party’s determination to avoid being once again labeled 
“fatherlandless elements” (Vaterlandlose Gesellen) and among the “November criminals,” as 
had occurred under Weimar.61 Schumacher and the SPD leadership believed that it would be a 
grave threat to the prospects of German democracy if the German public perceived national 
claims to be an exclusive terrain of the political right. While scholars present this view as 
understandable, they widely criticize the leadership for not realizing that post-WWII 
developments in Germany and Europe differed fundamentally from those following the First 
World War. In this view, Schumacher and “his party seemed to be persecuted by the trauma of 
socialist experiences after World War I,”62 and pursued an anachronistic policy to correct the 
mistakes of Weimar when the postwar era required a different, more conciliatory form of politics 
that Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came to embody.63 The central 
57 V. Stanley Vardys, “Germany’s Postwar Socialism: Nationalism and Kurt Schumacher (1945-1952),” The Review 
of Politics 27 (1965): 235-36. Vardys describes Schumacher’s nationalism as a “democratic nationalism” or 
“socialistic nationalism” in the tradition of Ferdinand Lassalle.  
58 William E. Paterson, “The German Social Democratic Party and European Integration in Emigration and 
Occupation,” European History Quarterly 5 (1975): 435. 
59 Orlow also writes that, “In stridently nationalistic tones the SPD’s national leaders insisted that national 
unification (and the recovery of the lost territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line), and the restoration of full 
sovereignty had to precede any agreements on European integration. Orlow, Common Destiny, 55.  
60 For example, see Talbot Imlay, “‘The policy of social democracy is self-consciously internationalist’”. Imlay adds 
his own list of contemporaries and historians depicting Schumacher as a nationalist: French High Commissioner 
André François-Poncet, American military commander Lucius D. Clay, British High Commissioner Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, Konrad Adenauer, and historians Kurt Klotzboch and Beatrix Bouvier.  
61 Lewis Joachim Edinger writes that, “Tactical considerations as well as the ‘lessons of the past’ were no doubt 
contributing factors but it is also clear that already in the pre-Hitler period [Schumacher] had held views that led him 
to assume this role.” Lewis Joachim Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 150. 
62 Vardys, op cit., 242-43. 
63 This is in effect what Orlow means when he writes of the SPD’s “‘delayed reaction’ to the problems of democracy 
and nationalism” after the Second World War. Dietrich Orlow, “Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and 
the SPD, 1945-1966,” German Studies Review 16,1 (1993): 77-102. Carl Cavanagh Hodge writes of “Schumacher’s 
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evidence for the widespread contention that Schumacher was a nationalist directly pertains, as 
we shall see, to the SPD’s position on heavy industry and French-German relations from 1948 to 
1951, and its reaction to the following developments of the early postwar era: the 1948-49 
announcement of the Ruhr Statute, the November 1949 Petersburg accords, and the SPD 
campaign to defeat the Schuman Plan in 1951. The SPD came to be the most insistent advocate 
of German reunification in the initial postwar period, and Schumacher’s reptutation as a 
nationalist had much to do with his incessant lambasting of CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
for privileging Western integration over German reunification. Schumacher suspected, perhaps 
justly, that Adenauer was rather content to allow the crucial SPD constituencies of Berlin, 
Saxony and Thuringia to remain on the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” votes without which the 
SPD would be unlikely to reach a majority in national elections.  
It is perhaps fair for historians to critique the SPD for not correctly assessing the political 
spirit of the postwar era, but at times scholars’ critiques themselves suffer from anachronisms. 
Schumacher and company could not have known that German democracy would successfully 
implant itself over the next decade, that the German economy would experience an “economic 
wonder” in the 1950s, and that the German coal and steel industries would re-emerge for a 
period as the driving force of European heavy industry. The SPD’s determination to represent 
German national claims was based on what it perceived to be the errors of its recent past. Konrad 
Adenauer and Robert Schuman were as equally obsessed by the demons of Weimar and the 
French defeat of 1940 as was the SPD, and the “lessons” that they derived from their experiences 
directly shaped their views as well. These “lessons,” though, led the SPD to different conclusions 
than the CDU when faced with early efforts to unite the European continent under French 
leadership from 1949 to 1952.  
Scholars have been nearly unanimous in their condemnation of SPD policy on Europe 
and Franco-German reconciliation. At times their critiques read more like editorials than 
analyses. Haas writes that the SPD’s policy was “sweeping and self-contradictory” and “boil[ed] 
down to purely national demands.”64 Orlow writes that, “Schumacher’s convoluted reasoning 
allowed most party leaders as well as rank-and-file activists to live with the illusion that once the 
dark, Weimaresque visions of the republic’s present circumstance...”  Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The Long Fifties: The 
Politics of Socialist Programmatic Revision in Britain, France and Germany,” Contemporary European History 2, 1, 
(1993): 22. 
64 Ernst B. Haas, The United of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958, 1968), 131-32. 
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Schuman Plan had been defeated, the party and Germany would regain the initiative in foreign 
relations.”65 There is also general agreement among historians that Kurt Schumacher alone set 
SPD international policy, especially as it pertained to German heavy industry.66 There is 
considerable evidence to support this point of view. For instance, when the Allies announced the 
results of their negotiations to establish an International Authority of the Ruhr (IAR), 
Schumacher issued the official SPD response without consulting the party’s Central Committee. 
An exclusive focus on Schumacher, however, risks assigning excessive causative value to 
Schumacher’s whims and personality to the detriment of other structural and internal political 
factors. Such is the case with Orlow, who writes that the SPD suffered due to Schumacher’s 
“arrogant, authoritarian, uncompromising personality.”67 An early biographer of Schumacher 
goes even further, explaining the SPD’s policies in large part through the claim that, 
“Schumacher’s behavior and attitude patterns point to character traits clinically identified with 
those of an obsessive-compulsive personality striving to adjust to the objective environment in a 
socially acceptable manner.”68 
This study offers a different perspective. It argues, first, that scholars have been sloppy 
and loose in their claims that Schumacher was a “nationalist,” and that a myopic over-emphasis 
on the role of Schumacher has led scholars to overlook other reasons for SPD opposition to 
French policy for European heavy industry. In particular scholars neglect to analyze the 
influence that SPD politicians from the Ruhr valley and from the Land North-Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) exercised in support of Schumacher’s policies, as this and the following chapter make 
clear. 
Did the SPD in fact reject French proposals for the Ruhr and the Schuman Plan because 
of the party’s or its leader’s “nationalism”? The question is polemical by its very nature. 
Whereas the term “nationalist” had at times positive connotations in German history, particularly 
during the Weimar period, it emerged as one of the strongest pejoratives of the postwar era. Its 
employment represented an unambiguous condemnation of the SPD’s policies, tone, and attitude, 
both when deployed at the time and when made later by historians. The evidence, however, is 
not at all as clear cut as many have presented it. On only one occasion, and only when pressed, 
65 Orlow, Common Destiny, 179.  
66 Edinger, opt. cit., 117, 144; Ramuschkat, opt. cit., 17. 
67 Dietrich Orlow, “Delayed Reaction,” 80. 
68 Edinger, opt. cit., 275, 294.  
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did an historian define what he meant by designating Schumacher a nationalist. Paterson in 1995 
substantiated his claim of “nationalism” by stating that Schumacher under-estimated the security 
needs of other states, a point to which we will return.69  
The term “nationalism” was anathema among European Socialists, including the SPD. 
For a Socialist to call another Socialist a “nationalist” in the postwar era cut deep; in effect it 
questioned the individual’s credentials as a Socialist. Years later, for instance, when André Philip 
broke with SFIO leader Guy Mollet over the Mollet government’s repressive Algerian policy and 
the invasion of the Suez peninsula, Philip’s central charge was that Mollet had abandoned 
“socialism” and adopted “nationalist” policies.70 For his part, Schumacher forcefully and 
continuously rejected accusations of “nationalism,” seeking to discredit the charge by telling an 
interviewer that the allegation had its roots in the Soviet Union’s campaign to achieve the 
organic fusion of the KPD and SPD, a development Schumacher had successfully resisted in 
1946.71 Schumacher countered the accusation by identifying himself as a Socialist or Social 
Democrat, an internationalist, and a German patriot. The SFIO’s resistance-era leader, Daniel 
Mayer, retrospectively endorsed Schumacher’s self-depiction:  
...the Socialists did not accept that Schumacher, after the Second World War, would not 
accept that a democratic Germany be humiliated. That is what one call[ed] nationalism, 
but in reality it is a form of patriotism and the identification of the working class with the 
nation.72  
 
Regardless if we find Schumacher’s distinction between nationalism and patriotism convincing, 
Schumacher gained legitimacy for his point within the tradition of international socialism. In 
fact, he found historical legitimacy within the canons of the French Socialist Party. He quoted 
the martyred French Socialist leader Jean Jaurès ad nauseum to demonstrate that his policies 
were consistent with international socialism. Schumacher distinguished “patriotism” from 
“nationalism,” a distinction that had a long history: Jean Jaurès in 1911 declared the claim of the 
Communist Manifesto that the workers had no country to be “nonsense.” Famously he wrote 
that: 
69 Ramuschkat, opt. cit., 38.  Paterson’s account is discussed in Ramuschkat.  
70 André Philip, Le socialisme trahi (Paris: Plon, 1957). 
71 Ramuschkat, opt. cit., 37.  
72 Claude Juin, Daniel Mayer (1909-1996): l’homme qui aurait pu tout changer (Paris: Romillat, 1998), 41-42. 
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...a bit of internationalism distances one from the country (patrie), a lot of 
internationalism returns one to it. A bit of patriotism distances one from the International; 
a lot of patriotism returns one to it.73  
 
According to Jaurès, patriotism was a positive attribute for a Socialist, whereas nationalism was 
degrading and dangerously tied to militarism. Jaurès’ position did much to shape the language of 
French socialist internationalism that Schumacher himself appropriated. Most French Socialists 
viewed themselves as the inheritors of the French revolutionary tradition and believed that 
republican universalism made French republicanism central to internationalism. The SPD, on the 
other hand, as the largest Socialist party of Europe during the Kaiserreich, made equal claims for 
the mantle of internationalism. In light of the social accomplishments of the early Republic, the 
SPD argued that the defense of the Weimar state meant as well the defense of socialism and the 
working class, which was being progressively integrated into the German nation despite 
conservative and völkisch efforts to exclude them.74   
An examination of Schumacher’s policies and demeanor with definitions of 
“nationalism” in the scholarly literature leaves an ambiguous picture. The first challenge is that 
there is no consensus on what “nationalism” means, and scholars of nationalism stress that it is 
more appropriate to speak of “nationalisms.” It is highly questionable whether Schumacher falls 
under Karl Deutsch’s definition: 
Nationalism is a state of mind which gives “national” messages, memories, and images a 
preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making of decisions. 
A nationalist gives preference in attention, transmission, and communication to those 
messages which carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific 
national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or culture. 
If the greater attention and the greater weight given to such messages is [sic] so large as 
to override all other messages, memories, or images, then we speak of nationalism as 
“extreme.”75  
 
An examination of Schumacher’s speeches shows that ideas, memories and images derived from 
the socialist international tradition were prominent in his rhetoric. The question then turns on 
whether “nationally”-derived ideas were the determinant factors in SPD decisions. According to 
Peter Alter, “Current linguistic usage defines ‘nationalists’ as people whose action or reasoning 
gives indiscriminate precedence to the interest of one nation (usually their own) over those of 
73 Jean-Pierre Rioux, Jean Jaurès (Paris: Perrin, 2005), 273.  
74 See Dieter Groh, Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus: die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am 
Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).  
75 Karl W. Deutsch, Tides Among Nations (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979), 301. 
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other nations, and who are prepared to disregard those others for the sacrosanct honour of their 
own nation.”76 It is clear that the SPD under Schumacher did place certain domestic interests 
above French claims for security, but the following analysis suggests that the party’s decisions 
were hardly “indiscriminate” and that “disregard” is too strong a term to adequately denote the 
SPD’s response to French security claims.77 
“Nationalism” as an explanatory factor is not a particularly useful frame of analysis for 
policy-making in the SPD after WWII. As political practitioners, SPD leaders often had to make 
choices when presented with sets of conditions that placed different policy goals in opposition to 
one another. The same held true for the SFIO, as it does for all political parties that seek not only 
to claim, but also to exercise power. Struggles over material resources can be understood as 
examples of “nationalist” claims. However, those who suffered most acutely during the periodic 
coal shortages of 1944-1951 were the poor and working classes of both countries. The coal for 
French heat had to come largely from the Ruhr, but the Germans needed this coal for heating as 
well. Is it not reasonable to consider SFIO and SPD efforts to attain sufficient coal so as to 
ensure lower heating prices for working-class consumers “socialist” policies as well? In that 
case, as both parties were pursuing the same “socialist” goal of cheap coal for domestic heat 
within their nations, this would lead them inevitably into conflict with one another. Is it proper to 
consider “nationalism” a causative factor if both of these parties at times prioritized the health 
and welfare of their own poor above the more abstract efforts for Franco-German reconciliation? 
My point is that scholars should not be so quick to apply pejorative labels without considering 
the range of interacting political priorities that the parties were pursuing simultaneously. This 
chapter focuses on the SFIO’s support for the Monnet industrialization plan, and the SPD’s 
76 Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 6.  
77 If one judges the characteristics of nationalism by Umut Ozkirimli’s criteria, the term “nationalism” does not 
appear to apply to Schumacher. The “discourse of nationalism” was not central to Schumacher’s public reasoning. 
Schumacher did not claim and it is doubtful that he thought that, “the interest and values of the nation override all 
other interests and values.” Schumacher certainly did not “regard the nation as the only source of legitimacy.” 
Though Schumacher often “operate[d] through binary divisions—between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ ‘friends’ and ‘foes,’” he 
was as likely to counter “Socialist” or “Social Democrat” and “bourgeois” or “capitalist” as he would “German” and 
“foreigner.” See Umut Ozkirimili, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 2nd Edition (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). Schumacher conforms to some of the definitions of “nationalism” in a work by Ireneusz Pawel 
Karolewski and Andrezej Marcin Suszycki but not to others. It would be accurate to describe Schumacher as having 
the “sentiment of belonging to the nation and [displaying a] readiness to sacrifice [himself] for its well-being, 
security and social welfare” but he did not display “a nationalist ideology based on a definition of the genealogy of 
the nation, [and] the core narratives of national identity,” though he did present “the political preferences of the 
nation [as he conceived them, my addition] and the present state of the nation in relation to other nations, as well as 
suggestions for the way in which national goals could be realised.” Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Andrezej Marcin 
Suszycki, The Nation and Nationalism in Europe: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).  
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policies in the Ruhr, the center of postwar West German heavy industry, to explain the context 
within which the SFIO and SPD came into conflict on the politics of European heavy industry, 
and why, despite this lack of agreement, the label “nationalist” is inappropriate.  
Considering the central place that the mine basin and steel industry of the Ruhr had in the 
eventual breakdown of SFIO and SPD relations, it is rather surprising that historians have not 
investigated the impact of the Ruhr SPD on postwar SPD policy-making. As the following 
discussion makes clear, the regional politics of the Ruhr were central to SPD national policies on 
coal and steel integration. In order to understand how the politics of heavy industry played out in 
postwar relations between French Socialists and German Social Democrats, it is necessary to 
first examine the fraught legacy bequeathed to them by the interwar dispute between the French 
and German governments on reparations, which led to a nearly two-year occupation of the Ruhr 
territory by French and Belgian military forces in 1923-24.  
 
2.3 FRENCH SOCIALISTS, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE LEGACY OF 
THE 1923-24 MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR 
 
Scholars have generally considered the SFIO to have been the postwar Western European 
Socialist party most dedicated to the principle of internationalism.78 Claims that the SFIO also 
demonstrated “nationalist” attitudes and policies generally focus on the period following the 
Schuman Plan’s ratification, especially on the colonial policies of Mollet’s 1956-1958 
government. Although the party supported a forceful defense of certain national interests in 
Allied negotiations, the SFIO position remained consistent in 1945-1951. Rather, diplomatic 
pressure from the U.S. and Great Britain, and the lonely domestic opposition offered by the SFIO 
had reduced the French government’s demands on the German question to the core of French 
and SFIO claims on the Ruhr region. Unlike the interwar and initial postwar period, the SFIO 
and the French government now pursued policies that were, with important nuances, largely in 
tandem with one another. 
78 Adalbert Korff, Le revirement de la politique française à l’égard de l’Allemagne entre 1945 et 1950 (Lausanne: 
Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1965), 260. Wilfried Loth, however, writes that the SFIO position on the Ruhr was 
increasingly nationalized from 1948 to 1950.  Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus: Die französischen 
Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas, 1944-1950 (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlag-Anst., 1977). 
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As discussed below, the crux of the SFIO and SPD rhetorical dispute over the Ruhr came 
down to whether one considered the French policies from 1948 to 1950 that culminated in 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s proposal for the supranational integration of 
European heavy industry to be a break (tournant) from the traditional French thesis on the 
German question or, rather, its continuation in European disguise. Overhanging the dispute that 
developed on this question from 1948 to 1951 were memories and narratives from the 1923 
French occupation of the Ruhr territory. Although German Social Democrats publicly evoked the 
occupation of the Ruhr only on occasion, it is clear that the occupation directly informed SPD 
considerations of postwar French proposals at the national and local levels. The bitter memory of 
the social, economic and political cataclysm of 1923-24 framed the inter-party dispute of 1948-
1951. 
The SFIO evoked its forceful condemnation of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré’s 
decision to invade and occupy the Ruhr in 1923 as proof of the party’s internationalist 
credentials. SFIO parliamentary leader Léon Blum was the most prominent French politician to 
oppose the Ruhr invasion.79 The French Socialist Party organized protests in France against the 
Ruhr invasion, welcomed SPD leaders to Paris, and called for an immediate withdrawal and an 
agreement with Germany to create a reparations schedule that the German government would be 
capable of following without crippling the German economy.80 Postwar SFIO narratives of the 
errors of the interwar period competed with other narratives in France that claimed that the rise 
of Nazism was the result of a weakening of French intransigence. A number of postwar right-
wing French politicians assigned the fault for the French defeat of 1940 to the cartel des gauches 
government’s decision in 1924-25 to abandon Poincaré’s occupation policy and engage in a 
period of détente with the German government. The SFIO’s postwar position, on the other hand, 
reflected its continued opposition to the 1923 invasion. For the SFIO, the pernicious 
consequences of the Ruhr invasion spoke for themselves. SFIO leaders, in fact, were unlikely to 
disagree with SPD Economics Minister of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Erik Nölting’s claim 
79 The French Socialist and French Communist parties were the only parties to vote in opposition to the Ruhr 
invasion in the National Assembly when it began. Thomas Raithel, Das schwierige Spiel des Parlamentarismus: 
Deutscher Reichstag und französischer Chambre des Deputés in den Inflationskrisen der 1920er Jahre (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2005), 368-71. 
80 Stefan Feucht, Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zur Aussenpolitik während der 
Weimarer Republic (1918-1933), (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1998), 258-66. 
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that the French invasion offered Hitler’s movement its “starting chance.”81 In announcing his 
party’s opposition to the Ruhr Statute of 1948, the SPD’s factional leader in NRW, Fritz 
Henssler, warned that the consequence of the statute would likely be “the danger of increasing 
nationalism” for which “the experiences of the year 1923, the year of the Ruhr invasion, [offer] 
an extraordinarily good lesson.”82  
It is useful to take a brief excursion back to 1923-24 to examine how many of the 
defining features of the postwar SFIO-SPD dialogue on heavy industry resulted from SPD 
leaders’ interpretations of the catastrophic impact that the Ruhr invasion had had on the Ruhr 
working classes and residents, on the SPD and, ultimately, on the Weimar Republic itself. To do 
so, it is necessary also to consider the reactions of the largest trade union federation, the SPD-
aligned Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB). I briefly examine the causes, the 
social impact, the roles of the SPD and the ADGB in the Ruhr struggle, and the outcome and 
consequences of the French invasion in order to demonstrate how these events directly informed 
SPD analyses of French proposals on the Ruhr from 1948 to 1951.  
The official French government position in 1923 was that, if the Treaty of Versailles was 
to have any meaning at all, the German government could not be permitted to systematically 
violate its obligations to deliver coal and reparations to France. The French government’s 
demands came in the context of an insistence by the United States government that the Allies pay 
back their war debts regardless of the successful collection of reparations from the defeated 
powers. Seemingly abandoned by its U.S. and British allies, French leaders worried that, just five 
years after the end of the war, they would soon find themselves alone facing a revanchist 
Germany freed from the strictures placed on it following the war. Announcing that French troops 
were moving to occupy the Ruhr, French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré told the French 
81 Undated draft, Gedanken zum Ruhrstatut—Entwurf (Ein deutscher Wirtschaftsminister zum Ruhrstatut.) Erik 
Nölting 39, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD). 
82 “Stellungnahme zum Ruhrstatut—Rede im Landtag von Nordrhein-Westfalen am 11. Januar 1949 zum 
Ruhrstatut,” in Günther Högl and Hans-Wilhelm Bohrisch, eds., “Die Person immer ganz weit hinter der Sache” 
Fritz Henssler 1886-1953: Sozialdemokrat, Reichstagsabgeordneter und Dortmunder Oberbürgermeister (Essen: 
Klartext, 2003), 163. Fritz Erler was an exception when he clearly distinguished between French efforts to control 
German industry in 1949 from the policies of the Ruhr occupation. It is important to note, however, the Erler was 
neither a Ruhr- nor a northern Rhine-based politician nor a member yet of the SPD leadership. Württemberg 2 
December 1949, “Ein Nachwort zum Ruhrstatut von Fritz Erler,” Fritz Erler 6, AdsD. 
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Assembly that, “We will extract coal, that is all.”83 From its inception, international opinion 
suspected that Poincaré’s government harbored secret aims beyond those made in public. 
Historians continue to debate whether the Ruhr occupation was a defensive maneuver by the 
French government to fulfill the legal provisions of the Versailles Treaty and meet U.S. demands 
for a repayment of war loans, or rather an offensive assault to go beyond Versailles and 
permanently cripple the German economy and government.84  
In November 1947, NRW factional leader Fritz Henssler recalled that the Ruhr 
occupation “brought unheard of sacrifices for the workers.”85 The social catastrophe that 
accompanied the French occupation in 1923-24 remained permanently engrained in the region as 
a mythology of working-class martyrdom for the national interest. Ruhr workers were bitter 
towards the French government even before the Ruhr invasion: in order to meet reparation 
quotas, coal miners had been working extra shifts from 1920 to 1922 “at an appalling cost to 
their own health and that of the mining communities.”86 As an industrial region chronically 
dependent on an enormous amount of food imports from other regions, hunger and malnutrition 
had been a defining feature of daily life in the Ruhr at the end of the First World War. French 
occupation authorities in 1923 set up a customs border to isolate the Ruhr from the rest of 
Germany, an isolation that was further exacerbated by the ubiquitous transport disruptions that 
resulted from the German campaign to disrupt the French authorities. By the summer of 1923 
starvation threatened the Ruhr. Panicked workers sent their children to other German regions, 
83 Jacques Bariéty, “Die französische Politik in der Ruhrkrise,” in Klaus Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise 1923: 
Wendepunkt der internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1984), 
37. 
84 Klaus Schwabe argues that the French Ruhr action was “not the expression of a hegemonic effort, but rather the 
reflex of a deep-seated French insecurity regarding the long-term development of French-German relations.” Klaus 
Schwabe, “Grossbritannien und die Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 61. Jacques Bariéty, on the other 
hand, asserts that reparations were “only a piece of the economic holistic conception of the Versailles Treaty” and 
that the French government was in effect pursuing a goal from the Versailles negotiations that had not attained the 
support of the U.S. or Great Britain. He writes that, “Much more encompassing and deep-reaching was the intention 
of the economic concept to fundamentally change over the long term the structure of the German economy through a 
considerable weakening of the productive capacity of its iron industry.” Bariéty, “Die franzosische Politik in der 
Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 12-13. Wolfram Fischer leaves the question open. Wolfram Fischer, 
“Wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen des Ruhrkonflikts,” in Schwabe ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 96. An important 
corollary to this effort was, as Felten demonstrates, the French occupation authority’s efforts to encourage 
movements favoring separatism from the German central government along the Rhine. Franz J. Felten, “Frankreich 
am Rhein—eine ergänzende Einleitung,” in Franz J. Felten, ed., Frankreich am Rhein—von Mittelalter bis heute 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009), 31-35. 
85 “Die Politik der Sozialdemokratie in Nordrhein-Westfalen—Referat des Fraktionsvorsitzenden der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei, Fritz Henssler, Dortmund, am Anlass der Landeskonferenz in Recklinghausen am 19. 
November 1947,” in Günther Högl and Hans-Wilhelm Bohrisch, eds., 100-101. 
86 Conan Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17. 
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household supplies of coal for cooking and heat ran short, and workers began plundering wood 
and food from the surrounding countryside to support their desperate families.87 Weakened by 
malnutrition, disease swept through the SPD stronghold of Dortmund, disproportionately 
afflicting the elderly and children.88 The Ruhr region, despite the demographic and migratory 
upheaval of the National Socialist period, continued to carry the physical and psychological scars 
of the French invasion for decades to come. It was a defining experience for the generation of 
SPD leaders who sought to attain power in the Ruhr during the postwar period.  
The interwar SPD leadership viewed the Ruhr conflict through the prism of working-
class suffering for the German nation as a whole. SPD propaganda pamphlets from the period 
constructed a mythology celebrating the Ruhr workers’ struggle. As an historian has noted, the 
“burdens” of the passive resistance campaign launched in the Ruhr by the German government 
“were to be borne by the Republic’s grass-roots supporters.”89 The SPD newspaper Vorwärts 
compared Poincaré’s actions to the policy of King Louis XIV. The party, though, was also the 
most forceful advocate in the Reichstag for proactive proposals to end the crisis through 
negotiations that would lift the occupation, satisfy French security concerns, and achieve a 
compromise on French reparations demands. In a series of crisis meetings, SFIO and SPD 
leaders met with other Socialist parties to craft their own proposal for reparations, which they 
then presented to their home parliaments and governments.90  
To Poincaré’s surprise, among the fiercist opponents of the Ruhr invasion were the SPD 
and the ADGB union. With the German government’s encouragement, the Ruhr miners rose 
against the French occupation and the German government left it to the ADGB to channel these 
sentiments into a passive resistance campaign to block coal extraction designated for export to 
France. The SPD and ADGB were, in effect, at war with the French occupation authority’s 
program for the Ruhr, while they also denounced violence and sought to avoid armed 
confrontations between workers and French troops. They largely succeeded in these efforts, but 
they could not prevent incidents such as one at the Krupp works in Essen in which French troops 
fired on workers, killing thirteen and wounding twenty-five. Miners took it upon themselves to 
guard pits outside their working hours to prevent coal from leaving the mines. ADGB leader 
87 Fischer, op cit., 108.  
88 In 1912, the SPD won 44.5% of the vote in Dortmund. Günther Högl, “Zur Biographie und zum Nachlass,” in 
Högl and Borisch, eds., 19; Fischer, op cit., 115. 
89 Fischer, op cit., 2, 39. 
90 Feucht, op cit., 221-304. 
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Theodor Leipart and SPD leaders Rudolf Breitscheid and Hermann Müller called for 
negotiations but opposed any capitulation to the French government. As Ruhr industrialists 
increasingly sought an accommodation with French authorities, SPD leaders accused them of 
betraying the Ruhr workers.91 Henssler made this claim again in 1947, claiming that the “large 
property owners were splendidly remunerated” and “used the achievement of the German people 
to undermine the Republic.”92  
The Ruhr occupation ended in disaster for both the French and German governments. The 
French government found itself forced by international pressures to retreat from its hard-line 
demands and the German government, while perhaps the moral victor, faced the devastating 
social and political consequences of having financed its passive resistance campaign through a 
policy of inflation, a policy the repercussions of which shook the foundations of the Republic. As 
Henssler later recalled, perhaps the worst hit of all was the Ruhr industrial working classes. Not 
only had they had to endure the humiliation of daily life under occupation and the full impact of 
food shortages, but the end of the Ruhr occupation in 1924 signaled a renewed employer assault 
on the social and economic gains that workers had attained during the German Revolution of 
1918-20. Evoking the need to satisfy Allied and German coal requirements and to ensure the 
financial health of the battered mining industry, the government sanctioned the owners’ efforts to 
shed the constraints of the constitutionally-mandated eight-hour day. Conditions continued to 
deteriorate in the mines through 1924, wages increasingly lagged behind inflation, and a wave of 
bitter strikes and lockouts pitted owners and workers against each other. In the aftermath of the 
Ruhr invasion, Ruhr industrial owners succeeded in making the Stinnes-Legien accords of 1919, 
the signature labor achievement of the German Revolution, a dead letter and forced a return to 
the working practices of the pre-First World War era.93  
91 Fischer, op cit., 49, 58, 155, 165, 182-83. 
92 “Die Politik der Sozialdemokratie in Nordrhein-Westfalen—Referat des Fraktionsvorsitzenden der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei, Fritz Henssler, Dortmund, am Anlass der Landeskonferenz in Recklinghausen am 19. 
November 1947,” in Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 100-101. 
93 Fischer, op cit., 271-4, 292. Hans Mommsen, “Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr, 1918-1933,” in Jürgen 
Reulecke, ed., Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Rheinland-
Westfalen (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1974), 306. The Stinnes-Legien Accords was a compromise between ADGB 
leader Carl Legien, the newspaper empire magnate Alfred Hugenberg, and German industrialists Hugo Stinnes and 
Carl Friedrich von Siemens in which the trade unions agreed to work to end strikes, limit the role of factory 
councils, and work against the nationalization of industries in exchange for a 40-hour work week, the recognition of 
the trade unions as the sole representative of workers, and mediated arbitration to end any disputes between labor 
and management.   
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The SPD emerged from the Ruhr crisis a wounded party. Realizing that the passive 
resistance campaign had led to a stalemate along the Rhine, the SPD joined Gustav Stresemann’s 
unity government, which had formed to oversee international negotiations and to end the 
resistance campaign.94 Under attack from its left and right in the months to follow, the SPD 
created a pretext to exit Stresemann’s government. The SPD fared especially poorly in the 
subsequent 1924 national elections. As Conan Fischer writes, “this left Germany’s republican 
Socialists almost pathologically reluctant to assume governmental responsibility again.”95 
Memories of this experience, as well as of the “toleration policy” of the SPD towards Heinrich 
Brüning’s government in 1930-32, did much to strengthen Schumacher’s case following the 
1949 Bundestag election that the SPD should avoid joining any coalition in which it was not the 
leading political force.  
The political climate following 1924 was even worse for the SPD in the Ruhr. Despite 
decades of effort, the SPD and ADGB had been unable to win the loyalty of more than a 
plurality of the Ruhr’s industrial workers. Steeped in a Catholic tradition, the Ruhr was the heart 
of the labor wing of the Center Party and tensions had often been sharp between the social 
democratic and catholic trade unions. After the formation of the German Communist Party 
(KPD), the SPD had an additional rival in the Ruhr. The KPD had been able to gain a foothold in 
the Ruhr with the militant offensive that it launched from its base in Essen against Wolfgang 
Kapp’s attempted right-wing coup in 1920.96 Nonetheless, other than significant support in some 
of the metal unions,97 the KPD remained hopelessly outmatched in the Ruhr until the French 
invasion of 1923. From the start of the occupation, local KPD activists encouraged the Ruhr 
workers to abandon the passive resistance campaign of the official unions and to engage in 
militant resistance to the French occupation. The KPD sought to claim the leadership of wildcat 
strikes, often launched out of desperation. Although the SPD’s inclusion in Stresemann’s cabinet 
served to calm labor unrest on the national level, it had far less of an impact in the Ruhr. As the 
ADGB sought to maintain a moderate campaign against the occupation, it found itself under 
constant harassment from KPD activists eager to channel the harsh material circumstances and 
sense of affronted national pride towards its revolutionary program. When the SPD and the 
94 Klaus Schwabe, “Zur Einführung,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 6. 
95 Fischer, op cit., 261, 292. 
96 Siegfried Bahne, “Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik,” in Reulecke, ed. 318-19. 
97 Thirty percent of all KPD trade union members were in the metal industries, 12% were in the building and only 
7% in the mining industries. Ibid., 328. 
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government called an end to the passive resistance campaign, the KPD responded with mass 
protests across the Ruhr.98 A miniscule force in 1922, the KPD now presented a formidable 
challenge to the SPD’s position in the Ruhr.  
The 4 May 1924 Dortmund election, the first in which Henssler participated, revealed 
how the occupation had upended the political constellation of the Ruhr. The KPD won 29.4% of 
the vote in Dortmund, becoming the strongest party, while the SPD won a meager 16.2%, its 
worst result in decades.99 In the 1930 national elections, the Ruhr was the strongest area of KPD 
support in Germany, and the party won 17.3% in the territory that became NRW after the Second 
World War. At the same time, the ADGB experienced a hemorrhage in the factory council 
elections from 1929 to 1931, with the KPD-aligned Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition 
(RGO) reaping the benefits.100 As the Weimar Republic began to disintegrate and voters fled 
moderate parties in favor of the far left and right, the KPD defeated the SPD and its other rivals 
by wide margins in the 31 July 1932 elections in the cities of Dortmund, Herne, Castrop-Rauxel, 
Gelsenkirchen and Wattenscheid. In the November 1932 elections, it surpassed the Center Party 
as well to become the strongest party in the Ruhr territory for the first and only time in its 
history.101  
In light of events in the Ruhr in the decade from 1923 to 1933, one can well understand 
the explanation Ollenhauer gave to the SPD Central Committee in June 1948 for the SPD’s 
decision to reject the CDU’s call for a united campaign against the Ruhr Statute. Such an accord 
would mean, he said, that Germany would be “brought into the same situation that we once 
experienced in 1923 during the Ruhr struggle, and German Social Democracy is not prepared to 
98 Fischer, op cit., 198, 206, 215-17, 229. 
99 KPD deputies in the city assembly mercilessly attacked the SPD. Though the SPD rebounded later that year to 
27.9% (the KPD winning 17.7%), the KPD had demonstrated that in times of crisis it message appealed to 
disillusioned SPD voters. Having won only 1.7% in the 1920 elections in the area that later encompassed NRW, the 
KPD won 18.1% in May 1924, before sinking to 12.2% in the December 1924 elections. The impact was even 
starker in the factory council elections, in which the unions competed to represent the workers in negotiations with 
management. In November 1925, the ADGB lost its plurality to the Christian democratic union because the KPD 
union achieved a staggering 35% of the vote. In the late 1920s, the KPD and SPD share of the vote stabilized. The 
Ruhr KPD had incontrovertibly become a threat to the SPD in the Ruhr, in some cases surpassing the SPD vote in 
communal elections in key industrial cities like Gelsenkirchen. Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 20; Martin Martiny, 
“Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr vom Scheitern des Räte- und Sozialisierungsbewegung bis zum Ende der 
letzten parlamentarischen Regierung der Weimarer Republik (1920-1930),” in Reulecke, ed., 248. 
100 In 1931, the RGO won 29% of the factory council vote and the ADGB 36.5%. Lutz Niethammer, 
Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet: 1930 bis 1960 (Bonn: D.H.W. Dietz, 1989), 32, 36.  
101 Siegfried Bahne, “Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik,” in Reulecke, ed., 340-50. 
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take a position that would please only one party in Germany, namely the Communists, who seek 
to operate a nationalist policy in the western zones.”102  
 
2.4 THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTYAND THE POLITICS OF  
THE RUHR TERRITORY, 1945-1948 
 
The Ruhr occupation and the bitter struggle between the SPD, KPD, and the Center Party for the 
allegiance of the Ruhr working class were experiences that shaped the central goals and tactics of 
the SPD in the Ruhr after the Second World War. The overwhelming continuity in personnel 
between the inter- and postwar Ruhr SPD assured continuity as well in outlook and policy. Quite 
often SPD leaders emerged from the silence and “hibernat[ion]” of the Nazi period to reclaim 
positions at all levels of the SPD local organizations, and gained appointments to formerly-held 
administrative posts.103 In the large territorial unit formed by the British called North-Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW), the SPD sent to its newly established regional parliament (Landtag) a 
leadership all of whom had exercised political functions for the SPD prior to 1933. Not only the 
leaders, but 93% of the Ruhr SPD delegates in total had been members of the Weimar-era 
SPD.104   
Important SPD politicians in the post-war NRW political scene included NRW Interior 
Minister Walter Menzel, and NRW Economics Minister Erik Nölting. Most prominent of all was 
Fritz Henssler, the head of the SPD faction in the NRW Landtag, the mayor of Dortmund, the 
most important industrial city in the Ruhr, chair of the Ruhr-based West-Westphalian SPD 
chapter, and chair of the British zonal council .105 Nölting and Menzel had both joined the SPD 
in 1921. In 1928 and 1932, Nölting was elected to the Prussian parliament; Menzel entered that 
parliament as well in 1931. Henssler had an even longer and more illustrious history within the 
SPD. He was reported by the police as an “agitator” prior to WWI for his socialist activities; in 
102 SPD-PV Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss in Hamburg am 29. und 30. Juni 1948, 
Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 72, AdsD. 
103  Hartmut Pietsch, Militärregierung, Bürokratie und Sozialisierung: Zur Entwicklung des politischen System in 
den Städten des Ruhrgebietes 1945 bis 1948 (Duisburg: Walter Braun, 1978), 150-57. 
104 As Dieter Düding writes, “all ten were strongly anchored in the political and social-cultural milieu of the Weimar 
SPD.” Dieter Düding, Zwischen Tradition und Innovation: Die sozialdemokratische Landtagsfraktion in Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1946-1966 (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995), 29, 45. 
105 Other important SPD politicians included Alfred Dobbert, Robert Görlinger, Ernst Gnoss, Emil Gross, Heinrich 
Wenke, Viktor Agartz, Willi Eichler, the future NRW minister presidents Heinz Kühn and Fritz Steinhoff, and the 
Weimar-era member of the SPD leadership Carl Severing. 
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1921, he was elected to chair the West-Westphalian SPD chapter; in 1930, he entered the 
Reichstag.106 Henssler in particular is destined to play a central role in our story, as his influence 
on national SPD policy on the Schuman Plan has been overlooked. Not so his influence within 
the NRW and Ruhr SPD: regional historians have branded Henssler the “dominant figure in the 
Land” for the SPD, “the ‘central figure’ of the political reconstruction of the Ruhr territory,” and 
the “most high-profile and influential politician among the leadership of the NRW SPD,” who 
“in international political questions could be [considered] the speaker for the entire Ruhr 
territory.”107  
Henssler’s biography offers intriguing parallels with SPD leader Kurt Schumacher. Both 
had been active in the anti-Nazi Iron Front (as had Menzel as well), and both experienced arrest 
and imprisonment for their resistance activities during the 1930s. They each spent almost ten 
years in Nazi concentration camps and emerged from the war with chronic physical afflictions 
and illnesses that contributed to their early deaths: Schumacher died in 1952 and Henssler in 
1953. Both used the moral authority that they gained from resistance as a catapult to leadership 
within the first months of peace. At the same time, neither spoke in public about their 
experiences in the concentration camps.108 Henssler was welcomed back to Dortmund in June 
1945 and received stormy applauses similar in enthusiasm to those that greeted Schumacher at 
nearly all party meetings and speeches. In August 1945, Henssler was elected again to head the 
West-Westphalian SPD chapter. By the fall, he was the preeminent SPD politician in the NRW 
area. Like Schumacher, Henssler was renowned for his “brilliance” but also for an “authoritarian 
leadership style.”109 That Henssler’s thinking was shaped, like Schumacher’s, by a determination 
to avoid the stigma of “November criminals” that had stained the interwar SPD is clear from the 
title of one of his writings from May 1945: “No more November 1918.”110 
What influence did the NRW SPD and, in particular, the Ruhr SPD have within the 
national leadership? Schumacher is reputed to have paid relatively little attention in general to 
regional politics except when policies at the regional level contradicted national party goals.111 
106 Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 18. 
107 Düding, 31; Hans Peter Ehni, “Der Wiederaufbau der SPD nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Reulecke, ed., 427; 
and Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 32. 
108 Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 6. 
109 Günther Högl, “Zum Biographie und zum Nachlass,” in Högl and Bohrisch, eds. 31-32. 
110 Ibid., 27. 
111 Claudia Nölting, Erik Nölting: Wirtschaftsminister und Theoretiker der SPD (1892-1953) (Essen: Klartext, 
1989), 353. 
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However, the Ruhr territory was one of the most concentrated areas of the industrial working 
classes in all of Europe, and the SPD’s traditional weakness there had long been an 
embarrassment to the party.112 With the loss of the industrial region of Silesia in the Allied Yalta 
agreements and with Thuringia and Saxony falling within the Soviet zone, the SPD had lost a 
great reservoir of votes that had allowed the SPD to become such a powerful political force prior 
to the rise of Nazism. As a consequence, the Ruhr gained even greater sentimental and tactical 
importance for a Social Democratic Party eager to fashion a majority in West Germany. Scholars 
have pointed out that the SPD’s efforts to “open” to the middle classes failed during the late 
1940s.113 Less attention has been paid to the party’s sustained and forceful effort to create a SPD 
hegemony among the workers of the Ruhr and thereby give credence to the party’s claim to 
represent the German working class. While the proportion of workers in the SPD membership 
averaged 45% nationally, in Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen it was 60%; in Bochum and Witten 
the proportion reached 70%. Among SPD candidates for local positions, 30-50% were workers, 
most of whom were miners; an additional 20-30% were employees.114 
The NRW and Ruhr SPD were also positioned to exercise power within the national 
party. Seven members of the NRW Landtag also held posts in the SPD Central Committee: Fritz 
Henssler, Ernst Gnoss, Roger Görlinger, Emil Gross, Walter Menzel, Willi Eichler and Viktor 
Agartz.115 Henssler’s SPD chapter in the Ruhr had the largest membership of all of the SPD’s 23 
chapters in the western zones, making it the largest voting bloc in party congresses as well.116 
From his base in Dortmund and NRW, Henssler became one of the most influential of all 
postwar SPD politicians.  
While historians have granted much attention to Schumacher’s opponents among the 
SPD’s “regional princes,”117 few have pointed out that the SPD in West Germany’s largest 
region, NRW, and the strongest SPD local chapter, West-Westphalia, located in the Ruhr Valley, 
were among Schumacher’s most adamant supporters. The regional and local chapters had warm 
112 Lutz Niethammer, “‘Normalisierung’ im Westen: Erinnerungsspuren in die 50er Jahre,” in Gerhard Brunn and 
Reimar Hobbing, eds., Nordrhein-Westfalen und seine Anfänge 1945/46 (Essen: Klartext, 1986), 179. 
113 Vardys, op. cit., 233. 
114 Pietsch, op. cit., 207, 213. 
115 Felten, op cit., 65. 
116 Christoph Klessmann and Peter Friedemann, eds., Streiks und Hungermärsche im Ruhrgebiet 1946-1948 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1977), 32; Hans-Peter Ehni, “Der Wiederaufbau der SPD nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg,” in Reulecke, ed., 417; and Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 27. 
117 For examples of scholars’ focus on Schumacher’s opponents rather than supporters, see Edinger, op cit., 128-136; 
Orlow, Common Destiny, 56-57, 175; and William E. Paterson, “The German Social Democratic Party,” 438-40. 
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relations with Schumacher as soon as they learned of his positions and campaign for leadership 
in August 1945. As the local chapters began to reconstitute themselves, Henssler’s subordinate, 
Heinrich Wenke, the chapter undersecretary for Dortmund, served as a vital link with 
Schumacher’s Hannover office, and distributed its literature to the local Ruhr chapters. The 
West-Westphalian chapter supported Schumacher’s leadership claims “as self-evident,” one 
historian notes. When he spoke to the West-Westphalia chapter congress in November 1945, he 
received an emotional and enthusiastic response from local party members.118 Schumacher 
remained extraordinarily popular in the Ruhr for the rest of his career.  
The Ruhr-based SPD did not support Schumacher because of an attitude of subservience. 
The personality and strength of its leader, Henssler, precluded this possibility. Henssler was no 
less single-minded or assertive than Schumacher’s regional opponents, perhaps even more so 
than Schumacher himself. Rather, Henssler and the great majority of local politicians supported 
Schumacher because his policies were almost completely in line with their own conceptions.  
Probably the most important factor in the community of interests between the Hannover 
leadership and Ruhr SPD was a determination in the short term to prevent all cooperation 
between the SPD and the KPD and, over the long term, to eradicate Communist influence from 
the western zones.119 As grass-roots Antifascist Committees (Antifas) sprang up in early postwar 
Germany and a number of local-based politicians, especially in eastern and southern Germany, 
declared themselves in favor of creating a “Socialist Unity Party” (Sozialistische Einheitspartei), 
Schumacher made the struggle to maintain the SPD’s independence the centerpiece of his 
campaign for leadership in the western zones. The history of the SPD in the years 1945-1946 is 
in large part the story of Schumacher’s gradual victory over the unity-minded SPD leadership 
from the Soviet Zone.  
The Ruhr SPD emerged from World War II ready to recommence its Weimar-era battle 
against the KPD. A bastion of the SPD right under Weimar, none of the post-WWII Ruhr SPD 
leadership belonged to the SPD left.120 Henssler had been particularly active in the anti-KPD 
struggle in the Ruhr. In 1920, as the KPD launched strikes throughout the territory, Henssler 
wrote to the Hermann Müller government demanding that it employ soldiers to crush the 
118 Felten, op cit., 166. 
119 Hans Peter Ehni writes that, “The circulars of the West-Westphalian district...make clear that Schumacher’s 
position against the Communists was taken up without any fundamental critique.” Reulecke, ed., 436. 
120 Felten, op cit., 155. 
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“terrorist minority” until “the last man of the red bands [were] disarmed.”121 In the months 
following Germany’s defeat in WWII, antifascist committees sprang up across the Ruhr territory, 
establishing bases in the key cities of Bochum, Dortmund, and Essen. Although the occupation 
authorities ordered these dissolved as alleged communist-front organizations, the KPD claimed 
the mayorship of Wattenscheid and achieved important posts in the communal administrations of 
Bochum, Dortmund, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, and Herne. At first, SPD activists in the Ruhr seemed 
divided about how to react to KPD overtures and a number of local officials seemed all too eager 
to collaborate with Communists in 1945. As Schumacher worked to suppress such efforts 
throughout the western zones, the West-Westphalian leadership, without needing any prompt 
from Schumacher’s Hannover office, forcefully clamped down on unity efforts in its territory.122 
Only in Bochum and the Ruhr-neighboring city of Düsseldorf were there aborted attempts to 
create a “Union of Socialists.”123  
Henssler used the full weight of his influence to support Schumacher’s anti-unity 
position. Both men had reason to worry at that time about the KPD. The Ruhr territory appeared 
to be fertile ground for a Communist renaissance in 1945-46. The KPD had not only been the 
strongest party in the Ruhr at the end of the Weimar Republic, it had also been the most active 
resistance party during the Nazi period and the most successful at distributing propaganda 
through its underground network.124 The KPD presented a formidable challenge to the SPD in 
the Ruhr, the most formidable, in fact, of any region in the western zones.125  
121 Düding, op cit., 65. 
122 Felten, op cit., 110-17, 134, 136. 
123 The continued collaboration between Social Democrats and Communists in Duisburg was an increasingly lonely 
endeavor. Wenke, who denounced unity efforts in August 1945, demanded that any such initiative receive the 
chapter’s approval, which would surely not be forthcoming. Wenke wrote Schumacher in September that his chapter 
fundamentally mistrusted the Communists. At the first large party congress of the SPD in the western zones from 5-
6 October in Wennigsen, the West-Westphalian SPD was among the most aggressive in denouncing unity efforts 
throughout Germany. Ulrich Borsdorf, “Der Weg zur Einheitsgewerkschaft,” in Reulecke, ed., 433; and Felten, op 
cit., 160. 
124 Felten, op cit., 110; Günther Plum, “Die Arbeiterbewegung während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft,” in 
Reulecke, ed., 379. 
125 In December 1946, the KPD had 50,596 members in the Ruhr to the SPD’s 83,317. Almost all of the KPD 
members in the NRW Land were from the Ruhr territory. In the 1947 NRW land elections, the KPD won more than 
20% of the vote in 14 NRW cities, most of which were in the Ruhr. In Bochum the KPD tied the SPD vote of 32%, 
allowing the CDU to reach a plurality. The ostracism practiced by the SPD, CDU and British military authorities 
dampened the impact of the KPD’s vote but the KPD still attained important posts throughout the Ruhr, while the 
SPD surpassed the CDU’s presence in official positions in 1946 to become the most influential party in the Ruhr by 
a small margin. Hans Peter Ehni, in Reulecke, ed. 417; Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: 
Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1984), 40; and Felten, op. cit., 194-95. 
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The SPD shared the prevailing view that the Communist success in the Ruhr territory was 
a direct result of the miserable working and living conditions in the area. Indeed conditions in the 
Ruhr were dismal. Food shortages became ubiquitous and daily average calorie intake fell to life-
threatening levels.126 Wartime bombing also had a disproportionate impact on the Ruhr’s urban 
areas and destroyed much of the region’s working-class housing.127 In many of the Ruhr cities, 
half of pre-war housing lay in ruins.128 The large influx of expellees from the lost German 
Eastern provinces into NRW exacerbated the situation. Conditions continued to deteriorate over 
the next years. Heating, coal, and electrical shortages (in November 1946 the electrical supply 
covered only 30% of demand) made for dark and cold winters and combined to create an 
explosive social situation.129 Only over the course of 1948-49 did the food and electrical supply 
display marked improvement.130 
In the winter of 1947-1948, massive strikes and demonstrations broke out across the 
Ruhr. Although the strikers in 1947 demanded socialization and co-determination in industry, 
these strikes were in essence spontaneous, grass-roots hunger strikes with a political accent. The 
first protest broke out in Essen in February 1947. Its demands almost all related to the dire food 
situation.131 The strike aroused particular support in the mines. By March, tens of thousands of 
workers were demonstrating in each of the major Ruhr cities; in Duisburg the number reached 
100,000. The NRW regional government and the British military occupation responded with a 
number of reforms. Nölting introduced a point rationing system for coal miners that assured 
126 With the impact of the social unrest caused by food shortages during the First World War in mind, the Nazi 
government had taken great strides to ensure an adequate food supply for Germany’s cities during the war. As late 
as 1944-45, the rationing system provided an average consumption of 2,000 calories for Ruhr consumers. At the end 
of the war, rations were on average 1,200 calories, due primarily to the Allied bombing campaign of 1944-45, which 
targeted the rail system and destroyed the distribution network. The occupation authorities thrust responsibility for 
the rationing system into German, in fact, into SPD hands. NRW Economics Minister Erik Nölting became the 
target of popular frustration at the ineffective rationing system until the task moved to the CDU’s Hans Schlange-
Schöningen. The targeted average ration of 1,500 calories was almost never achieved in practice from 1945 to 1948. 
In 1947, the average daily ration in the Ruhr sank to 750 calories. The SPD’s early association with the failures of 
the rationing system did much to tarnish the party’s image. The KPD’s greatest success in the 1947 NRW elections 
was in Bochum, a city that had the lowest daily calorie ration of any area of the Bizone in spring 1947, a meager 
629. Coal workers scoured the countryside, often offering to trade coal for potatoes. Klessmann and Friedemann, op. 
cit., 22-24; Abelshauser, op. cit., 32, 40; and Brunn and Hobbing, eds., 82-84. 
127 In fact, an overwhelming majority of the heavily and medium-damaged dwellings of the Bizone were in the 
NRW and, especially, in the Ruhr territory. Brunn and Hobbing, eds., op. cit.,16; Klessemann and Friedemann, op. 
cit., 26. 
128 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 25. 
129 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 225, 236. 
130 Abelshauser, op. cit., 71; and Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 239. 
131 Karl Dietrich Erdmann, “Alternativen der deutschen Politik im Ruhrkampf,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 43; 
and Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 45-46. 
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them a far higher ration than the rest of the population.132 These actions succeeded in quieting 
the protest movement, but it broke out again in February 1948 as the Ruhr food supply reached 
its nadir. Throughout the British zone, 1.6 million workers struck on 3 February. This time the 
impetus came from the metal workers, rather than the miners.133  
The SPD recognized that hunger was driving workers to protest but it also interpreted the 
strikes within the context of its own anti-Communist tradition and the escalating Cold War. 
Though sympathetic to the strikers’ demands, it suspected that a “Communist orchestra director” 
had provoked and was exploiting the 1948 strikes for the KPD’s own political designs.134 The 
SPD press asked whether “One wishes to repeat the French and Italian experiments with internal 
unrest in West Germany?”135 Historians have since shown that SPD claims of KPD subversion in 
the strikes “belongs to the propaganda arsenal of the Cold War,”136 though Communists did lend 
enthusiastic support to the strikes. The SPD feared that the strikes might grant the Communists a 
propaganda coup and gain them greater traction within the trade union movement. The Social 
Democratic-leaning leaders of the trade unions, while split over whether to support the 1947 
strikes, were overwhelmingly hostile to their repetition in 1948.137 Within weeks of their 
outbreak, Schumacher conferred with the trade union leadership, telling them that, “We are of 
the opinion that the strikes under the current circumstances have no hope of success.”138 The 
trade unionists agreed, with the head of the German trade union federation, re-christened the 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), Hans Böckler, announcing that the strikes would not 
extract “one piece more of bread.”139  
The union leadership itself engaged in a battle to eliminate Communist influence from 
the Ruhr mines and factories. The task was not easy.140 Communist power in the local Ruhr 
unions made these the strongest bastion of KPD influence in the western zones from 1945 to 
132 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 36-37. 
133 Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 36. 
134 Ibid., 58-59. 
135 Ibid., 60. 
136 Ibid., 50. 
137 Ibid., 52, 55-56. 
138 SPD Parteivorstand, 26 January 1948, AdSD. 
139 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 75. 
140 At the founding congress of the coal miner’s union (Industrieverbandes Bergbau) on 9 December 1946, the 
Social Democrat August Schmidt only narrowly defeated Willi Agatz, the Communist candidate, for the leadership 
of the miners’ union. Although the federal unions succeeded in blocking a Communist presence among their 
leadership, the Communists were quite active and enjoyed wide support at the local levels. On the initiative of KPD 
workers, local unions took up KPD-inspired resolutions and submitted them directly to municipal governments. 
Borsdorf, op. cit., 401-2; and Felten, op. cit., 203. 
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1950. The union leadership faced the dilemma that the strike tactics that they rejected were 
popular beyond the ranks of the KPD. The DGB leaders had to make great exertions in order to 
reassert the prerogative of the federation over the local chapters to set strategy and tactics. They 
succeeded in defeating efforts to institutionalize decision-making autonomy for the local 
chapters, but the leaderships’ control over local actions was shaky throughout the territory and 
non-existent in parts of it. Future DGB leader Christian Fette sought to divert the workers’ anger 
towards the Communists at the DGB delegate conference of 30 January 1948. The food shortage, 
he told the assembly, was the consequence of the Soviet practice of exporting goods from its 
territory, but the delegates greeted this interpretation with “fierce protest.”141 Although the non-
Communist union leadership survived the crisis, the 1947 and 1948 strikes made apparent to all 
the limits of the federal unions’ power over their members.  
In the context of its national campaign to eliminate Communist influence, the SPD 
leadership found the situation in the Ruhr unions intolerable. During the crisis, the factory 
councils throughout the Ruhr had acted as a counterweight to the unions’ efforts to end the 
strikes.142 As they had after the First World War, the union leadership regarded the factory 
councils with suspicion and as a threat to their own position and power. Unlike the SPD, the 
KPD had expended great efforts to win the factory council elections in the aftermath of WWII.143 
Following the 1947 strikes, the SPD leadership, and the West-Westphalian SPD in particular, 
denounced the party’s “lethargy” in competing for these posts and undertook a decisive 
campaign to reclaim power in the councils from the KPD.144 By fall 1947, the party had groups 
operating in all the mines, though they were still outmatched by the KPD’s ground-level 
organization. There was a bitter struggle for power in the local mine unions for the next two 
141 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 61-63. 
142 Ibid., 65. 
143 In the September-October 1945 factory council elections, the KPD appears to have had a majority of the 
delegates; from 1946 to 1948, the KPD and SPD had an almost equal number of delegates. Pietsch, op. cit., 102-03; 
and Klesseman and Friedemann, op. cit., 68-70. 
144 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 71. In the document “Sozialdemokratische Partei, Unterbezirk Dortmund, 
Betriebssekretäriat 9.9.1947 Rundschreiben Nr 8/47,” Emil Emanuelsson (Betriebssekretär) writes that, “the KP(D) 
saw and carried through its most important work before 1933 in the mines. Their entire structure leads through the 
mines, through the factory council groups. The political organization is a factor of second rank for them. Their 
primary determination is the conquering of the factories. They have better discipline and for this reason their people 
are more active. Carefully regulated, until the last man they will lead and strictly and obstinately carry out the orders 
and instructions given from a central location...” In a circular the SPD West-Westphalian leadership instructed its 
officials in 1947 that, “The first task of the factory council groups is to eliminate the impact of Communist faction’s 
work through the enlightenment and activation of the social democratic council members.” in Ibid., 118-19; and 
Document “Sozialdemokratische Partei, Bezirk Westliches Westfalen Entwurf Richtlinien für die Arbeit der 
Betriebsgruppen” 21.3.1947, in Ibid., 114. 
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years. Aided by support from the occupation authorities, the CDU, and the propagandistic 
nightmare that the Berlin blockade brought upon the KPD, the SPD was able to deliver a 
decisive blow to the KPD in the factory council in 1949. Rapidly losing support at the federal 
level, the KPD never recovered.145  
The SPD had attained its long-standing goal of becoming the dominant party in the Ruhr 
by the end of 1949. It is of vital importance for our understanding of SPD responses to various 
proposals for the Ruhr from 1948 to 1951 that they coincided with the SPD’s efforts to 
consolidate its gain in the territory. As such, the national SPD often became a mouthpiece for the 
interests of the local Ruhr SPD. The policies and temperament of Schumacher’s leadership circle 
and the Ruhr SPD were often indistinguishable from 1948 to 1951. The national SPD made the 
socialization of heavy industry the centerpiece of its campaign for Germany’s reconstruction.146 
It did so due to party tradition and conviction, but in particular because it sought to represent the 
demands of the Ruhr working classes, mediated through the influence of the Ruhr SPD in the 
national party. Dramatic local events in the territory influenced SPD national policy.  
 
2.5 THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE RUHR VALLEY, AND  
THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALIZATION AND CO-DETERMINATION, 1948-1951 
 
A British military report from late 1945 laid bare the brewing conflict over socialization 
in the Ruhr: “Miners wish to eject all management as Nazis: however RCD (Ruhr Coal District. 
D.V.) [is] in favour of their retention as irreplaceable technical experts, who can obtain coal.”147 
A campaign for the socialization of heavy industry swept through the mines and metal factories 
of the Ruhr from 1945 to 1948, and polls revealed majorities for socialization among the Ruhr 
population, and heavy majorities among workers.148 Much of the impetus for this wave resulted 
from workers’ desire to prevent the reconstruction of the “reactionary” system of industrial 
145 Having won 33% of the factory council mandates in 1948 to the SPD’s 36%, the KPD share sank to 27% to the 
SPD’s 42% in 1949. Ibid., 72. In the October 1948 local elections, the KPD won only 7.8% of the vote in NRW 
compared to 14% in the regional elections the previous year and suffered a significant a loss of votes in the Ruhr. 
Pietsch, op. cit., 24.  For Pietsch, the SPD organizational assault on the KPD was the “decisive” factor in these 
developments.  
146 SPD leaders preferred the somewhat ambiguous term “socialization” to “nationalization,” in part because the 
latter term recalled the state-centered control apparatus of the Nazi period. Generally what SPD leaders meant by 
“socialization” was a balance of worker’s management with regional and national interest representatives. 
147 Pietsch, op. cit., 106. 
148 Abelshauser, op. cit., 30. 
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relations that the Ruhr industrialists had succeeded in (re)implanting in the Ruhr in the aftermath 
of the Ruhr occupation by the French government in the interwar period. Demands for the 
eviction of management were often the result of personal animosities, fueled by the frustrations 
of daily experiences. Ruhr industrial circles had secretly begun coordinating a strategy by late 
summer 1945 to reclaim their power and influence in the Ruhr mines and factories. The British 
military government vacillated as it sought to fashion its own policy for the region. The future of 
ownership in the Ruhr remained in doubt. After arresting over a hundred Ruhr industrialists and 
managers in 1946, British authorities allowed the old industrial families to reclaim the leadership 
of the holding societies of many Ruhr firms.149 Ruhr workers were furious to learn that the 
names of industrialists such as Hermann Reusch and Günther Henle (the nephew of the deceased 
industrialisat Peter Klöckner) were yet again being placed in positions that allowed them to 
rebuild their influence and claims to ownership.150  
Until 1951 the question of ownership of the Ruhr mines remained open.151 Resolving the 
conflict-ladden politics of the Ruhr became one of the principal tasks of the trizonal 
Parliamentary Council and of the national SPD. At the founding congress of the British zone 
DGB, the delegates approved a program calling for the socialization of heavy industry.152 As 
early as May 1946, a SPD office in Westphalia lamented the lack of zeal with which the de-
Nazification committees engaged their task.153 When the deliberately impotent de-Nazification 
law passed the NRW legislature on 29 April 1948, the SPD voted in opposition. A SPD deputy 
condemned the “failed” de-Nazification policies: “While a great number of fellow-travelers have 
been punished with the loss of their office and position, the truly guilty ones have not been 
149 Ibid., 19-20. 
150 After protest strikes broke out in 1948, a trade union delegation turned to the SPD faction in the council to block 
the British from allowing Hermann Reusch to sit on the Iron and Steel Commission. The “Reusch” affair became 
one of the most divisive issues of the pre-parliamentary body, pitting the SPD against the CDU and FDP. Though 
Reusch himself had maintained distance from the Nazis, the local and national SPD considered the reappointment of 
compromised personnel to be symptomatic of a failed British de-Nazification program. Werner Bührer, Ruhrstahl 
und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, 
1945-1952 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 44-46. See also, S. Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the 
Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
151 Sopade, 30 July 1947, “Gefahr für die Industrie,” EO 451, AdsD. The SPD national press took up the campaign 
to prevent former owners, such as M. C. Müller, the head of the Office for Steel and Iron, from returning to power 
and preventing the socialization of industry. 
152 Entschliessung “Zur Sozialisierung,” angenommen vom 1. Bundeskongress des DGB der britischen Zone, 22. bis 
25. April 1947 in Bielefeld. In Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 138. 
153 This was the view of Alfred Gleisner. Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 18. According to Pietsch, in the Ruhr 
cities 15-30% of civil servants, 10-30% of employees and 10% of workers were fired due to de-Nazification 
proceedings. Pietsch, op. cit., 76. 
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brought to justice.”154 The truly guilty ones, in SPD parlance, referred to influential figures in the 
economy who, in SPD narratives, were responsible for aiding and financing the rise of National 
Socialism.  
While SPD leaders considered socialization a key step towards the “planned economy” 
that they wished to implement in Germany, their foremost concern was the political power 
fostered by economic concentration. The experience of Weimar directly informed the SPD 
viewpoint. NRW Economics Minister Nölting called the failure to socialize the Ruhr in 1918-19 
a missed opportunity: “In my opinion Weimar in the end went the path of Golgotha because it 
was unable to solve the decisive problem of dissolving the power of private concentration and 
tearing down the State within the State” that resulted from such great economic power lying in 
private hands.155 In the internal discussions of the SPD’s socialization commission, Nölting 
returned to this argument, telling his colleagues that, “Our socialization has not only economic 
purposes, but also comes out of considerations of political power.”156 The lessons of history were 
equally important for Fritz Henssler, who called for socialization as early as May 1945. He told 
the West-Westphalian district congress that after the First World War, “we had perhaps not 
clearly enough recognized that the complete destruction of the power of large ownership 
(Grossbesitzes) was decisive for the implantation of democracy and that our argument at the time 
that one cannot socialize ruins appears to us today almost as a comfortable alibi.”157 The 
majority SPD (the SPD had experienced a schism during the First World War) and ADGB had in 
fact opposed socialization during the massive April 1919 miners’ strike. Only after the failure of 
the 1920 Kapp Putsch, by which time socialization had become politically impossible, did the 
SPD and ADGB shift gears and call for socialization in the Ruhr.158  
The views of the regional leaders Nölting and Henssler fit quite well with those of the 
SPD national leadership. Often referring to the binds that tied heavy industry to the Wilhelmine 
state of the nineteenth century, Schumacher saw socialization as an historic duty for the party. 
His narrative of German history made this clear:  
154 Düding, op. cit., 73-74. 
155 Ibid., op. cit., 85. 
156 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 212. 
157 Fritz Henssler, “Bezirksparteitag der SPD des Westlichen Westfalens—“Wir sind mehr als nur Mitglieder einer 
Partei, wir sind eine echte Gesinnungsgemeinschaft”—Referat des Bezirksvorsitzenden Fritz Henssler am 14. Mai 
1948 in Lünen,” in Högl and Bohrisch, eds.,118. 
158 Hans Mommsen, “Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr 1918-1933,” in Reulecke, ed., 293-98. 
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Supported by the Prussian government, its officials and military, the Master-in-House 
[policy] was established. The trinity of throne, altar and money (Geldsack) became the 
strongest factor. For the entire period of the Kaisserreich industrial power was the real 
master of the country...One can say of the western German large industrialists that they 
were more rigid, harder, more violent and had less of a conscience than the exponents of 
the eastern-Elbe agrarian- and military feudalism, whose societal example they sought, 
like awkward parvenus, to copy.159  
 
By autumn 1946, Schumacher had designated two leading NRW officials, Nölting and Viktor 
Agartz, to collaborate in formulating a SPD proposal for the socialization of heavy industry.160 
When the KPD preempted the SPD and offered a socialization bill to the NRW legislature in 
December 1946, Henssler wrote to Ernst Gnoss that the SPD must counter with its own proposal. 
In the 21 January 1947, NRW-SPD faction meeting, the group decided to present a proposal to 
transfer the coal, iron and steel industries into “collective property.” The SPD faction brought the 
law to the legislature on 29 July 1947, with the clear intention that a NRW socialization law 
would serve as a model and precedent for a national German government. NRW Minister 
President Karl Arnold of the CDU, who was close to Christian-democratic trade unions, worked 
to achieve consensus between the SPD and CDU, while Adenauer encouraged the NRW-CDU to 
employ tactics to delay a vote on the law.161 Over a year later, the socialization bill passed the 
NRW legislature with the votes of the Center, KPD, and SPD parties.  
Under U.S. pressure, the British military authorities vetoed the bill, as they had in the 
SPD stronghold of Lower Saxony. Having defeated its Communist opponents, the SPD found the 
coalition of the CDU right and occupation authorities a far more formidable challenge to their 
designs for the Ruhr. In fact, the Ruhr and national SPD became increasingly strident by 1948 as 
the chances for a fundamental realignment of power in the Ruhr appeared to be escaping their 
grasps. The SPD deplored that the Allied de-concentration program seemed destined to leave 
property relations unreformed.162 Socialization remained a fundamental demand of the industrial 
unions as well.  
As the fight to socialize Ruhr heavy industry continued to suffer defeats, the trade unions 
shifted to a strategy of trying to obtain as much power for workers’ representatives in the 
159 “Rede des Vorsitzenden der SPD Dr. Schumacher am Donnerstag,” 13 February 1948, Kurt Schumacher 44, 
AdsD.  
160 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 40. 
161 Düding, op. cit., 77-85. 
162 For an overview of the relationship between the Allied governments and the Ruhr industrialists organized into the 
Wirtschaftsverein Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, see Werner Bührer, Ruhrstahl und Europa. 
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management of firms as possible. The postwar trade unions sought to reconstruct and deepen the 
“co-determination” (Mitbestimmung) institutions dismantled by the Nazis. In the interwar era, 
the social-democratic unions had at first kept their distance from the co-determination bodies 
guaranteed in the Weimar constitution. After the 1922 law assuring workers’ representation in 
the firms’ oversight boards passed the Reichstag, the ADGB warmed to the institution and, at its 
1925 congress, called for an extension of co-determination powers and for “parity” between 
workers and employers.163 The federal union’s demand received a theoretical basis when Fritz 
Naphtali published his influential book, Economic democracy—Its Essence, Path and Goal, in 
1928. In August 1946, the trade union conference of the British zone resurrected the demand for 
co-determination in industry. The primary thrust for the co-determination campaign came from 
the IG Metall union, which placed it at the center of its demands for a renovation of German 
industrial relations.164 The demand also surfaced in the protest strikes that broke out. In response, 
the British military government went part of the way to meet the unions’ demands in 1947/48, 
reestablishing a form of co-determination in 1947/48 for the iron industry as well as for the 
Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung (DKBL), a board set up to oversee the coal industry.165  
Wedded to the socialization campaign, the SPD leadership took up the call from their 
union allies for co-determination with some reluctance. The national SPD press called for co-
determination and the building of an “economic democracy” in December 1946.166 Henssler 
announced his support of the co-determination strategy, but argued that it must include workers’ 
representatives from outside the industry being administered, in order to prevent the 
development of “group egoism” that might pit the workers and employers of one industry against 
those of another.167 After the British veto of the NRW socialization law, the SPD took the 
unions’ demands for co-determination to the NRW legislature where, after a year of bitter 
debate, it approved a co-determination law in summer 1949. Again the British military 
163 Hans-Jürgen Teuteberg, “Ursprünge und Entwicklung der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland,” in Hans Pohl, ed., 
Mitbestimmung: Ursprünge und Entwicklung: Referate und Diskussionsbeiträge der 5. Öffentlichen 
Vortragsveranstaltung der Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte e.V. am 7. Mai 1980 in Düsseldorf 
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 33-42. 
164 Horst Thum, Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie: Der Mythos vom Sieg der Gewerkschaften (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), 19-22. 
165 Gabriel Müller-List, “Die Entstehung der Montanmitbestimmung,” in Walter Först, ed., Zwischen Ruhrkontrolle 
und Mitbestimmung (Cologne: Kohlhammer, 1982), 128.; and Thum, op. cit., 18. 
166 SPD-Pressedienst, 17 December 1946, cited in Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 37. 
167 Fritz Henssler, “Politik nicht Agitation 1947,” in Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 153-54. 
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government vetoed the law.168 Blocked at the regional level by the military authorities, the SPD 
had to bring the co-determination campaign into the newly constituted Bundestag. As we shall 
see, the debate over the Schuman Plan would be conspicuously tied to the national fight over co-
determination from 1950 to 1952.  
Finally, the greatest threat of all to the Ruhr working class in the view of the SPD was the 
Allied dismantlement program. Erich Ollenhauer’s private notes reveal how memory from the 
recent past prompted the SPD leadership to consider dismantlements as an existential threat to 
the future of German democracy. He wrote that, “Dismantlements mean a serious crisis of 
confidence/Hopelessness for millions/Economic Crisis 1930/33 fertile soil for Nazis and 
KPD.”169 As the British plans for dismantlement began to take shape, Henssler and Nölting took 
on the task of defending their own. As early as February 1946, Henssler warned that the 
announced dismantlement of the Union and Hösch factories would be “for Dortmund—if not a 
death sentence, it would certainly mean a condemnation to a long-lasting infirmity 
[Siechtum].”170 Henssler was among the foremost advocates of a hard line on the dismantlement 
issue within the SPD.171 As chief intermediary between the NRW government and the British 
military authorities on economic issues, Nölting was the most important political figure working 
to mitigate the consequences of the dismantlement program.172  
In October and November 1947, Nölting and the SPD Central Committee worked in 
tandem to set SPD strategy in the campaign against dismantlements. Their responses mirrored 
one another: both placed ultimate blame for the dismantlements on the “criminal” policies of the 
Nazis, but also stressed that the program contradicted the aims of the recently announced 
Marshall Plan and was proof that the Allied policies lacked a “European spirit.”173 Revealing 
168 Düding, op. cit., 92-96. 
169 Notes for speech 1947, EO 60, AdsD. 
170 Fritz Henssler, “Ehrenmal-Weihe in Wickede,” February 1946, in Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 62. 
171 Düding, op. cit., 72. 
172 When the British finally announced on 17 October 1947 their list of 681 factories to be dismantled, Nölting at 
first adopted delaying tactics. In his diary he laid out his strategy: “Play for time, don’t conjure any nationalism, cast 
doubt upon the capacity calculations, offer no objects for exchange.” In the next years, Nölting tirelessly assembled 
portfolios on employment and production statistics of the Ruhr factories and, with notable success, worked to 
convince the British to reduce their list of dismantlements. Düding writes that Nölting “put his stamp on the North-
Rhine-Westphalian Anti-Dismantlement-Policy.” Düding, op. cit., 292-93. SPD Vice President of the NRW 
legislature and SPD central committee member Alfred Dobbert later said that, “It is thanks to Economics Minister 
Prof. Dr. Nölting that the struggle against the dismantlements ended with such a remarkable success.” Klessman and 
Friedemann, op. cit., 12-13; Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 243, 248, 257-67. 
173Parteivorstand Frankfurt/Main, 28 October 1947; “Stimmen zur Demontage,” Sopade Nr. 321, 7 November 1947, 
SPD Parteivorstand 1947, AdsD; Nölting’s comments from 29 October 1947 are in Claudia Nölting, op. cit.,  242. 
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again the central place that the Ruhr and NRW had in SPD national policies, the SPD faction in 
the Economic Council demanded that the burden of dismantlement be shared equitably across 
the zones and not be focused disproportionately on NRW and the French zone.174 Long absent 
from exercising direct influence on the policies for the Ruhr’s future, the negotiations to merge 
the French zone with the Anglo-American Bizone hinged in large part around the French 
government’s demand that it participate in Allied designs for the Ruhr. The assiduousness with 
which the French authorities pursued dismantlement in their largely agricultural zone augured 
poorly for a moderate policy in the Ruhr. As Schumacher never tired of noting, “the real impact 
of French dismantlements lies only slightly behind those of the Russian zone...”175 The French 
government from 1948 on presented a new, and in the view of many in the SPD, the most 
formidable of all obstacles to the SPD policy on the Ruhr.  
 
2.6 THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, ECONOMIC SECURITY, AND  
FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION, 1944-1948 
 
Rooted as they were in domestic concerns, the SPD’s policies for the Ruhr put it on a collision 
course with its French fraternal party. As we shall see, the SFIO shared many of the SPD’s views 
on Ruhr policy, far more, in fact, than did any other French party. However, the Ruhr also 
conjured French Socialist fears rooted in national history and memory. Crucially, the Ruhr’s 
resources constituted a material necessity for French and French Socialist designs for a far-
reaching industrial modernization program. As discussed above, historians for the most part 
concur that the SFIO was among the least “nationalist” and most “internationalist” of the postwar 
western European socialist parties.176 No doubt the SFIO leadership’s rhetoric on international 
issues from 1948 to 1952 was generally far milder than that coming out of Schumacher’s 
Hannover circle. Examining the reasons for the SFIO’s program for the Ruhr, though, reveals 
174 Aktennotiz Fraktionssitzung Montag, den 27. Oktober 1947, 15 Uhr, Frankfurt, Gerhard Kreyssig 62, AdsD. 
175 Referat Dr. Schumacher auf der Redakteurkonferenz der Parteipresse am 30. November 1947 in Hannover, 
Schumacher 43, AdsD. 
176 Gérard Bossuat, “Léon Blum et l’organisation de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale,” in René Girault 
and Gilbert Ziebura, eds., Léon Blum, socialiste européen (Brussels: Editions complexe, 1995), 166; Guillaume 
Devin, L’Internationale socialiste: Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945-1990) (Paris: Presse de 
la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993), 38-41; Michael Newman, Socialism and European Unity: The 
Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France (London: Junction Books, 1983), 18-19; Raymond Poidevin, “Die 
französische Deutschlandpolitik, 1943-1949,” in Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, eds., Die 
Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die französische Zone, 1945-1949 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), 22.  
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that the SFIO was also pursuing policies rooted in domestic political aims. Like the SPD, it 
seemed to the SFIO that the stakes in the dispute over the Ruhr could not be higher.  
French Socialists, like their German counterparts, would never have conceded that their 
postwar policies on heavy industry represented “nationalist” claims. Historian Michel Winoch, 
himself coming out of the French left tradition, distinguishes between an “open nationalism” of 
“patriots,” which was “of the left, republican, founded on popular sovereignty, and call[ed] on 
suppressed nations to liberate themselves from their chains” against a “closed nationalism” of the 
“nationalists” that “subordinated all interests exclusively to the nation, the nation-state, to its 
force, its power, its grandeur.”177 The SFIO generally falls into Winoch’s characterization of 
“open nationalism” within the Jacobin tradition, as one can see in the SFIO’s moderate policies 
toward German reconstruction in the postwar period.  
In the contemporary parlance of the French Fourth Republic, however, the attributes of 
“closed nationalism” were synonymous with the term “nationalism,” and evoked as well a 
punitive Poincarist-style policy for Germany. Though the French word nationalisme appears to 
have arisen during the late 1790s, the term gained new connotations during the tumultuous 
Dreyfus Affair a century later. The political realignment brought about by the Dreyfus Affair and 
the campaign of Jean Jaurès, Léon Blum and others for Dreyfus’ exoneration was a defining 
moment in the political identity formation of many of those who went on to found the SFIO, 
which united the various currents of French socialism under a new program and name in 1905, 
just a year before Dreyfus regained his position in the French army. French Socialists 
consciously expunged anti-Semitic rhetoric from their rhetorical armature and declared a 
domestic struggle against “nationalists,” who combined racism, anti-Semitism and militarism to 
rebrand the French political right. SFIO leaders considered themselves to be anti-nationalist by 
definition. Given its dedication to a program for French-German reconciliation, why did the 
SFIO lay out far-reaching demands for the Ruhr territory that led it into a bitter conflict with the 
SPD? 
Considering the national traumas of the First and Second World Wars for France, and the 
often very personal traumas that these wars brought about for many leading French Socialists, it 
is rather remarkable that they pushed as hard as they did within the French political scene for a 
non-punitive, reconciliatory policy for France-German relations from 1945 to 1948. However, as 
177 Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France (Paris: Seuil, 2004, 1982), 11-38.  
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one of the leading parties of postwar France, one must remember that, despite claims to 
internationalism, they were elected by French voters to govern France and to repair the economic 
and social disaster left by the Second World War. In addition, they could not but be affected by 
the principal psychological and political currents of French politics, even if they so often found 
themselves opposed to the policies of the majority. As we have seen, the SFIO steadfastly 
opposed the French government’s program to ensure French security through a long-term 
destruction of centralized German political power. What they did share with a majority of the 
French political world, however, was a view that French security was in large part economic in 
nature and required that France achieve a level of industrial power sufficient to contain what they 
saw as a rapacious and insatiable German economy on their border.178 The SPD, for its part, 
never came to fully accept the SFIO’s position that French security had a central economic 
dimension. 
In the realm of high politics after the Second World War, most statesmen directly tied 
geopolitical power to levels of national industrialization. Today politicians and economists tend 
to analyze economic strength by measuring a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
productivity, unemployment levels, and by use of the more elusive category of competitiveness. 
Utilizing GDP as a method of appraisal was a child of the postwar era and was first employed in 
the United States in 1947. It took some time to gain credibility as a measure within Europe. 
Unemployment had already gained great importance as a standard in Western Europe due to the 
social cataclysm it wreaked during the Great Depression. Postwar politicians often saw the fate 
of their democracy to be reflected in unemployment statistics. Productivity was just gaining 
traction in Europe as a measure. It soon became a constant in the analyses of leading SFIO 
economist André Philip, who did much to popularize the concept in French politics. The head of 
the French Planning Commission, Jean Monnet, only began stressing the importance of 
productivity within the French administration in the years 1948-1949.179 The concept would 
continually gain in importance over the course of the 1950s. 
178 Robert Frank writes that, “Henceforth economic considerations took the place of politics and culture in the 
evaluation of power. This was the great difference between the ‘value system’ before and after 1940.” Robert Frank, 
“The French Dilemma: Modernization with Dependence or Independence and Decline,” in Josef Becker and Frank 
Knipping, eds., Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950 (New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 264. 
179 Thum, op. cit., 70-71. 
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Emerging from the Second World War, however, the gold standard for measuring 
national economic power remained raw industrial production and population statistics. The 
language of the Economic and Defense Ministries, newspapers, and National Assembly debates 
were replete with monthly (often comparative) national statistics of coal, steel, iron, gas and 
electrical production.180 This standard gained particular resonance in France because it was 
entwined with national narratives of the history of French-German relations that emphasized 
French economic inferiority and the “crisis” of French natalism.181 
Many postwar French politicians premised their views of France’s geopolitical strength 
on raw production statistics with which they based their assessments of the diverging historical 
evolution of French and German industrialization.182 The “shock” of Napoleon III’s defeat to 
Prussia in 1870 had, after all, been in large part a result of the Germans armies’ superior use of 
railways as a military tactic. In the 1880s, German industrialization took a clear leap forward 
compared to developments in France, in large part due to explosive growth in the coal, iron, 
steel, machine-building, chemical and electrical industries.  Much of the driving force for this 
growth lay in the Ruhr territory. Whereas in 1850 France had produced twice as much raw iron 
than the states that came to form the German Empire, in 1910 Germany produced three times 
more raw iron as France and four times as much steel and electricity.183 Although French coal 
production had increased from 1 million tons in 1820 to 41 million in 1913, it seemed to lag 
hopelessly behind the industrial engines of Great Britain and Germany.184 These developments 
were fueled by a demographic chasm: while the French population grew from 37 million in 1850 
180 Klaus Schwabe, “Grossbritannien und die Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 70. 
181 As Kaelble has demonstrated, if French public opinion had utilized GDP statistics as a standard for the period of 
industrialization from 1870 to the First World War, it would have found French economic growth to have lagged 
only slightly behind German growth. The greater German economic growth, he claims, was mostly the result of 
larger demographic growth in Germany. The principal French industrial regions, the Nord, Lyon and Paris grew as 
quickly as their German counterparts. In fact, he argues that despite the prevalence of narratives claiming national 
decline, the French population on the eve of WWI was wealthier, enjoyed a higher standard of living and lived 
longer on average than Germans. Helmut Kaelble, Nachbarn am Rhein: Entfremdung und Annäherung der 
französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 20-27. 
182 Kuisel writes that, “What was distinctive about France was the compelling sense of economic backwardness.” 
Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the state in modern France: Renovation and economic management in the 
twentieth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 201. 
183 Kaelble, op. cit., 22-24. For a useful comparative overview of the French and German steel industries from the 
late nineteenth century until the ECSC, see Philippe Mioche, “Et l’acier créara l’Europe...” Matériaux pour 
l’histoire de notre temps 47 (1997): 29-36; and Matthias Kipping, “Inter-firm relations and industrial policy: the 
French and German steel producers and users in the twentieth century,” Business History 38.1 (1996).  
184 Daryl Holter, The Battle for Coal: Miners and the Politics of Nationalization in France, 1940-1950 (Dekalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), 22-23. 
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to 42 million in 1910, in Germany the population grew from 32 to 59 million. From 1879 to 
1910, four million Frenchmen and women migrated from rural to urban areas; seven million 
Germans did so from 1870 to 1914.185 The result was that eleven million workers labored in 
German industry by 1900; in France, the number was six million. German heavy industry 
employed more than double the number employed by French heavy industry.186 Trade between 
France and Germany added to a growing sense of malaise as the strength of French agricultural 
exports to Germany seemed paltry compared to the influx of German steel, iron, chemicals and 
machine tools into France.187 French exports on the European continent gave way before the 
German export boom; German exports to France doubled from 1898 to 1913.188 
French victory in the First World War did little to change the balance of economic power, 
real and perceived, between the two countries. France regained the industrial region of Alsace-
Lorraine, but the Lorraine iron industry remained dependent on coal imports from a Ruhr 
industrial class eager to inflict damage on Germany’s lost territory. Helmut Kaelble writes that 
the First World War “plainly revealed what some prewar pundits had noted; on the economic 
terrain France could not meet Germany as an equal.”189 As the Great Depression and new war 
clouds darkened European skies, French industrial production failed to match the gains made 
under the Nazi re-industrialization program. Whereas in 1929 Germany had produced 16 million 
tons of steel to France’s 9.5, in 1938 the statistics were 19.8 and 6.1.190 With steel pouring into 
the production of planes, tanks, and rail, these were ominous statistics indeed.  
The French far right hammered the Third Republic for falling behind Germany 
throughout the interwar period. It saw in the demographic and production statistics a crisis of the 
French character and soul that, in its interpretation, proved the decadence of French political and 
cultural elites. While eschewing the cultural determinism of their right-wing critics, of which 
they had often been the primary targets, French Socialists shared the prevailing post-WWII 
consensus that French defeat in the recent war had in large part been economic in nature.  
185 Kaeble, op. cit., 22-29. 
186 There were 1.6 million employed in French mines and metal-producing and transforming industries while 3.5 
million worked in these industries in Germany in the lead-up to the First World War. Klaus Schwabe, 
“Grossbritannien und die Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 70. 
187 Kaelble, op. cit., 25. 
188 Ibid., 28. 
189 Ibid., 31. 
190 Clemens A. Wurm, “Les cartels internationaux de l’acier de l’entre-deux-guerres: Précurseurs du Plan 
Schuman?,” in Wilkens ed., 65. 
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France’s industrial apparatus had suffered considerable damage during the war. Still 
reeling from the Great Depression, the impact of which hit France later than most other European 
countries, it then suffered four years of systematic exploitation during the German occupation of 
World War II. Then French industry ground to a halt as liberation armies swept through France 
in 1944-45. The energy sectors (gas, coal, electricity) lay still, creating an acute crisis for a 
transport system already over-burdened by the demands of the Allied militaries.191 Years of low 
capital investment in heavy industry had created an industrial landscape littered with broken or 
barely functioning machinery, much of which had been built during the reconstruction phase 
after the First World War in the early 1920s.192 Industrial workers were overworked, underfed, 
and demoralized. A massive miners’ strike came on the heels of liberation, further exacerbating 
the energy crisis. Shipments of coal under the Lend-Lease program from winter 1944 to summer 
1945 were all that shielded the French population from the complete devastation a lack of coal 
for transporting food and heating homes would have inflicted.  
Material necessities dictated that the primary objective of France’s liberation government 
would be to restore the coal supply and prevent its malnourished population from experiencing 
starvation. Much of the task fell on the new Socialist Minister of Industrial Production, Robert 
Lacoste, who told the French Constitutive Assembly in December 1944 that his first task was to 
attack the coal problem and reconstruct the country’s electrical network.193 The government also 
charged him with coordinating the rationing of raw materials, primarily coal, to industry.  
In the next years, the French government reached a conclusion that became decisive for 
France’s postwar development. It accepted the argument of Jean Monnet and others that France 
must not only reconstruct, but also fundamentally modernize its industrial sector. To do this, 
Jean Monnet set up a Planning Commissariat outside the control of the Ministries of Industrial 
Production, Finance, and Economy that answered directly to the Prime Minister. As is often the 
case, Monnet’s designs for the Commissariat led to an inter-ministerial turf war, as the other 
economic ministries struggled to maintain their prerogative to shape the postwar French 
191 Kuisel writes that in 1944 “coal supplies were so low that French industry was on the verge of expiration.” 
Kuisel, op. cit., 183. 
192 “Most coal-mining firms never moved far beyond the modernization efforts of the early 1920s...They continued 
to use steam-powered locomotives to move coal rather than switch to more efficient electrical-based transport 
systems.” Holter, op. cit., 31. 
193 7 December 1944, Journal Officiel (JO), 466. 
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economy. Robert Lacoste and André Philip, Economics Minister from 1946-47, fought against 
granting far-reaching powers to the Commissariat.194  
The initial resistance to Monnet’s planning designs within the ranks of the SFIO was not 
based on principle. The idea of planning as a Socialist mode of governing under a capitalist 
system had made great strides within the party during the interwar period. Much of the impetus 
came from the Belgian Socialist Henri de Man, who popularized a Socialist alternative to the 
Soviet planning system. By the early 1930s, a young generation of economic experts in the trade 
union federation, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), and in the SFIO worked to win 
the party and unions to the planiste philosophy. Many of the early planistes became prominent 
figures in postwar French socialism and attained government positions. In addition to André 
Philip and Jules Moch for the SFIO, the CGT planistes included Christian Pineau and Robert 
Lacoste.195 Although party leaders Léon Blum and Paul Faure opposed the planistes at the 1934 
party congress, the debate turned around the usefulness of planning as an electoral tactic, rather 
than its substance.196 With political power seemingly far out of their reach, there seemed to the 
party delegates little reason to develop a detailed economic program for government. To 
everyone’s surprise, however, the Popular Front (PF) election of 1936 brought the SFIO to 
power under Prime Minister Léon Blum. Although the PF government had little time to institute 
a planning policy due to the tumultuous domestic and international political climate, a Socialist 
planiste, Charles Spinasse, became Economic Minister and Jules Moch entered Blum’s 
government as well.  
The idea continued to gain ground among Socialists in the French resistance. In 
December 1941, Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle created study commissions to devise 
economic policy for a postwar government. André Philip headed the Commissariat for the 
Interior and Labor within which planners carved out an influential role, though political 
differences led to a failure to issue recommendations.197 Meanwhile other efforts at planning 
among the Free French paralleled the Vichy government’s attempts to create planning 
institutions amidst the difficulties of German interference in the French economy. Following the 
194 Kuisel, op. cit., 194-5. 
195 Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet: Génèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987), 
103. 
196 Kuisel, op. cit., 114-15. 
197 Ibid., 160-63. 
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war, a “planning consensus” emerged among French politicians, signaling an economic sea-shift 
from the austere interwar period.198  
On 4 December 1945, Jean Monnet proposed that Charles de Gaulle create a “Plan of 
Modernization and Equipment” and charge him with its execution. On the eve of de Gaulle’s 
resignation, the government accepted Monnet’s proposal and named Monnet Director of 
Planning on 3 January 1946. The new government, under Socialist Félix Gouin brokered a 
compromise between Monnet and the new Economic Minister, André Philip. While Philip would 
oversee the short-term reconstruction plan, Monnet’s Commissariat would design a four-year 
plan to be effective through 1950. Over the next months Socialists Jules Moch and André Philip 
tried to take charge of France’s postwar planning.199 The Socialists, in this phase, were Monnet’s 
principal opponents. They argued for a more powerful and centralized form of planning than that 
promoted by Monnet and for its extension to the private economy.200 In Monnet’s design, the 
plan would not be binding on private industry; rather, the state would use its power to direct 
resources and investment in a period of paucity to push industry to conform to its objectives. 
Here Monnet received the unexpected support of the PCF, which sought to stem the Socialists’ 
efforts to direct economic policy. The debate that ensued was never over the principles of the 
Monnet plan, but was rather primarily about political power.201 Philip, in fact, supported the 
most controversial part of Monnet’s proposal, when he told the Economic Commission on 18 
February 1946 that, “Like Russia on the eve of the first Five Year Plan, we must sacrifice present 
consumption to assist future production.”202 It is noteworthy that the most assiduous opponents 
of Monnet were those Socialists who had been immersed in the interwar planning efforts. 
The Gouin government approved the Planning Commission’s recommendations and 
charged Blum and Monnet with the task of acquiring the loans and raw materials from the United 
States needed to begin to put the plan into effect. The result was the Blum-Byrnes accord of 1946 
198 Hitchcock, op. cit., 39. 
199 Jules Moch’s planning proposal from 1942 was a large source of inspiration for Philip. “Moch proposed creating 
some twenty autonomous sectors, autonomous because they were free of both capitalism and the state. Only the 
large firms in each sector need be expropriated to render an entire branch autonomous. A general council composed 
of managers, workers, and representatives of the general interest managed each sector...In Moch’s view this was a 
democratic and socialist form of production.” Kuisel, op. cit., 175. 
200 Mioche, op. cit., 91. 
201 Philip argued that Monnet’s intention to raise French industrial production to 25% above the 1929 figure was 
overly optimistic. In addition, he argued that the plan overestimated the role of coal and did not consider the use of 
oil as a substitute energy source. Mioche, op. cit., 191-93. 
202 Ibid., 190-91. 
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that opened up a line of credit and increased deliveries of U.S. coal to France. When Blum 
formed an all-Socialist interim government in December 1946, Monnet’s position appeared again 
to be under threat. The SFIO was determined to appoint Gouin Minister for Planning. Monnet 
pleaded his case to a sympathetic Blum, who enacted a compromise in which Gouin entered the 
government as an unofficial Minister for Planning and Monnet remained at the head of the 
Planning Commissariat. After defeating the SFIO planistes in 1934, Prime Minister Blum signed 
the decree making the Four Year Plan official policy in January 1947. Blum called the document 
an “essential piece” of France’s economic recovery.203  
Although the Socialist Party had failed in its effort to enact a more far-reaching and 
interventionist form of planning, it found much to be enthusiastic about in Monnet’s Four Year 
Plan. In February 1947, Monnet’s former Socialist opponents (Philip, Moch, Gouin, and Pineau) 
publicly rallied in support of the Plan’s objectives.204 Gouin presented the Monnet Plan to the 
SFIO Directing Committee on 27 February 1947. Noting the heavy French reliance on imports, 
“the weakness of our birth rate,” and “our obsolete equipment,” he argued that, “I believe that 
the Plan translates the efforts of the Party in the economic domain.”205 As the Communists were 
forced from government and the French political scene began to move markedly to the right over 
the course of 1947, the Socialist Party became the most ardent defender of the Monnet Plan 
against liberal politicians determined to strangle the postwar experiment with planning in its 
infancy. SFIO delegates tirelessly took to the floor of the National Assembly over the course of 
1947 to 1951 to stem efforts of the political right to reduce government investments aimed at 
modernizing heavy industry.206 As we shall see, the SFIO’s determination to see the Monnet 
Plan through to a successful conclusion is essential for understanding how SFIO policy on the 
Ruhr developed. 
Before the domestic assault on financing the investment policies of the Monnet Plan 
began, an even more serious problem confronted supporters of the Plan. France faced a hopeless 
shortage of coal. In the interwar period, France had been the most reliant of all the industrial 
nations on coal imports, habitually importing about 30-45% of the coal it consumed.207 France 
203 Kuisel, op. cit., 235. Roger Quilliot discusses Blum’s relationship with planism. Roger Quilliot, La S.F.I.O. et 
l’exercice du pouvoir 1944-1958 (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 94-95. 
204 Philip, 18 February 1947, and Pineau, 20 February 1947 to the National Assembly, JO 367, 392. 
205 Comité directeur, 27 February 1947, OURS. 
206 See, for instance, SFIO deputy Francis Leenhardt’s speech to the National Assembly, 26 April 1950, JO, 2885. 
207 Hitchcock, op. cit., 67. 
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had, like all industrial nations of the time, a coal-based economy, with 76% of its entire energy 
consumption coming from coal.208 The coal shortage threatened the steel and transport 
industries, and hurt consumers, who still relied overwhelmingly on coal for heat. But it also 
affected all sectors of the economy. Lacoste and others explained to the National Assembly in 
1945 how the lack of coal was causing shortages of goods in sectors as diverse as bicycles and 
sugar, as these industries required coal to operate.209  
The government had no choice. The coal had to come from the Ruhr. Other sources were 
impossible. The Labour government in Great Britain, a country that had exported a great amount 
of coal in the interwar period, was determined to keep its coal in Britain to build its own 
industry. Another important supplier, Poland, lay on the other side of what was soon to be 
popularly known as the “Iron Curtain” and needed coal for its own reconstruction. Whereas it 
had exported on average 1 to 2 million tons of coal per year to France in the interwar period, it 
exported only 576,000 to France in 1946 and it was possible that the geopolitical situation would 
cause this source to dry up completely.210 The French government signed a series of short-term 
accords with the United States to meet its minimum needs for coal, but the cost of transporting 
coal across the Atlantic made a continued reliance on this source prohibitive. In addition, the 
French government had to pay for U.S. coal in dollars and the chronic “dollar shortage” of the 
period made this an even bleaker option. Coal from the Ruhr, on the other hand, was selling at 
half the world market price.211 
The Ruhr, however, lay in the British occupation zone. This was a fundamental structural 
factor for French and, as we shall see, for French Socialist foreign policy in the initial postwar 
period. The French government was able to acquire tutelage over the Saar region, another coal-
producing area, but exports from the Saar could only go part of the way to meeting France’s 
energy needs. By late 1945, the French government angrily noted that it was receiving only half 
of its allotted amount of Ruhr coal.212 The situation deteriorated further in 1946.213 Half of 
208 Korff, op. cit., 132. 
209 Agricultural Minister André Tanguy-Prigent to the Provisional Assembly, 12 December 1944, JO, 487-88. 
210 Pierre Gerbet, Le rélèvement, 1944-1949 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1991), 142. 
211 From May 1945 to September 1947 German coal sold at $10.50 a ton, less than half the world market price. 
Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen 
Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 87. 
212 Sylvie Lefèvre, Les relations économiques franco-allemands de 1945 à 1955: De l’occupation à la cooperation 
(Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière, 1998), 49. 
213 France received 386,000 tons of coal from the British zone in February 1946. In April 1946 this figure had fallen 
to 111,561 and averaged about 100,000 for the rest of 1946. Korff writes that, “Little by little over the course of the 
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France’s imports of coal in the first six months of 1946 came from the U.S.; only one-seventh 
came from the Ruhr.214 By the end of 1946, coal shortages forced the French government to 
cancel trains and close factories for several days at a time.215  
If the French government could not obtain an adequate supply of coal, the Monnet Plan 
would remain no more than a fantasy. A pessimistic climate developed among the planning staff 
and, on 26 November 1946, Monnet signaled that he had underestimated France’s coal needs and 
that industrial production was stalling throughout France.216 Mollet’s report argued that it was 
imperative to raise coal imports from Germany from 300-400,000 a month to 1.3 million.217 
Here is not the place to retrace the work of diplomatic historians, who have demonstrated how 
the French government in effect demanded a secure supply of cheap coal as its price for aligning 
with the Western countries against the Soviet Union in 1946-1947.218 As the most ardent 
defenders of the modernization plan, Socialist ministers were among the most insistent that 
France receive a greater supply of coal and coke from the Ruhr. Prime Minister Blum wrote 
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee in early 1946: 
One or two million tons of coal more per month, voilà what will determine our economic 
construction or our political destruction. I don’t exaggerate in the slightest when I affirm 
that the fate of democracy and of socialism in France—and by extension in Europe—is in 
play for this price. One or two million tons, that is to say a tiny quantity relative to your 
total production in Great Britain or of normal production in the Ruhr.219  
 
The situation became even more dire due to developments in the French coal regions. Philip 
wrote a distressing report for the planning staff in early March describing how the repatriation of 
German Prisoners of War working in French mines had caused the French coal industry to fall 
far short of the Monnet Plan’s 1947 targets for domestic coal production. The consequence of 
this was that the iron, steel, electrical and gas industries would also not be able to meet their 
objectives. Philip told the Commissariat in March 1947, that “the entire economic outlook is 
dominated by the coal problem.”220 The massive strikes that shook French mining in 1947 and 
year 1946 coal became the principal objective of the French government and the justification for its demands.” 
Korff, op. cit., 158. 
214 Lefèvre, op. cit., 52-53. 
215 Gerbet, op. cit., 143. 
216 Mioche, op. cit., 149. 
217 Hitchcock, op. cit., 34. 
218 See, among others, Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
219 Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 64. 
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1948 threatened to cripple the reconstruction efforts. The prominent role of the French 
Communist Party in these strikes and the insurrectionary intentions cast upon them by the 
government assisted the French government’s efforts to convince the U.S. and Great Britain to 
guarantee France greater supplies of Ruhr coal. As Irwin Wall has brilliantly shown, French 
diplomats deftly used France’s economic weakness and the strength of the PCF to extract a series 
of concessions in 1947-1950 from western allies worried that France might fall into the 
Communist orbit.221 What, in fact, was happening in the French mines? 
Coal mining in France was overwhelmingly concentrated in the northern departments of 
Nord and Pas-de-Calais, as well as in the Lorraine. The Midi had a smaller number of mines and 
the southern industrial town Decazeville, the constituency of Prime Minister Paul Ramadier, had 
a long-established coal operation as well. The Nord, however, was the heart of French mining. 
Subjected to direct rule during German occupation and merged into an administrative unit with 
Belgium, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais suffered more than most French regions during the 
occupation. The expulsion of the German armies took the form of a social revolution in the 
Northern mining basin. Miners downed tools and refused to work for their former bosses, whom 
they accused of collaborating with the enemy during the occupation. 
The Nord and Pas-de-Calais had a long history of class conflict dating back to the late 
nineteenth century. Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier Français built its base of support among the 
region’s miners.222 Massive strikes shook the region and led to the infamous repression of the 
1891 Formies strike, which was popularized in Émile Zola’s classic novel Germinal. The Nord 
coal miners became the symbol of French industrial working class militancy, earning a place 
next to the Communards in French Socialist iconography. During the First World War, the Nord 
and Pas-de-Calais were among the martyred departments, as the Western Front calcified for 
years across the northwestern French plain. After the war, the introduction of Taylorism in the 
northern mines embittered the miners. The drive for productivity, known as the Bédaux system, 
raised coal production, but often at the expense of the miners’ health.  The number of injuries on 
the job increased from 1932 to 1935, from 48 to 79 per thousand workers. Penalties, 
surveillance, privileges and housing segregation between management, engineers and workers 
221 See Wall, op. cit. 
222 Martine Pottrain, Le Nord au coeur: Historique de la Féderation du Nord du Parti Socialiste, 1880-1993 (Nord: 
Demain, 2003), 12. 
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led to a segmented social system in the Nord largely based around class.223 The Popular Front 
strikes brought the miners substantial gains,224 but these were erased by the reaction that set in 
under Édouard Daladier’s government, a process that continued under German occupation. 
There are clear parallels between the situation in the Nord and Ruhr in the initial postwar 
years. Class animosities and hatred pulsated through the northern coal basin. The authorities 
feared for the physical safety of the managerial class. The miners insisted that the mines be 
socialized and purged of those managers who had collaborated, by which they meant virtually all 
of the managers. The postwar SFIO leadership sought to channel the miners’ demands and fight 
against Communist influence in the basin. From the 1890s, the leaders of the three major 
Socialist factions, Jules Guesde, Jean Jaurès, and Édouard Vaillant, had all called for the 
nationalization of the coal mines, and the SFIO repeated this demand in its 1943 resistance 
platform. The SFIO was the most committed of all French parties to an extensive program of 
nationalizations in the postwar period and the coal mines were the party’s first target.225 The 
popularity of the miners’ strike and the coal shortage made a quick resolution of the miners’ 
demands appear imperative. In December 1944, Industrial Production Minister Lacoste issued a 
decree that provisionally nationalized the mines. Over the next years, SFIO deputies vigorously 
defended the nationalization program against charges that the continued coal shortages were the 
fault of the nationalized bodies. Socialist Prime Minister Gouin’s government definitively 
nationalized the mines in spring 1946. Miners were angry, however, that most of the 
management had been shuffled to different mines rather than replaced. The purge commissions 
had difficulty substantiating the miners’ often vague charges of collaboration and, as happened 
as well in the Ruhr’s de-Nazification program, officials found that purges and a quick restoration 
of production often proved to be contradictory goals.  
223 Holter writes that, “Coal operators enjoyed a degree of social control over coal miners that was unparalleled in 
France...The companies controlled virtually all aspects of the lives of the coal miners and their families: wages, 
housing, schools, churches, medical care, retirement, and distribution of food and water. They also employed the 
local police force.” He goes on to write that, “Economic isolation combined with geographic concentration produced 
a mono-industrial economy in the coal-mining villages...Engineers formed a privileged class as the mining 
companies raised barriers that prevented easy access to such positions. The establishment of separate residential 
areas and schools for the engineers and their families further defined the difference between worker and manager.” 
Holter, op cit., 25-27. 
224 The French miners achieved a 12 percent raise, the right to return to work for laid-off workers, and the banning 
of the Bédaux system.  
225 The French Communist Party was largely mute on the nationalization program until it announced its formal 
support in a joint communiqué with the SFIO in March 1945.  
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Under SFIO pressure, the French government rapidly achieved the goal of nationalizing 
the coal mines, a goal that eluded the SPD in postwar Germany. It also set up comités 
d’entreprise, a form of worker participation in management throughout French industry.226 The 
committees were charged with managing the firms’ welfare and social activities, examining 
corporate accounts, and receiving reports of the companies’ progress. Unlike the co-
determination system later enacted in Germany, this left the committees little influence over the 
firms’ decision-making processes. In the nationalized coal bodies, miners’ representatives 
received seats on the steering and consultative committees. In a pamphlet entitled “War on 
Trusts,” Jules Moch argued that the nationalizations had not gone far enough and demanded that 
the wartime management be given no representation on the consultative committee. In addition, 
the Consultative Assembly approved a new Miners’ Statute on 14 June 1946 that satisfied many 
demands that the Federation of Miners had pursued for decades.227  
Under these conditions, the miners went back to work. When they did, the PCF 
announced with much fanfare a “battle for coal” and exhorted miners with Stakhanovite imagery 
to produce more in the interests of the nation. The Socialists sought to take advantage of the 
unpopularity of the PCF campaign among the miners to win the miners and unions to their party. 
Hence, SFIO propaganda in this period legitimized working-class discontent in the mines, even 
though the SFIO was as concerned as the PCF with the need to produce coal. Similar to what 
was happening in the Ruhr, the local SFIO in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais also revived its 
interwar battle with the Communists for the allegiance of the northern miners. After the 1920 
schism, the SFIO had initially held a hegemonic position among this old Guesdist constituency, 
but the Great Depression and unity efforts between the Socialist-aligned CGT and Communist 
Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU) invigorated the Communist Party in the 
region.228 The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 gave occasion for the CGT to expel Communists from 
226 Socialist Albert Gazier, a former CGT leader, presented the Social Affairs Committee report to the Provisional 
Assembly arguing for the creation of this system in December 1944. Gazier also argued that the committees should 
be instituted in all businesses with 50 or more employees, rather than the envisioned figure of 100, a proposal that 
would double the number of affected businesses. He argued for applying the system to agriculture and public 
administration as well. Socialists Lacoste, Moch, and Verdier called for granting as much power as possible to these 
representative committees as an extension of democracy into the economic sphere. 12 December 1944, JO, 487-88. 
227 Holter writes that, “The statute defined the terms of employment in the mines, labor and management rights, and 
procedures for setting wages, resolving grievances, and taking disciplinary action. It was basically an agreement 
reached between the top managers, the miners’ union and the ministries concerned.” Holter, op. cit.,102. 
228 Holter argues that the Popular Front was more myth than reality in the mining regions because Socialists and 
Communists fought bitterly for control of the newly united mine unions. Pottrain writes that, “In the Nord a climate 
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its leadership ranks but the Communist-based resistance that developed during the German 
occupation allowed the PCF to emerge from the war with a clear advantage over the SFIO in the 
region. As Holter writes, “For the first time Communist unionists were in the majority in several 
unions, including the coal mines of [the Nord and Pas-de-Calais], the metal industry in Lille, the 
chemical industry in the Nord, the local transit system and the construction industry.”229 
In the next years, the PCF not only consolidated these gains, but extended them into the 
newly nationalized coal boards. Communist Marcel Paul, who replaced Lacoste for much of 
1946 as Minister of Industrial Production, appointed his comrade Auguste Lecoeur, recently 
elected head of the miners’ union, to be his undersecretary. The SFIO leadership shared and 
fanned a widespread belief that the PCF was stacking the personnel of the nationalized 
Charbonnages de France with its patrons and complained of its inability to place its own 
officials in positions of influence. In 1945-46, the PCF and SFIO were clearly engaged in a 
grass-roots war for power in a coal industry rich with Socialist historic and symbolic importance. 
Unlike the SPD in its battle with the KPD, however, by 1947, it was clear that the SFIO had in 
large part failed. The miners’ unions and the comités d’entreprise became Communist 
strongholds at the same time that an acceleration of Cold War tensions caused Socialist leaders 
to view their domestic dispute with the PCF through a dangerous international lens.  
Unable to defeat the Communists in the mines, the Socialist-led governments of 1947 
worked to expel them from the administration of the Charbonnages de France. A series of 
decrees from Lacoste’s ministry sharply cut CGT representation on the coal boards, scaling back 
the representation in management miners had only recently acquired.230 Strikes broke out 
of rancor, even of hate installed itself between the fraternal enemies...The militants lived a permanent drama, with 
insults and injuries raining down from both sides...Physical violence multiplied and the police had to intervene on 
several occasions...From 1921 to 1925 Communists frequently disrupted Socialist meetings...After February 8 1934, 
unlike what happened in Paris, the Socialist and Communist strikers clashed physically.” Pottrain, op. cit., 45, 56. 
229 Holter, op. cit., 57. 
230 “One of the first things Lacoste did was to alter once more the composition of production committees by 
reducing the number of representatives selected by the mine workers to one. This left management responsible for 
naming the remaining three representatives...Then Lacoste turned to the task of making changes in the boardrooms. 
...He changed the requirement for membership on the board of directors of the Charbonnages de France by 
requiring the state to select representatives with at least five years of administrative experience in government 
agencies. ...Another decree allowed the Minister of Industrial Production to dissolve the boards of directors at the 
national or regional level of those agencies considered to be failing in their responsibilities. ...The new decrees 
reduced the number of CGT representatives in the Charbonnages de France from twelve to six. ...While removing 
CGT representatives from the councils, Lacoste reinstalled many of the old mining chiefs. Indeed, eleven 
administrators who had served on the Coal Mines Committees during the 1930s and the Coal Mines organizations 
committee under the Vichy regime were appointed by Lacoste to board positions in the nationalized mines. His 
actions angered the mine workers.” Holter, op. cit., 123-4, 159.  
77 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
throughout French industry in spring and fall 1947, culminating in a massive strike wave in 
autumn 1948. The strikes were spontaneous responses to the economic and social difficulties of 
the early postwar period but, like in the Ruhr, they had clear political implications. The workers’ 
claims struck at core government priorities. The miners’ demands for wage increases threatened 
to nullify the economic centerpiece of the Blum and Ramadier governments: the holding down of 
prices and wages to prevent an inflationary wage-price spiral. They also threatened to deepen the 
coal shortages that had plagued French industry from 1944 to 1946.231 
The strikes were not part of an insurrectionary plot by the French Communist Party to 
overthrow the French government but, rather, were largely a rearguard effort by the miners to 
preserve their recent gains. Like the SPD in 1947-48, however, the SFIO saw the sinister hand of 
Moscow at play.232 After Prague, why not Paris, French leaders asked themselves.233 While the 
miners in the Ruhr faced the occupation authorities, the 1947 strikes in France pitted much of the 
northern working classes against the 1947 Socialist-led government. Though the Christian 
Democrat Robert Schuman became Prime Minister in late 1947, the tripartite coalition continued 
with Lacoste remaining head of Industrial Production and Jules Moch taking the Interior 
Ministry, a position that he used to suppress the strikes. 
Fall 1948 was a dramatic period in postwar French history. As Holter writes, “the 
government considered itself at war with the striking miners.”234 Moch consciously applied 
military tactics to ensure miners’ “right to work.” The government called up military reserves 
and sent in the national police to conquer the mines one by one.235 Skirmishes, sabotage, train 
derailments, and deaths turned the mining region into a bloody battleground that created political 
231 Philip complained to the National Assembly about the spring 1947 strikes’ negative impact on French coal 
supplies. 1 July 1947, JO, 2599-2601. 
232 Minister of the Interior Jules Moch believed that the Russian Communist official Andrei Zhdanov himself had 
given the orders to strike in June, three months before the strike began. Holter, op. cit., 153.  
233 In fact, that the PCF never called for mass demonstrations in Paris during the period of the strike is part of the 
overwhelming evidence that there was no Communist plot against the republic.  
234 Holter, op. cit.,170. 
235 On 22 October 1948, the French cabinet approved Moch’s proposal to call the 1948 reserve class to report to 
duty, to allow the police to shoot after a warning had been issued, to allow prefects to prohibit assembly, to expel 
foreigners from France who participated in demonstrations and to allow prefects to censor or seize newspapers 
supporting the demonstrators. Moch laid out his strategy to Blum: “1) requisition by the army of all the vehicles of 
the nationalized enterprises in order to prevent their use by the strikers for transporting commandos and distributing 
food as had happened last November; 2) encircling, from a distance, the mining basin in order to occupy them in 
case of suspension of security; 3) reaching an agreement with the FO and the other unions if possible.” Anticipating 
the strike, “Moch had already crafted an elaborate system of communications, setting up special radios and 
telephones between the prefects and the ‘problem areas’ and linking together the mining management from the 
different mining regions.” Holter, op. cit.,146-69. 
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fault-lines and a web of personal hatreds that shaped the region’s culture for decades to 
follow.236 The government’s hard-line reaction to the strikes forced the CGT to admit defeat in 
exchange for a few token face-saving measures.  
The strikes also gave birth to a new union: Force Ouvrière (FO). The FO union, though 
formally independent, associated itself with the SFIO. It supported the SFIO’s central economic 
policy of working to increase purchasing power rather than wages.237 Discontent had been 
brewing within the CGT ever since the Communists achieved hegemony in the organization. The 
CGT right, the centrists around Léon Jouhaux, and anarcho-syndicalists coalesced to create a 
faction within the CGT that broke with the union during the 1948 strikes. The hand of 
Washington, as French Communists claimed, was no more at play in the CGT schism than 
Moscow had been in launching the strike. Though the C.I.A. funneled money to finance the 
creation of the FO’s office, the schism itself was the culmination of decades of tension between 
grass-roots militants.238  
These developments are central to understanding the SFIO’s about-face on policy 
towards the mines, and, ultimately, its decision to support the Schuman Plan even though the 
Plan envisioned the closing of a substantial number of the northern coal mines.239 Historians 
have not examined the link between the SFIO’s domestic policy for the French mines and its 
decision to support the Schuman Plan.  
Germany had a significantly higher proportion of industrial workers in its population than 
was the case in France. Whereas the SPD had gained a hegemonic position in the Ruhr mines by 
1948, the Socialist trade unionists had all but been thrown out of the northern mines. Though the 
SFIO continued to receive substantial electoral support from the region’s miners, the March 1948 
comités d’entreprise elections in the northern mines confirmed the weakness of the party’s trade 
union allies: the CGT won over 50% of the vote; the FO received a disappointing 14%. Jean-
236 Lacoste described incidents of sabotage to the National Assembly. 18 November 1948, JO,7091-3. 
237 Alain Bergounioux, Force Ouvrière (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 43, 61. 
238 “In a general sense, the grass-roots militants disdained compromise and lived these divisions more intensely...The 
actions of the [PCF and SFIO] had only to act as catalysts during the course of events.” “In effect the schism was 
less the product of a voluntary, deliberated decision than the expression of a profound rift.” Bergounioux, op. cit., 
38, 83. 
239 Lefèvre writes that, “For the technical services of the Ministry of Industrial Production, the application of the 
measures proposed by Robert Schuman “will probably lead to a decrease in French coal production until it reached 
equilibrium with German productive profitability, therefore the closing of mines with less profitability in the center 
regions and Midi of France, as well as some of the Eastern mines producing excessive quantities.” Lefèvre, op. cit., 
262.  
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Pierre Rioux goes so far as to write that, “the handling of the strike in the mines had lost the 
Republic the support of the working classes.”240  
The SFIO had always had a more distant relationship with the French industrial working 
classes than had the SPD in Germany.241 Its policies in 1947-48 definitively alienated the party 
from key elements of the industrial working class and, in particular, from the miners. Force 
Ouvrière remained weak in industry and strong among public servants, the latter of which made 
up much of the SFIO electoral base as well.242 Developments among the steel workers, an 
industry concentrated largely in the Lorraine region,243 paralleled these developments. Steel 
workers played an important role as well in the 1947-48 strikes; the FO Metal Federation that 
emerged in 1948-49 was hopelessly outmatched by the CGT.244 The SFIO experienced a 
significant electoral setback in the 1948 Nord elections and the national party found that its 
voting base was migrating from industrial cities to more rural areas and small towns.245  
Miners were therefore not as large a constituency for the SFIO as they were for the SPD 
and the SFIO was therefore more willing to sacrifice the miners’ interests for economic gains 
elsewhere. Before the Schuman Plan was even announced, the SFIO had sanctioned a policy that 
many in France warned the Plan would accelerate: the implementation of rationalization in the 
mines, the recreation of the Bédaux system, and mass layoffs. The SPD in 1948, on the other 
hand, had more support among the Ruhr mine and steel workers than they had ever had before. 
The party was determined to defend their interests and local SPD leaders pressured a sympathetic 
leadership to make the defense of the Ruhr industrial workers a central party objective. 
Like the West-Westphalian SPD, the Nord Federation had been the most powerful 
federation in the SFIO since the party’s founding in 1905 and had the most votes in party 
240 Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 153-54. 
241 Kaelble, op. cit., 90-94. The SFIO had always had more of a following among farmers and small property owners 
than had the SPD.  
242 Bergounioux, op. cit.,5.  
243 In 1938, 67% of steel production was located in the Lorraine, 19% in the Nord and much of the rest in the 
Centre-Midi region. Michel Freyssenet, La sidérugie française: 1945-1979. L’histoire d’une faillite. Les solutions 
qui s’affrontent (Paris: Savelli, 1979), 17. 
244 Freyssenet, op. cit., 12. 
245 Bernard Vanneste, Augustin Laurent, ou toute une vie pour le socialisme (Dunquerke: Beffrois, 1983), 101-2. 
From 1948, the Nord federation lost a high proportion of its dues-paying members. The SFIO won 30% of the Nord 
vote in the October 1945 national elections, a share that shrank to 26% in the June 1946 national elections. In the 
1951 national elections, the SFIO share of the Nord vote fell to 24% but the party won more seats due to the 1951 
electoral law created to disadvantage the PCF and the Gaullist RPF. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 362. 
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congresses.246 Martine Pottrain writes that, “With [a membership] of more than 40% industrial 
and agricultural workers, the Nord Federation remained one of the most working-class of the 
party[’s]” federations.247 The Nord Federation leader from 1947 to 1967, Augustin Laurent, was, 
along with Gaston Defferre, mayor of Marseille, the most powerful of the SFIO’s regional 
politicians.248 Nicknamed the SFIO “pope,” Laurent defended the government’s actions during 
the strikes and supported the Socialist Ministers’ policy of holding down prices and wages.249 
Unlike the leadership of the NRW-SPD, however, the Nord-SFIO did not take the initiative 
within the party to oppose the Schuman Plan. Although the SFIO retained a sizable base in the 
industrial regions, support for Socialists among miners and steel workers fell significantly behind 
that of the PCF. In addition, SFIO national leaders found that working-class militancy threatened 
their economic policy of keeping both prices and salaries low. This configuration helps to 
explain why the SFIO was more supportive of efforts to keep coal and steel prices low in order to 
stimulate industries that consumed coal and steel. The SFIO’s policies on coal and steel of 1948-
51 were therefore constructed more out of a consideration for France’s economy as a whole 
rather than as a sectoral defense of the coal and steel industries, as was the case for the SPD.   
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how French Socialists and German Social Democrats brought 
different visions and priorities to questions of postwar European industrial reconstruction. As the 
uniting element of France’s tripartite coalition government, French Socialist Prime Ministers and 
Socialist Ministers of Economy and Industrial Reconstruction were often directly responsible for 
managing their country’s precarious economic reconstruction. To this challenge was added an 
ardent commitment to a long-term industrial modernization of the French economy. French 
Socialist leaders shared a core premise of the Monnet Plan that French national security could 
246 The Nord Federation had 10% of the party’s total membership and 367 delegates at the national congresses. 
Pottrain, op. cit., 17, 96. 
247 Ibid., 94-95. 
248 Laurent later said that SFIO general secretary “Guy Mollet never made an important decision without consulting 
me and without me being in agreement with him, besides the Suez affair.” Vanneste, op. cit., 54. 
249 Laurent told the newspaper “Nord-Matin” in June 1948 that, “It is absolutely necessary that the government take 
energetic measures in the coming days to ameliorate workers’ purchasing power through a serious lowering of 
prices...” Ibid., 100. 
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only be secured if French industry surpassed or achieved parity with German industry. Jean 
Monnet’s Modernization Plan became a core element of the SFIO’s economic policy. The 
success of the Plan was a domestic priority for which the party demanded satisfaction in its 
transnational meetings with German Social Democrats, as the next chapter shows. 
The policy of the German Social Democrats towards heavy industry, on the other hand, 
was the result of a regional struggle for political hegemony in the center of postwar West 
German industry, the Ruhr valley. The domestic fight for the allegiance of Ruhr workers was 
refracted through the lens of the region’s experience in the interwar period. The traumas of the 
Ruhr occupation and the scars it left in its wake were stitched into the minds of SPD leaders of 
the powerful new region North-Rhine-Westphalia, all of whom had personally experienced the 
French occupation of 1923-24. Under occupation, regional politics had an inherent international 
dimension because the British authorities, under U.S. pressure, stymied the regional SPD’s 
efforts to restructure property relations in heavy industry. With the French government making 
its demands concerning the Ruhr’s future a precondition for unifying the three Western zones, 
the SPD now faced another potential obstacle to its designs in the region. Under these 
circumstances, regional politics were grafted onto the national party’s foreign policy.  
In addition, the priority granted to attaining the loyalty of industrial workers and 
weakening communism in the region, which were central goals of the SPD, had a parallel in the 
SFIO’s campaign to defeat Communists among the coal and steel workers of the Nord and Pas-
de-Calais regions. The SPD succeeded, however, while the SFIO failed. These contrasting 
outcomes had implications for the parties’ national economic policies that explain in part the 
parties’ differing approaches to the Schuman Plan. Whereas the SPD represented the interests of 
the Ruhr’s coal and steel workers, the SFIO gave priority to other economic sectors and was 
willing to countenance the potential layoffs that might result from the integration of Western 
Europe’s coal and steel industries. Thus, competing priorities, but also contrasting developments 
in the political contexts of the French and German coal and steel industries, created the contours 
for the SPD-SFIO dispute over the Schuman Plan discussed in the following chapter.  
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3. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE: THE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF 
THE FRENCH SOCIALIST AND GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, 
AND THE DEBATE OVER THE SCHUMAN PLAN, 1948-1951 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter demonstrates why an initial convergence between the SFIO and SPD from 1945 to 
Spring 1948 on issues of European heavy industry and, in particular, on the future of the Ruhr 
industrial valley, degenerated into a public conflict between the two parties from June 1948 to 
the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris that formed the European Coal & Steel Community 
(ECSC) in December 1951-January 1952. It argues that existing interpretations within the 
scholarly literature, particularly a focus on SPD “nationalism” and SFIO “internationalism” as 
explanatory factors, oversimplify the policy considerations that went into the SFIO’s decision to 
support and the SPD’s decision to oppose the Schuman Plan.  
The SFIO and SPD made great efforts from 1948 to 1951 to achieve a consensus on the 
Allied diplomatic negotiations surrounding European industrial recovery and the fate of the 
Ruhr, a territory that had fueled German industrialization since the nineteenth century and the 
rich resources of which the Nazi government utilized to launch its assault on its neighbors. That 
the discussions between the SFIO and SPD ultimately failed does not prove that the parties were 
not dedicated to a policy of international socialist understanding. Rather, efforts to achieve an 
entente between the French and German governments, as well as between their fraternal socialist 
parties, were important priorities for both parties. To attain these goals, each party was willing to 
go to considerable lengths. However, these priorities competed with, and sometimes 
contradicted, other key party goals.  
Uncertainty and fear of a repetition of the horrors of the recent past characterized the 
political climate of the initial postwar period. Neither socialist party had full faith that their 
nation’s future would be democratic. In this context, the SPD’s defense of sectoral interests, such 
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as the fate of the Ruhr coal and steel industries, was enveloped in a general fear concerning the 
fragility of German democracy. In turn, while supportive of most SPD policies, including many 
SPD goals for the Ruhr, the SFIO found itself pursuing economic goals that forced it into 
conflict with the SPD. For the SFIO, postwar security meant not only a Europe free of the threat 
of German militarism, but also a form of industrial parity between France and Germany. Its own 
fears about the stability of German democracy, which intensified in 1949-1950, led the SFIO to 
harden its position on the German question and to seek more wide-reaching guarantees vis-à-vis 
its cross-Rhine neighbor. In this context, the SFIO came to view the SPD’s demands for 
“equality of conditions” (Gleichberechtigung), which SPD leaders viewed as essential to gain 
credibility for Germany’s democratic parties, as too dangerous to countenance for the immediate 
future. Both parties mistrusted the intentions of the other country’s government and, as this 
chapter shows, they often had good reason to do so. Each worried that the other country would 
attain an economic hegemony on the European continent at their nation’s expense if left to its 
own devices. Hence, each party lamented Great Britain’s self-exclusion from the first initiatives 
of European integration, which left France and Germany as the only large powers within the first 
supranational European Community.  
The SFIO and SPD were actually much closer to one another’s policies in this period 
than has generally been recognized by scholars. However, they had to interact in a universe in 
which the great powers set geopolitical policy, often with little heed of the wishes of the two 
socialist parties. Such was the case in their diverging responses to the June 1948 London 
Accords that created an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) and opened a pathway for 
West German statehood. In addition, the SFIO and SPD were often unable to achieve their goals 
within their domestic polities and these failures led the parties to more vigorously defend their 
other fragile policy victories, a process that led the parties into conflict at the transnational level. 
The parties’ inability to assert their maximal program for European recovery amplified the policy 
areas that separated them, in particular their disagreement about the necessity of supranational 
European anti-cartel legislation.  
The announcement on 9 May 1950 by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, crafted 
in secret by Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet and his small team of advisers, was a 
momentous event in postwar history. The French government proposed the integration of 
Western European heavy industry under a supranational High Authority that would have the 
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powers to supervise the production and distribution of heavy industrial goods, and to intervene to 
prevent national or business disruption of the conditions necessary to assure fair competition. 
After a period of hesitancy following the announcement, the parties returned to the narratives 
that they had developed in 1948 in response to the London Accords. The fundamental 
disagreement concerned Jean Monnet’s decision to break the Ruhr sales cartel as a condition for 
the creation of the ECSC. The SPD leadership, which believed in the utility of cartels for 
economic stability, saw in this maneuver a return to a traditional French policy of pursuing 
French economic hegemony on the continent at the expense of German workers. The party 
leadership’s views was directly influenced and informed by the SPD leaders in North-Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) and the Ruhr Valley and, in particular, by Dortmund mayor Fritz Henssler. 
The SFIO leadership, on the other hand, generally opposed cartels within French domestic 
politics, and was convinced that a muzzling of the Ruhr industrialists’ appetite for concentration 
was necessary to ensure French economic security. 
The parties did pursue a policy of international cooperation in the postwar period. 
However, other important political goals, in particular economic prosperity and democratic 
stability, ultimately resulted in a bitter conflict between the SFIO and SPD over the future of 
European coal and steel. That the parties later achieved a positive working relationship within 
the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community and pursued common goals 
against their Christian Democratic and Liberal opponents at the transnational level indicates that 
there was in fact a basis for a German-French Socialist policy on coal and steel that differentiated 
socialists from their domestic political opponents, despite fundamental areas of disagreement 
between the SFIO and SPD. Thus the disagreement from 1948 to 1952 was perhaps the 
exception rather than the rule, as the parties were able to create a wide-ranging consensus on 
most of the controversial issues relating to coal and steel from 1946 to June 1948 and again after 
1954. Politicians operate within a set of constraints. It was these constraints, as outlined below, 
that led the SFIO and SPD to oppose one another in a period when the French and German 
Christian Democratic parties achieved a greater degree of transnational consensus in their pursuit 
of a customs union for coal and steel.250  
 
250 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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3.2 FRENCH SOCIALISTS, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND  
THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN HEAVY INDUSTRY, 1945—SPRING 1948:  
A PRECARIOUS SYNTHESIS 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the SPD and SFIO pursued different interests as they 
related to the future of the Ruhr territory in the aftermath of the Second World War. The SPD 
sought to represent the Ruhr working classes, and battled with Communists and Catholic unions 
for workers’ allegiance. The SFIO needed larger and more secure supplies of Ruhr coal and coke 
to ameliorate the French government’s dollar deficit and to allow for the realization of the 
Monnet Plan. Despite these different approaches based on national and regional priorities, the 
SFIO and SPD were not all that far apart in their official positions on the Ruhr from 1945 to 
early 1948. In fact, they had more in common with one another than they did with any of the 
other political parties in either country. Historians’ emphasis on the conflict that broke out 
between the parties from 1948 to 1951 has led many of them to overlook this early convergence.  
The French Socialist and German Social Democratic positions shared much in common. 
Each party supported the centerpiece of their fraternal party’s program for the Ruhr. The SFIO 
called repeatedly for the expropriation of the Ruhr magnates, arguing in line with the SPD that 
they represented a danger to a future democratic system and to the maintenance of peace in 
Europe. But, socialization under a German government was more controversial within the SFIO 
and pitted SFIO hardliners on the German question against those more willing to accommodate 
the wishes of their German comrades. The SFIO was, though, the only French party willing to 
countenance socialization under a German government and the party formulated an official 
position that the Allies should encourage socialization in a global settlement that would satisfy 
Léon Blum’s call for an “international nationalization” of the Ruhr.251 The CDU initially 
supported socialization in the Ruhr in its Ahlener Program of March 1947, but this position 
quickly lost its relevance as Konrad Adenauer accumulated support for a reorientation towards 
market principles within the CDU. Adenauer’s offensive isolated the Christian trade unionists, 
largely based in the Ruhr, most of whom supported socialization. By 1948, the SFIO and SPD 
were the only large parties in either country that supported some sort of socialization of Ruhr 
251 Gérard Bossuat, “Léon Blum et l’organisation de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale,” in René Girault 
and Gilbert Ziebura, eds., Léon Blum, socialiste européen (Brussels: Editions complexe, 1995), 150. 
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industry. This represented not only a victory of the leftist faction of the SFIO around Marceau 
Pivert, but also resulted in part from the expressed desire of the SFIO leaders to publicly support 
a central demand of the SPD, which it hoped would lead the first postwar government.  
In turn, the SPD supported the SFIO’s call for the internationalization of the Ruhr, under 
the condition that all of Western heavy industry be internationalized under equal conditions. The 
demand for Gleichberechtigung, or equal conditions, would be a staple of SPD demands 
concerning German participation in efforts to unify Europe for the next decade. Some within the 
SFIO hesitated when faced with this proposal, which was clearly aimed at the Nord and the 
Lorraine, as well as at the industries of Belgium and Luxembourg. However, a general 
internationalization of heavy industries and raw materials was in line with the vision for a 
postwar world that the SFIO had developed during the resistance period.252 The SPD’s position 
was ideologically compelling and found support not only among Pivert’s supporters, but also 
with André Philip, who came to be the foremost exponent of this concept in French politics in 
1948-1949. The SFIO was the only party in France committed to an internationalization of 
European, rather than exclusively German, heavy industry in these years. Though the idea found 
concrete expression in government policy in Robert Schuman’s famous declaration of 9 May 
1950, the Christian Democratic MRP had not signaled that it supported this idea before Schuman 
took the initiative to support Monnet’s proposal. In fact, from 1945 to 1948, French Foreign 
Minister and leading MRP politician, Georges Bidault, was a tenacious opponent of a program to 
internationalize European heavy industry as a solution to the Ruhr question.253  
From 1945 to early 1948, the SFIO and SPD critiques of French government policy on 
the Ruhr were virtually the same. Charles de Gaulle, head of the provisional government, called 
in December 1944 for the internationalization of the Ruhr. The SFIO, overtly hostile to any 
annexation or the breaking up of Germany, wanted an economic, but not political, 
internationalization of the Ruhr. Foreign Minister Bidault was even more intransigent than de 
Gaulle under Socialist Prime Ministers Félix Gouin and Paul Ramadier, earning him the wrath of 
a Socialist Party frustrated by coalitional politics that forced it to acquiesce to a tacit MRP-PCF 
252 Wilfried Loth, “Les projets de politique extérieure de la Résistance socialiste en France,” Revue d’histoire 
moderne et contemporaine 24, 4 (Oct-Dec 1977): 544-569. 
253 When U.S. ambassador Douglas suggested extending an international regime from the Ruhr to other European 
regions on 27 February 1948 he received “a glacial welcome” from the French government. Pierre Mélandri, “Le 
röle de l’unification européenne dans la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis 1948-1950,” in Raymond Poidevin, ed., 
Histoire des débuts de la Construction européenne, Mars 1948-Mai 1950, Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 28-30 
Novembre 1984 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1986). 
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alliance on the German question within the French cabinet. When Blum formed a temporary all-
Socialist government in December 1946, he definitively abandoned the official French policy for 
an independent Rhineland state and called for an international organization on the model of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to supervise heavy industry in the Ruhr. Though historians have 
recently questioned the sincerity of Bidault’s hard-line policy on Germany, Socialists viewed 
Bidault as an irredeemable foe of their efforts to forge a conciliatory policy towards Germany.254 
When it seemed that Bidault, re-installed as Foreign Minister on the MRP’s insistence in Paul 
Ramadier’s 1947 government, was seeking to resurrect his German policy of 1945-46, an angry 
SFIO Central Committee demanded that a Socialist delegate accompany Bidault to the 
November 1947 Allied Conference in London. French Socialists believed that Bidault was 
pursuing his own foreign policy separate from that of the French cabinet.  
The SPD also formulated an official position that any future German government must 
ensure French security concerns in the Ruhr. Within the Parliamentary Council, the SPD faced a 
Christian-Democratic-Liberal coalition that became the governing coalition of Germany after 
national elections took place in summer 1949. The SPD did not enter the national government 
until 1966. Therefore, we can never know precisely how far the SPD would have been willing to 
go to satisfy French security demands. Outside of government, it was easier for the SPD to fall 
back on a resolute defense of the interests of Ruhr workers than if it had had to engage in the 
hard political bargaining required of a government under Allied occupation. Yet from the 
inception, there was a crucial difference between SFIO and SPD visions of what constituted 
French security. The SPD leadership argued that socialization and the removal of the industrial 
magnates whom it associated with German militarism would suffice to assure that the Ruhr 
would not again be used for aggressive purposes. The SFIO leadership, uncertain about who 
would lead Germany in the future, was divided about whether socialization without some form 
254 This is part of Michael Creswell’s thesis in Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the 
United States Created Cold War Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). For the debate, see the 
responses to Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’s article “France and the German Question, 1945-1955” in Journal of 
Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, 3 (2003): 5-28. See also the responses in this edition to their argument. Hitchcock writes 
that, “while Bidault remained inflexible [on the German question], Gouin, Auriol, Blum, and other Socialists of 
cabinet rank were in contact with the American ambassador, trying to cut a deal that would enhance the Socialist 
Party’s prestige and undermine the foreign minister, a political rival.” William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold 
War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998), 59. 
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of internationalization would definitively prevent a renewed exploitation of the Ruhr resources 
for rearmament and war.  
There was another, central, dimension separating SFIO and SPD conceptions of French 
security. The SPD never fully accepted the SFIO’s and French government’s argument that 
French security had an economic dimension.255 This argument had, after all, been a primary 
consideration in the formulation of the Monnet Plan. SFIO leaders were insistent on this point. 
SFIO deputy Géraud Jouve spelled out the SFIO’s vision in clear terms: he asked the National 
Assembly “to concentrate its attention on what we consider to be the essential aspects of the 
entire German problem from the French point of view: security and coal, I would even say 
security through coal.” He went on to say that, “Today the problem of coal is more important 
[l’emporte] than that of security. I would say that it commands it,” and, “The Ruhr for us is coal, 
it is security through coal.” He concluded that government policy must be “the permanent 
occupation of the Ruhr as a condition sine qua non of the success of a plan of supervision and 
economic internationalization” and that, “It would not displease us at all, to the contrary, to see 
the Ruhr become the station for the contingents of the future international army, the creation of 
which the best among us have called for since 1919.”256  
For the SPD, however, such rhetoric conjured frightful memories from the interwar Ruhr 
occupation. Henssler evoked the Ruhr occupation in November 1947 to counter proposals along 
the lines of those put forth by Jouve. He declared that: 
Proposals for control of the Ruhr territory mean the degradation of the Ruhr territory into 
a colony. Precisely because we seriously seek a German-French understanding, we must 
state that this understanding can only be reached through an abandonment of the 
disastrous thinking of the Rhine-Bund-Method, and that we must seek a new political 
path...257  
255 Historians have picked up on the economic dimension of French security concerns in this period. Hitchcock 
writes, for instance that, “over traditional great-power status economic security had emerged as the top priority, and 
this would be the nation’s leading concern throughout the postwar decade.” Hitchcock, op. cit., 39. Sylvie Lefèvre 
writes that, “the problem of security vis-à-vis Germany posed itself henceforth more in economic than in military 
terms...” Les relations économiques franco-allemands de 1945 à 1955: De l’occupation à la cooperation (Paris: 
Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière, 1998), 233-34.  
256 28 February 1947, Journal Officiel (JO), 528-9. In November 1949, Lapie told the National Assembly that it was 
necessary “to disarm not only the army, but also the factory...[without] annihilating and beating the people.” He 
went on to say that there were two categories concerning security: “demilitarization and industrial 
prohibitions...because war has become industrial as diplomacy has often become economic.” 15 November 1949, 
JO, 6319.  
257 “Die Politik der Sozialdemokratie in Nordrhein-Westfalen—Referat des Fraktionsvorsitzenden der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei, Fritz Henssler, Dortmund, am Anlass der Landeskonferenz in Recklinghausen am 19. 
November 1947,” in Günther Högl and Hans-Wilhelm Bohrisch, eds., “Die Person immer ganz weit hinter der 
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Schumacher, for his part, was already complaining about a French “security sickness” as early as 
May 1946.258 Henssler told the NRW SPD conference that, “The security guarantee will be best 
achieved though the stabilization of democracy...” Rumors of schemes to grant the French a form 
of supervision over Ruhr industry in exchange for French investment in the Ruhr met with 
vigorous opposition from the SPD, which worried that these were camouflaged efforts to 
eliminate the possibility of a socialization of Ruhr industry. SPD statements about the dangers of 
reawakening German nationalism amongst German workers subjected to foreign management 
and “rule” (Herrschaft) were direct allusions to the experience of the interwar Ruhr occupation.  
Nevertheless, there remained sufficient areas of agreement to awaken hope within both 
parties that they could achieve a form of consensus on the Ruhr issue through transnational 
contact. Diplomatic developments, however, intervened. From February to June 1948, the Allied 
governments held a painstaking series of meetings in which they negotiated a common policy for 
the merger of the French zone with the U.S.-British Bizone, and set forth the contours of a future 
West German state. In these negotiations, the French government pursued its long-standing goal 
of achieving a form of supervision or control over the Ruhr territory. Parallel to these diplomatic 
meetings of the Allied governments, the western European Socialist parties sought to reach a 
consensus on the Ruhr and publicize a common Socialist position. For the first time in the 
postwar period, the inter-Socialist discussions clearly pitted SFIO against SPD delegates.  
 
3.3 THE DISPUTE EMERGES: THE SFIO AND SPD DEBATE  
THE JUNE 1948 LONDON ACCORDS, AND THE CREATION OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR THE RUHR (IAR) 
 
Although an international Socialist conference in March 1945 had approved the SFIO’s proposal 
for the internationalization of the Ruhr, the British Labour government, after a period of 
hesitancy, decided in 1946 to support efforts to socialize, rather than internationalize, Ruhr 
industry.259 In 1948, both the SFIO and SPD supported in principle the internationalization of 
Sache” Fritz Henssler 1886-1953: Sozialdemokrat, Reichstagsabgeordneter und Dortmunder Oberbürgermeister 
(Essen: Klartext, 2003), 96.  
258 “Deutschland und das Ruhrgebiet,” 31 May 1946, Kurt Schumacher (KS) 37, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie 
(AdsD).  
259 Grumbach report, “Deutschland und die Probleme der Ruhr” (Vorgelegt bei der Pariser Konferenz der Sozialisten 
v. 24./25. April 1948), Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 452, AdsD. 
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European heavy industry, a position that the Labour Party refused to adopt for its own industry. 
However, SFIO and SPD designs for an international management of European heavy industry 
came up against the reality that the French government, and Foreign Minister Bidault in 
particular, was steadfastly opposed to discussing the internationalization of French industry. The 
SFIO’s position that Socialists must support the internationalization of the Ruhr regardless if 
other European countries simultaneously internationalized their industries set the SFIO on a 
collision course with the SPD at a 24-25 April 1948 inter-Socialist meeting. The SPD came to 
the meeting intent on insisting that an internationalization of French and Belgian heavy industry 
accompany any internationalization of the Ruhr.  
SPD leaders worked hard to gain SFIO support for their position. The SPD’s liaison with 
the SFIO in Paris, Günther Markscheffel, conducted a series of meetings with French Socialist 
leaders in anticipation of the April meeting. His report to the SPD Central Committee makes 
clear that the SFIO leadership had united around a demand that the Allies internationalize the 
Ruhr as part of any settlement of the German question. The SPD leadership had hoped that the 
SFIO’s primary delegate to the Socialist meetings, Salomon Grumbach, represented a minority 
view. Grumbach had told Markscheffel that he was going “to plead for the immediate 
internationalization of the Ruhr without discussing the internationalization of other European 
raw material territories” and that, “the Ruhr internationalization in a way was a first step and an 
experiment for later internationalizations.” For Grumbach, internationalization must begin with 
the Ruhr because Germany had begun and lost the last war. He said that the Socialists should 
also agree in principle on a future internationalization of Luxembourg, Belgium, Northern France 
and the Saar territory. Markscheffel quoted Grumbach as saying that, “Any other attitude would 
place us automatically in an irreconcilable opposition with the newly fashioned position of the 
French government” and make the SFIO more susceptible to Communist propaganda against the 
Third Force government. The left-wing Marceau Pivert, who had the Seine Federation as his 
power base, had called for the party to support simultaneous internationalization but, as 
Grumbach told Markscheffel, “These people around Pivert want to conduct foreign policy 
without taking into account in the slightest the realpolitische preconditions for foreign policy.” 
He went on to say that, “They proclaim something or other and have no idea whether their 
proclamations can in reality be carried through.”260  
260 Markscheffel to Parteivorstand, 9 April 1948, EO 451, AdsD. 
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The SPD leadership had also hoped to win Léon Blum to their view, but he had recently 
published a series of articles insisting again on the Ruhr’s immediate internationalization. To the 
SPD leadership’s dismay, Blum told Markscheffel that, “I am in these questions completely one 
with comrade Grumbach...you can all take what he says in these series of questions as though it 
had come from me.”261 Markscheffel reported that the party’s secretary general, Guy Mollet, had 
told him that, “in the German question, in particular in the Ruhr question, he was of the same 
opinion as Léon Blum.” In all of Markscheffel’s interviews, French Socialists expressed hope 
that Markscheffel could explain and gain the support of the SPD for the SFIO’s predicament that, 
though the party supported an internationalization of European, rather than simply Ruhr industry, 
it did not have the political power to sway the French government to support such a policy. At 
the 24-25 April 1948 Socialist Conference in Paris, Grumbach proposed a three-point program 
for the Ruhr: the expropriation of the coal and metal magnates; the socialization of this 
expropriated property on an international basis; and the erection of an international supervisory 
body with authority over the management of production and distribution.262 
Schumacher’s handwritten notes on Markscheffel’s letter show that a clash was in the 
making. Schumacher, working from his sick bed, wrote on the back of the letter “colonial 
status,” within which the Ruhr workers would have “a foreign management,” that such a 
program would provide “stimulus for nationalism through political formulas based on class,” and 
that, “the SPD has no interest in” going forward “before the others” with internationalization.263 
Here Schumacher found the agreement of DGB chair Hans Böckler, who threatened to conduct a 
general strike against any “regime of force as well as all unjustified control measures for the 
Ruhr...that were a cover for political or economic hegemonic efforts.”264 Crucially, Schumacher 
also had the support of Fritz Henssler, who expressed the fear that, “one wishes to make the Ruhr 
territory into a mere raw material provider for Western Europe.”265 The SPD Central Committee 
published its position eleven days before the inter-socialist conference opened:  
On the question of the Ruhr territory, German Social Democracy cannot agree to any 
arrangement that removes the territory from German jurisdiction (Verfügungsrecht). An 
international supervision of production and distribution must be tied with two 
261 Ibid. 
262 Grumbach Report, “Deutschland und die Probleme der Ruhr.” 
263 Markscheffel to Parteivorstand, 9 April 1948.  
264 Ursula Rombeck-Joschinski, Nordrhein-Westfalen, die Ruhr und Europa: Föderalismus und Europapolitik, 
1945-1955 (Essen: Klartext, 1990), 45.  
265 9 April 1948, Parteivorstand (PV) 1948, AdsD.  
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preconditions: a German participation and that it be applied to all heavy industry in the 
economic territories of Germany and Western Europe.  
 
The party delegated its vice president, Erich Ollenhauer, as well as Carlo Schmid, Willi Eichler, 
and Fritz Henssler to represent the party at the conference on the Ruhr.266  
At the 24-25 April conference in Paris, the SPD succeeded in delaying a public socialist 
resolution on the Ruhr. The socialist delegates agreed to grant more time to crafting a common 
position and scheduled a conference for June 1948. In the meantime, positions hardened. At a 
SPD Central Committee meeting on 6 May 1948, Ollenhauer charged the party with constructing 
a proposal on the Ruhr’s future for the next conference. In the ensuing discussion, it became 
clear that the SPD would insist on property ownership for the German people. The SPD decided 
that it could agree to an international supervision of the Ruhr to prevent German rearmament, but 
not to manage heavy industry or to oversee the distribution of its production. Henssler expressed 
hope at the meeting that the SPD could win Labour Party support for its position. In a letter to 
the Central Committee four days later, Henssler explained his position at length.267 His demands 
were nearly identical in tone and content with the official position that the party publicized in a 
pamphlet dated five days later, “The German Social Democratic Party and the Ruhr,” written by 
Schumacher from his sick bed.268 They are worth quoting at length because Henssler lays out the 
rationale with which the SPD approached French proposals for the Ruhr for the next three years. 
His letter demonstrates how memory politics and the political conditions of the Ruhr granted 
Henssler a power within the national party to shape the SPD’s response to SFIO proposals for 
internationalization: 
266 For the 7 June 1948 conference in Vienna, the SPD delegated Erich Ollenhauer, Herta Gotthelf, Carlo Schmid, 
Fritz Henssler, Ernst Reuter and invited the trade unionist Viktor Agartz to attend as a guest. “Staatsrechtliche 
Entwicklung und Ruhrprobleme,” 7 May 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.  
267 Henssler to Parteivorstand, 10 May 1948, Fritz Henssler 48, AdsD.  
268 In it Schumacher writes, “The internationalization of the Ruhr would make impossible the internationalization of 
the remaining sections of Western European industrial centers...It would strengthen nationalist agitation...When the 
real possibility of a simultaneous program of internationalization of the Western European heavy industry under 
equal conditions is not on hand, then socialization stands for the German Social Democratic party on the immediate 
agenda....The transfer of leading functions to Allied bodies is therefore to be avoided because the opposition 
between employers and employees should not be undermined at the national level and it would create propagandistic 
difficulties for daily praxis that would awaken a situation that would be similar to that of a colonial status.” PV 
1948, AdsD. The otherwise conciliatory Max Brauer, who later supported the Schuman Plan, offered a similar 
assessment in the SPD Central Committee: “I have the feeling that the three years since the capitulation...will be 
considered later historically as the colonial period of postwar Germany.” Eröffnung der Tagung des Parteivorstandes 
und des Parteiausschusses (29.6.48—15, 20 Uhr), EO 72, AdsD. 
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A one-sided international administration of the Ruhr industrial territory cannot be 
considered as a beginning for [European] internationalization. Rather, it raises the 
impression—and has the effect—of forcing a colonial status on the Ruhr...Our agreement 
to such an internationalization would prepare the path for a nationalist atmosphere of hate 
that would destroy all conditions for a true understanding and cooperation. In addition: 
the strongest and most effective argument against the Bolshevik influence is that they 
[sic] are pursuing in the Eastern zone a great number of dismantlements and the 
Russification of valuable operations. The demand of the French Socialists would have the 
same result. We must say to it: impossible. If one wishes to manage the Ruhr question 
primarily through the point of view of reparations (Wiedergutmachung) in the style of old 
methods, then it would be a false policy to demand that democrats take the responsibility. 
They expect us to commit political suicide and destroy all hope for a new arrangement in 
order to repay the debts caused by Hitlerism...The French demand is rooted in old 
methods. They wish to dress it up [beschönigen] with a new name.269 
 
Under these conditions, the SPD and SFIO had opposing reactions when on 6 June 1948 the 
Allies made public the fruits of months of secret negotiations in the London Accords. The 
essence of the London Accords was the fusion of the French zone with the Bizone, the creation 
of a constitutional committee, and the introduction of a West German currency. The Accords 
also paved a path towards West German statehood. In return, the French government attained an 
assurance of “the firm determination of the [Allied] governments to not proceed to any general 
retreat of the occupying forces from Germany until the peace of Europe is assured” and that, “the 
occupation of Germany should continue for a long period.”270 In France, uproar against the 
Accords erupted across the political landscape, including within the French Socialist Party.271 
Pressed by the U.S. team, French negotiators had, in fact, made substantial and far-reaching 
concessions on the German question.272 The Marshall Plan proposal and French diplomatic 
pressures to create a military alliance with the U.S. had allowed the U.S. delegation to gain a 
larger degree of maneuver with the French government on the German question. In agreeing to 
the Accords, the French delegation forfeited not only the bases of the de Gaulle/Bidault thesis of 
269 Henssler to Parteivorstand, 10 May 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.  
270 Cyril Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin: La France et l’Allemagne, 1945-1949 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 142-43.  
271 Gerbet writes that, “The London recommendations elicited in France, even before their publication, a violent 
opposition from the political parties, the press, public opinion and even within the government and the parliamentary 
majority.” Pierre Gerbet, Le rélèvement, 1944-1949 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1991), 287. 
272 “On 23 February 1948 the first session of the London conference opened. On the 27th René Massigli presented 
again the French project for an International Authority for the Ruhr at the opening of the fourth session. According 
to the French proposal, the future international authority, including henceforth ‘German representatives,’ would 
supervise not only the distribution of the Ruhr coal, but would also have the power to approve the production plans, 
investments and financial policy, guaranteeing in that way the supervision of the managements of the heavy 
industries. In addition, rights to investigate and station an international force would guarantee the power of the 
organization to [carry through] sanctions...” Lefèvre, op cit., 156. 
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splitting the Ruhr from Germany, but had also agreed to the creation of an International 
Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), which was granted only a shadow of the powers demanded by the 
SFIO and the French government. Crucially, French negotiators had failed to gain the Allies’ 
agreement to internationalize Ruhr industry. Opinion was split on the accords within the SFIO. 
Blum said privately to Lapie that,  
“The agreement is poor but one cannot not vote for it. We must focus our efforts on 
article 12, the Ruhr. The powers of the new authority only deal with distribution. If we do 
not achieve the internal supervision of management we will fall back on the exterior 
supervision similar to that of the League of Nations, that is to say, little at all.”273  
 
Showing that some basis for agreement remained with the SPD, Blum went on to say that, “What 
matters is that the English and Americans do not oppose the socialization of the Ruhr by the 
Germans.” In the Foreign Affairs Committee and in a speech to the National Assembly, Philip 
offered a vigorous defense of the Accords but demanded that the powers of the IAR be 
strengthened.274 
In its 17 June 1948 resolution, the French National Assembly approved the London 
Accords by a mere six votes,275 thanks only to the addition of a resolution demanding further 
negotiations to internationalize the Ruhr territory.276 By insisting on this resolution, the French 
Assembly explicitly rejected the preamble of the London Accords, which had claimed that, 
“these recommendations form a whole; their principal dispositions are in effect interdependent” 
and “their approval by each government of their totality is the necessary condition for the 
approval of it by the others.”277 In Lapie’s view, it was only the fear that the Accords’ rejection 
would strengthen Gaullist agitation against the fragile government that led a sufficient number of 
deputies to rally in favor of ratification.  
273 Lapie records retrospectively in his memoirs that, “I did not understand why Blum found the agreement [to be] so 
poor...” Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 154-56. 
274 “Of all the participants in the general discussions only Philip (S.F.I.O.) and [Marc] Scherer (M.R.P.) did not 
demand the rejection of the recommendations or the resumption of negotiations.” Adalbert Korff, Le revirement de 
la politique française à l’égard de l’Allemagne entre 1945 et 1950 (Lausanne: Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1965), 252. 
275 The London Accords passed the Foreign Affairs Commission by one vote, 21 to 20 with two abstentions on 9 
June. Commission des Affaires étrangères, C/15333, Archives nationales (AN). 
276 The six-point resolution also demanded the expropriation of the Ruhr owners, an occupation of Germany during a 
sufficiently long period so as to assure French security and reparations, the prevention of the recreation of a 
centralized government, the search for a four-power accord on the German question, and actions toward the creation 
of an economic and political organization for Europe.  
277 Buffet, op. cit., 142-43.  
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At a cabinet meeting on 11 June, French President Vincent Auriol, a Socialist, expressed 
his “fears” that “we risk having [another Munich] or a brawl [bagarre].” Socialist Christian 
Pineau wished to accept the Accords in principle, accompanied with reservations, while Jules 
Moch “wanted to subordinate parliamentary approval to the obtaining of a certain number of 
ameliorations.”278 This was, in fact, how the National Assembly chose to proceed in this 
atmosphere of geopolitical uncertainty. Having obtained a resolution to expand the powers of the 
IAR, the SFIO held ranks by demanding party discipline on the vote, which helped to assure the 
Accords’ narrow passage. In return, the SFIO demanded Bidault’s head, whose policies they had 
long despised.279 In the next government, Robert Schuman replaced Georges Bidault as Foreign 
Minister, a post that remained in his hands until December 1952.  
Although the London Accords continued limits on industrial production and the policy of 
dismantlement, the SPD leadership was largely relieved that the supervisory organs agreed to by 
the Allies were less interventionist and intrusive than previously feared.  In his private notes, 
Ollenhauer stressed the positive aspects of the London accords, in particular, the abandonment of 
efforts to split the Ruhr from Germany and to internationalize the territory. Pointing to the 
success of Communist and Gaullist propaganda against the accords in France, Ollenhauer wrote 
that, “Without France no European order is possible” and that, “France’s approval [of the 
Accords] lies in our interests,” a view he repeated two weeks later to the SPD Central 
Committee. Transnational conversations and reports by Markscheffel led Ollenhauer to 
sympathize with the reasons for the SFIO’s position: “And the difficulty lies in the fact that there 
is a united front of nationalists in France against a reasonable arrangement on this question; from 
the Communists to the Gaullists there is a front against [the French coalitional] government and 
especially against the French Socialists.”  
In response to CDU overtures to form a cross-party front to oppose the occupation 
authorities, a SPD delegation including Erich Ollenhauer and Fritz Heine met with Adenauer. 
The SPD leaders refused his request that the two parties conduct a united campaign against the 
Accords. In the SPD press, Ollenhauer warned darkly against nationalist tendencies within 
German society seeking to take advantage of the Accords to resurrect revanchist politics. At the 
28-30 June 1948 Central Committee meeting on the London Accords, Ollenhauer warned that a 
278 Ibid., 144-46. 
279 Ibid., 123-24, 148. In an April 1948 letter, the five Socialist ministers wrote a scathing attack against Bidault’s 
tenure as Foreign Minister in a letter to Prime Minister Robert Schuman.  
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united campaign including the Communists and Christian Democrats could reawaken the politics 
of the 1923 Ruhr struggle and reproduce its result, thereby reviving a dangerous nationalist 
climate. Ollenhauer at this time favored an accommodating attitude for the SPD to counter the 
more aggressive policies of the CDU, which Ollenhauer believed was considering removing its 
deputies in protest from the parliamentary bodies set up by the Western Allies. Ollenhauer called 
the agreement “clearly a progress.”280 Despite this optimism, the party decided to adopt a 
reserved public attitude in large part due to the efforts of Henssler, who argued that: 
We must explain that a final position on the London Accords is not possible as long as all 
of the details are not known. We cannot approve the one-sided control of the Ruhr’s 
heavy industry. 
 
In a sign of the influence Henssler had within the Central Committee on these issues, he 
succeeded in striking from the resolution a paragraph that approved in principle an international 
supervision of the Ruhr.281 Henssler was a hardliner within the SPD on this question, and his 
influence was in large part responsible for the SPD’s move towards a more intransigent attitude 
over the next year.282 The SPD went on to place conditions on its acceptance of the Accords, 
conditions all of which focused on the Ruhr: the right to socialize industry and to determine the 
final property arrangement for the Ruhr must lie in German hands; the SPD would accept French 
government calls for security guarantees only to the extent that it be allowed to supervise 
German industry to prevent rearmament; and the SPD supported European unity efforts and the 
creation of an international regime for heavy industry as long as German industry entered on the 
same conditions as its partners. 
Although the SFIO and SPD had reached a consensus on a combined resolution 
supporting the London Accords at the Socialist conference in Vienna, in which the SPD agreed 
to the military, but not economic, security demands of the SFIO, this agreement merely papered 
over the continued differences between the parties over how to react in practice, rather than in 
principle, to developments over which they only had partial control. The Conference approved a 
common resolution without knowing the exact content of the Accords, which was in large part a 
280 Ollenhauer went on to say that we responded “in our attitude towards Adenauer’s arguments that the latent 
danger of nationalism among the Germans seems so large that we found his proposal to counter nationalism through 
a united front to be the worst path possible.” Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss in 
Hamburg am 29. und 30. Juni 1948, PV 1948, EO 72, AdsD.  
281 Parteivorstand Hamburg, 28 June 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.  
282 See for instance Henssler’s statements in the 21-22 January 1949 SPD Central Committee meeting on the Ruhr 
Statute, PV 1948, AdsD.  
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victory for a Labour Party eager to have European Socialists endorse the outcome of negotiations 
in which its government had played a leading role. In a compromise that gave satisfaction to the 
SPD’s position, the resolution called for the inclusion of the Ruhr territory in an international 
supervisory organization that included all of European heavy industry.  
Although French Socialists had always put forward a reconciliatory policy towards 
German reconstruction within French politics, the London Accords threatened not only the 
party’s internal political position, but also the party’s commitment to modernize the French 
economy.283 Nobody knew what powers the IAR would have in practice and, therefore, it was 
unclear whether French industry would receive a sufficient supply of coal and coke to meet the 
Monnet Plan’s targets.284 The difficulty for the French government intensified with the 
unleashing of the strike wave in October-December 1948, which increased France’s reliance on 
coal imports. Fearful that the Fourth Republic might soon fall under the combined assault of the 
PCF and the Gaullist Party (RPF), a revision of the London Accords appeared imperative to 
French Socialists for the survival of the regime. Influenced by the ideas of Blum and Monnet, the 
French Socialist President of the Republic Vincent Auriol helped craft the government’s position 
in early August 1948. The government took the position that the Allies could allow property and 
administration to remain in German hands in return for the creation of a regional control 
mechanism, like the Tennessee Valley Authority, to oversee production and the distribution of 
industrial resources.285  
In this context, relations between the SFIO and SPD began to deteriorate. The French 
Socialists lacked the power within the French government to meet the SPD’s condition that it 
internationalize French industry. The party’s leaders, though, remained unwilling to sacrifice the 
supervision of Ruhr coal. German Social Democrat Willi Eichler sought the mediation of the 
Labour Party but his efforts were shut down by the SPD party secretariat under Fritz Heine, who 
responded to Eichler’s letter by writing that,  
283 Hitchcock writes that for the rest of 1948, “French officials had to keep the modest retreat that the London 
Accords represented from turning into a rout." Hitchcock, op cit., 101.  
284 In August-September 1948, because of its trade deficit with its zone, “The French found themselves in the 
situation in which they had to either reduce imports of coal, to pay for them immediately or to increase their exports 
of essential goods to Germany. The [Allied] discussions took on a passionate tone because it centered on whether 
the modernization of France would happen before that of Germany.” Gérard Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine 
et la construction européenne 1944-1954 (Paris: Ministère des Finances, 1992), 621. 
285 Hitchcock, op cit., 101.  
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We believe that a common French/German declaration on the Ruhr cannot be created (at 
the present moment) that would be useful to them or to us./It is much better to avoid 
under the present circumstances written commitments and rather just attempt to discuss 
orally together our different standpoints or find another way so far as possible to come 
together or at least make clear the conviction among ourselves that the other side does not 
harbor any bad intentions.286  
 
On the eve of the next round of Western Allied negotiations set to open 11 November 
1948 in London, the U.S. and British governments came to a bilateral agreement on the Ruhr and 
published it as Law 75 of the Bizone. The SPD and German public in general were furious to 
learn that the U.S. and G.B. intended to carry through a large program of factory dismantlements, 
though the number had been reduced considerably compared to previous Allied announcements. 
The French government and SFIO, for their part, were livid for a different set of reasons. 
Excluded from the negotiations, they rejected what they saw as a fait accompli. Law 75 
envisioned the return of management to German hands, leaving the question of ownership to a 
future elected national government. In a gesture of goodwill, Britain and the U.S. accepted the 
French delegation’s demand that it be included immediately in the current organs administrating 
the Ruhr industries in Essen (the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung). Philip publicly denounced 
the U.S.-British agreement in the name of the SFIO and the party approved a National Assembly 
resolution that demanded its revision.287 In defending the SFIO’s thesis on internationalization, 
Socialist deputy Jean Le Bail argued that nationalization would have been a great weapon for 
Hitler.288 At the same time, Philip put forward the SFIO view that the Ruhr Statute should lead to 
“the formation of a common sales cartel for coal and steel,” and that a “public cartel [should be 
placed] in the hands of the European nations as a whole,” which, as Lapie said, should be an 
acceptable solution for the SPD.  
In a tenacious series of negotiations on the design for the future IAR, French diplomats 
extracted important concessions intended to give teeth to the new organization. In the Ruhr 
Statute made public on 28 December 1948, the Allies agreed to grant the IAR not only the right 
to supervise and influence the distribution of Ruhr production, but also to transfer the 
supervisory powers of the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung over Ruhr management to the IAR 
286 Eichler to Heine, 6 August 1948; Heine to Eichler, 12 August 1948, Willi Eichler (WE) 110, AdsD. 
287 Philip told the National Assembly that the British and American military authorities had no right to set policy 
outside the channels of Allied inter-governmental negotiations and that no government could itself make final 
decisions about German property. 30 November 1948, JO, 7312. 
288 2 December 1948, JO, 7327.  
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once a German government formed. The IAR was to coordinate Ruhr production with goals set 
by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), forbid discriminatory 
practices, and balance foreign needs for coal with internal German consumption. The Allies 
intended that the IAR ensure French economic security, while the military program of preventing 
remilitarization and rearmament would be taken up by a different organization, the Office of 
Military Security. The agreement was a clear, though fragile, victory for the French delegation.  
The announcement of the Ruhr Statute gave occasion for a nasty and public dispute 
between the SFIO and SPD that set the contours for how the parties would react to the Schuman 
Plan. A chorus of protest from the ranks of the SPD greeted the announcement of the Ruhr 
Statute. The concrete design of the IAR remained to be worked out over the course of 1949. 
Nevertheless, though with different degrees of nuance, the national leadership and the NRW 
SPD condemned the agreement. That the SPD argued so forcefully against an arrangement the 
content of which remained unknown signaled that a crisis in trust towards the Allies and, in 
particular, towards the the French government, had become a driving motive in the party’s 
policies and strategy. As we shall see, the SPD was fighting the design for what turned out to be 
an impotent agency. At the time, though, the party leadership and NRW SPD emphasized the 
potential powers of an organization the actual powers of which remained largely to be 
determined.  
Henssler and NRW Economic Minister Nölting developed the most comprehensive 
critiques of the IAR in January 1949 and led the charge against the treaty in the NRW Landtag. 
A day after its announcement, Henssler claimed that the treaty “came close to a colonial statute,” 
an assertion that Nölting repeated.289 The party leadership took up this argument in only a 
slightly less polemical form. The potential powers of the new organization threatened to make 
nonsense of any future German sovereignty because control of Ruhr industry by the Allies would 
remove from a German government its ability to set its own economic policy. The IAR, like the 
German military in previous decades, would constitute a “State within the State.” Instead, the 
party must continue its pursuit of socialization. Ollenhauer, for his part, saw the SFIO’s embrace 
of the IAR as a betrayal of the compromise that he and Grumbach had reached at the Vienna 
Conference. With an eye to the SFIO, he argued that the SPD, for its part, still felt itself bound 
289 Henssler 48, AdsD. Nölting called the Ruhr Statute “an instrument of colonial policy”. Rombeck-Jaschinksi, op 
cit., 56. 
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by the socialist conference’s resolution. The SPD leadership argued that the SFIO’s argument 
that this was a first step towards the internationalization of European heavy industry was invalid 
because the treaty said nothing of extending the regime to other nations. The SPD found itself in 
alliance with the West German trade union leadership, which quickly rejected the Allied 
agreement as well.290 The SPD press celebrated the enthusiastic embrace that it claimed the Ruhr 
working classes had for the SPD’s stance on the Ruhr Statute.291 Though the CDU rejected the 
Ruhr Statute as well, its tone and response was this time far more moderate.  
To the SPD’s fury, Philip took the SFIO’s campaign in favor of the Ruhr Statute to the 
Ruhr territory itself. In January 1949, Philip held a series of conferences, touring the Ruhr cities 
of Dortmund, Bochum, and Hagen.292 He presented the Ruhr Statute as a first step towards a 
European economic union and met NRW Minister President Karl Arnold of the CDU, who was 
developing similar views.293 Yet, seemingly unbeknownst to SPD leaders, Philip was willing to 
go considerably further in accommodating the wishes of the SPD than much of the rest of the 
SFIO leadership. The noisy agitation of a minority in Germany had awakened a general fear in 
Germany’s neighbors that nationalism was again rearing its head in Western Germany. As 
Germany lurched towards national elections, many believed that a sizable part of the electorate 
silently agreed with the fulminations of right-wing demagogues. By early 1949, SFIO leaders 
began to see dangerous signs within German politics as well, and considered the upcoming 
German national elections with a sense of foreboding.  
Like the SPD, the SFIO could not know the outcome of the elections slated for August 
1949, but a deep sense of mistrust led the party leadership to harden its position on 
internationalization and, for the first time, to formally reject a policy for the socialization of Ruhr 
property under a German national government. There had always been divisions within the party 
on this question but, in general, public statements had been supportive of the SPD’s socialization 
290 DGB leader Hans Böckler immediately rejected the agreement and, in his meeting with NRW Minister-President 
Karl Arnold, Böckler expressed concern that the IAR’s information-gathering powers could be an “easy form of 
organized industrial espionage.” Werner Bührer, Ruhrstahl und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und 
Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, 1945-1952 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 147. 
Important trade unionists aligned with the SPD, all from North-Rhine-Westphalia, Viktor Agartz, Heinrich Deist, 
and Erich Potthoff were charged with the official drafting of the union’s position.  
291 “Arbeiter der Ruhr unterstützen Haltung der SPD,” SPD-Pressedienst, 29 December 1948.  
292 Raymond Poidevin, “Le facteur Europe dans la politique allemande de Robert Schuman (été 1948-printemps 
1949,” in Poidevin, ed., 325-6.  
293 In an October 1948 meeting, Karl Arnold reached agreement with Paul Devinat and SFIO deputy Géraud Jouve 
to support the creation of European organizations to supervise heavy industrial resources.  
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campaign. Philip was especially sympathetic. At a February 1949 Directing Committee meeting, 
Philip reported on his trip through the Ruhr. He called the dismantling of factories “economic 
craziness” and said that, “From the moment of an internationalization of management, property 
is of no interest...I am a partisan of the nationalization of the [Ruhr] property.”294  
That same meeting, though, made clear that the climate had shifted within SFIO 
leadership circles. Party leader Mollet not only expressed concern about renewed nationalism in 
Germany, but also presented the SPD as one of its bearers. The SPD campaign against the IAR 
was an important example but, more so were reports that, “in Germany the socialist party still 
shows the effects of the political past of Nazism; purification has not been conducted by our 
comrades.” As for the IAR, Mollet stated darkly that, “If the German Social Democrats had 
understood their just role, they would be in agreement with us to adopt the idea of 
internationalization.” The Committee agreed to a suggestion that it strengthen its public calls for 
an extension of internationalization to cover other European countries. Then it voted to support 
the internationalization of the Ruhr property rather than its socialization. Mollet said that, 
“Personally I remain profoundly hostile to any German control of the Ruhr due to the average 
spirit prevailing still today in Germany.” Only Philip, Marceau Pivert, and Oreste Rosenfeld 
voted against this provision. The committee did not heed Philip’s stated worry, which was put 
forth by the SPD as well, that internationalization would strengthen “neo-nationalism” in 
Germany.295  
In essence, the SFIO and SPD rift on the IAR and, later, on the Schuman Plan, came 
down to contrary assessments of whether the French government had in fact experienced a 
conversion or turn (tournant) on the German question under Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
from 1948-1950. In the view of SFIO leaders, the French government had abandoned the 
revanchist policies reviled by both parties in 1945-1947. They considered the more limited 
demands of the French government to be imperatives for French economic and military security 
that could not be further reduced. Whereas SFIO leaders saw the IAR and, in particular, the 
Schuman Plan, as departures from traditional French policies, the SPD leadership viewed them 
as their reincarnation.  
294 SFIO comité directeur, 2 February 1949, OURS. 
295 SFIO comité directeur, 16 February 1949, OURS. 
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At a press conference in March 1950, Schumacher called Schuman “a much friendlier 
and more polite man” than, one would presume, Bidault, but this did not amount to recognizing a 
change in French policy.296 Historians have criticized Schumacher for not perceiving the sea-
change that had occurred in official French policy.297 However, the historiography on the 
Schuman Plan provides a more complicated picture of the French “turn.” Some historians, 
usually emphasizing the Plan’s political components, have considered the Schuman Plan “a 
complete rupture” with previous French policy.298 Historians who have examined in detail the 
economic components of the Schuman Plan, on the other hand, have demonstrated that the Plan 
sought to achieve a number of traditional French economic goals through a different set of 
means.299 The SFIO stressed the positive aspects of the policy that sought to integrate Germany 
296 Schumacher Pressekonferenz am 24. März 1950, KS 50, AdsD.  
297 “Schumacher...did not always discern with precision the evolution of the German policy of the Quai d’Orsay 
under [Foreign Minister Robert] Schuman.” Jean-Paul Cahn, Le Parti social-démocrate allemand et la fin de la 
quatrième république (1954-1958) (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1996), 4. “Though French policy relaxed after the first two 
or three years of the occupation, Schumacher maintained that basically it had not changed, as French insistence upon 
a decentralized German state during the 1948-49 dispute over the Basic Law. He claimed that French proposals in 
the early 1950’s for the economic and military integration of the new German state with other European nations 
were aimed at keeping Germany permanently feeble, divided and under French domination.” Lewis Joachim 
Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1965), 174. 
298 Bossuat wrotes that the Plan was “a complete rupture.” Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, 752. Willis, who 
focuses on politics, writes that, “Schuman broke completely with the foreign policy that since [Cardinal] Richelieu’s 
time had been based on the axiom that the weakness of Germany is the strength of France.” F. Roy Willis, France, 
Germany, and the New Europe, 1943-1967, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1968, 1965), 81. 
299 Alan Milward writes that, “the Schuman proposals [...] far from being a change of economic and political 
direction, evolved logically from the consistent pursuit of France’s original domestic and foreign reconstruction 
aims.” Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 380. William Diebold writes in his inaugural study that the Schuman Plan “proposed going, at one 
leap, well beyond what had already been done, yet it was linked with what had gone before, both in its aims and in 
some of its methods.” William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959 (New 
York: Praeger, 1959). According to Korff, “At first view, the Schuman Plan seems a complete reversal of the French 
policy regarding Germany. Analyzed in light of the constants of French policy, one perceives however that the Plan 
takes up all the themes that had always guided French policy regarding Germany...despite the turn that it announced, 
the solution was, in fact, profoundly French...[The Plan’s originality] resides in having adopted so soon after the war 
the positive variant, not new, of course, but long neglected by French diplomacy” and “offering to the European 
countries the possibility of resolving themselves their own problems, of recovering gradually all of their freedom for 
political action and to follow their own path.” Adalbert Korff, Le revirement de la politique française à l’égard de 
l’Allemagne entre 1945 et 1950 (Lausanne: Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1965), 173. Hitchcock notes that, “the shift 
from confrontation to cooperation did not imply any weakening of French determination to contain Germany and 
bolster French influence.” Hitchcock, op cit., 74. Trausch cites a Quai d’Orsay memo that the Schuman Plan was a 
“second Monnet Plan,” which was necessary because the Commissariat General’s first plan had largely failed, to 
argue for a continuity in French policy. “Here the continuity in goals is clear.” Gilbert Trausch, “Der Schuman-Plan 
zwischen Mythos und Realität: Der Stellenwert des Schuman-Planes,” Historische Zeitschrift 21 (1995): 115. In 
Nausch’s view, “A comparison of the Monnet and Schuman Plans, especially the creation and functioning of the 
General Commissariat and the High Authority, justifies the claim that the Schuman-Plan was intended as a 
continuation of the Monnet-Plan on the European level.” Eckart F. Nausch, Die Entwicklung der deutschen und 
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within a united Europe on formally equal terms. It was a policy, in their view, that abandoned the 
punitive goals of the early postwar period and set a framework for peaceful cooperation between 
the German and French governments. During a debate on the Schuman Plan on 12 July 1951, 
however, Carlo Schmid asserted that, “it is not a beginning for Europe, but rather a piece [meant] 
to carry through the [French] policy of the postwar period.”300 In responding to the Ruhr Statute 
in early 1949, Henssler and Deist both perceived and praised the more positive attitude 
emanating from Schuman’s ministry but still rejected the Statute as containing too many 
traditional French demands.301 The following section examines the substance of their claims 
before turning to the debate that ensued between the SFIO and SPD from the Petersberg Accord 
of November 1949 to the ratifications of the European Coal & Steel Community by the 
Bundestag in January 1952. The SPD’s position can only be understood through an examination 
of 1) French policy on the Saarland, 2) French economic competition policy and the Monnet 
Plan, and 3) French policies on cartelization. An examination of these factors makes clear that 
there is more to SPD claims of continuity in French policy than historians have generally granted 
in their assessments of SPD policy in the initial stage of European integration.  
 
3.4 POISON ON THE MOSELLE RIVER: THE SAARLAND BETWEEN  
FRANCE AND GERMANY 
 
The issue of the Saarland plagued French-German relations from 1946 until the two governments 
reached a resolution in 1956 under Guy Mollet’s Socialist-led coalition government. Within the 
tripartite coalition of 1945-47, the SFIO had sought to block any annexation of the Saarland, but 
it approved the economic union of the Saarland with France that occurred in 1946 and the 
introduction of the French franc for a provisional phase. Unlike French Christian Democrats, 
who made political annexation a part of their official platform in 1945, and most other French 
parties, the SFIO recognized that the Saarland was culturally and historically German and 
expected it to return one day to German sovereignty. Economic imperatives, however, led the 
französischen Stahlindustrie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und ihr Einfluss auf die Verankerung eines 
grundsätzlichen Subventionsverbots für Stahl im Montan-Vertrag von 1952 (Cologne: Müller Botermann, 1988), 
134. 
300 Hans-Joachim Daul, ed., Carlo Schmid: Bundestags Reden (Bonn: AZ Studio, 1966), 101.  
301 Das Ruhr-Statut: Vortrag von Dr. Heinrich Deist, gehalten auf der Arbeitsdirektoren-Konferenz am 27./28. 
Januar 1949 in Berkhöpen, Erich Potthoff 41, AdsD. Henssler on Westfälische Rundschau, 19 June 1949, pointed to 
the danger that, “the Ruhr will be abused as a competitive buffer by its supervisors.” KS 47, AdsD.  
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SFIO to refuse an immediate return. In light of the severe coal shortages of the initial postwar 
period and the uncertain fate of the Ruhr territory, the SFIO was unwilling to sacrifice French 
claims for Saar coal.  
The SFIO had reason to be satisfied with the situation in the Saar by the beginning of 
1948. While the French government blasted the British occupation for the meager recovery of 
coal production in the Ruhr, which had only reached 55% of its 1938 level in October 1947, the 
figure was 80% in the Saar.302  However, the coal was of only limited use to French industry 
because it was not the type required for Lorraine steel production, which remained reliant on the 
higher quality output from the Ruhr. In addition, while clamping down on unwelcome political 
agitation, the French occupiers pursued a more liberal economic policy than they did in their 
zone of occupation, raising the salaries of miners, assuring scarce steel supplies for Saar 
industry, and raising ration levels.303 This helped to create an initial period of political calm and 
strengthened an autonomous movement seeking closer accommodation with France, despite a 
political approach that repressed pro-German parties. Nevertheless, SFIO leaders were 
uncomfortable with the political situation in the Saarland. Mollet correctly predicted in early 
1947 that a referendum in the Saar for economic union would come out in France’s favor. He 
noted to the SFIO Directing Committee, though, that such a vote would be “for not particularly 
noble reasons” because it would be the result of French occupation efforts to woo the Saar 
population through the granting of material privileges.304 
SPD policy on the Saar and Ruhr developed in tandem and developments in both regions 
mutually reinforced the SPD conception of French policy. Like the Ruhr, SPD leaders argued 
that French policy in the Saar strengthened KPD propaganda by offering a Western example of 
the annexations taking place in the East. Schmid and some others, though, went to great length to 
balance a denunciation of French policies with assertions that the situation was far worse in the 
eastern regions.305 As the French government successfully instituted the “Saar Statute” in early 
1950, German Social Democrats characterized it as a “protectorate constitution” backed by a 
302 Sylvie Lefèvre, op cit., 64. On 20 February 1948, the French government obtained from the Allies a concession 
that Saar coal would not be considered a part of the quotas for coal exports from Germany to France. 
303 In its circular to the International Socialist Conference, the SFIO claimed that, “No one contests, in any respect, 
the advantages to be gained by the Saar population through economic union with France.” International Socialist 
Conference Circular No. 102/50, “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale 
Abteilung 02516, AdsD. 
304 SFIO comité directeur, 19 February 1947, OURS. 
305 Hans-Joachim Daul, ed., 64-71. 
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“police state.”306 Time and again SPD speakers denounced the widespread violations of political 
freedoms in the Saar and the refusal by the French regime to grant licenses to pro-German 
parties. Jacques Freymond’s study demonstrates that the SPD was the most persistent of all 
German parties in raising the issue in the Bundestag during the length of the dispute from 1949 
to 1955.307 
Verbal attacks were only a part of the SPD’s arsenal in its battle against the detachment 
of the Saar from Germany. Here is not the place to reproduce the detailed historical studies 
analyzing the ground war that the SPD conducted against the French occupation of the Saar.308 
Suffice to say that the secret funneling of money, propaganda and personnel between the western 
zones and the Saar, an effort led by SPD deputy Karl Mommer, represented in part a mirror to 
the surreptitious efforts that the SPD conducted in the postwar period to undermine Communist 
rule in Eastern Germany through its “Eastern bureau.”  
For the SPD, French policy in the Saar was tangible proof that the French “turn” was 
more show than reality. The fate of the Saarland fueled the breakdown of SFIO-SPD relations 
from 1948 to 1951, and a controversy over the Saar’s status in international bodies led the SPD 
to reject Germany’s inclusion in the Council of Europe, the first institution for European 
unification in the postwar period. The SPD also fought against the inclusion of representatives of 
the autonomous Saar government in the international Socialist conference when the Saar 
Socialist Party, the Sozialistische Partei Saarlands (SPS), placed the SFIO in an embarrassing 
situation by applying for membership.  
Policy on the Saar was a divisive issue within the SFIO leadership, which sought to 
balance its coalitional commitments and the need to import coal with pressures from the SPD 
and other socialist parties to revise French policy. Both the SFIO and SPD made considerable 
efforts to reach a consensus on the Saar, but each had to face the reality that neither party was the 
driving force behind their governments’ policy on this issue until Mollet formed a government in 
1956. In socialist international meetings and in their speeches, SPD leaders recognized French 
economic interests in the Saar and agreed that an accord over the output of the Saar coal mines 
be made part of a deal for the Saar’s return to Germany. The question of property again divided 
306 Schmid to the Bundestag, 29 September 1949, in Hans-Joachim Daul, ed., 22.  
307 Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict, 1945-1955 (New York: Praeger, 1960), 285. 
308 See Rainer Hudemann and Raymond Poidevin, eds., Die Saar 1945-1955: Ein Problem der europäischen 
Geschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992). 
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the parties, with Ollenhauer telling his international socialist colleagues that, “We want to stress 
that, although we recognize this right of the French government to exploit the Saar coal mines, 
we consider them to be German property under the administration of an occupying power.” 
Reproducing the SFIO approach to the Ruhr question, Mollet responded that, “The [Saar] mines 
should belong to an international body; the only solution is an international one, perhaps at first 
on a European basis.” To SPD objections that this occur simultaneously with the 
Europeanization of the Lorraine, the SFIO replied that this was “unrealistic” in light of present 
French government policies and that, “the discriminatory nature of this has been imposed upon 
us by events, as it is the circumstances resulting from the war” that were responsible for the 
present situation.309  
Although SFIO leaders rejected the SPD’s claims that the Saar be immediately returned, 
they did support in principle a referendum for self-determination, a position unique at the time 
among French political parties. In laying out this position, Mollet told the Socialist conference 
that, “the population is predominately German and if a plebiscite were held in the Saar territory, 
the result would probably be the same as that of 1935” when the Saarlanders voted to return to 
German sovereignty.310 The parties agreed in April 1950 to set up a sub-commission to seek a 
socialist consensus on the Saar question. The commission’s report, issued in May 1950, gave 
satisfaction to much of the SFIO position in favor of an Europeanization of the Saar mines. It 
also called for a referendum on the territory’s future, but Mollet now objected that his party 
opposed this method for the present time, citing the dangers of a recrudescent German 
nationalism.311 The SFIO hoped to delay any proposal for a long-term solution.312 As workers 
and miners began to protest French policies and the Saar government in 1950, the SPD made 
clear its intention to channel this anger. The party agreed to the resolution only because it 
309 A year later the SFIO circular to the International Socialist Conference claimed that, “The system established by 
the Versailles Treaty, and in force until the plebiscite of 1935, gave France not merely privileges, but also a property 
right in the Saar, though it was attached neither politically nor economically to France.” International Socialist 
Conference Circular No. 102/50, “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale 
Abteilung 02516, AdsD. 
310 Note that Mollet’s comments here come several years after the referendum approving the French-Saar Economic 
union. 15 April 1950, Comisco circular on “The Meeting of the Committee of the International Socialist Conference 
at Hastings, 18-19 March, 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02512, AdsD.  
311 International Socialist Conference Circular No. 133/50, “The Meeting of the Committee of the International 
Socialist Conference at Copenhagen,” 13 May 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02512, AdsD.  
312 “On a long term basis it is most likely that the Saar will again be attached or called back to the German 
‘Fatherland.’” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50, 12 May 1950, “The French Socialists and the 
Saar question,” Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.  
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condemned the bilateral Saar Statute between the French and Saar governments, but it refused to 
revise its public position, which had recently been affirmed at its 1950 party congress.   
The SPD leadership bitterly resented the decision of the international socialist conference 
to admit representatives of the Saar Socialist Party as observers to its meetings in 1949-1950. 
The SFIO Directing Committee approved the inclusion of the SPS delegates as observers, rather 
than as full members.313 That such prominent figures as Georges Brutelle, Pierre Commin, 
Daniel Mayer, Mollet, and Rosenfeld voted against their inclusion reveals how sharply the SFIO 
split over this issue. The SPD was also incensed that the French government had linked its 
agreement to allow Germany to apply for membership in the newly constituted Council of 
Europe to German agreement for Saar membership in the Council. The SFIO continued to 
promote its alternative policies within the French government. In a nod to the SPD position, 
Mollet was the only French delegate to vote against the Saar’s inclusion in a Council of Europe 
session. While Mollet denounced the French government’s demand that the Saarland be admitted 
simultaneously with West Germany into the Council of Europe, he insisted that the SPD not 
predicate its agreement to join the Council on the exclusion of the Saar.314 The SPD leadership, 
in fact, favored European integration within the Council of Europe and Germany’s membership 
in it. Its only objection was the inclusion of the Saar, which, party leaders argued, amounted to a 
German recognition of the Saar’s separate status. The dispute on whether to approve German 
membership resulted in a serious rift within the SPD and bitter exchanges among prominent SPD 
figures, such Wilhelm Kaisen, Hermann Brill, Ernst Reuter and Max Bauer on the one hand, and 
the party leadership on the other. Nonetheless, the party congress overwhelmingly supported the 
party leadership’s position and the SPD Bundestag faction voted against the treaty.  
The vote on the Council of Europe in June 1950 set a precedent for the SPD faction’s 
rejection of the European Coal & Steel Community in January 1952. First, the SPD immediately 
313 SFIO comité directeur, 11 May 1949, OURS. 
314 The SFIO circular stated that, “Simultaneous admission necessarily implies German recognition of the Saar’s 
admission to the Council of Europe, and thus implicitly the recognition of her political separation from Germany. 
However, our Party does not consider that Germany should make conditions concerning her joining of [sic] the 
Council of Europe. The French Socialists appreciate the courageous fight of the German Social Democrats against 
Neo-Fascism and Nationalism, they also know of the difficult situation in Germany today. Dictatorship has been the 
fate of this country for so long that the task of the rebirth of democracy is most difficult and slow; but the German 
Socialists must have the courage to adopt a positive attitude towards their adherence to the Council of Europe even 
though this may risk incurring a certain unpopularity.” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50 “The 
French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD. 
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rejected a part of the international socialist conference report that praised the Schuman Plan as a 
possible means for resolving the Saar issue through the Europeanization of Saar property. French 
Foreign Minister Schuman in 1951 sought again to link European integration proposals to 
German recognition of the French position in the Saar. French negotiators tried, but failed to win 
Adenauer’s endorsement for the Saar Statute, as the SPD conducted a virulent public campaign 
against French policy in the Saar. The SPD in fact strengthened Adenauer’s hand and the final 
treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes in which the French government recognized the 
German government’s position that the final status of the Saar would be left to a definitive peace 
treaty. The governments resolved that the Saarland would be represented by the French 
delegation in the ECSC rather than have an independent delegation, a decision that the SPD also 
rejected.  
There can be no doubt that the Saar issue played a large role in the SPD’s decision to 
reject Germany’s entrance into the Council of Europe and the ECSC Treaty. However, it is not 
clear that the issue would have sufficed to lead the SPD to oppose the Schuman Plan without the 
influence of other, though related, factors. That the SPD did not reject the Schuman Plan out of 
hand when it was announced in May 1950, during the height of agitation against the Saar Statute, 
indicates that more was at play in the party’s decision. The Saar issue helped forge a larger 
narrative within the SPD that the French government intended to confine West Germany to a 
subordinate position in the postwar European order. The SPD leadership viewed the French 
economic union with the Saar, as well as the policies enacted in the French zone of occupation, 
as a continuation of a long-term French effort to attain economic hegemony on the European 
continent through the exploitation of German raw materials for French interests.315  
 
3.5 HEGEMONY THROUGH STEEL: SOCIALISTS AND THE QUEST FOR  
AN ECONOMIC BALANCE OF POWER 
 
In its reaction to the announcement of the Ruhr Statute, SPD leaders developed a rationale that 
they later employed in their campaign against the Schuman Plan in 1951. In their view, the 
315 One example among many is SPD-Pressedienst, Dr. G. Lütkens, “Die Montanunion der ‘Festen Hand,’” 20 April 
1951, WE 114, AdsD.  
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fundamentals of French policy had not changed since the time of Georges Clemenceau.316 The 
Ruhr Statute and the Schuman Plan, they argued, were in effect a French conspiracy to 
permanently change the economic balance of power between the two nations by crippling 
German steel production.317 Factory dismantlements, the naked exploitation of primary resources 
in the French occupation zone and the Saarland, and French policy towards the Ruhr were part of 
a unified effort to fulfill the Monnet Plan by eliminating the foundations for German competition 
in the future.318 The first victims of this effort, in the SPD leadership’s view, were the German 
316 Carlo Schmid said of the Ruhr Statute that its control mechanism would be used “for the purpose of eliminating 
German competition from the world market, manipulated for the purpose of a one-sided exploitation of the German 
people’s work, for the purpose which once—it was the beginning of the twenties—was called ‘taking Germany by 
the belt’ [‘die an die Gurgel Deutschlands legen’]. We know what calamitous consequences this had...” 
Hauptausschuss-Sitzung vom 7. Januar 1949. Erklärung der SPD-Fraktion zum Ruhrstatut, vertreten durch Carlo 
Schmid, EO 453, AdsD. In September 1951 the SPD press wrote about the Schuman Plan: “In 1918 France began to 
build the Lorraine steel industry with large state subsidies. For this the French steel industry required the high-
quality Ruhr coke because French coal was not good for the coking process. The relentless French reparations policy 
towards Germany, at first supported by the other victorious powers, aimed to weaken Germany’s heavy industry and 
assure the cheapest possible supply of Ruhr coal for French industry (autonomy of the Saar territory, attempt to 
found an autonomous Rhineland State, occupation of the Ruhr territory). This attempt failed in the end. After 1945 
France wanted to permanently remove the superiority of German heavy industry. France was the most adamant 
power for the dismantlement policy that robbed Germany of all its modern equipment. The heavy industry plan 
worked out by the French manager Jean Monnet and approved by the government (Monnet-Plan) intended to build 
up French steel industry above German capacity, [and] therefore keep German capacity low and limit German steel 
production.” Der SPD Redner: Informationen und Unterlagen, “Der Schuman-Plan,” September 1951, WE 114, 
AdsD.  
317 In the party brochure, “SPD and Ruhr Statute,” written by Schumacher and published in February 1949, 
Schumacher argues that, “For the time-being some of the countries may find it convenient to have Germany as a 
supplier of raw materials and not as a competitor in the export market.” KS 46, AdsD. Ollenhauer characterized 
French policy in his notes on the announcement of the June 1948 London Accords in this way: “Two [sic] factors 
are decisive for France. Security needs. Securing of the highest possible share of Ruhr production. Maintenance of 
the supremacy of steel production.” EO 72, AdsD. After the announcement of the December 1948 Allied Accords, 
Ollenhauer told a private meeting of SPD leaders and regional ministers that, “What is harder for us to accept [than 
French security guarantees] is that the French want to secure their aspiration for the supremacy of the French steel 
industry over the German through the arrangement for the Ruhr territory...” EO 73, AdsD. “Finally in the industry 
plan developed in London, in which German capacity is limited to 10.7 million tons [of steel], while the French and 
Benelux countries are allowed a doubling of their steel production compared to the prewar period and everyone 
knows that if the French steel industry wants to reach this level, it can only reach it with the support of the coal and 
coke of the Ruhr and only as long as it is assured that it does not have to face large German competition on the 
international market...in practice the Ruhr Statue is an attempt to stabilize national economies at the cost of another 
economy, namely at the cost of the German economy.” Fraktion Parlamentarischen Rat, Ministerpräsidenten, 
Minister Länderregierungen, PV PA-Sitzung, 22 January 1949, EO 73, AdsD.  Schumacher used the same argument 
in a private SPD meeting in September 1951 to justify his opposition to the Schuman Plan: “As for the Schuman-
Plan, Schumacher explains that it had become ever clearer which direction it was going—namely a guaranteed 
mastery of the Ruhr by foreign influence and a fundamental repositioning of European heavy industry at the expense 
of the German and a gradual washing away of German steel capacity.” Auszug aus der Rede Dr. Kurt Schumacher 
am 8. September 1951 in Bonn vor Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss der SPD, PV 1951, AdsD.  
318 In its brief for COMISCO, the party criticized the IAR and wrote that, “Germany must be a partner with equal 
rights and be protected against [efforts by] its real and potential competitors to use it as a competitive buffer.” 
Comisco Witten, “Vorschlag Deutschlands zur Änderung des Ruhrstatuts,” 2/PVBT4 AdsD. In his notes, Ollenhauer 
wrote: “Steering of the type and scale of the Ruhr production based on the competitive needs of other interested 
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and, particularly, the Ruhr, working classes. As Kurt Schumacher’s private notes show, the party 
considered Adenauer’s government to be “passive” in the face of French initiatives and this 
passivity before an exploitative occupier risked channeling Germans’ frustration into the 
momentarily ascendant neo-fascist movement.319 
Allied policies to limit German industry in the initial postwar period and the favoritism 
exhibited by the Marshall Plan administrators for French efforts to modernize the French steel 
industry provide the background for the SPD’s argument that a customs union for coal and steel 
was disadvantageous to German industry because of the different “starting conditions” for 
German industry.320 The SPD focused its critique at first on the impact that a customs union 
would have on German steel, rather than on the German coal industry. It did so because it was 
apparent to all that, until Monnet raised the cartel issue in fall 1950, the Schuman Plan posed no 
threat to the Ruhr coal industry; in fact, it was rather advantageous for Ruhr coal because it 
provided a large guaranteed market for its exports.321 The SPD view, on the other hand, that the 
Ruhr Statute and Schuman Plan aimed to continue the French assault on German steel was a 
central factor for the SPD decision to oppose the Schuman Plan. As Schumacher told a private 
party meeting in July 1950, “No, no, my dear assembly, we refuse to let ourselves warm to a 
program that favors German coal by disadvantaging German steel; such a disadvantage of 
German steel production would mean unemployment in those industrial areas where we have 
[realized] our best accomplishments, in iron transformation, in machine tools, in the construction 
of apparatuses, in electronic techniques.”322  
parties.” EO 74, AdsD. Ollenhauer also said that, “This Ruhr Statute gives the Ruhr Authority the opportunity not 
only to supervise German production in the Ruhr; it also gives it the opportunity to regulate the production of the 
Ruhr for the competitive needs of the countries that participate in the Ruhr Authority.” Bundestag Verhandlungen, 
25 November 1949, 521. Schmid wrote in the name of the SPD faction about the Ruhr Statute: “As I read some of 
the articles—and I have read it long, often and carefully—my impression has continuingly strengthened that [the 
IAR] has less to do with creating security against German aggression and much more with creating security against 
the return of a possible new prosperity of the German economy, as if one wants to build an apparatus that would 
make possible at any arbitrary time to compensate for a general or particular economic crisis at the cost of the 
German economy.” Hauptausschuss-Sitzung vom 7. Januar 1949, Erklärung der SPD-Fraktion zum Ruhrstatut, 
vertreten durch Carlo Schmid,” EO 453, AdsD. 
319 “A policy of fait accomplis through French activity. German passivity.” KS 63, AdsD.  
320 The German steel industry received 165 million marks up to July 1951, a paltry sum compared to Germany’s 
neighbors. Nausch, op cit., 58. See also, for instance, Schmid’s and Nölting’s comments to the Bundestag Ausschuss 
für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 17 December 1951. Wolfgang Hölscher and Joachim Wintzer, eds., Ausschuss für 
auswärtiges Angelegenheiten. 1949-1953, 2 volumes, Quellen zur Geschichte der Parlementarismus und der 
politischen Parteien, Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998. 
321 Milward, The Reconstruction, op cit., 388. 
322 Ansprache Dr. Kurt Schumacher in einer Funktionärversammlung der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 
am 31. Juli 1950 um 17.30 Uhr, KS 52 AdsD.  
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SPD economic experts, including Fritz Baade, Erik Nölting and Hermann Veit, furnished 
the party leadership with statistics showing that German steel would enter a customs union at a 
strong disadvantage. The experts were correct that Marshall Plan funds allocated only a 
relatively small sum for the German steel and iron industries.323 Foreign investment flooded into 
the Ruhr coal mines, while it studiously avoided assisting German steel and iron. As Gillingham 
writes of these industries, “For whole months at a time the very physical existence of key 
production installations seemed in jeopardy.”324 In both France and Germany, private capital for 
large-scale investments was largely non-existent in the initial postwar period.  
While the French government embarked on a massive investment program in heavy 
industry that reached its zenith in the years 1949-50, SPD economic experts bemoaned the 
seeming lack of interest in investment on the part of Adenauer’s government. The construction 
of the first two broad-band train systems in France, one in the Nord and the other in the Lorraine, 
symbolized French ambitions for its steel modernization program.325 Meanwhile, the Soviet 
occupation had removed Germany’s only broad-band train system for steel. As Veit and Nölting 
argued, only state investment financed through taxation could make up for lost time. The 
situation seemed all the more dangerous for German steel because the United Nations Economic 
Commision for Europe (UNECE) warned in 1949 of a massive European overproduction of steel 
by 1952-53. The UNECE’s conclusions were a result of a situation in which all the major 
western European nations were investing in large steel export industries for which there was not 
323 Baade told the Bundestag on 18 January 1950 that the Marshall Plan had provided 12 dollars per capita to 
Germany in 1949/50, 17 to England, 22 to France, and 45 to the Netherlands. In his view, “This is a discrimination 
against Germany.” Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 18 January 1950, 836. 
324 John Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem: German Heavy Industry and the Schuman Plan,” in Klaus 
Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/51 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988), 403. 
325 The broad-band steel train system was an innovation pioneered in the United States that allowed operators to 
produce over a million tons of high-quality steel per year. At the end of World War II, the U.S. had twenty of these 
trains, Germany one, and Great Britain one. France had none. The first broad-band steel train in France was built in 
1946 by two Nord companies that combined to form Usinor after Economic Minister Pierre Mendès-France’s gave 
impetus to the project. Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet: Génèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publications de 
la Sorbonne, 1987), 251. Three Lorraine companies, including the industrial giant de Wendel, after having lost their 
initial application for the trains in 1946 to the Nord companies, combined in 1948 to form La Sollac with the 
purpose of financing a broad-band steel train in Florange. As Poidevin writes, “The second [broad-band steel train] 
at Sollac where de Wendel had the major share represented a victory for the French planners over [U.S. High 
Commander] General [Lucius] Clay and the German steel industry which had made a bid for it to go to Germany.” 
Poidevin, “Le rôle personnel de Robert Schuman dans les négociations C.E.C.A. (juin 1950-avril 1951),” in 
Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, 124. According to some historians, “Until the mid-1950s the American authorities, with 
the backing of the OEEC, prevented German industry from acquiring a new wide strip mill from the United States, 
even though the steel producers managed to secure entirely private funding.” Matthias Kipping, Ruggero Ranieri, 
and Joost Dankers, “The emergence of New Competitor Nations in the European Steel Industry: Italy and The 
Netherlands, 1945-1966,” Business history 42, 1, (2001): 69-99. 
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a sufficient projected future demand. In their final analysis of the Schuman Plan, SPD leaders 
argued that Germany’s economic competitors would utilize the proposed High Authority, which 
had the power to approve or disapprove certain investment plans, to freeze investment in German 
steel and iron and cement the transformation in national market shares that had occurred in the 
postwar period. Again, this argument represented a lack of trust in the intentions of Germany’s 
neighbor, a view rooted in long-term historical developments and party narratives.326  
Did the position that the SPD developed on the Schuman Plan reflect a degree of 
paranoia? An examination of French historiography gives reason for pause before making such 
an assessment.327 Internal administrative documents and notes from the diplomatic service make 
clear that many French ministers and officials hoped to make use of the occupation period to 
gain a long-term competitive advantage for French steel.328 This appears to have initially been 
326 Schumacher’s private notes from this period read, “Monnet-Plan expanded and supported by the Schuman Plan. 
Structural transformation of the French steel industry. Everything modernized. French iron industry is expanding 
and is encroaching upon the transformation industries. Consequences for German iron industry. High Authority 
decides about the distribution of consumption quotas.” KS 63, AdsD. 
327 Pierre Gerbet entitles a sub-chapter in his book on French postwar reconstruction “The Steel Dream”. Gerbet, Le 
rélèvement, op cit., 138. Writing about the year 1947, Schwabe states that, “In placing the accent on the distribution 
of coal, the French were seeking simultaneously to limit and supervise interior German consumption, to obtain the 
necessary coal for the French economy and to assure the supremacy of French steel over German steel in Europe.” 
Klaus Schwabe, “L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’integration à l’ouest,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Le Plan 
Schuman dans l’histoire: Intérêts nationaux et projet européen (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 2004), 128. “The 
principal obsession is modernization through the crushing [écrasement] of Germany. France believed itself capable 
of replacing German power in Europe. The means? Ruhr coal and the creation of a large steel industry in France.” 
Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, 899. According to Lefèvre, “The essential objective [of the French 
government] was therefore to economically disarm Germany in order to assure the security and reconstruction of 
France.” Lefèvre, op cit., 7. Kipping shows how the French Foreign Ministry argued to the Allies that France could 
fill the hole in steel production caused by quotas on German steel production. Kipping writes, however, that, “It is 
controversial in the research whether France intended [with the Monnet Plan] to replace Germany as the leading 
steel producer on the European continent.” Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-
Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 47.  
328 Economic Minister Pierre Mendès-France announced the resistance government’s policy in a radio address on 24 
February 1945: “instead of sending, like before, Lorraine minerals to the Ruhr so that they may be converted in 
German heavy furnaces, contributing to Germany’s fortune, we should import Ruhr coke to convert in our heavy 
furnaces so that it contributes to French reconstruction and prosperity. For this purpose we must renovate our 
equipment, construct heavy furnaces and rolling mills...Master of this industry, France will be a great power not 
only because steel is the industry most fundamental for national defense, but also because the production and wealth 
of the nation depend on it...” Also, instructions dated 28 December 1946 to the French delegation of the three-party 
Allied council stated that, “France, Belgium and Luxembourg have the capacity to replace the Ruhr steel production 
on the European and world market and meet British and Dutch needs.” Gerbet, Le Rélèvement, op cit., 138, 152. 
Later, “In response to American journalists, [Pierre Mendès-France] denied wanting to eliminate German steel, but 
he continued to plead in September 1948 for a new balance of steel to benefit France.” Bossuat, La France, l’aide 
americaine, op cit., 658. An internal memo prepared by an economic sub-commission on German affairs in the 
Foreign Affairs ministry carried the title “Economic Disarmament of Germany.” It argued for the suppression of 
certain industries like airplane construction and machine-tools, and called for a severe curtailment of the German 
steel industry. Lefèvre, op cit., 17, 22. An internal memo from October 1945 also made this intention clear: “...in a 
measure to be determined, the Ruhr should be fed with semi-produced steel products of the French industry in the 
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Jean Monnet’s view as well.329 In addition, during the Schuman Plan negotiations, the effort of 
the French delegation to ban government subsidies to the proposed Community’s coal and steel 
industries, following what had been a period of restrictions on German production and expansion 
of French production, appeared to be a naked attempt to solidify the advantages French industry 
had gained from 1946 to 1950. Nevertheless, it is less clear that French negotiators were 
pursuing an offensive, rather than defensive, policy in their efforts to contain a German steel 
industry that was already rebounding dramatically by 1949-1950. Nor is it clear that French 
Socialists, who supported the Monnet Plan, intended to permanently eliminate or cripple German 
economic competiveness.  
To determine the SFIO’s position on German competition, it is necessary to examine 
again the views of Professor of Economics André Philip, who was the SFIO’s principal 
economic expert in this period. He wielded influence within the government, within the SFIO 
central committee, and in crafting SFIO economic resolutions at party congresses. As Economic 
Minister in early 1946, he wrote that, “The complete economic disarmament of Germany risks 
leading to unfavorable consequences for the French economy” and he argued that the French 
policy of limiting German industrial production had to be revised and brought into “harmony 
with the new German and French economic necessities.”330 Philip was willing to go a 
considerable way to meet German economic claims, telling the National Assembly that 
Germany’s need to import food and its greater population density caused by an influx of refugees 
Lorraine, in exchange for the sending of refined coke from the Ruhr. German steel production and French-Belgian-
Luxemburg steel production are closely tied but the smelting and steel production of the Allies should be raised to 
the detriment of Ruhr production. Instead of exporting French iron ore to Germany, we will import coal and refined 
coke for the Lorraine.” Rombeck-Jaschinski, op cit., 17. Hervé Alphand wrote a memo that, according to Hitchcock, 
“envisaged a control system in which German coal and coke were exported from the Ruhr to the Lorraine forges, 
steel would be exported to Germany. This arrangement would invert the traditional relationship of these two 
countries, whereby France had exported iron ore from Lorraine to be used in German forges for the production of 
steel that then was exported by Germany. France could thereby direct the Ruhr’s industries away from the 
production of steel and pig iron and toward the production of finished goods, using French steel.” Hitchcock, op cit., 
53.  
329 Su writes that in 1943, “Monnet suggested stripping Germany of its metallurgical industry.” And, “Even if he 
declined to accept integrally the American Morgenthau Plan, his core concern during and in the aftermath of WWII 
was how to reduce German industrial strength to the extent that any German aggression would become improbable 
in the future.” Hung-Dah Su, “Jean-Monnet’s Great Design for Europe and its Criticism, Journal of European 
Integration History 15, 2 (2009): 30. In an internal memorandum, Monnet wrote that, “France’s reconstruction will 
not progress unless the question of German industrial production and its competitive potential finds a quick 
solution.” Werner Bührer, “Dirigismus und Europäische Integration. Jean Monnet aus Sicht der deutschen 
Industrie,” Andreas Wilkens, ed., Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 212-13.  
330 Hitchcock, op cit., 55. 
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made a Morgenthau-style de-industrialization plan impossible. He called the Ruhr “the industrial 
lung through which all the industry of continental Europe breaths.” French foreign policy must, 
he argued, recognize that imports from the Ruhr, and not just of coal, would have to be allowed 
to increase if the German economy was to avoid complete collapse.331  
Philip had developed a policy far in advance of many of his French counterparts, 
including of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the most celebrated Frenchmen among the early 
“founding fathers” of European integration. To Philip, German industrial recovery was necessary 
for the health of the European economy as a whole, a view that fit well with that of the U.S. and 
Benelux governments. However, Philip also envisioned a fundamental restructuring of the 
European economy, a view that put his ideas on a collision course with the SPD. He argued that 
the German government had used its steel exports in the interwar period to bully other countries 
to support its foreign policy. In 1946, he wrote that, “Rather than leave Germany the ability to 
export only in areas without military significance—but which might nevertheless be dangerously 
competitive with France (i.e., in areas such as textiles, optics, clocks, chemicals, etc.), we should 
rather authorize the Germans to conserve some part of their export markets of finished 
goods...while rigorously controlling the commercial organization of these markets.”332 Philip 
envisioned a realignment of French-German trade, with France exporting to Germany high 
quality steel that German steel-transforming industries would then convert into machine tools 
and other finished goods. That vision clashed with elements in the French Economic Ministry 
that intended not only to limit German steel, but also to eliminate high-quality German finished 
goods from the European market.333 In this regard Philip offered a far more conciliatory 
economic policy towards German recovery.  
However, Philip’s economic vision did require a French supremacy in steel over the Ruhr 
steel industry, to be compensated by a liberal policy on exports of German finished goods. Thus, 
as Economic Minister, Philip adamantly supported continued limitations on German annual steel 
production and fought the Allied Control Council’s efforts to lift the steel quota from 7.5 to 10 
331 30 November 1948, JO, 7313-5.  
332 Hitchcock, op cit., 56. 
333A meeting chaired by Hervé Alphand on 9 August 1948 set French government policy for a new wave of German 
factory dismantlements. According to Bossuat, the meeting decided to target high technology. “The French wanted 
to hit the heart of German technological innovation: magnesium, aluminum, beryllium, vanadium radioactive 
isotopes, electronic tubes, synthetic oil, and reduce chemical production, the dying industry and heavy machine-
tools.” Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, op cit., 668.  
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million tons.334 Out of government, Philip continued to promote an economic entente with 
Germany as chair of the steel committee of the OEEC and in his position on the United Nations’ 
steel committee for Europe, activities that culminated with his proposal for a European heavy 
industrial union in 1948-1949.  
Socialist deputy Géraud Jouve, named rapporteur by the Foreign Affairs Commission of 
the National Assembly to report on the activities of the IAR, shared Philip’s view. He submitted 
a motion that argued that, “the activity of the German transformation industries constitutes a 
more effective means to combat unemployment than the development of the steel industry,” and 
asked the government to “resolutely oppose any rise in German steel production and make 
efforts to find, on the level of a European agreement, a solution that takes account of the steel 
needs of German transformation industries that can be covered by deliveries from the steel 
industries of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg.”335 He pointed to the far greater number of 
employees in the German transformation industries. This was true, as it was in France as well, 
but such a policy would still have inflicted heavy damage on the Ruhr industries, as most of the 
transforming industries lay outside the Ruhr territory.  
Philip’s position reflected well the general SFIO approach to German economic recovery 
in government. As Prime Minister, Blum asked Lapie: 
Why should we conserve a point of view on Germany which no one believes anymore? 
What idea do we have of Germany? We must be clear. Germany works today at 18% of 
its prewar production. One cannot permanently block the development of this country. 
We must revise [French government policy]. 
 
At the same time, though, Philip seconded Socialist Prime Minister Paul Ramadier’s public 
objection to the Allied increase in the German steel quota in July 1947. “The German 
renaissance,” Ramadier insisted, “must not come before our own.”336  
As de Gaulle thundered against the French government’s “policy of abandonment” on the 
German question, SFIO leaders shared the widespread malaise in French policy circles brought 
334 Hitchcock op cit., 69. 
335 Jouve motion to the Foreign Affairs Commission, 29 March 1950, C/13334, AN.  
336 Philip told the SFIO congress in 1947 that, “Today we face our Allies’ desire for a German recovery and I 
believe that it must be said that Germany cannot remain as it is because it must also have its reconstruction, its 
industrial development, but we demand that this industrial development be linked to the industrial development of 
France, that the victim countries have priority because it is normal that this project intends also the increase of 
primary resources for the victim countries, that it truly be a general recovery for all the countries, that Germany not 
have a general recovery while France continues to weaken due to the present lack of coal and steel.” 1947 SFIO 
Party Congress, OURS.   
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about in part by the rising statistics of German steel production. In 1948 the Bizone produced 
5.47 million tons of steel against 7.12 in France; in 1949 German and French industry each 
produced 9 million tons of steel; in 1950 Germany surpassed France, producing 11.9 million tons 
against 8.5 million in France, in part due to continued coal shortages and strikes in French 
industry.337 It appeared that the objectives of the Monnet Plan for French steel might be washed 
away in a rising tide of German steel exports. The major Monnet Plan allotments to modernize 
French steel came in 1949 and 1950, the same years that the UNECE and U.S. began to warn 
that an overproduction crisis in European steel lay on the near horizon.338 The Ruhr industrial 
magnates looked with optimism to the re-conquering of their prewar markets as the Allied 
governments progressively lifted production limits. German steel industrialists, with Adenauer’s 
support, began to complain about French steel ambitions, which they considered to be 
counterproductive to European recovery. The Monnet Plan’s goal to eventually produce 18 
million tons of steel, an 85% increase above the 1929 level was, in their view, unrealistic. 
Despite SPD fears, the IAR proved a hapless and ineffective organization from its inauguration 
due to British and U.S. obstruction of French policy.339 Unaware that the Korean War would 
bring a huge increase in demand for steel starting in June 1950, French policymakers from fall 
1949 to spring 1950 scurried to forge an alternative policy to supervise Ruhr production, 
guarantee Ruhr coal exports to French industry, and create a form of European cooperation that 
would save the Monnet Plan. French Socialists were heavily engaged in these efforts.  
Few in France had confidence that French industry could resist German competition if 
the Allies lifted all production quotas. However, at this moment a different set of French 
industries began to assert themselves within official channels. The French steel-transforming 
337 The figures for the Saarland were 1.21 million tons in 1948, 1.73 in 1949 and 1.87 in 1950. Gerbet, Le 
rélèvement, op cit., 280.  
338 Michel Freyssenet, La sidérugie franciase: 1945-1979. L’histoire d’une faillite. Les solutions qui s’affrontent 
(Paris: Savelli, 1979), 23.  
339 See Milward, The Reconstruction, op cit., 382. Diebold writes that, “The Ruhr Agreement might have worked in 
one of several different ways, ranging from virtual exploitation of Germany by the victors to the exercise of a 
control so light as to be negligible. In fact, it never assumed the major role projected in the Agreement.” Diebold, 
The Schuman Plan, op cit., 33. Corinne DeFrance argues that, “According to the Ruhr Statute, the IAR was above 
all a supervisory organism, but, in fact, it was a European cooperative agency granted few powers” and that, “The 
International Authority for the Ruhr seems to have proven to be a failure: not only could the Allies not reach an 
agreement on the competences to grant it, but the Germans were able to take advantage of the growing discord...” 
Corinne DeFrance, “La France, l’Autorité internationale de la Ruhr jusqu’à l’annonce du plan Schuman,” in 
Andreas Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op cit., 140. The situation in the IAR deteriorated for the 
French government to the point that in winter 1951 the German government was ignoring its decisions, which 
contributed to a reappearance of shortages of coke in France.  
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industries used their muscle to successfully block efforts to include Germany in the trade 
liberalization negotiations between France, Italy and the Benelux countries, known as “Finebel,” 
in late 1949.340 The industries had the ear of the Socialist chair of the National Assembly’s 
Finance Committee, Francis Leenhardt, who argued that the steel-transforming industries could 
not withstand German competition at the present moment. With the nationalized Renault 
management and the Trade Association of the Mechanical Engineering and Metal Transforming 
Industries taking the lead, the steel-transforming industries insisted that, unless French steel 
prices fell to German levels, they could not compete with lower German prices for finished 
goods.341 In particular, their ability to compete required ending the German government’s policy 
of “double-pricing” for coal, in which German firms sold coal to domestic producers in 1949 at 
$12.90 per ton, and exported it at the price of $19.70. From late 1949, the French government 
began the acrimonious process of demanding an equalization of German coal prices for domestic 
and foreign consumption, a fight that continued later under the auspices of the Schuman Plan 
negotiations. A May 1949 French Foreign Ministry report lent credence to the argument of the 
steel-transforming industries, reporting that the differing costs of steel created a 20% cost 
disadvantage for French steel transformers. A bitter internal struggle played out within French 
industry and government, as the steel transformers angrily derided the French steel industry’s 
inadequate appetite for modernization and its policy of favoring steel exports by selling steel at a 
higher price on the French market. From the middle of 1949, the steel transformers made trade 
liberalization conditional to the opening of the French steel industry to competition. They found 
the sympathy of André Philip, who rubbed shoulders with important representatives of these 
industries as leader of the Senate’s Working Group on the European Coal & Steel 
340 Kipping writes that, “The decisive rejection of a German participation came completely from the Industrial 
Ministry. More precisely it probably came from the Directory for Mechanical and Electrical Industries” in which, in 
particular, the steel-transforming section worried that free competition under the present conditions of high steel 
prices in France would ruin their industry and cause unemployment. An internal note of the Foreign Ministry 
confirms that the opposition of the Industrial Ministry was responsible for the failure of the Finebel negotiations. 
Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 127-29.  
341 A May 1949 Foreign Ministry report claimed that steel cost 6,000 francs per ton in the Lorraine but only 3,500 in 
the Ruhr territory. Leading Renault manager Pierre Lefacheux complained in fall 1950 that Volkswagen benefited 
from steel prices 40% below that of Renault. Kipping argues that steel was 5 to 29% cheaper for the German than 
the French steel transformers. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 94-107.  Jean Constant, the Secretary General of 
the Trade Association of the Mechnical Engineering and Metal Transforming Industries, was a relentless critic of the 
steel industry and supported the creation of the ECSC. Matthias Kipping, “Inter-firm relations and industrial policy: 
the French and German steel producers and users in the twentieth century,” Business History 38, 1 (1996): 1-25. 
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Community.342 Philip’s appreciation for the position of the French steel transformers was in part 
a reversal of his previous policy, which looked to guarantee a large market for German steel 
transformers in return for their reliance on French steel exports. Representatives of the steel-
transforming industries enthusiastically greeted the Senate committee’s recommendation in favor 
of the ratification of the ECSC.343 Designed to limit coal and steel prices within a competitive 
internal market, the steel transformers were the largest supporters of the ECSC among French 
industrialists, and did much to blunt the anti-ECSC campaign conducted by the French steel 
industry.344  
French Socialists became increasingly responsive to the campaign of the French steel 
transformers over the course of 1949. Minister of Industrial Production Lacoste evoked the 
difficulties of the French automobile industry and said his ministry intended to focus its energies 
on increasing the export of tractors. Pointing to the ominous reports of a coming overproduction 
to support his concept of a “Inter-European Public Authority for Steel,” Philip turned his 
attention to the steel-transforming industries, arguing that, “It is urgent to foresee from this 
moment a slowing of investments in the steel industry and, instead, a systematic development of 
investments in the steel-consuming industries, in order to reach a balance.”345 Socialist Finance 
Commission chair Francis Leenhardt called for subsidies for the steel-transforming industries 
over the course of 1950 to aid French exports.346 
342 In a speech in February 1950, Philip said that, “A very important element which led to a prolongation and 
aggravation of the economic crisis [of the interwar era] was the maintenance of stable prices through the steel cartel, 
while the sales prices of consumer goods industries in the unprotected sectors collapsed.” Matthias Kipping, “Inter-
firm relations,” op cit. The “Economic Council” chaired by Philip to advise the National Assembly on the economic 
implications of the Treaty of Paris included representatives of the government, parliament and economic interests. It 
voted on 29 November 1951, 111-29 with 29 abstentions in favor of a report recommending ratification of the 
treaty. Ludwin Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in den Montan-
Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 109. The report explicitly called for 
the building of canals, a coking program for the Lorraine and the electrification of Lorraine railways.  See 
Commission des Affaires étrangères, Rapport d’information de M. André Philip sur le projet de pool du charbon et 
de l’acier, 11 avril 1951, C/13334, AN. 
343 Sebastian Rosato is therefore incorrect when he claims that, “French industry was uniformly opposed to the 
ECSC proposal when it was made public.” Sebastian Rosato, Power Politics and the Making of the European 
Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 97-99. The position of the steel transformers, overlooked by 
Rosato and others, undermines Rosato’s claim that the Schuman Plan was the result mostly of geopolitical, rather 
than economic and interest group, concerns.  
344 This is the thesis of Kipping’s brilliant study. Kipping writes that Lefaucheux was considered a “fanatical 
supporter” of the ECSC. Monnet evoked the steel-transforming industry’s support, noting these industries employed 
1.3 million workers to the steel industries 130,000. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 274, 287.  
345 15 November 1949, JO, 6306.  
346 Leenhardt, 26 April 1950, JO, 2887. SFIO deputy Gozard did so as well, 27 December 1950, JO, 9700. 
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Thus the SFIO industrial policy as it related to domestic and foreign policy can be 
summarized as follows. Since 75% of the cost of steel in France and Germany came from raw 
materials and energy costs, cheap coal was necessary for lower steel costs, which in turn were 
necessary for the international competitiveness of the French steel-transforming industries, upon 
whose exports France’s balance of trade and currency depended. Therefore, after losing much of 
their support in the mines, the SFIO advocated a policy of rationalization and wage control in the 
nationalized mines to favor other industries.347 The SFIO accepted the possibility of mine 
closures, which Monnet and Schuman admitted would likely result from a customs union of coal 
and steel.348 SFIO economic experts also supported efforts to keep the price of French steel low, 
to favor both steel exports and the domestic steel-transforming industry. In turn, they demanded 
that the German government provide coal to France at the same price as that of the German 
internal market.  
SPD leaders countered the SFIO position on “double-pricing” by arguing that German 
coal export prices remained considerably lower than the average world market price, which was 
true. However, for the SFIO, the maintenance of the double-pricing mechanism would place 
French steel and the French steel-transforming industries at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis 
German industrial exports. French Socialists and the French government made its removal a 
precondition for a European customs union, while the SPD engaged in a policy to maintain 
higher coal prices in order to assure salary increases for the Ruhr coal miners. The dual-pricing 
347 Minister of Industrial Production Robert Lacoste told the National Assembly that, on Socialist Jules Moch’s 
initiative, the Charbonnages de France had launched an investigation to determine how to lower coal prices. The 
investigation inspired the Lacoste decrees, which sought to lower the price of coal in part through the layoff of 10% 
of mining employees. Ramadier fought efforts to increase the price of coal, saying that, if the French government 
“raised the price of coal, the increase will spread to the prices of almost all manufacturing...” 2 September 1947, JO, 
4835. SFIO deputy Jean Minjoz referred to the increase in French steel prices as “the strongest and least justified 
[price] increase.” French coal prices were fixed by the government and as inflation continued, Moch and others were 
reluctantly forced a number of time for budgetary reasons to increase the French coal sales price in order to lower 
state subsidies.  
348 Speaking about the potential consequences of the Schuman Plan, Philip said that, though he considered fears of 
the closing of metal and coal companies to be exaggerated, “it seems necessary to close businesses that are not able 
to adapt to the new conditions...” 25 July 1950, JO, 5942. Holter writes that, “For French miners, though, the plan 
offered little. Monnet, speaking at the signing of the ECSC treaty in April 1951, foresaw a general improvement in 
the standard of living for workers. But in making this first presentation to the French Cabinet members a year 
earlier, Monnet had indicated that the plan’s focus on productivity would involve closing a substantial number of 
French mines and laying off miners.” Daryl Holter, The Battle for Coal: Miners and the Politics of Nationalization 
in France, 1940-1950 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), 184.  Monnet told the Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the National Assembly that, “I do not think that the Nord is situated such as to become a large center 
of development...” Commission des Affaires étrangères, 26 November 1951, C/15591, AN. The northern French 
steel industry representatives warned of “considerable unrest” and the loss of 45,000 jobs as a result of the Schuman 
Plan in its talks with Monnet and Schuman in December 1950.  
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mechanism allowed the SPD to claim support for increased salaries while also supporting 
German steel consumers’ interest for cheap coal and steel.349 The German trade union leadership 
also supported double-pricing.350 An equal price would place these two goals into contradiction.  
The SFIO leadership, for its part, shared a widespread fear that trade liberalization might 
resurrect “German hegemony” on the continent if it did not occur within a carefully structured 
economic organization designed to assure an economic balance of power. Philip, Leenhardt and 
Lacoste demanded and received from the National Assembly a new infusion of investment 
capital for heavy industry as a precondition for SFIO ratification of the European Coal & Steel 
Community (ECSC) treaty.351 The SPD leadership, in turn, pointed to this new investment 
program as further evidence that France was solidifying its economic position at the dawn of the 
opening of the ECSC at the expense of German industry, workers, and consumers.  
 
3.6 SFIO AND SPD RESPONSES TO  
349 Veit wrote in a memo for a Socialist International meeting that the IAR “sets export quotas that do not take 
account of the capacity of the Ruhr mines and a sufficient domestic supply and sets export prices that lie below the 
world market price...” Memorandum der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zu Punkt 8 der Sitzung des 
Generalrats der Sozialistischen Internationale. Methoden der Produktivitätssteigerung bei Aufrechterhaltung des 
gegenwärtigen Lebensstandards v. Dr. H. Veit, Md.B. u. Wirtschaftsminister v. Württemberg-Baden, 10 December 
1950, PV-Internationale Abteilung 8, AdsD. 
350 In its 21 November 1949 Memorandum of the Trade Unions regarding the Ruhr Statute and Law Nr., 75, the 
DGB leadership wrote that, “If German coal and steel industry should therefore be compelled to adapt the internal 
and export prices, a collapse of the precariously stabilized price and cost structure would be the inevitable 
consequence. Prices for finished goods would rise. Germany would be prevented to make [sic] her necessary 
contribution to the European export of finished goods. This would render impossible any development towards a 
balance of payments for Germany as well as for Europe.” DGB economic expert Potthoff, close to the SPD, claimed 
that, “Our coal price is about 50% cheaper than the world market price. This is an injustice towards us.” Erich 
Potthoff 41, AdsD. 
351 With SFIO support, a rider was approved along with the ratification of the ECSC that called for the canalization 
of the Mosel River, an investment law to assist coke refining of Lorraine coal, and the electrification of a large 
number of rail lines to help French steel competitiveness. In addition, the government lowered its interest rate on its 
outstanding loans to the French steel industry from 7 to 4.5%. Philippe Mioche, “Le patronat de la sidérurgie 
française et le Plan Schuman en 1950-1952: les apparences d’un combat et la realité d’une mutation,” in Schwabe, 
ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 313.  In the SFIO Parliamentary faction meeting during the ratification debates on 11 
December 1951, Leenhardt “asked that the guarantees given at the moment of ratifications for the investments 
considered essential by Philip be effectively carried through. He did not receive a very precise response but he had 
no doubt that it was one of the essential conditions for the ratification of the group. This fundamental demand of the 
group is fulfilled in article 2 which declares that the government would bring a bill within four months. However, 
this delay of four months is absolutely incompatible with the opinion of the Economic Council...” At the same 
meeting Lacoste worried that without sufficient guarantees, the ECSC “could end in German hegemony.” While 
Leenhardt and Lacoste were less confident in French heavy industry’s ability to compete than were Philip and Jean 
Le Bail and therefore adopted a more skeptical attitude toward the ECSC, the party was united around the demand 
for increased government investment in heavy industry. The ECSC-enthusiast Le Bail also publicly worried about 
the possibility of “Germany conquering an economic hegemony in Western Europe.” 11 December 1951, Groupe 
Parlementaire Socialiste (GPS), OURS.  
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THE PETERSBERG ACCORD OF NOVEMBER 1949 
 
Schumacher’s response to Adenauer’s decision to sign the November 1949 Petersberg Accords 
and allow German representation in the International Authority of the Ruhr launched the young 
republic into its first major political crisis. In return for Adenauer’s concession, the Allied 
governments greatly reduced the number of factories subject to the dismantlement program. In 
the previous months SPD and DGB officials had vigorously resisted the Allied dismantlement 
program.352 They rejected as well efforts by the German government and industrialists to save 
the factories by offering French heavy industry the opportunity to purchase up to half the 
property share of key factories in the Ruhr. SPD and DGB officials viewed such attempts as part 
of a larger effort to forestall socialization and co-determination. Nölting and Henssler were 
particularly engaged in the SPD campaign to block French investment in the Ruhr.353  
When the Allied military authorities and the German government announced the 
Petersberg Accord, Schumacher told a party meeting that, “Anyone who wants to enter the Ruhr  
Authority unconditionally is a national criminal.” Without having first secured the approval of 
the SPD Central Committee or the Bundestag faction, Schumacher set the SPD policy of 
intransigent opposition in interviews from 9-12 November.354 This approach infuriated 
Schumacher’s SPD colleagues, with Henssler and others complaining about Schumacher’s 
“authoritarian” tendencies. On the night of 15 November, Schumacher made his famous speech 
calling Adenauer “the Chancellor of the Allies,” a disparaging epithet that threw the Bundestag 
into turmoil and led the CDU to successfully sponsor a censorship motion the next day that 
formally excluded Schumacher from the Bundestag for twenty sessions.  
Schumacher’s harsh rhetoric met with considerable unease within the SPD leadership. 
Nölting’s diary notes appear representative of the general sentiment within the party: “The entire 
faction despondent. Outrage at Schumacher’s lack of self-control.” However, the indignation and 
embarrassment of the SPD leaders was due to Schumacher’s indelicate language, rather than his 
352 August Schmidt, head of IG Metall, told an assembly on 21 October 1949 that no “decent German” would take 
part in the dismantlement and called for a campaign of passive resistance which called to mind the union’s response 
to the interwar Ruhr occupation. Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 460.  
353 Claudia Nölting, Erik Nölting: Wirtschaftsminister und Theoretiker der SPD (1892-1953) (Essen: Klartext, 
1989), 256-57. The SPD faction delegated Nölting, Henssler, Veit and Keuning to the Bundestag Special 
Commission on Dismantlement on 21 October 1949, PV 1949, AdsD.  
354 William Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (Glasgow: Saxon House Lexington Books, 1974), 25-28. 
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policy of rejecting German membership in the IAR. Adolf Arndt, the SPD’s constitutional 
expert, gave voice to a general anger that Adenauer seemed to be undermining parliamentary 
democracy by not submitting the Accord to a vote in the Bundestag.355 Nölting and Schmid also 
rejected the Accord, arguing that it would recreate the atmosphere of the 1920s when the German 
government signed international agreements only to then immediately seek their revision. 
Schmid specifically evoked the 1924 agreement ending the Ruhr occupation to argue against 
Germany’s joining the IAR.356 SPD economic expert Fritz Baade complained to the Bundestag 
that Adenauer was breathing new life into the moribund IAR, revealing that the SPD was aware 
of the paralysis in the IAR. The only overt opposition to this line came from Wilhelm Kaisen, the 
SPD Minister-President of Bremen, who publicly supported the IAR. Faced with party sanctions 
and Schumacher’s wrath, Kaisen received no support in the Central Committee.357 
Scholars often overlook that Schumacher’s shout of “Chancellor of the Allies” resulted 
from an exchange in which Adenauer charged that the SPD’s rejection of the Petersberg Accord 
meant, in effect, that the SPD supported the factory dismantlements. The immediate occasion for 
Schumacher’s interruption was Adenauer’s announcement that the SPD-aligned DGB trade 
union federation supported the Petersberg Accords as a means to save the factories.358 The 
position of the DGB fomented confusion within the SPD ranks, as it was unusual for the union 
federation to take a position on such an important political issue without consulting the SPD.359 
The discord signaled the temporary ascendance of trade unionists seeking an independent policy 
and collaboration with Christian Democrats within the DGB leadership, a development that 
created a sense of bewilderment within the SPD. The official DGB position on the IAR, which 
was controversial within the union movement, foreshadowed the break that later took place 
between the DGB and SPD on the Schuman Plan.360 In France, meanwhile, the unions split along 
355 24-25 November 1949, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 477-80. At meetings in December 1949, Léon Blum and 
Grumbach agreed with SPD leaders that Adenauer should have submitted the accords for a vote. Pariser Gespräche, 
12 December 1949, Erik Nölting 39, AdsD. 
356 Carlo Schmid, “‘Man muss die Affekte gegenstandlos machen’: Das Verhältnis Deutschland-Frankreich/der 
Kardinalfehler der Weimarer Republik,” Mannheimer Morgen, 24 November 1949, Carlo Schmid 49, AdsD. 
357 Paterson, op cit., 32. 
358 Merseburger, op cit., 462. 
359 Theo Pirker writes that, “To the astonishment and anger of Schumacher the DGB placed itself in opposition to 
the party for the first time since the founding of the new republic.” Theo Pirker, Die SPD nach Hitler; die 
Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1945-1964 (Munich: Putten & Löning, 1965), 122.  
360 The SPD-aligned leaders were in the minority from 1949 to 1952 within the union leadership and could not 
prevent the DGB from first offering its constructive participation in the work of the IAR in December 1949 and 
then, later, formally supporting the Treaty of Paris to create the ECSC. The DGB officially announced its support for 
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political lines. The Communist-aligned CGT denounced the Schuman Plan the day after its 
announcement while the FO supported it.361 
The SPD reaction to the Petersberg Accords, which the SFIO supported, brought relations 
between the parties to a nadir.362 Blum told the SPD leadership privately that he could not 
understand the SPD’s negative attitude towards the IAR.363 Guy Mollet was furious, questioning 
the SPD’s commitment to international cooperation. In a secret meeting on 30 November 1949, 
the Labour Party tried to mediate between the SFIO and SPD. In this meeting Schumacher 
refused to give any assurance that, if the SPD came to power, it would recognize the obligations 
incurred by Adenauer’s government in the Petersberg Accord. SFIO leaders were left to wonder 
whether a SPD-led government under Schumacher would be such a good thing after all.  
 
3.7 A LUKEWARM RECEPTION: THE SFIO’S AND SPD’S INITIAL RESPONSES TO 
THE SCHUMAN PLAN, SPRING-FALL 1950 
 
Several socialist conferences called for the purpose of reconciling SFIO and SPD policies 
floundered on the same obstacles that had blocked consensus in the lead-up to the announcement 
of the Ruhr Statute. On Philip’s suggestion, a major socialist conference in March 1950 took 
place in Witten, a city in the Ruhr. Despite growing reservations, the SFIO still formally 
supported the SPD policy of socialization so long as it be accompanied by internationalization 
and the SPD supported the internationalization of European heavy industry based on equal 
conditions.364 The conference resolved a three point platform of “a) internationalization through 
the Treaty of Paris on 7 May 1951. Horst Thum, Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie: Der Mythos vom Sieg der 
Gewerkschaften (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), 101. SPD deputy and IG Metall chair Walter Freitag had the 
clear support of the SPD to replace the deceased Hans Böckler as head of the DGB in June 1951. Christian Fette, 
who supported DGB policy independence from the SPD, defeated Freitag.  
361 Lefèvre, op cit., 254-55. Sylvain Schirmann, “Syndicats français et questions européennes 1949-1954,” in 
Othmar Nikola Haberl and Lutz Niethammer, eds., Der Marshall-Plan und die europäische Linke (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1986), 323-27. 
362 Orlow writes that, “Especially Schumacher’s unbridled criticism of the French policymakers led to a decided 
cooling of relations between the two parties, even though the German leader took care not to attack his French 
comrades specifically.” Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and 
German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 176. 
363 Vertrauliche undated/unsigned, Günther Markscheffel 26, AdsD.  
364 At the SFIO Directing Committee meeting of 5 April 1950 and 26 April 1950, Grumbach and Mollet expressed 
regret that they had supported the SPD’s call for socialization but Grumbach argued that the party could not renege 
now on the commitment it had made in the COMISCO. Guy Mollet wondered aloud whether the SFIO should 
withdraw from the COMISCO due to its disagreements with the Labour Party and the SPD. The protocol reads that, 
“He declared himself very anxious, in particular concerning German Social Democracy. The Social Democrats seem 
124 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
nationalization; b) international supervision of nationalized industries; c) international 
supervision of private industries.”365 SFIO leaders refused, however, socialization without 
internationalization and the SPD rejected an internationalization limited to the Ruhr. In the SFIO 
Directing Committee’s resolution on the Ruhr, issued shortly before Schuman’s announcement, 
the SFIO agreed with the SPD that the Ruhr property must not be returned to its former owners 
and should be socialized, a switch back to its policy before 1949. However, the resolution also 
stated that the SFIO “deplored” the SPD’s position on the IAR.366 
It appears that only the internationalization of the ensemble of Western European heavy 
industry could have broken the impasse between the parties. In a sign that a consensus was 
possible, Carlo Schmid embraced Philip’s proposal for a common authority for European coal 
and steel in November 1949.367 When Robert Schuman called a press conference and proposed a 
coal and steel customs union under the supervision of a supranational executive, Philip had good 
reason to view the proposal as his brainchild.368 It should come as no surprise that Philip 
immediately offered the Schuman Plan his enthusiastic support.  
One might expect that the SFIO would do so as well. Yet many among the SFIO 
leadership expressed skepticism of the plan similar in tone and content to some of the initial 
to want to conduct a nationalist policy.” Pointing to internal German politics, though, Grumbach argued that, “The 
SPD conducts on the internal level a campaign against nationalism.” Philip and Rosenfeld argued that the party 
should continue to support the SPD’s demands for socialization and seek cooperation with the SPD in COMISCO. 
Comité directeur, 5 April 1950, OURS.  
365 “Bericht über die Tagung der COMISCO-Wirtschaftsexperten in Witten/Ruhr von 26./31. März 1950. 2/PVBT4, 
AdsD. 
366 SFIO Comité directeur, 26 April 1950, OURS. 
367 John Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem: German Heavy Industry and the Schuman Plan,” in Schwabe ed., 
Die Anfänge, op cit., 410.  
368 After hearing Philip in person propose his plan at a conference in Geneva, Jean Monnet wrote him on 27 
February 1950 to state that, “I am entirely in agreement with you on the essentials: construct Europe, which will 
only be possible if the various countries accept to reduce their national sovereignty and to create an international 
authority capable of taking the decisions the countries should execute. It is clearly an excessively difficult task. How 
to get there? I admit that I am perplexed...Industrial coordination...I fear, would result in the creation of cartels...” 
Pierre Gerbet, “La naissance du Plan Schuman,” in Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, 15-16. Monnet 
and his team later said that Philip’s proposals had little to no influence on their thinking but it is hard to lend 
credence to this view. Pierre Uri retrospectively said that, “We did not follow very closely the proposals made in the 
Council of Europe, in particular by André Philip. They did not play any role in the development of the ideas of those 
who prepared the May 9 declaration.” Étienne Hirsch, for his part, claimed that, “We were up to date but it did not 
play any role.” Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “Le rôle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l’Europe,” in Poidevin, 
ed., op cit., 218-19. At the least, Philip’s proposals contributed to the favorable climate in which the Schuman Plan 
was greeted within France and abroad. Philip was not the only source of such proposals. CDU Minister President of 
NRW, Karl Arnold put forward similar views and developed a good rapport with Philip. Newspapers in both 
countries buzzed with various proposals from winter 1949 to spring 1950. Adenauer also proposed a complete 
French-German union in spring 1950. Schumacher responded to Adenauer’s proposal that, though he welcomed 
such a union in theory, due to the present balance of power such a union could only result in French dominance.   
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statements emanating from the SPD leadership.369 Both parties perceived the Schuman Plan 
within the context of a right-ward shift in their domestic politics. The Plan was suspect because 
neither party was involved in, nor informed of its crafting. This encouraged suspicion that the 
Plan bore the imprint of secret transnational negotiations and that Schuman’s lofty declaration 
perhaps concealed its true intention. Mollet initially thought that U.S. diplomacy was behind the 
plan370 and Schumacher’s famous line from September 1950 that the Plan was konservative, 
369 See the SFIO Directing Committee meeting held the day after Schuman’s press conference on 10 May 1950. 
Comité directeur, OURS. Leading party member Lapie wrote in his memoirs: “A strange thing—but the Socialists 
never stopped astonishing me—my party comrades’ reactions were not enthusiastic. Guy Mollet took poorly the 
sentiment of having the ground cut from under the feet of his desperate attempts to build a political Europe in the 
permanent commission of the Council of Europe; [Paul] Sion a coal miner, president of the Labour Commission [of 
the National Assembly], worried about salaries; Leenhardt, president of the Economic Commission, of 
unemployment; Jules Moch, finally, worried about the specter of a Vatican Europe. I defended it.” Lapie, op cit., 
247. Craig Parsons’ distinction between “confederal” and “community” path in analyzing “the cross-cutting debate 
across French parties” does not hold up well for the SFIO. He cites as opponents Auriol and Moch, who, though 
influential in government, did not have a substantial political base with the SFIO. Blum, Parsons tells us, opposed 
the Schuman Plan. This claim would surprise our actors, as Blum had died three months before the Schuman 
declaration. The reluctance within the party was not about abstract principles of confederation or communitarianism 
but rather about how far to go in sacrificing supranationalism and supervision of the Ruhr to attract Labour Party 
support. Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 56-57. Rioux writes that 
the French “Socialists had reservations about the emerging Europe of the Christian Democrats...but gave a mild 
support...” Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
143. Haas writes that, “In May of 1950 Guy Mollet saw in the Schuman Plan little more than a scheme to shore up a 
decadent German and French capitalism and affront the British Labour Party. Ultimately, the SFIO came to support 
the Treaty, but not without serious misgivings...the deep-seated national preoccupation of many Socialists was 
equally patent. ECSC would be good only if French coal and steel can successfully compete with their German 
rivals. Hence, modernization and investments—not subject to High Authority direction—must be continued, argued 
Robert Lacoste...If commitment to ‘Europa’ was present, so was a determination not to allow a European rationale 
to interfere with the claims of French workers.” Ernst B. Haas, The United of Europe: Political, Social, and 
Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 1968), 116. 
370 Annie Lacroix-Riz appears alone among historians in asserting that the U.S. was the primary source for the 
crafting of the Schuman Plan, emphasizing Monnet’s extensive ties to U.S. policy circles. Annie Lacroix-Riz, “Paris 
et Washington au début du Plan Schuman (1950-1951),” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 254-68. Schwabe 
argues that the plan came exclusively from the French government.  Klaus Schwabe, “‘Ein Akt konstruktiver 
Staatskunst—die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 211-28. It is 
true that the plan was crafted in secret among Monnet’s team without consultation until the last moment with the rest 
of the French government. Duroselle writes that, “When Schuman presented it to him for the first time Acheson was 
so surprised that he could not hide his embarrassment.”  Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, “1948: les débuts de la 
construction européenne,” in Poidevin, ed., op cit., 44. Diebold writes that “the French initiative was truly a surprise 
to the Americans.” William Diebold, “A Personal Note,” Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 24. Bossaut, Hitchcock 
and Poidevin give convincing accounts that emphasize how the French government officials received signals from 
fall 1949 to spring 1950 from, among others, Dean Acheson, that the United States government would welcome a 
European integration initiative emanating from the French government. Acheson encouraged Schuman to take the 
lead in a letter from 30 September 1949 and U.S. diplomatic pressure increased from January to April 1950. The 
U.S. government shared the general frustration among pro-integration circles that the Labour government was 
sabotaging efforts to achieve concrete measures of European cooperation in the late 1940s. Brigitte Leucht has 
recently introduced a most productive theme into this debate by highlighting the importance of experts in “two 
transatlantic policy networks,” including a “US Embassy working group,” and a “transnational university network.” 
Her analysis transcends the false dichotomy created by Lacroix-Rix and Schwabe and has the benefit of including 
German and Dutch figures as well in the crafting of the ECSC’s structures during the Paris negotiations. Brigitte 
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katholisch, klerikal, kapitalistisch, and kartellisch found agreement among large sections of the 
SFIO ranks. Jules Moch, in particular, saw the influence of the Vatican in the plans.371 The two 
parties’ reflexive anti-clericalism, combined with the frustration caused by their distance from 
the reins of power, fomented suspicion about the origins and intentions of Schuman’s 
announcement.  
Nevertheless, French and German Socialists were not immune from the general public 
enthusiasm that greeted the project, and the expressed goals of the Plan were in line with the 
parties’ official policies. Schumacher welcomed the plan in principle at a press conference but 
declared that, for the moment, it was a “house without furniture” and that the SPD would reserve 
its vote until the content of the treaty negotiations emerged. Historians are divided about whether 
Schumacher intended to oppose the treaty from the moment of its announcement.372 The 
evidence presently available is ambiguous and inconclusive.  If intransigence was Schumacher’s 
intention from May 1950, however, it is noteworthy that he left the party’s options open. 
Whether out of conviction or internal party tactics, Schumacher knew that the Plan had attained 
such a resounding public relations success that overt opposition might have caused a public split 
within the SPD.  
Several reasons have been given for the SPD’s decision to oppose to the Schuman Plan. 
The SPD’s propaganda against the Plan in 1951 can be deceiving because, once the party made 
the anti-ECSC campaign a centerpiece of its efforts to distinguish itself within German politics, 
it offered a bewildering series of all-encompassing arguments to justify its position. Some 
historians have argued that the aggressive SPD campaign for German reunification, a campaign 
that so marked the SPD’s opposition to the European Defense Community, was already present 
Leucht, “Expertise and the Creation of a Constitutional Order for Core Europe: Transatlantic Policy Networks in the 
Schuman Plan Negotiations,” in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, eds., Transnational Networks 
in Regional Integration, Governing Europe 1945-83 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
371 Moch told the SFIO Directing Committee that the Schuman Plan was part of a “Vatican offensive against 
Anglican England.” Comité directeur, 10 May 1950, OURS.  
372 Schwabe writes that the SPD “criticized the plan from its beginning” and, according to Spierenburg and 
Poidevin, “The day after the treaty was signed [SPD] leader, Kurt Schumacher, laid down conditions that left no 
doubt that the SPD would vote against.” Schwabe, “L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’integration à l’ouest,” in 
Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op cit.;  Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The History of the 
High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994), 32. Dietmar Ramuschkat argues that, “long before the opening of negotiations Schumacher had 
already made the decision not to support the Schuman Plan.” Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und die europäische 
Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik (Niebüll: videel OHG, 2003), 
105. Paterson argues that, “The SPD position, then, had changed from benevolent neutrality to intransigent 
opposition in the course of the realisation of the Schuman initiative.” Paterson, op cit., 64-65. 
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in 1950 and was the primary factor in the party’s decision to oppose the plan.373 This argument is 
unconvincing. Though there are some statements expressing concern that the ECSC might be an 
obstacle to reunification, SPD leaders rarely put this argument forward in 1950 and only did so 
with hesitation. The SPD leadership had already signaled that it was moving towards a negative 
position before Winston Churchill famously called for a German military contribution to 
Western defense in August 1950 and before the French government put forward the Pleven Plan 
for a German contribution to a supranational military organization in October 1950. It appears 
that it was only in fall 1951-summer 1952 that the SPD leadership solidified a foreign policy that 
made European integration initiatives conditional to its impact on German reunification, as 
discussed in the next chapter.  
A more compelling argument is that the six nations that agreed to the conditions that 
Schuman set to enter negotiations in summer 1950 were all countries in which Christian 
Democratic parties were the strongest political forces. It was apparent to all upon its 
announcement that the Plan’s design would be unattractive to the Social Democratic regimes in 
Scandinavia and to the Labour government in Great Britain.374 Nevertheless, the SPD 
leadership’s opposition to the Plan followed by at least a month the opening of the six-nation 
negotiations, by which time it had been clear for several months that the Scandinavian and 
British governments would not participate in the customs union for coal and steel. Without doubt 
373 Rudolf Hrbek’s path-breaking study over-emphases the reunification factor in the SPD decision to oppose the 
Schuman Plan. Hrbek’s citations for his argument come almost exclusively from 1951, by which time SPD policy 
had already been set. Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europe: Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum 
Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1955) (Bonn: Europa Union, 1972). Vardys also 
emphasizes reunification as the central factor in the SPD’s rejection of the Schuman Plan. V. Stanley Vardys, 
“Germany’s Postwar Socialism: Nationalism and Kurt Schumacher (1945-1952),” The Review of Politics 27 (1965): 
238. Willis writes that, “Schumacher’s first reaction to the plan was guarded. That France had proposed it was 
enough to rouse his suspicions. Adenauer, he charged, was sacrificing all possibility of reuniting Germany by 
integrating the Federal Republic with the West.” Willis’ citation for this claim, however, has Schumacher expressing 
worry that the ECSC would block a socialization program and does not mention reunification. Willis, op cit., 127. 
Ramuschkat argues that, “The linkage [between the Pleven and Schuman Plans] was Schumacher’s major, if not his 
only, reason to refuse the ECSC.” Ramuschkat, op cit., 124-25. Klotzbach argues that the German reunification 
argument can be found “immediately in the opening stage of the debate, even if it did not have the clear 
predominance that it gained in the second half of the year 1951 and then especially in 1952.” Kurt Koltzbach, “Die 
deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Schuman-Plan,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 335.  It is not clear that in 
May 1950 Schumacher had definitively broken with his assessment of the Marshall Plan, which the SPD supported. 
Schumacher had said that the “Marshall Plan was not cause but consequence of [European] division,” a position that 
could apply as well to the Schuman Plan. See also Hans-Peter Ehni, “Die Reaktion der SPD auf den Marshall-Plan,” 
in Othmar Nikola Haberl and Lutz Niethammer, eds., op cit. 
374 Some historians argue that Britain’s self-exclusion was key to Schumacher’s decision, but Deibold argues that 
the SPD “needed no encouragement from the British.” Diebold, The Schuman Plan, op cit., 60.  
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these governments’ self-exclusions were contributing factors for the SPD reticence towards the 
Schuman Plan. However, they do not appear to have been definitive for the SPD’s final position.  
The question of whether to make approval of the ECSC conditional to British 
membership, on the other hand, was the central question in the disputes over the Schuman Plan 
within the SFIO. The argument pitted ECSC-enthusiast André Philip against the anglophile Guy 
Mollet, who had been an English high school teacher before entering politics. The Labour 
government had dragged its feet in 1947-1949 on issues of European economic and political 
cooperation. Labour had imposed the principle of unanimity for binding resolutions both within 
the intergovernmental Council of Europe and within the Socialist International against the 
SFIO’s support for majority or qualified majority voting. In launching the Schuman Plan, the 
French government had taken the decisive step of refusing to make its initiative dependent on 
British approval. The question was now whether the SFIO, the votes of which would likely be 
necessary for the success of any treaty in the National Assembly, would follow its government.  
Exasperation had grown among all sections of the party at Labour’s intransigence on 
issues related to European cooperation. All party leaders wanted British membership and saw 
Britain as a crucial counter-weight to the integration of Germany in European bodies. Various 
SFIO leaders, however, proved to have differing breaking points in their tolerance for Labour’s 
attitude. The Labour government’s unilateral devaluation in fall 1949, after it had claimed for 
months that it would not devalue, came as a shock to the SFIO and French government leaders. 
Its action forced a string of devaluations across the Western European economies and made 
nonsense of efforts to coordinate a unified European economic policy. Blum said in private that 
he was “scandalized” by Labour’s methods.375 Philip, active within the European movement and 
a star in both the OEEC and the Council of Europe, was fed up with Labour blocking his 
initiatives. In 1949, he called for European integration to proceed with or without Britain. This 
put him on a collision course with Mollet, who angrily rejected Philip’s position. This 
subterranean fight erupted again as the party debated its response to Schuman’s announcement. 
The party’s Directing Committee passed a compromise resolution supporting the Schuman Plan 
but insisted also on British participation. The SFIO parliamentary group made British 
participation a condition for its participation in government during coalitional negotiations on 5 
July 1950. Point F of its position on the customs union was to “Insist on the absolutely necessary 
375 Lapie, op cit., 214. 
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presence of England. No French-German tête-à-tête.”376 However, rather than reflecting a party 
consensus, the leadership intended this statement more as a means to pressure the French 
government to reopen negotiations with Britain than as an ultimatum.  
The Labour Party’s intransigent attitude in the next months did much to resolve the 
dispute over the Schuman Plan within the SFIO.377 In its June 1950 pamphlet titled “European 
Unity,” the Labour Party rejected British membership in any supranational institution and 
couched its position with a rhetoric French Socialists found to be overtly insulting to themselves 
and to the French government. Although Mollet travelled to Britain to try to dissuade the Labour 
Party from announcing this position, Labour made it clear that no progress would be possible if 
the Schuman Plan was made conditional on its participation.378 SFIO leaders noted with dismay 
that the Council of Europe was developing into a hapless body, devoid of any real power, a 
critique it shared with the SPD, which took its seats within the Council in summer 1950.379 Yet 
at the same time, German industry was recovering at a rapid rate and coal shortages were 
contributing to waning French industrial growth. In this situation Philip’s position that economic 
integration must proceed regardless of British participation gained the upper hand and his 
arguments of economic necessity resonated with an increasing number of SFIO deputies and 
members of the Directing Committee. A public dispute on this issue between Philip and Mollet 
at the Council of Europe in December 1950 further embittered relations between the two leaders 
376 5 July 1950, GPS, AHC.  
377 On 27 May 1950 the British government rejected Schuman’s preconditions for entering the negotiations.  
378 Guy Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee that, “The part of the brochure treating Robert Schuman seemed 
to me to have been after the fact. If it had only concerned the SCHUMAN Plan, we could accept the majority of the 
reservations. Only one thing seemed however unacceptable: the veto rule. What seems worse to me are the other 
aspects of the Labour’s international policy. We are the only ones to have imposed on ourselves, in all of our public 
positions, the concern to not bother our Labour friends. But they have never showed fair-play with regard to us in 
their international decisions...I must tell the Labour people that this cannot continue.” Comité directeur, 13 June 
1950, OURS.  
 379 Schumacher said, for instance, that the “Strasbourg Assembly is a church without believers! What has it 
concretely accomplished? It is only a senate that merely grants the right to speak.” Translation of an article from 
Franc-Tireur interview with Schumacher 30 May 1950, KS 51, AdsD.  Philip and Jaquet clashed with Mollet at the 
August and November sessions of the Council of Europe. On both occasions Philip and Jaquet embraced proposals 
to strengthen the Council of Europe’s powers at the risk of alienating Labour and Great Britain, while Mollet only 
supported texts designed to appeal to the British delegates. 13 September 1950, SFIO Comité directeur, OURS. 
However when the British House of Commons in November 1950 voted down Mollet’s draft from the Council of 
Europe’s Commission of General Affairs, arguing that it went too far towards supranationalism, Mollet was furious 
and told a meeting of COMISCO that, “I appeal to the British to consider this situation seriously. They have isolated 
themselves from the rest of the Strasbourg Assembly to a degree that is very dangerous.” Ollenhauer placed the SPD 
position between that of Labour and the SFIO at this meeting, arguing in favor of strengthening the powers of the 
Consultative Assembly vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers but he opposed SFIO efforts to go beyond the powers 
granted in the Council’s charter. International Socialist Conference, Circular No. 218/50, 22 November 1950, 
Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD. 
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and embarrassed the party on the international stage. Mollet, Ramadier and Leenhardt fought a 
rearguard effort to woo Labour to the European institutions but, by summer 1950, the party’s 
position had evolved to supporting the creation of the ECSC regardless of the British 
government’s position.380 The party remained split on how far to go to accommodate the British 
government’s position over the course of the 1950s. 
Besides sentimental attachment to the French-British alliance and widespread anglophilia 
within the SFIO leadership ranks, one of the main reasons for the SFIO’s insistence on British 
participation in European institutions from 1947-Spring 1950 was a fear that only British 
membership could make possible the French government’s effort to achieve an acceptable 
balance of power against a potentially resurgent Germany.381 The SPD leadership, in fact, had 
the same view in reverse, worrying that Germany would fall prey to French hegemony if not 
balanced by a third large power. Given their size, few in either party thought much of the 
potential for power politics of the other nations negotiating to create the ECSC. Thus both the 
SFIO and SPD leadership wanted British membership in order to strengthen the left within the 
community but, perhaps more importantly, to mediate between the potentially hegemonic 
intentions of their cross-Rhine neighbor.  
 
3.8 SFIO AND SPD POLICY ON INDUSTRIAL CARTELS AND THEIR RESPONSES 
TO MONNET’S ASSAULT ON THE GERMAN COAL SALES CARTEL (DKV),  
FALL 1950-SPRING 1951 
 
The principal factor in the SPD’s decision in fall 1950 to oppose the Schuman Plan was 
Monnet’s push to ban cartels in the coal and steel industry and to grant the High Authority far-
reaching powers to combat cartelization. By targeting the Ruhr Coal Sales Cartel for dissolution, 
the proposed ECSC now appeared to threaten not only German steel, but the German coal 
industry as well. Policies on cartelization and the issue of the export price of Ruhr coal were 
380 Wilfred Loth, “Der Abschied vom Europarat. Europapolitisches Entscheidungen im Kontext des Schuman-
Planes,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 189-94. 
381 The protocol of the 16 November 1949 SFIO parliamentary group meeting reads: “For months we have had a 
certain reservation from England in its decision to not enter Europe. It is necessary to have a response and it is from 
this response that our attitude regarding the German question depends. G. Mollet does not believe that one can 
construct Europe without England. In a Europe with a tête-à-tête between Germany and France we will arrive at a 
German hegemony and it will be Germany that will govern this new unified Europe.” 16 November 1949, GPS, 
AHC. 
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essential components of each party’s economic policy. They made impossible a SFIO and SPD 
consensus on the Schuman Plan. 
The Schuman declaration contained no mention of cartels. Throughout the occupation 
period, decartelization of German industry had been a primary goal of the French and American 
governments. The 1947 Allied Law on cartels went far beyond any previous German legislation 
in constraining firms’ ability to form industrial ententes.382 It was apparent to all that, if the 
Allies lifted these restrictions, German industry would engage in re-concentration and re-
cartelization, a process that the German government and parliament were likely to welcome. In 
their proposal in the opening stages of the Schuman plan negotiations, the German government 
proposed granting powers to regulate ententes to industrial organizations, rather than to the High 
Authority. On 28 September Monnet, dramatically announced that the High Authority must be 
delegated the power to break cartels.383 As John Gillingham writes, Monnet declared “total war 
against cartels” and “was asserting the right to forbid re-concentration indefinitely.”384 Monnet 
made the granting of sweeping powers to combat cartels a condition for the continuation of the 
six-nation talks, warning an angry German delegation that he would otherwise resign as leader of 
the Schuman Plan negotiations.  
Monnet’s assault on cartels was the result of his economic liberalism, worries within the 
U.S. government and businesses that the Schuman Plan would evolve into a restrictive cartel 
and, most importantly, a widespread conviction within French industrial circles that French 
industry could not effectively compete against a reconstituted coal and steel cartel system in the 
Ruhr. Monnet warned that, without restrictions on cartels, the ECSC would result in the 
“hegemony of the monolithic organization of the Ruhr.”385 French cartelization, particularly 
382 This law banned not only formal agreements but also gentlemens’ agreements and banned not only horizontal 
integration, as German law had done previously, but also vertical integration, which so marked the relationship 
between coal and steel in the Ruhr. The law was based on article 12 of the Potsdam Accord in which the Allies made 
the deconcentration of German industry a primary goal of the war effort. Wolf Wank, “Die alliierten 
Entflechtungsmassnahmen—politische und juristische Aspekte,” and Günther Schultz “Die 
Entflechtungsmassnahmen und ihre wirtschaftliche Bedeutung,” in Hans Pohl, ed., Mitbestimmung: Ursprünge und 
Entwicklung: Referate und Diskussionsbeiträge der 5. Öffentlichen Vortragsveranstaltung der Gesellschaft für 
Unternehmensgeschichte e.V. am 7. Mai 1980 in Düsseldorf (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 202-05, 210-11. 
383 Richard T. Griffiths, “The Schuman Plan Negotiations: The Economic Clauses,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge,  
op cit., 61-71. 
384 John Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem: German Heavy Industry and the Schuman Plan,” in Schwabe, ed., 
Die Anfänge, op cit., 424.  
385 Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 251. In his 22 December note to Robert Schuman, Monnet wrote that a 
cartel ban was “essential to prevent the Ruhr magnates from recreating their dominance in German politics” and that 
“our industries cannot fight with equal arms if they must face the Konzern as they had previously”.  
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vertical integration in heavy industry, had lagged behind that occurring in Germany since the late 
nineteenth century, in part due to the reluctance of French employers to combine as well as a 
liberal majority in government that, until the Great Depression, looked with disfavor upon 
cartelization efforts.386 French policymakers after WWII generally viewed the disparities in 
cartelization as an essential feature of French economic and, hence, geopolitical weakness vis-à-
vis Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, by 1948, French and German 
industrialists had begun private talks to reconstruct the interwar European steel cartel.387 SFIO 
and SPD leaders were both determined to prevent a renewal of the private cartel arrangements 
and much of Philip’s efforts in 1948-50 to create a public authority over coal and steel were 
designed to assure that supervision of these essential sectors take place under government, rather 
than private, auspices.388  
Quickly German industry, the trade unions, the government and the Social Democratic 
opposition rallied against Monnet’s far-reaching proposals. The subject of cartels became the 
most controversial issue of the Schuman negotiations, bogging down progress towards an accord 
from October 1950 until Adenauer capitulated to Monnet in April 1951. The central aspect of 
these negotiations was the fate of the German coal-sales syndicate (Deutscher Kohlen-Verkauf, 
DKV), which the French, Dutch and Italian governments considered to have the potential to 
dictate the Community’s market conditions. In December 1950, Monnet succeeded in using his 
386 Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the state in modern France: Renovation and economic management in the 
twentieth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 15-28, 95; Helmut Kaelble, Nachbarn am Rhein: 
Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 
24.  
387 The first steel cartel was created in 1926 and welcomed in France and Germany as an industrial “armistice” and 
as part of the general spirit of cooperation and reconciliation of the Stresemann-Briand era. The steel cartel was 
initially considered disadvantageous to German industry because it fixed future quotas based on a year in which 
German steel output was substantially below average. The German steel industry entered the arrangement with a 
revanchist attitude to amend its quotas and its efforts resulted in the substantially more powerful steel cartel of 1933 
that replaced its predecessor and that controlled sales and export prices, as well as distribution and that no longer 
restricted its members’ levels of production. The coal industry organized relatively late and the international cartel 
was principally an agreement between the coal-exporting nations of Great Britain and Germany. It excluded France, 
a coal-importing nation. Clemens A. Wurm, “Les cartels internationaux de l’acier de l’entre-deux-guerres: 
Précurseurs du Plan Schuman?,” in Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op cit., 56-64.  
388 Schumacher wrote, for instance, “Under this false flag German and French heavy industry would like to step 
towards an international cartel agreement. But international cartels operate against all peoples, against the French 
just as much as against the German.” “Dr. Schumacher. Die Zeit der Entscheidung: Deutsche Demokratie in 
Gefahr—Dr. Adenauers Aussenpolitik ist Klassenpolitik,” Volksstimme, 9 December 1949, KS 49. Wilhelm 
Salewski of the WESI was clear in his determination for the “reconstruction of an international cartel on the basis of 
the private economy.” Bührer, Ruhrstahl und Europa, 86-87. The French and German steel-transforming industries 
both supported anti-cartel legislation and pressured their governments to this effect. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op 
cit., 202-03; Philip to the National Assembly, 25 July 1950, JO, 5940-41. 
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influence to convince U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy to intervene with the German 
government in favor of the French position, which already had support in important U.S. policy 
circles.389 This double assault proved too strong for the young German government to resist. In 
March 1951, Adenauer agreed to Monnet’s terms, thereby removing the last obstacle to the 
signing of the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951 to create the European Coal & Steel Community.  
Internal German politics precluded the SPD from making the cartel issue the center of its 
public critique of the Schuman Plan. Historians have pointed out the irony that the SPD adopted 
a similar position on cartels to large industry, while accusing the ECSC of being “kartellisch.”390 
The truth, though, was that the SPD was not in principle opposed to cartels. At a 1949 meeting of 
the Political-Economic Commission under the SPD’s Central Committee, SPD deputy Paul 
Bleiss, himself deeply involved in the coal politics of the Ruhr, argued in favor of maintaining 
the cartels. A SPD official summarized the sentiment in the meeting as: “all the speakers were 
more or less in favor of concentration, but with public supervision.”391 The SPD still supported a 
“planned economy” in this period and considered the concentration of industry to be an 
inevitable part of capitalist development and a necessary step towards the industries’ 
socialization. Frustrated in their efforts to socialize German heavy industry, the SPD called for 
the creation of a “monopoly office” and large state intervention and oversight of the Ruhr 
industries. They did not, however, want to break the vertical integration that they deemed 
389 There is consensus among historians that the U.S. influence “cannot be overestimated” and that, “There can be no 
doubt that the American-German negotiations in the first weeks of 1951 saved the Schuman Plan.” Klaus Schwabe, 
“L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’integration à l’ouest” in Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op 
cit., 121; and Schwabe, “‘Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst’—die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman Plan,” in 
Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 238. The final agreement called for the dissolution of the DKV by 1 October 
1952, the creation of 24 new steel groups with vertical integration to be permitted between coal and steel in only 11 
of them, with a limitation on ownership share of 75%. This arrangement would place only 15% of German coal 
under the control of the German steel industries, whereas the figure was 56% before the war. Lefèvre, op cit., 267-8.  
For a useful overview of Allied negotiations with the West Germany government and the politics of the organization 
of the steel industry, see Isabel Warner, Steel and Sovereignty: The Deconcentration of the West German Steel 
Industry, 1949-54 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1996).  
390 Willis writes that, “ironically, the two political parties supposedly friendly to business interests, the CDU and 
FDP, opposed the demands of business, and the party of labor, the SPD, rejected the demands of the labor unions.” 
Willis, op cit., 120-21. 
391 The protocol reads: “Bleiss argued for a certain maintenance of the cartels whose disadvantage admittedly was 
that they brought with them monopolistic dominance and demand monopolistic benefits that cannot be avoided. 
However, if one wants an economy steered by the state, one needs large economic units. Through an approval of the 
cartel economy, one can come to the setting of new prices. The more economic units one includes, the larger can be 
its cost effectiveness, real wages and distribution.” Baade responded that, “the concentration process of the capitalist 
economy is unavoidable and one should not forbid it but rather step-by-step take it under [state] supervision.” 
Protokoll der Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Auschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands am 25. und 26.11.1949, Erich Potthoff 31, AdsD.  
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essential to the region’s competitiveness, nor did they wish to dissolve the centralized coal sales 
agency (DKV). In public, Nölting and Schumacher admitted the negative effects of cartels on 
consumers and the pernicious influence of their power in the political system. However, they 
also rejected a “ruinous competition of annihilation (Vernichtungswettbewerb)” and argued 
against allowing the economy to become “a football field.”392 This position reflected a continuity 
with the cartel policies of the August Bebel- and Weimar-era SPD. The SPD Bundestag faction 
sought to stem the de-concentration initiatives of the Allies, but also those of German Economics 
Minister Ludwig Erhard. It fought on the domestic level for a far-reaching state supervision of 
industrial combinations and against strict anti-cartel proposals.393  
In this context, SPD leaders understood the French efforts to place wide-reaching powers 
over the cartels in the hands of a supranational High Authority as a measure that was part and 
parcel of the overall French policy to place German steel at a permanent competitive 
disadvantage.394 SPD leaders pointed to the nationalization of the French coal industry and, with 
it, the central French coal purchasing agency, as well as concentration efforts in the private 
French steel industry from 1948 to 1951, undertaken under pressure from Monnet’s Planning 
Commission, to argue that the ECSC would de facto discriminate against German industry in the 
Ruhr.395 The DGB and the miners’ union, IG Bergbau, also threw their full weight into a defense 
of the vertical integration economy and the DKV, lauding the stability they fostered within the 
industry.396 As Schumacher argued to the SPD Central Committee, “The realization of the 
392 27 January 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 983-86.  
393 Nölting for instance told the Bundestag that, “The SPD would like to leave no doubt that it is less interested in a 
vague arrangements for competition than for a sensible and planned supervision of economic power.” 31 March 
1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 2109. See also Peter Hüttenberger, “Wirtschaftsordnung und Interessenpolitik in 
der Kartellgesetzgebung der Bundesrepublik 1949-1957,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 24, 3 (1976), 287-307.  
394 “One wishes to remove from the Germans the unified coal sales agency. Also, the claim against German vertical 
integration means a disadvantage for the German next to the nationalized French coal industry.” “Die SPD bleibt 
fest: Eigenbericht des ‘Neue Vorwärts’ über die Partei-Vorstandes,” Neuer Vorwärts, Sonderdruck, PV 1951, AdsD. 
The SPD made “The restoration of the vertical integration and the program of a new coal sales organization” a 
condition for its support for the Treaty of Paris in its resolution to the Bundestag (Drucksache 2484) on 12 July 
1951. Paterson, op cit., 60. For details of the operations of the vertical integration economy in the Ruhr and why 
policymakers saw it as essential for the region’s competitiveness, see Kurt Klotzbach, “Die deutsche 
Sozialdemokratie und der Schuman-Plan,” in Schwabe., ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 339-40. 
395 The concentration of the French steel industry had proceeded largely piecemeal from 1947 to 1950, but in 1950 
four Lorraine steel companies combined to form Sidélor and further concentrations appeared to be on the horizon.  
396 “With regard to the reorganization of iron and coal enterprises it is necessary to create efficient economic units. 
This means that they must have a size which is in conformity with the demands of modern industrial economy...In 
the Ruhr area, mining, iron and steel production and manufacture are closely concentrated on [sic] a small space. 
This allows an intensive compound economy...The high efficiency of the Ruhr industry is chiefly due to compound 
[sic] economy.” Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund für das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Düsseldorf, 
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Schuman Plan will have as a consequence the social disintegration of the Ruhr. The dissolution 
of the vertical integration economy will first of all threaten workers and their jobs,” which, he 
argued, could breathe new life into Communist efforts in the Ruhr.397  
The SFIO did not share the SPD’s view about the merits of cartelization. This was a 
policy area that clearly separated the two parties. Within French politics, the SFIO was among 
the parties most supportive of strong anti-cartel legislation in both the inter- and postwar era.398 
There seems to have been little dissent within the party as Philip and Gazier pushed to strengthen 
proposed anti-cartel legislation in 1948-1950.399 The SFIO position was consistent with a general 
policy that was more focused on attaining lower coal and steel prices to aid the consuming 
industries. In addition, the party supported as early as 1948 “a European legislation for cartels 
and the creation of an inter-European organism, be it administrative, or judicial...to watch over 
the cartels and coalitions that inevitably and, as it is to be wished, are going to tend to surpass 
national borders.”400  
SFIO efforts for strong anti-cartel legislation within France make clear that this policy 
was a matter of conviction within the party and part of the SFIO’s general economic policy, 
rather than simply a design to attack German competitiveness. The SFIO, in effect, supported 
Monnet’s campaign against cartels prima facie. On the international level, the party’s position 
was strengthened by a belief that a reconstitution of the interwar steel cartel would inevitably 
November 21st, 1949, “Memorandum of the Trade Unions regarding the Ruhr Statute and Law Nr. 75,” Erich 
Potthoff 41, AdsD. Historian A. W. Lovett writes that, “the German miner...proved the most tenacious defender of 
the single sales agency.” A.W. Lovett, “The United States and the Schuman Plan: A Study in French Diplomacy 
1950-1952,” The Historical Journal 39, 2, (1996): 446. To the SPD’s surprise, the DGB later came out in support of 
the Schuman Plan, again without consulting the SPD. The DGB’s position was tactical: it gained Adenauer’s 
support for the passing of a co-determination law in heavy industry in exchange for its embrace of the Schuman 
Plan.  
397 9-10 March 1951, PV 1951, AdsD.  
398 Kipping writes about Philip that, “his rejection of cartel agreements places him within the anti-‘trust’ tradition of 
the French left.” Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 246, 351. 
399  See the discussion in the parliamentary group 30 May 1950 and 5 April 1951, GPS, AHC. Philip called for anti-
cartel legislation on the model of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in a speech to the National Assembly on 6 
July 1948, stating that, “Prices should be fixed by the nation or by free competition. What no one can tolerate is a 
dirigisme that escapes the hands of the state and passes it into the hands of professionals. That is unfortunately the 
present situation...in a great number of industries the conditions for a [price] decrease are present but a break is 
placed on it by certain professional organizations of owners.”  On the initiative of Albert Gazier, the National 
Assembly’s Commission for Economic Affairs passed a resolution by a vote of 14 to 11 on 8 December 1948 calling 
for “the preparation of an anti-trust law...” to decrease prices. Kipping, op cit., 72. There was consensus on this 
policy within the SFIO Directing Committee during its discussions on proposed French anti-cartel legislation in 
1950-51, with Philip, for instance, telling the committee on 25 January 1951 that, “the destruction of cartels should 
be a primary priority of Socialist action.” 25 January 1951, GPS, AHC.  
400 Philip, 6 July 1948, JO, 4351.  
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result in German economic hegemony.401 The primacy of the cartel and price issue for the 
dispute between the SFIO and SPD was apparent to the parties’ leaderships following a meeting 
between the parties to discuss the Treaty of Paris on 27 June 1951. It is important to highlight the 
outcome of this meeting because it made clear the divisive issues at stake. Guy Mollet reported 
to the SFIO Directing Committee that the meeting was quite cordial. Mollet said, though, that, 
“Schumacher told us that the proximity of Hitler’s war made it difficult to reach a common 
position.” According to Mollet: 
“It is very apparent that the problem for them is essentially one of domestic policy. 
Schumacher declared that the SPD favored cartelization and the maintenance of the 
double-pricing [mechanism] for coal. I responded to him that a common position with us 
was impossible if it included a defense of cartelization and double-pricing. At that 
moment Schumacher expressed a desire that the discussion cease.”402  
 
The SPD leadership’s position on the Schuman Plan hence evolved from an attentiste 
attitude in summer 1950 to overt opposition by November 1950, the period in which the cartel 
issue became the most prominent feature of the negotiations and public discussion.403 Much has 
been made of the internal SPD opposition around Max Brauer, Hermann Brill, Wilhelm Kaisen, 
and Ernst Reuter, who all supported the Treaty.404 Ramuschkat puts forth the scholarly 
consensus on Schumacher’s role by writing that, “The struggle against the Schuman Plan was 
Schumacher’s struggle.”405 Yet no one has pointed out that none of these SPD politicians came 
from the region of Germany that would be most affected by the Schuman Plan, North-Rhine-
Westphalia and, in particular, the Ruhr valley. The SPD leadership designated politicians from 
this region, in particular Erik Nölting, Fritz Henssler and Joachim Schöne, to give most of the 
prominent speeches outlining the party’s position on the Schuman Plan from 1950 to its 
401 In Philip’s report about the Schuman Plan on 17 May 1950, he stated that, “in such a cartel, Germany would 
quickly exercise a dominating action.” Commission des Affaires étrangères, 17 May 1950, AN. Le Bail told the 
National Assembly that, if talks between French and German steel magnates continued, “I don’t believe I err in my 
prophecy, which is sinister: in ten years, German will be assured hegemony in Western Europe.” 15 November 
1949, JO, 6286. 
402 SFIO comité directeur, 27 June 1951, OURS.  
403 SPD representatives abstained on votes welcoming the Schuman Plan within COMISCO and Nölting abstained at 
the Council of Europe vote on 14 August 1950. In September-October, the first signals came from Erich Ollenhauer 
and Schumacher (Schumacher interviews on 5 September and 24 October 1950) that the SPD was moving into 
opposition, a position that the party leadership confirmed by November 1950. Paterson, op cit., 55. 
404 See the previous chapter.  
405 Yet this is just one page after Ramuschkat points out that it was Henssler’s pressure that led Schumacher to stress 
the importance of defending the coal sales cartel. Ramuschkat, op cit., 108-09. 
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ratification in January 1952.406 Pitting region against region, Henssler suspected that Kaisen’s 
position resulted from the advantages to be gained for Bremen’s port by a potential increase in 
European maritime trade.407 The Central Committee resolution condemning Kaisen’s public 
attack on SPD policy claimed that Kaisen was willing “to sacrifice the foundation 
[Lebensgrundlage] and future of the Ruhr territory for the assumed interest of a Land [Bremen].” 
The SPD Bundestag faction lent support to CDU Minister-President Karl Arnold’s efforts to gain 
a seat for his Land government in the federal government’s policy-making bodies on the 
Schuman Plan because it believed that Adenauer’s team was ignoring the interests of the 
region.408 The protocol of the 20-21 January 1951 SPD Central Committee meeting reads that 
Henssler “completely shared Schumacher’s negative attitude on the question of the Schuman 
Plan.”409 The national and regional SPD of NRW and the Ruhr Valley walked as one in framing 
the SPD’s response to the Schuman Plan.  
The polemics surrounding the Schuman Plan intersected with debates about a French 
proposal for a supranational European Defense Community that emerged in fall 1950 in response 
to a U.S. ultimatum that its western Allies permit a German military contribution to defend 
Western Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War. It is to this subject that we now turn, as 
proposals to widen the range of European integration measures in this period were largely 
overshadowed by the intense, emotion-driven theatrics of the EDC debate.  
406 Paterson argues that besides Schumacher the greatest influence on SPD policy on the Schuman Plan came from 
Henssler, Baade, Nölting and Agartz, three of four of whom came from NRW. Paterson, op cit., 64-65. Nölting was 
also designated to represent the SPD in the Council of Europe’s sub-committees for production and coal. Claudia 
Nölting, op cit., 47. 
407 Henssler speech, “Gleich im Recht—gleich in der Verpflichtung—Referat auf dem Bezirksparteitag in Hagen am 
26./27. Mai 1951,” in Högl and Borisch, eds., 132-42.  
408 See Lütkens speech to the Bundestag, 31 May 1951, Verhandlungen, 5754. The SPD had been in coalition with 
Arnold from 1946 until summer 1950, when Adenauer insisted that Arnold form a Land government on the model of 
the national government with a CDU-FDP governing majority. SPD leaders Nölting and Henssler had positive 
personal rapports with Arnold, who wanted the NRW to represent “the social conscious” of postwar Germany. 
Christoph Klessmann and Peter Friedemann, eds., Streiks und Hungermärsche im Ruhrgebiet 1946-1948 (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Campus Verlag GmbH, 1977), 46. Arnold was close to the trade-unionist wing of the CDU and often found 
himself in opposition to Adenauer’s more conservative policies. Although Arnold approved the Schuman Plan, he 
campaigned vigorously for the maintenance of the DKV coal sales agency and for the maximum consultation 
possible between the German negotiators and the NRW government. See Rombeck-Jaschinski for more about 
Arnold’s activities in this period. Rombeck-Jaschinski, op cit., 82-105.  
409 SPD PV 20-21 January, PV 1951, AdsD. 
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4. COLD WAR POLITICS AND A CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE: THE SFIO AND SPD 
DEBATE GERMAN REARMAMENT AND DEFENSE INTEGRATION, 1950-1954 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The politics of coal and steel and proposals for the integration of European heavy industry drew 
the attention of industry officials, industrial workers and trade unions, Allied governments, and a 
transatlantic set of political and economic elites. Outside of these circles and the Ruhr territory, 
the bitter debates surrounding the Schuman Plan were far too technical to attract much interest 
from a German and French public whom poll after poll revealed to be largely ignorant of what 
all the fuss was about.  
Proposals to recreate a German military within an integrated European defense system 
was a different story altogether. When they began to broach the issue of German rearmament, 
Allied and German policymakers could hardly hope to confine their debates to political elites and 
economic and sectoral interest groups. As proposals to mobilize West German war potential for 
the Western alliance evolved from backdoor whispering in 1948-49 to concrete proposals and a 
U.S. ultimatum that a West German military be created in 1950,  an emotional and rancorous 
public debate broke out in France and Germany. For the next five years, the issue of German 
rearmament was at the center of domestic politics in France and Germany and of diplomacy 
between the West German and Allied governments. 
This chapter traces the actions and reactions of the French Socialist and German Social 
Democratic parties to the evolving proposals for German rearmament up to West Germany’s 
incorporation into the Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) alliance systems in 1955. That West Germany would join NATO a mere ten years after 
the end of the Second World War was by no means pre-ordained. Although military officials in 
the Allied countries (and ex-military officials in West Germany) and some political leaders 
favored mobilizing West German forces for the Cold War in the late 1940s, most politicians 
considered such a step to be far too dangerous for German democratic stability and far too 
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provocative a move towards the Soviet Union. However, the outbreak of the Korean War 
upended this calculus. In response to a U.S. ultimatum that the French government agree to the 
formation of a West German military, French Defense Minister René Pleven proposed an 
integrated European defense system within which German troops could participate in Western 
defense. Pleven’s proposal was intended to at the least stall, and hopefully to prevent, the 
creation of an autonomous German military. 
The Pleven Plan allowed the French government to re-seize the initiative on Allied 
discussions of European defense. However, the French government faced a formidable foe in 
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who was eager to exploit the Allied need for 
German manpower to reduce the Allied occupation’s limitations on West German sovereignty. 
Adenauer’s effort succeeded, and the signing of the General Treaty, which lifted almost all 
formal restrictions on West German sovereignty, accompanied the signing of a treaty to create a 
European Defense Community in summer 1952. Successive French governments, aware that 
there was no majority for these Treaties in the National Assembly, then developed cold feet and 
spent the next two years forcing a series of new concessions from the German and Allied 
governments that reinstituted some of the discriminatory features towards Germany embodied in 
the original Pleven Plan. Still there remained no majority in the National Assembly, and the 
Treaties went down to defeat in August 1954. In response, a series of hasty Allied meetings 
resulted in the Paris Accords of 1954, in which the French government received a set of 
unprecedented military guarantees from the United States and Great Britain in exchange for 
agreeing to West Germany’s inclusion in the Western European Union, which provided an 
antechamber to its entrance into the NATO system. Despite these concessions it was only 
through recourse to threats and issue linkages that a majority in the French assembly voted for 
the Paris Accords at the end of December 1954. 
This chapter analyzes the involvement of the SFIO and SPD in this protracted, 
acrimonious process. A common portrayal of SFIO and SPD policy on defense integration from 
1950 to 1954 is one of failure. Despite nearly a decade of resistance to Adenauer’s security 
policies, the SPD failed to prevent the creation of a West German military. Furthermore, the 
party failed to force Adenauer to seriously engage in negotiations for German reunification. The 
results of the 1953 and 1957 elections seemed to confirm West Germans’ preference for 
Adenauer’s defense policy. For its part, the SFIO failed to prevent the French government from 
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acquiescing to U.S. demands that West Germany be rearmed in fall 1950. Once the leadership 
had accepted the principle of a West German military contribution to Western defense, it failed 
to maintain the party unity needed to ratify the Treaty to create the European Defense 
Community (EDC) and instead had to accept West Germany’s incorporation into NATO, a 
solution the leadership had vigorously refused to countenance before fall 1954. The SFIO 
opposition, which defied party discipline and caused the defeat of the EDC Treaty, failed in its 
aim of preventing West German rearmament and, due to its intransigent opposition, the French 
government was forced to agree to a West German army with considerably more autonomy than 
would have been permitted within an integrated defense community. Many thought that four 
years of incessant squabbling on the EDC issue had done irrevocable damage to the idea of a 
united Europe and to the Western alliance system.  
Recent scholarship has argued that French leaders were far more able and competent in 
protecting French security goals during the Fourth Republic than previous scholars have 
recognized.410 As this new scholarship shows, through a cunning exploitation of their domestic 
constraints and an able manipulation of the shifting geopolitics of the early Cold War, French 
foreign policy leaders successfully resisted Allied designs for an autonomous West German 
military and in its stead gained a measure of control over the timing and shape of West German 
rearmament. Although these diplomatic historians tend to assign intention to what were often 
haphazard and sometimes desperate diplomatic maneuvers, their basic point remains valid. 
Against U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s wish, French leaders impelled the U.S. government 
to adopt a continental defense strategy that assured French security vis-à-vis both the Soviet 
Union and West Germany.411  
This chapter argues that, despite the defeats mentioned above, the SFIO and the SPD 
were successful in achieving some central party goals related to West German rearmament in 
410 Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the 
Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Marc 
Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999); and Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
411 Over the course of the negotiations on the European Defense Community, the U.S. troop presence in continental 
Europe increased from 100,000 in 1950 to 427,000 in 1953. Wolfgang Krieger, “Die Ursprünge der langfristigen 
Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europe 1945-1951,” in Ludolf Herbst, Werner Bührer, and Hanno 
Sowade, eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EVG: Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Welt (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1990), 394-96. 
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1950-1954. Their policies appeared reckless indeed to many contemporary, as well as scholarly, 
followers of “realism” or power politics because they delayed German rearmament for over four 
years while the Soviet Union maintained an overwhelming military advantage on the European 
continent. However, such a policy was reckless only if 1) the parties believed there to be a real 
threat of a short- or medium-term invasion from the Eastern bloc, and 2) the parties considered 
this threat from the East to be greater than the potential long-term threat posed by a reassertion of 
militarist personnel and values in the early West German republic.  
As I argue below, the SPD did not believe a Soviet invasion to be imminent and 
considered the resurrection of a West German military to be part of a larger context in which 
reactionary, anti-democratic elements were reasserting themselves within West German society 
and politics. In addition, though the SPD’s defense policy was often murky and failed to inspire 
confidence in a majority of West German voters, the SPD more likely would have performed 
significantly better in the 1953 and 1957 elections had it not been for the crackdown on the East 
Berlin workers’ protest in June 1953 and the tense geopolitical situation following the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary and the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of the Suez canal in November 
1956. In addition, party leaders Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer skillfully navigated deep 
party divisions on the issue of defense and managed to maintain party unity while pushing a 
largely pacifist base towards accepting some form of a German defense contribution. As in the 
case of coal and steel, the party leadership’s position was often a response to political currents 
lower down the party hierarchy. In this context, the SPD leadership was able to attain two goals: 
the maintenance of party unity by encompassing within its coalition pacifists, former 
Communists, neutralists and advocates of a limited contribution to Western defense. In this 
regard, murky language and imprecise policy were often to the party’s political advantage. At the 
same time, the party was able to blunt the stigma that it represented “Fatherland-less elements” 
by vigorously advocating for German reunification, having SPD defense experts construct close 
working relations with the budding West German military personnel, and asserting a substantial 
influence in crafting the designs for a German military the creation of which the SPD leadership 
realized it could not prevent.412 
412 For details of the SPD’s influence in shaping the West German military, see Gordon D. Drummond, The Social 
Democrats in Opposition, 1949 to 1960. The Case against Rearmament (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1982); and David Clay Large, Germans to the Front. West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: 
the University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
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The SFIO, on the other hand, experienced one of the most profound internal crises in its 
history. The party schism over the EDC was among the most acrimonious and bitter episodes of 
postwar French socialism, comparable only to the conflict over the Algerian War that began just 
a few years later. As the SPD did in 1950-51, Mollet sought to balance opposing wings of his 
party through a “conditional yes” to West German rearmament that meant, in fact, a “no” for the 
present. However, the SFIO was not afforded the luxury of intransigent opposition because its 
pivotal role in the fractured French political scene meant that the full weight of domestic and 
foreign pressure fell upon a SFIO leadership that would have much preferred to maintain party 
unity through abstention. Although the party leadership failed to save the EDC, it did attain 
unprecedented U.S. and British military guarantees that provided French leaders with a sense of 
security that they had not had in many decades. In addition, the conditions that the party posed 
and its evident reluctance to alienate powerful conflicting intra-party sentiments was such that 
the SFIO contributed more than any other French party to the four-year delay of West German 
rearmament. With both wings of the party concerned about the impact of a German military on 
West German democracy, this delay may well have allowed a breathing space for anti-militarist 
social forces to assert themselves in West German society. A West German military formed in 
early 1951, when revisionist ideas and right-wing radicalism were on the upswing, may have 
presented a far more menacing face to democrats within and to enemies and allies alike abroad.   
Examining the history of the failed European Defense Community reveals that a number 
of the major debates of the early Cold War played out within ad hoc transnational coalitions that 
blur the contours of “national interest” so central to realist presumptions. Here I examine how the 
issues of collective security, military blocs, threats to German democracy, the Korean War, and 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s offer to reunite Germany in 1952 often revealed a larger degree of 
agreement between SFIO and SPD leaders than either party had with their own governments. 
The most important question facing the socialist leaders was whether to assign primacy to 
détente and German reunification or to the strengthening of the Western alliance. This question 
split the SFIO. Many prominent SFIO leaders took a position that conformed with the SPD’s 
view rather than to that of their own party leadership, let alone to that of their own government. 
From the unconditionally pro-rearmament Dutch Labor Party to the anti-EDC SPD, the EDC, 
traditionally understood as an integration initiative that bitterly divided European Socialist 
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parties from one another, was also the impetus for transnational socialist coalitions or, more 
loosely, transnational communities of views that pitted French Socialists against one another.  
 
4.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND MILITARY BLOCS: THE SFIO, SPD, AND 
DEFENSE POLICY IN THE INTERWAR AND INITIAL POSTWAR PERIODS 
 
French Socialists and German Social Democrats had always had a fraught relationship with their 
own nations’ militaries. From the parties’ origins in the late nineteenth century through to the 
precipice of the Second World War, Socialist attitudes to the military uneasily alternated from a 
wary distance and distrust to outbursts of angry accusation and recrimination. The momentary 
euphoria created by the “civil peace” of 1914 did not erase Socialists’ perceptions of the military 
as a vanguard of reaction, an instigator of war, and a threat to both the abstract ideal of 
democracy and to the physical bodies of democrats. The role of former general and Weimar 
President Paul von Hindenburg in the Nazi coup of 1933 and the acquiescence of German 
military leaders to their new rulers in peace and in war hardened such attitudes within German 
Social Democracy even further. On the other hand, the collaboration of the French Socialist 
resistance with elements of the French military hostile to Marshall Philippe Pétain’s National 
Revolution tempered SFIO anti-militarism and led the party to emerge from WWII with a far 
more ambivalent attitude toward their own military than that of the anti-militarist SPD. 
Hostile to the military by temperament and history, both parties nevertheless supported in 
principle their nations’ right to self-defense.413 With Russian troops poised to Germany’s east 
and German troops on France’s eastern border, SFIO and SPD leaders claimed that their vote for 
war credits in August 1914 was a defensive policy, despite the violence that their decisions did to 
their conception of themselves as internationalists. Unwilling to suffer the opprobrium of 
patriotic sentiment in a time of international crisis and, in most cases, convinced of the moral 
superiority of the national effort over that of the opposing alliance, French and German socialists 
joined their nations’ war efforts. Yet their policies remained distinct from their governments: 
both parties refused the ancient principle of annexation by conquest and argued for a conciliatory 
peace against the harshly formulated “war aims,” some public, others secret, of their 
governments.  
413 Drummond, op cit., 9. 
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While the concept of “revolutionary defeatism” championed by Vladimir Lenin and the 
Zimmerwald movement began to make inroads among a war-weary public, the moderate 
Socialists who would lead the charge against the coming Communist schism seized upon U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s design for a postwar order with a sense of fleeting hope and timid 
relief. For the rest of the war and into the interwar period, the SFIO and SPD leaderships held 
tight to a program largely inherited from the liberal international peace movement: international 
disarmament, national self-determination, peace without annexations, and a League of Nations to 
peacefully arbitrate future disputes between nations.  
The SPD and SFIO carried this program into the interwar period.414 In its early years, the 
Weimar Republic lurched from crisis to crisis while the nationalist leaders of a revanchist French 
Republic short of allies peered apprehensively at developments across the Rhine. Opposed to the 
Versailles settlement, the SFIO and SPD steadfastly lent support to the efforts of centrist leaders 
like Édouard Herriot, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann to stabilize an unsteady European 
peace. One historian writes that Blum “fought for disarmament with a conviction quite rare for 
the period, almost with an intractable firmness, an extraordinary radicalism.” Blum went so far 
as to call for a unilateral French disarmament before the Nazis came to power in Germany.415 
However, although SPD leaders favored the Dawes and Locarno Treaties, as did the SFIO, there 
was an internal party conflict that later shaped much of the division among Social Democrats on 
the issue of rearmament following the Second World War. 
As bearers of the stigma of participating in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and 
subject to the daily taunts of conservative and right-wing radical forces that they were 
“November criminals” and “Fatherland-less elements,” Social Democrats were none too pleased 
that it was only with their votes that coalition governments to which they were often not even 
members were able to ratify the Treaties. Domestic politics made it such that SPD leaders 
wanted to thrust responsibility for the Locarno Treaty’s ratification onto conservative shoulders. 
When the right-wing German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) 
bolted Stresemann’s coalition, the SPD faced a dire choice. Although over a third of the SPD 
Reichstag faction, mostly the party’s left wing, voted against ratification in an internal vote, the 
414 Both the Independent Social Democratic (USPD) and Majority Social Democratic (MSPD) parties, the two 
Socialist parties that emerged from the wartime schism of the SPD, supported this program. See, for instance, 
Drummond, 19-20. 
415 Gilbert Ziebura, “Léon Blum et la conception de la sécurite collective,” in René Girault and Gilbert Ziebura, eds., 
Léon Blum, socialiste européen (Brussels: Editions complexe, 1995), 20-21. 
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SPD reluctantly agreed to lend its votes to Stresemann’s embattled government and rescue the 
Locarno Treaty from defeat.416  
The internal struggle within the SPD was rooted in fear. All factions of the party 
enthusiastically supported the concept of collective security, for which Locarno represented a 
considerable, if insufficient, advance. The SFIO shared this view. Prior to and following the First 
World War, SPD and SFIO leaders pointed to the alliance system as one of the principal 
destabilizing forces propelling the countries of Europe to war. While the French government 
desperately sought to resurrect its wartime alliance with Great Britain and the United States so as 
to permanently restrain its neighbor, the SFIO, with its parliamentary leader Léon Blum at the 
forefront, argued endlessly for a strengthening of the League of Nations and a program of 
international disarmament.417  
The League of Nations, alas, never acquired the power necessary to live up to its high 
aspirations, a geopolitical reality that the SFIO would face again with the paralysis of the United 
Nations after the Second World War.  By the mid-1930s, French Socialists watched with 
trepidation as an arms race broke out on the European continent. Their German comrades, 
suffering political and sometimes physical exile, incarceration or worse, had effectively exited 
the political scene while continental Europe lurched painfully through a cataclysmic decade. In 
1935, Blum denounced the incapacity of the League of Nations to counter overt aggression and 
signaled out for criticism French Prime Minister Pierre Laval, who helped block sanctions 
against Italy’s fascist government after its invasion of Ethiopia.418 As Prime Minister of France’s 
Popular Front government, Blum pursued an international policy of disarmament and negotiation 
that conformed to the profoundly pacifist sentiment of both his party and nation. Dismayed at the 
consequences of “neutrality” in the Spanish Civil War and horrified by the Nazi rearmament of 
the Rhineland and its renunciation of its treaty obligations, Blum, in alliance with Jean 
Zyromski’s Bataille socialiste faction of the party, reversed the French Socialist position over the 
course of 1936 to 1938. Under relentless attack from the pacifist wing under SFIO party leader 
Paul Faure, Blum authorized a French rearmament program and sought refuge in bilateral 
416 William Lee Blackwood, “German Hegemony and the Socialist International’s Place in Interwar European 
Diplomacy,” European History Quarterly 31, 101(2001): 131-2; Klaus E. Rieseberg, “Die SPD in der 
‘Locarnokrise’ Oktober/November 1925,” Viertelsjahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Jan., 1982): 130-161.  
417 For an overview of Leon Blum’s views, see Gilbert Ziebura, “Léon Blum et la conception de la sécurite 
collective,” in Léon Blum, socialiste européen, 18-25; and Wilfried Loth, “Les projets de politique extérieure de la 
Résistance socialiste en France,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contémporaine 24, 4 (1977): 544-569. 
418 Serge Berstein, Léon Blum (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 426. 
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alliance treaties with Britain and the Soviet Union rather than in impotent collective security 
arrangements. Blum set a precedent the logic of which led directly to the Socialists’ later 
approval of the Atlantic Alliance.  
Passions against Blum’s change of course ran so high within the party that the SFIO 
spent much of the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War at war with itself. To 
preserve party unity, Blum and his supporters agreed reluctantly to vote for the Munich accords, 
in which the French and British governments agreed to German annexation of the Sudetenland 
region of Czechoslovakia in return for Hitler’s assurance that he would present no further 
territorial claims. However, Blum’s decision postponed only momentarily the intractable 
dispute.419 The German military invasion of France in 1940 and Blum’s public martyrdom at the 
kangaroo court at Riom lent retrospective credence to Blum and his faction. From prison, Blum’s 
authority grew to such an extent within the French Socialist resistance movement that his 
clandestine writings on a postwar order became the core of the SFIO’s wartime foreign policy 
even while he sat in a guarded house outside the Buchenwald concentration camp.  
The Socialist platform, unique among the French resistance parties, envisioned a 
resurrected League of Nations shorn of the weaknesses that paralyzed it during the interwar 
period.420 In the party’s view, the organization must include both the United States and USSR, 
have the power to make decisions that bound its members and to enforce its decisions by 
economic sanctions or, crucially, through military force.421 Further, collective security should be 
guaranteed by both a world organization and regional federations, i.e., a United States of Europe, 
though Blum and the SFIO were vague about the relations they envisioned between these 
proposed organizations.  In French Socialist André Philip’s words, “from the beginning we must 
inscribe the principle of an international police force in the international organization.”422  
419 Many Socialists who opposed the Munich accords voted in favor of the treaty in respect of party discipline. 
Noëlline Castagnez, Socialistes en République: Les parlementaires SFIO de la IVème République (Rennes: Presses 
universitaires de Rennes, 2004), 23. 
420 Serge Berstein, “French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War II,” in Josef Becker and Frank 
Knipping, ed., Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950 (New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 176. 
421 SFIO resistance platform, in Daniel Mayer, Les socialistes dans la Résistance: souvenirs et documents (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1968), 236. 
422 27 March 1945, Journal officiel (JO), 721. 
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By 1943, the SPD leadership in exile had abandoned its overt hostility towards the Soviet 
Union and called for Europe to act as a mediator between the United States and Soviet Union.423 
A number of scholars have commented that, in the initial postwar period, SPD party leader Kurt 
Schumacher endorsed a vision of the world shaped by power politics and national interests.424 
However, a close reading of Schumacher’s statements makes clear that he was describing the 
geopolitics that he observed, rather than advocating in favor of them. Despite his visceral hatred 
of communism, Schumacher explicitly called for the inclusion of the USSR in an “international 
peace community of peoples.”425 SPD delegate Carlo Schmid, the chair of the body charged with 
crafting Germany’s Basic Law, inserted a clause into West Germany’s founding charter that 
permitted the delegation of sovereignty to international organizations for collective security.426  
French Socialist leaders welcomed the announcement of the 1944 French-Soviet alliance 
treaty, but called for its immediate expansion to Britain and the United States during a period in 
which French President Charles de Gaulle was ratcheting up tensions with his western allies in 
North Africa and the Levant. Philip proclaimed that while “this is the security that France vainly 
sought in the years following 1918,” he also made clear that “alliances are not a substitute for an 
international organization.”427 French Socialists presented the Treaty of Dunkirk, a military 
alliance with Great Britain negotiated by Blum’s government in early 1946, as a Western 
complement to the alliance with the Soviet Union and as a contribution to collective security. At 
the same time, French Socialists rejected the idea of a western bloc aimed at containing the 
Soviet Union.428 Given such wide ambitions, the structure granted to the United Nations was 
bound to disappoint French Socialist and German Social Democratic leaders. SFIO leaders 
tirelessly denounced the right to veto resolutions granted to the Security Council and the paucity 
of enforcement measures to anchor a system of binding arbitration of international disputes into 
international law. In addition, the SFIO would have greatly preferred an internationally 
integrated army under U.N. command, rather than having the states lend national contingents to 
423 William E. Paterson, “The German Social Democratic Party and European Integration in Emigration and 
Occupation,” European History Quarterly 5 (1975): 432. 
424 Ulrich Buczylowski, Kurt Schumacher und die deutsche Frage: Sicherheitspolitik und strategische 
Offensivkonzeption vom August 1950 bis September 1951 (Öffingen: Seewald, 1973), 35, 39.  
425 Buczylowski, op cit., 40. 
426 Drummond, op cit., 36. 
427 21 December 1944, JO, 590.  
428 Ibid. and Depreux, 27 March 1945, JO, 720.  
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the U.N. to complete its missions.429 French Socialists condemned the Soviet Union in particular 
for preventing the creation of a powerful international organization.  
Concepts of collective security coexisted with the reemergence of pacifism as a defining 
feature of internal socialist debates. This tendency was stronger among German Social 
Democrats, whose traditional anti-militarism found new legitimacy in the horror of Wehrmacht 
wartime atrocities. Carlo Schmid at first put forth a moral imperative of unqualified pacifism.430 
He worked to insert provisions into the Basic Law that made all war unconstitutional, arguing 
against the efforts of right-wing delegates to limit the ban to aggressive wars. Such a position 
was quite popular among the SPD base. The SFIO, on the other hand, shared the mantle of the 
heroic, militarized, French resistance; many of its leaders had fought, whether in the army or 
clandestinely, against Vichy and German occupation. Yet distrust of the army ran deep among 
many SFIO leaders, and even deeper among the traditionally anti-militarist SFIO base.431 De 
Gaulle’s resignation in January 1946 was in large part the result of the SFIO’s refusal to agree to 
a large military budget after the war. Willing to risk the wrath of a generation of military leaders 
with long memories, the SFIO succeeded in slashing the military budget in 1946, arguing that the 
money was better served financing reconstruction and economic modernization.432 The SFIO 
returned for the moment to the Socialist tradition of constraining military spending, a common 
practice for both the SFIO and SPD in the pre- and interwar periods.433  
The SFIO accepted the polarized relations that came to embody the Cold War belatedly, 
grudgingly and with ideological agony. In these same years, the SPD bemoaned the development 
of twin power blocs that precluded a framework for German reunification.434 Blum refused to 
endorse or condemn the Truman Doctrine in spring 1947, but he reacted with enthusiasm to U.S. 
429 Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus: Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung 
Europas 1940-1950 (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlag-Anst., 1977), 60-63, 126.  
430 See for instance Carlo Schmid’s comments at the founding congress of the Sudwürttemberg SPD in 
Buczylowski, op cit., 54-55. 
431 Georgette Elgey, La république des illusions, 1945-1951 (Fayard: Paris, 1965), 459. 
432 Serge Berstein, “French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War II,” in Power in Europe?, 176. 
433 In 1912 the SPD faction did vote for military credits after a harrowing internal dispute but these votes were not 
due to the party’s support for increasing military spending but rather because it was linked to a progressive income 
tax to finance the budget. In 1929, the SPD cabinet members and parliamentary faction split on the question of 
funding the Panzer program. The cabinet members called for a favorable vote in order to maintain what was already 
a shaky coalition. Drummond, op cit., 21-22.  
434 Dietrich Orlow writes that, “No political group was more disappointed by the end of the wartime alliance among 
the Big Four and the outbreak of the Cold War than Europe’s Socialists.” Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny: A 
Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1966 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2000), 134. 
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Secretary of State George Marshall’s offer of a large economic program to rebuild Western 
Europe, as did Schumacher and the SPD.435 The SFIO perceived the Marshall Plan as a source of 
funds to make a European “Third Force” between the developing blocs economically viable and 
did not want the economic program to further the divide on the European continent.436 The party 
leaders hoped that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes under its sway would 
participate in the program.437 French Socialists were again at odds with Foreign Minister 
Georges Bidault, who said privately that, “We must make Molotov come but there can be no 
question of him accepting the American offer.”438 Molotov did come to Paris but he walked out 
of the conference on 30 June 1947 after receiving an intelligence report that described secret 
talks between the U.S. and Great Britain in which the Marshall Plan was portrayed as part of a 
western defense policy against the Soviet Union.439 
There also developed a tension between the parties’ formal programs to build a socialist 
“Third Force” between Western capitalism and Soviet communism, and an historical-cultural 
psychology that pulled them toward aligning with Great Britain and the U.S. That Schumacher 
and the SFIO leadership both incorporated the concept of a “Third Force” into their speeches and 
party resolutions was a clear sign of cross-party transnational transfer.440 The term gave 
expression to a joint SFIO-SPD desire to build a domestic system that avoided what French 
Socialists and German Social Democrats viewed to be the excesses of the Soviet and U.S. 
435 See Blum’s articles, “L’Amérique et L’O.N.U.,” 20 May 1947; “Le Prêt-Bail et la Paix,” 8-9 June 1947; “Les 
préventions soviétiques ne peuvent demeurer,” 19 June 1947; and “Cri d’alarme,” 2 July 1947. L’Oeuvre de Léon 
Blum (1947-1950) (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1964), 14-30.  
436 Wilfried Loth, “Die französischen Sozialisten und der Marshall-Plan,” in Othmar Nikola Haberl and Lutz 
Niethammer, eds., Der Marshall-Plan und die europäische Linke (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
1986), 359-363.  
437 In private, he told French Socialist President Vincent Auriol that, “It is necessary to continue down the path that 
we have chosen. It is necessary to fight to the end, even if in despair, to prevent the situation from crystallizing into 
an eastern bloc against a western bloc.” Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 133, 150-1. Roger Quilliot,  La 
S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir, 1944-1958 (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 308. In a colloquium about Blum, Wall questions 
whether Blum could have been so naive as to think that the USSR might accept Marshall Aid. Gérard Bossuat 
responded that he did not believe Blum was naive, but rather “enthusiastic and optimistic.” He went on to say that, 
“When one reads the French texts, one notices that Léon Blum truly believed in the idea of maintaining good 
relations with the USSR.” Robert Verdier, in attendance and a close collaborator with Blum, opined that Blum was 
genuine in his hope that the USSR would participate in the Marshall Plan. Gérard Bossaut, “Léon Blum et 
l’organisation de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale,” in Léon Blum: socialiste européeen, 153-186.  
438 Elgey, op cit., 327. 
439 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
27-28.  
440 There were elements among left-Catholic political movements, including Martin Niemöller and Eugen Kogon, 
who also advocated for this view in the late 1940s within West German postwar politics. Wilfried Loth, “German 
Conceptions of Europe,” in Power in Europe?, 518-19.  
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political and economic systems, and proclaimed the parties’ refusal to accept the accelerating 
geopolitical trend towards military blocs and spheres of influence. As Schumacher said in a 
speech on 16 October 1946, “There can be for us no orientation toward the East, nor an 
orientation toward the West.”441 
Yet an affinity for the West on the part of both party’s leadership was already clear in the 
initial postwar years. Blum spoke upon his return in 1945 of France belonging to the “Western 
family,” which he claimed differed from participating in a “Western bloc,” a distinction repeated 
by SFIO party leader Daniel Mayer in January 1946.442 Schumacher made clear in an internal 
circular from August 1945 that he considered Germany to have a similar culture and civilization 
with the Anglo-Saxon world (notice French civilization is absent) rather than with Russia.443 
Though Adenauer’s background in the Rhineland likely made him more amenable in his dealings 
with the French government, there is no reason to give credence to the view that Schumacher’s 
Prussian upbringing made him more reluctant than most German politicians to accept a Western 
alignment.444 Schumacher had, after all, spent most of his Weimar political career in Frankfurt 
and had few ties with political circles in the east.  
Both party leaderships put forth the view that their nations should not join a military bloc 
against the USSR, but they also explicitly rejected “neutrality” in the growing conflict between 
the values that purportedly defined East and West. Both parties were in effect “Cold Warriors” 
within their domestic politics, but they did not want their domestic political fight with 
Communists to play out as well at the diplomatic level between the geopolitical systems. The 
“Third Force” was to a large extent a rhetorical protest to satisfy the various wings of the two 
parties, with some eager for a defense against the Soviet threat and others worried that their 
brand of socialism would suffocate in the tight embrace of an Atlantic alliance. The “Third 
Force” thesis represented a unifying effort around which the parties achieved near unanimity 
441 Berliner, es geht um Deutschland: Dr. Kurt Schumacher—Hannover, in den Argus-Hallen Berlin-Reinickendorf 
am 16. Oktober 1946, 19 Uhr 30, Kurt Schumacher (KS) 39, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD). 
442 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 80-84. 
443 Dietric Staritz and Arnold Sywottek, “The International Political Situation as seen by the German Linksparteien 
(SPD, SED and KPD) between 1945 and 1949,” in Power in Europe?, 217. 
444 I am the argument in Katja Weber and Paul A. Kowert, Cultures of Order: Leadership, Language, and Social 
Reconstruction in Germany and Japan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). 
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from 1948 to 1950, as Cold War tensions hardened. As a period of détente set in from 1951-52, 
the concept gradually lost its ability to reconcile internal conflicts.445  
Schumacher welcomed the Marshall Plan, saying that it was “not the cause but an effect 
of the division.”446 The same logic led the SPD and SFIO to approve the formation of the 
trizone, the calling of a constitutional assembly for West Germany, and the introduction of a 
West German currency, all measures that elicited angry reactions from the Soviet government. 
SFIO and SPD leaders foresaw correctly that the failure of the Moscow Foreign Ministers 
negotiations in November 1947 marked a caesura in postwar history. Neither party considered 
the incorporation of the western zones into the western area of economic cooperation at this time 
to be at odds with their support for German reunification. Socialist outrage against Soviet actions 
reached a height during the Prague coup of February 1948. It had a lasting impact on Guy 
Mollet, who told an interviewer ten years later that he had been, “without doubt one of the last 
politicians to go to Czechoslovakia before it fell under Soviet domination.”447 Not only did Blum 
and SFIO leaders condemn the coup in unequivocal terms, but for the first time the party moved 
to infuse its program of European unity with a defensive component aimed to stem Soviet 
expansionism.448  
Recent scholarship has demonstrated clearly that the Atlantic Alliance, rather than being 
forced upon Western Europe by its colossal U.S. ally, resulted rather from sustained pressure on 
the U.S. government, punctuated by outbreaks of panic, from Western European governments 
terrified by the prospect of a Soviet invasion. The role of Georges Bidault in this regard cannot 
be overestimated.449 The negotiations that led to the peacetime military alliance, the first in U.S. 
445 Loth writes that, “More and more the commitment to a policy of the open door (for the Eastern countries to enter 
a European federation) lost its real content and they sought refuge in verbal self-justification...” Loth, Sozialismus 
und Internationalismus, 185.  
446 Detlef Rogosch, Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945-
1957 (Hamburg: Dr. R. Krämer, 1996), 77, 81. 
447 “A Rouen, devant un auditoire attentif, Guy Mollet,” La République de la Normandie, 28 February 1958, AGM 
44, Office universitaire de recherche socialiste (OURS). 
448 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 179-82. As Mastny writes about the Western reception of the news 
from Czechoslovakia: “[Stalin’s] subjugation of Czechoslovakia, despite all its efforts to oblige him, was plausibly, 
if wrongly, regarded abroad as the first act in the incipient westward expansion of his empire rather than the last act 
of its Sovietization.” Mastny, op cit., 43. 
449 See, for instance, Pierre Mélandri and Maurice Vaïsse, “France: From Powerlessness to the Search for 
Influence,” in Power in Europe?, 464-7. They write that Bidault overruled the Socialists in the cabinet, Jules Moch 
and Vincent Auriol, who in April 1948 argued for postponing the creation of an Atlantic Alliance until the French 
government had rebuilt its military. Auriol said on 9 April 1948 that, “Obviously there are some people in France 
who deliberately want to form two blocs and to align with the American bloc. I don’t believe that this would be 
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history, placed before the French Socialist Party, still a member of an allegedly “Third Force” 
governing coalition, the stark choice of whether to join a multilateral military alliance directed 
against the Soviet Union. While the party presented the Western European Union military 
alliance of early 1948 as a step towards its “Third Force” idea, the inclusion of the U.S. led 
significant voices within the party to protest against an abandonment of the “Third Force” 
foreign policy.450 Within the cabinet, however, Socialist Defense Minister Paul Ramadier 
supported Foreign Minister Schuman, who had meanwhile replaced Bidault, in his efforts to 
create the NATO system.451 In the shadow of the Berlin blockade, the SFIO quietly announced 
its support for NATO without lending it the effusive praise that it had reserved for the program 
for economic cooperation embodied by the Marshall Plan. In May 1950, the SFIO congress 
confirmed this position, passing a resolution condemning “an impossible neutrality” and 
affirming SFIO support for the “Atlantic Community.”452 Henceforth, for the SFIO, collective 
security meant in practice a participation in the Western military alliance. However, the SFIO 
made its support for the Atlantic Alliance conditional on the exclusion of West Germany and the 
refusal of German rearmament.453  
The SPD, for its part, rallied around the popular SPD mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter, as 
Western media highlighted his heroic effort to maintain morale in a city that debuted in the 
starring role that it would play during the decades of Cold War. Reuter’s call during the blockade 
for the founding of a West German state strengthened SPD resolve. As Dortmund mayor Fritz 
Henssler had the party’s ear on issues of coal and steel, Reuter’s views in Berlin could not help 
but affect SPD policies related to the Cold War, though he did not entertain as close relations as 
did Henssler with the SPD leadership. Nonetheless, the SPD sought to keep the door open for 
reunification and, under Schmid’s impetus, the emerging text from the constitutional assembly 
received the epithet “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz) rather than “Constitution” (Verfassung). The 
wise. Nor do I believe that we have to remain neutral...Western Europe must show the two antagonists a peaceful 
way of tackling all their problems.” 
450 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 178. 
451 Élisabeth du Réau, “Paul Ramadier et les prémisses du Pacte atlantique,” in Serge Berstein, ed., Paul Ramadier: 
la République et le socialisme: Actes du colloque (Éditions complexe, 1990), 299-301. 
452 Quilliot, op cit., 309. 
453 Lapie to the National Assembly, 25 July 1949, JO, 5237. 
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concept of the Bonn Republic as a provisional state was codified into West Germany’s founding 
charter.454  
Schumacher was unwilling at this stage to accept the division of Germany, but he was 
also determined that the western zones be granted equality within Western Europe’s program of 
economic reconstruction. Schumacher reconciled these objectives in the “magnet theory” that he 
expounded for German reunification.455 In this conception, which resembled in some respects the 
“policy of strength” thesis developed by Adenauer, West Germany, and by extension Western 
Europe, must raise its living standards through economic reform and make their societies so 
attractive in economic and cultural terms that East Germany and Eastern Europe would be 
inevitably drawn over the long term into the Western orbit. However, where Schumacher 
differed from Adenauer was that his “magnet theory,” while reliant on the Western militaries as a 
shield from overt Soviet aggression, provided no role for a German military contribution. 
Although Schumacher and SPD leaders in this period welcomed the creation of the Western 
European Union in early 1948 and NATO in 1949, party leaders wavered on the question of 
whether their social, economic and cultural affinity for the “western world” should lead them to 
accept a West German military contribution.456  
The SPD’s concept of collective security was malleable in the years 1948-1949, and 
served to mask a situation in which the leading figures in the SPD lacked a common position on 
the prospect of West German participation in defense structures. In light of the rapidly changing 
geopolitical situation, and the nebulous future of a West German state in the process of 
454 Reuter succeeded in defeating Schmid’s more “radical provisional state concept,” the language for which was 
then substantially weakened in the Basic Law draft. Petra Weber, Carlo Schmid 1896-1979: Eine Biographie 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1996), 329, 339-40. 
455 The magnet theory was almost universally accepted within the SPD leadership. Schmid and SPD Minister 
President of Niedersachsen Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf were the only significant figures to oppose it. Rogosch, op cit., 
99. See also Wilfried Loth, “German Conceptions of Europe during the Escalation of the East-West Conflict, 1945-
1949,” in Power in Europe?, 526. 
456 Buczylowski, op cit., 59. Nonetheless, until fall 1949 there were conflicting voices within the SPD on the 
question of whether it would countenance some sort of West German contribution to western defense. Ulrich 
Löwke, Die SPD und die Wehrfrage: 1949-1955 (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1976), 40-41. Rudolf Hrbek and 
Buczyclowski claim that the adoption of the magnet theory marked a turning point in which the SPD abandoned for 
a time hope in German reunification and rather accepted the incorporation of West Germany into the Western 
military bloc, an argument Rogosch rejects. In my view the “magnet theory” was an attempt by Schumacher to 
reconcile conflicting goals. While holding out hope for new initiatives leading to West German reunification, the 
SPD leadership was also pursuing the goal of ending occupation controls, such as the dismantlement plans, and of 
economic recovery within the OEEC. The “magnet theory” was a way to rhetorically pursue both goals at once. 
Buczyclowski, op cit., 42; Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europe : Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie 
zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1955) Bonn: Europa Union, 1972); Rogosch, 
op cit., 101.  
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formation, fixing the party’s position on defense for a state still without the basic attributes of 
sovereignty seemed unnecessary and potentially dangerous. The most coherent position was put 
forward by Carlo Schmid, who called for regional pacts for collective security under the auspices 
of the U.N.457 What then would the party’s response be to West German participation in the 
Atlantic Alliance, which was after all a regional pact outside the authority of the U.N.? SPD 
leaders’ statements from December 1948 to spring 1949, while Kurt Schumacher lay ill, seemed 
to leave the door open to some sort of West German military contribution.  
While SPD Vice Chairman Erich Ollenhauer appears to have considered a regional 
security pact with West German participation on the basis of equality to be acceptable for the 
SPD, Schmid and others envisioned collective security to mean a worldwide system, to which 
regional pacts must be subjected. In one of his first interviews after overcoming a grave illness, 
Schumacher called German remilitarization “completely indiskutabel.”458 Then on 20 April 
1949, he proclaimed that, “There is for us an absolute necessity for military neutrality.”459 As the 
public discussion of West German rearmament moved from the realm of fantasy to becoming an 
ever more concrete possibility over the course of 1949, the SPD position hardened into opposing 
even the discussion of West German rearmament, in large part due to domestic reasons discussed 
in further detail in the next section.460 When the newly inaugurated Christian Democratic 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer publicly raised the idea of a West German military contribution to 
NATO in late 1949, Ollenhauer responded that the SPD opposed raising the issue at all. The next 
month Schumacher told a press conference that, “It would be a good idea if all Germans kept 
their mouths shut” about West German rearmament.461  As for calls to match East Germany’s 
military-style police build-up, sixty-thousand officers strong by 1948, Schumacher replied, “Our 
policy must not be to rearm the Western police but to disarm the East German police.”462 The 
457 Drummond, op cit., 36. 
458 “Ein Interview mit Kurt Schumacher: Kampf in und um Deutschland,” Neuer Vorwärts, KS 35, AdsD.  
459 Löwke, op cit., 25. 
460 Myounghwan Lee writes that, “When one compares the resolutions of the Party Central Committee of December 
1948 with Ollenhauer’s statements from December 1949 one can see a change. While the SPD a year before did not 
reject rearmament of West Germany under all circumstances, the SPD-faction as the parliamentary opposition 
stressed its fundamental rejection of any form of German rearmament.” Myounghwan Lee, Die Reaktion der 
deutschen Sozialdemokratie auf den Koreakrieg 1950-1951 (Cologne, 1998), 31. 
461 “Journalisten Fragen—Dr. Schumacher antwortet,” Neuer Vorwärts, 13 January 1950, KS 50, AdsD. 
462 “Schumacher sprach vor 20 000 Berlinern,” Telegraf, 10 January 1950, KS 50, AdsD.  
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May 1950 party congress, on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War, made opposition to 
German rearmament official party policy.463 
Throughout the debate on West German rearmament in the 1950s differing conceptions 
of collective security, rooted in German Social Democratic traditions, became rhetorical swords 
against West German participation in the proposed European Defense Community and, later, 
against Germany’s incorporation into the WEU and NATO. At its party congress in Dortmund in 
1952, the SPD enshrined its support for “collective security” into its party platform, but refused 
to define precisely what type of collective security organization would receive SPD support.464 
Many scholars and contemporaries have pointed out the vagueness, even incoherence of the 
SPD’s concept of collective security in these years.465 Although at times an acute embarrassment 
to party leaders charged with countering Adenauer’s more easily explained “policy of strength,” 
the SPD’s policy did succeed in reconciling a range of competing views within the SPD on 
defense policy. It also maintained a flexibility in the party’s position so that it could adapt to 
what it hoped would be initiatives by the major powers to create an all-encompassing collective 
security system that would include within it a reunited Germany.  
Within this context the SPD in effect reasserted a traditional socialist view of collective 
security that precluded participation in military blocs. SPD statements against West German 
participation in western military alliances were at times absolute. Foreign policy expert Gerhard 
Lütkens said, for instance, “We must finally stop this misuse of words that was already present 
during the time of the League of Nations in which one seeks to misdirect public opinion to 
support collective security treaties, when one really means military alliances.”466 In February 
1952, Schmid said that, “I have spoken of a collective security system that includes the entirety 
of the world and not of one based on the power politics of the blocs.”467 What became the SPD’s 
standard line from 1952 to 1958, a line which conformed to an earlier socialist definition of 
collective security, was that a collective security treaty must bind together the opposing blocs. As 
Ollenhauer told an internal party meeting in October 1954, “Membership in a collective security 
463 SPD Parteitag 1950, AdsD. 
464 SPD Parteitag 1952, AdsD. 
465 Löwke, op cit., 130; Drummond, op cit., 97-99. 
466 Rede des Abgeordneten Dr. Gerhard Lütkens vor der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates 18.9.1954, 
1/HWAA22072, AdsD. Adolf Arndt called NATO a self-defense rather than collective security organization. 
Drummond, op cit., 98. 
467 8 February 1952 in Hans-Joachim Daul, ed., Carlo Schmid: Bundestags Reden (Bonn: AZ Studio, 1966), 109. 
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system must exclude a one-sided military alliance for a reunited Germany.”468 The SPD’s stance 
echoed within the EDC debate in France. A number of SFIO opponents raised this same 
dichotomy. René Naegelen, for instance, told the SFIO party congress that, “The EDC is for us a 
military coalition that has nothing to do with collective security,” while Jules Moch stated that 
the only form of collective security worth pursuing was international disarmament.469 
Nonetheless, a sizable portion of French leadership circles believed the Soviet threat in 
1949 to be far greater than that posed by the potential of a West German state. And 1949 was 
indeed a worrisome year for the Western allies. Despite their success in sustaining an airlift to 
counter the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the divisions available to the new NATO alliance on the 
European continent were hopelessly outmanned by Soviet forces. Fearful of a vengeful congress, 
the U.S. had rapidly drawn down its troop presence on the continent, confident that its nuclear 
arsenal would deter any Soviet attack.470 The perception of the danger changed in 1949, when 
the U.S. detected a successful Soviet atomic weapon explosion and the Chinese Communists 
forcefully ejected their nationalist rivals from mainland China. The most vocal advocates for a 
West German contribution to Western defense within French politics were perhaps 
understandably France’s leading generals, as well as traditionally anti-Communist politicians 
like Paul Reynaud.471 There were prominent proponents of German rearmament within the ruling 
parties as well, such as former Foreign Minister Georges Bidault.   
Despite the real perception of a Soviet threat, Dietmar Hüser’s thesis of a “double 
containment” policy toward the Soviet Union and West Germany is an apt description for 
generalizing about the motivations of French leadership.472 Such a “double containment” was a 
very difficult policy to sustain, as the next years showed, and there were certainly contradictions 
that emerged for French leaders from the tension between these two objectives. There was a 
468 PV PA KK, 16 October 1954, PV 1954, AdsD. 
469 Congrès national extraordinaire at Puteaux, 29-30 May 1954, OURS. Moch insisted on this point in a private 
interview as Defense Minister with NATO Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower in 1951. Jules Moch, 
Rencontres avec...Darlan, Eisenhower (Paris: Plon, 1968), 289.  
470 By the end of 1945, U.S. forces in Germany shrank to three armored divisions and seven infantry divisions, plus 
a few smaller forces. Large, op cit., 32. After the Korean War started, the Allies had only twelve divisions to counter 
the twenty-seven Soviet divisions in Germany and the seventy-five additional divisions that the Soviets had waiting 
in the wings. Drummond, op cit., 41. 
471 For the views of the French military on German rearmament, see Pierre Guillen, “Die französische Generalität, 
die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die EVG (1950-1954),” in Power in Europe?, 125-60. 
472 Dietmar Hüser, Frankreichs “doppelte Deutschlandpolitik”: Dynamik aus der Defensive—Planen, Entschieden, 
Umsetzen in gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen, inne- und weltpolitischen Krisensituation 1944-1950 (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
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range of voices within French leadership that placed differing degrees of emphasis on the 
German or Soviet threats. That the French leadership doggedly pursued these twin goals for at 
least six years nonetheless testifies to the continued fear the prospect of a militarized Germany 
conjured within France.  
In truth, only a minority of the French governing elite favored German rearmament in 
1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the ranks of those in favor swelled, but they 
remained a minority. Such sentiments were not exclusive to France: both the British and U.S. 
governments opposed German rearmament before the summer of 1950. In fact, it took nearly two 
months after the first shots in Korea for Truman to finally acquiesce to the Joint Chiefs’ demand 
that the U.S. government authorize West German rearmament.473 The cleavage over German 
rearmament before the Korean War was less between the Western nations than between their 
military staffs and political leaderships, with the foreign offices generally siding with the 
latter.474 It may be that the Western militaries were more “realistic” in asserting that West 
German rearmament was a prerequisite for a successful defense on the European continent, but 
the foreign offices and political leaders had other concerns as well. The largest of these was the 
nursing of a fragile West German democracy. While some observers believed that a “double 
containment” policy was impossible, many also believed the same of a rearmed West Germany 
democracy.  
473 On 16 June 1950, Truman responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that German rearmament “was not realistic 
under the current conditions.” It took until 6 July for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to abandon his opposition to 
German rearmament. Wilfried Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” in Josef 
Foschepoth, ed., Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Wiederstreit der Mächte, 1945-1952 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 338-344.  The Dutch government pushed most aggressively for a 
German contribution to defense efforts before the Korean War. Bert Zeeman, “Der Brüsseler Pakt und die 
Diskussion um eine westdeutschen Militärbeitrag,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschlands in die westliche Welt, 399-425.   
474 Creswell tells us that, “Throughout 1948, U.S. military officials had often raised the topic [of West German 
rearmament] with their French colleagues” and, “In autumn 1949, the U.S. Army General Staff devised a plan to 
incorporate German forces into NATO.” Creswell, op cit., 13-14. Guillen argues that, “Very early French generals 
were convinced that German rearmament was necessary for the strengthening of the defense potential of Western 
Europe against the USSR. (...) most French officers returned to their traditional anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
attitude. (...) There existed therefore an absolute opposition between the military officers and politicians.” Pierre 
Guillen, “Die französische Generalität, die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die EVG (1950-1954),” in Hans-
Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler, eds., Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, Stand und Probleme 
der Forschung (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1985),125-27. Poidevin, on the other hands, shows internal 
French diplomatic reports expressing concern about nationalist developments within German politics in 1951. He 
discusses as well the dilemma facing French negotiators, who wanted German troops to lift some of the financial 
burden off of France while trying to maintain a French military superiority vis-à-vis German troops. Raymond 
Poidevin, “Frankreich und das Problem der EVG: Nationale und internationale Einflüsse (Sommer 1951 bis Sommer 
1953),” in Ibid., 109-110. 
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 4.4 DANGER AT HOME AND ABROAD: THE KOREAN WAR, RIGHT-WING 
RADICALISM IN WEST GERMANY, AND GERMAN REARMAMENT,  
JUNE 1950—FALL 1951 
 
The North Korean government’s military invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 unleashed 
panic among the Western Allies. Nowhere was the fear more palpable than in Bonn, the capitol 
of the West German state. The postwar status and fate of Korea invited analogies with Germany. 
In an interview, Adenauer said that he was “completely convinced that Stalin plans the same 
procedure for West Germany as he did for Korea,” a claim that he repeats in his memoirs.475 As 
calls from East Germany for “people’s courts” to try the “treasonous” officials of West Germany 
resounded from East Berlin, West German deputies emptied the market of available cyanide 
tablets, made frantic efforts to get their names on a rumored U.S. list of West German “notables” 
to be rescued in the event of invasion and, led here by Chancellor Adenauer, stocked up on 
pistols to defend their homes and offices.476 Within and outside of Germany, there was 
widespread fear that the East German government would soon follow the example of its Korean 
counterpart.477  
Though more tempered, reactions were swift in France as well. Daniel Mayer presented a 
resolution to the Foreign Affairs Commission approving the U.N.’s intervention against North 
Korea. In it he lauded the intervention as “the first time that force has been placed in the service 
of the law by an international organization.”478 Jules Moch, now defense minister, pushed a 
reluctant Socialist Party to abandon its opposition to large increases in military spending. 
Henceforth, the SFIO authorized funds for France’s part in the arms race of 1950-1954.479 
However, there is little sign that anyone in the SFIO expected a Western replay of events on the 
Korean peninsula. U.S. diplomats also reacted with more caution, perhaps one can say with more 
475 Löwke, op cit., 56; cited in Georgette Elgey, La république des contradictions, 1951-1954 (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 
212. 
476 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 126-27; Large, op cit., 66-67.  
477 Jean-Paul Cahn, Gérard Schneilin, and Henri Ménudier, eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 1949-
1963 (Paris: Éditions du Temps, 1999), 16; Trachtenberg, op cit., 99.  
478 5 and 7 July 1950, Commission des affaires étrangères, C/13334, AN. 
479 Eric Méchoulan, Jules Moch et le socialisme 1893-1985 (Paris: Bruylant, 1999), 299-300. From 1950 to 1953, 
France increased its defense spending from 6.5% of GNP to 10.1%. Trachtenberg, op cit., 156. 
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“realism,” than their West German interlocutors. Neither U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
nor U.S. High Commissioner in West Germany John McCloy believed the German and Korean 
situations to be analogous; McCloy even thought the Korean War made an attack on West 
Germany less likely.480 
Perhaps most sober of all was Kurt Schumacher. The initial Social Democratic press 
reaction, in line with the general climate in West Germany, stressed the parallel between Korea 
and Germany. Reuter, the SPD mayor of Berlin, and other party leaders called for energetic 
action by the U.N. to stem the North Korean armies (a position it shared with the SFIO) and for 
the building of an Allied defense of West Germany.481 However, there was clearly a wait-and-
see approach from the SPD leadership, eager not to make hasty statements that could soon be 
overtaken by events. It became quickly evident, though, that the SPD gave little credence to fears 
of an East German invasion.482 In party meetings and then in public statements, Schumacher 
highlighted the presence of Allied forces in West Germany to debunk comparisons between 
Korea and Germany.483 Schumacher told an internal SPD meeting that, “The Russians for the 
moment and for the foreseeable future do not want a total war.”484  
To assess SFIO and SPD reactions to proposals for German rearmament, it is necessary 
to place their discussions on defense within the context of uncertainty that prevailed in the initial 
postwar period. Within German and French public debates, the rearmament question was tied up 
from the beginning with the polemics concerning the fate of German war criminals, as well as 
with the relative position of National Socialist and far-right movements in the young German 
democracy. De-Nazification measures, declared with much fanfare by the occupying powers in 
the wake of Nazi Germany’s defeat, were already being curtailed and their reach contested by the 
emerging German political elite, as well as by much of German society.485 Few within or outside 
of Germany thought that a democratic spirit reflected the belief of a concrete majority within the 
480 Large, op cit., 65-66.  
481 Myounghwan, op cit., 43-59. 
482 Buczylowski, op cit., 78; Myounghwan, op cit., 24-25. 
483 Anspracher Dr., Kurt Schumacher in einer Funktionärversammlung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands am 31. Juli 1950 um 17.30 Uhr, KS 52, AdsD; Myounghwan, op cit., 59-63. 
484 7 September 1950, PV 1950, AdsD.  
485 Wulf Kansteiner writes that, “the culture of [the 1950s in West Germany] is still most appropriately characterized 
as a period of communicative silence about the most troublesome aspects of the burden of the past, a silence that 
went hand-in-hand with noisy lamentations of German victimhood.” Wulf Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning 
the Memory Battle: The Legacy of Nazism, World War II and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 
in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fugo, eds., The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 108.  
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population at the time that West Germany went to the polls for its first federal elections in 
summer 1949. The threat of a reemergence of an organized and powerful National Socialist 
movement accompanied worries that West Germany would prove as ineffective or unwilling to 
suppress a radical right-wing opposition as had its Weimar predecessor just a few years before. It 
was in a context of international suspicion and doubt about political developments in Germany, 
particularly the rehabilitation of former Nazis and their integration into German politics and 
society, that the contours for the domestic political, international, and geopolitical struggles over 
German remilitarization emerged.486  
The present historiography on the origins of European integration and the early Cold War 
does not take adequate account of the impact of this brief resurgence of organized neo-Nazi 
activity in Germany. The same period that witnessed the first concrete European integration 
initiatives was also the heyday of neo-Nazism in the Bundesrepublik of the 1950s. That West 
German far-right movements received so much international attention meant that discussions of 
European unification in France and Germany were shaped to a large degree by fears of the 
prospects of neo-Nazism. 
In addition, SPD reticence on the issue of German rearmament from winter 1948 to 
spring 1950 closely follows public concern about the resurgence of far-right movements and an 
abandonment of the rhetoric and policies of the postwar de-Nazification program. In early 1949, 
when the party’s position on German rearmament remained undefined, SPD leaders downplayed 
the importance of the embryonic neo-Nazi movement.487 By fall 1949 and especially by spring 
486 A series of amnesty laws to free people from the burdens imposed by de-Nazification, the readmission of former 
Nazis into government administration, and a public campaign for the pardoning of German war criminals, the term 
now often being placed in quotation marks in major newspapers, demonstrate the reassertion of right-wing elements 
who had kept a prudent silence during the early years of occupation. Most ominous of all was the emergence of a 
political party of former Nazis, called the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), whose rhetoric, means of mobilization 
and organizational structure aped that of Hitler’s National Socialist Worker’s Party. The Socialist Reich Party has 
received relatively little attention by historians and is largely forgotten within West German public consciousness, 
overshadowed understandably by the stronger and more successful far-right Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (NPD) that emerged in the 1960s. For a few years, however, the SRP became the target of German, 
but especially international, opprobrium. The occupation authorities and German government, as well as the German 
Social Democratic Party, kept close tabs on its activities. The party was depicted internationally as evidence that the 
Nazi spirit remained alive in a substantial sector of German society, and the party therefore remained a major 
embarrassment for Adenauer’s government, until it became the first party banned in West Germany in 1952. See 
Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: the politics of amnesty and integration (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002); and Henning Hansen, Die Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP): Aufstieg und Scheitern einer 
rechtsextremen Partei (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2007).  
487 On 1 January 1949, Schumacher said in an interview that, “A truly concentrated nationalist or Nazi underground 
movement, supported with a clarity of conception and the strength of a leading personality, does not yet exist.” KS 
36, AdsD. Revealing a concern about the attention of foreigners and SPD assessments of the prospects of Neo-
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1950, as attendance at right-wing rallies grew and far-right parties began to register minor 
successes at the polls, it was clear that the SPD leadership now took the movement quite 
seriously.  
Even had they wanted to do so, German Social Democrats could not have divorced 
concerns about the reassertion of right-wing radicalism from their views on German rearmament. 
Soldiers’ groups and right-wing parties made an explicit connection between German 
rearmament and the elimination of punishments and restrictions enacted upon former Nazis. The 
policy of the Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei, SRP), the German Party, as well 
as of former leading German generals, was that any German military contribution to western 
defense was unacceptable until the Allies restored in principle “the honor” of the German soldier 
and granted clemency to all imprisoned German war criminals. At the same time that SPD 
opposition to German rearmament was raised to party principle, the SPD introduced into the 
Bundestag a “Law against the Enemies of Democracy,” calling for two to three year prison 
sentences for those who threatened force against the constitutional order, and at least three to six 
months for anyone who “render[ed] the republic’s flag contemptible or impugn[ed] the dignity of 
a group of people on the basis of race, belief, or Weltanschauung,” or those who insulted the 
memory of anti-Nazi resisters.488 
The power of these far-right movements waned over the next years after the Bonn 
government imposed repressive measures under pressure from Occupation Authorities and the 
SPD. West Germany’s constitutional court banned the neo-Nazi SRP, and the steadily improving 
economy took the bite out of much of the neo-Nazi critique of the young republic. Nonetheless, 
the SPD remained dubious about the prospects of a democratic future for West Germany. The 
German Social Democrats were less concerned about the existence of a neo-Nazi party than they 
were about the possibility of unreformed Nazis infiltrating right-wing political parties, and 
reasserting administrative power in the Foreign Office and the justice system.489 The SPD 
Nazism, Erich Ollenhauer said that same month, “In other countries the thesis is laid out, and even before the 
promulgation of the Ruhr Statute, that the Germans are nationalist once again...There can be no talk of Germans 
again being nationalist. Of course there are nationalists in Germany, nobody knows that better than we.” Fraktion 
Parlamentarischen Rat, Ministerpräsidenten, Minister Länderregierungen, PV PA-Sitzung, 22 January 1949, EO 73, 
AdsD. 
488 For the text of this bill see Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen die Feinde der Demokratie, Antrag der Fraktion der 
SPD Drucksache Nr. 563, 15 February 1950, Hermann Brill 330, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BaK).  
489 Schumacher wrote that, “We must now be clear that under such power distribution the police as an institution is 
not a reliable factor, but rather is a factor of insecurity, the justice system though, is a reliable factor against us.” 
[emphasis in original]. Alfred Joachim Fischer, “Soll wieder aufgerüstet werden? Fünf fuhrendene Politiker der 
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leadership saw the hand of political reaction gaining strength in the early years of the republic. 
The party’s opposition to a centralized police force in 1949-50 and then its obstinate refusal to 
have this force placed under the direction of the Chancellor arose from a fear that a national 
police was as likely to be used against SPD members and trade unionists as it was to be used 
against subversion from the East. The battle against a centralized police was a proxy fight in the 
SPD’s war against German rearmament: it would not be an exaggeration to say that many 
engaged SPD members feared a remilitarization of West Germany more than a hypothetical 
attack from Soviet Russia that party leaders considered to be implausible. Carlo Schmid summed 
up well the prevailing attitude when he rejected German rearmament at the Council of Europe in 
August 1950, stating that, “In a strong state the Wehrmacht is a servant of the government—in a 
weak state it is its master. West Germany is not yet a very strong state and we have not forgotten 
the role that certain generals played during the Weimar era...”490 The trajectory of the Weimar 
Republic became the lens through which SPD leaders analyzed political developments in West 
Germany.491  
The greatest ferment against the idea of German rearmament outside of Germany took 
place within France.492 The August 1949 elections and the formation of a center-right 
government caused consternation among French Socialists. It was the party’s expert on German 
affairs, Salomon Grumbach, a close follower of the German press, who sounded the alarm about 
the trajectory of German democracy between 1950 and 1952.493 The SFIO narrative of events in 
Germany from 1950 to 1952 closely corresponded to that put forth by the SPD: a Christian 
Bundesrepublik geben Antwort,” Welt am Sonntag, 6 August 1950,  KS 52, AdsD. Menzel estimated that 90-95% of 
administrative posts were occupied by former Nazi party members. 24 and 25 November 1949, Bundestag, 
Verhandlungen, 459. See also Ollenhauer’s personal notes, for instance Chefredaktuer-Konferenz am 30.11.52, 
Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 85, AdsD. SPD Hermann Brill reports on his work in the committee investigating the 
presence of Nazis in the Foreign Office in Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als Bundesabgeordneter in der 
Herbstsessions 1952, 20 January 1953, Brill 1, BaK.  
490 Carlo Schmid’s speech to the Council of Europe, 10 August 1950, SPD-PV 1950, AdsD.  
491 One of many examples is Schumacher’s article in Rheinsiche-Zeitung from 6 February 1950 entitled “About 
Neo-Fascism. Schumacher: the great sin of the Weimar Republic repeats itself,” KS 50, AdsD.  
492 Non-French Western diplomats and journalists in general also harbored deep suspicions and concerns about the 
potential impact of German rearmament on democratic institutions and values in West Germany. The U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of German Affairs argued that rearmament was “premature” because more time was necessary 
in order “to develop democratic tendencies on the part of the German people.” Acheson thought that, “strong 
centralized German police forces” would constitute an “inherent danger to democracy.” U.S. High Commissioner 
John McCloy wrote in a private letter that rearmament “would mean the abandonment of all serious efforts to 
nurture the German state into a liberal constructive element in Europe.” Schwarz, op cit., 122-23.  
493 See the series of Le Populaire articles Grumbach wrote against German rearmament in 1950-52, Daniel Mayer 1 
MA 13.6, Archiv d’histoire contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-Po. 
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Democratic Party imbued with a reactionary economic and cultural policy, allied with German 
nationalists and Nazi-sympathizers (the liberal and German parties), were providing space for 
neo-Nazis, militarist generals and secret right-wing societies to reclaim much of the influence 
war and occupation had torn away from them.  
This analysis, widespread in the SFIO press and within internal SFIO discussions, was 
the starting point in discussions on German rearmament for all but the most anti-Soviet of SFIO 
deputies.494 Citations from German newspapers, reports of the accumulating strength of the 
secret soldiers’ society known as the Bruderschaft, the Socialist Reich Party, and incendiary 
statements by German politicians all achieved a prominent place in SFIO discourse on German 
policy. Here SFIO leaders felt themselves in a community of spirit with their SPD comrades, 
united in opposition to Adenauer’s right-wing brand of Christian democracy.495 The SFIO and 
SPD simply did not trust Adenauer at this time to build a democratized German army. Even had 
Adenauer wanted to do so, which the two leaderships doubted, the cultural and political climate 
in West Germany remained such that German rearmament seemed bound to overwhelm the 
young democracy.  
Although French Socialists were largely united in 1950 around their conception of 
Adenauer’s government and fears of the consequences of German rearmament, by 1953 a fault-
line ran down the middle of the French Socialist Party. The party leadership around Guy Mollet 
had taken up Léon Blum’s and André Philip’s thesis that German contingents supervised and 
controlled by a European institution could muzzle the forces of militarist reaction and allow for a 
constructive contribution of West German forces for Western Europe’s defense.496 Support for 
this position within the party in 1953 conformed almost exactly to whether one’s conception of 
Adenauer and German democracy still conformed to the image that prevailed in 1950. While 
pro-EDC leaders like party leader Guy Mollet and Jean Le Bail spoke with confidence and 
494 Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee on 5 April 1950 that, “As Socialists we do not have the right to accept 
[West German] rearmament: it is a danger for [German] Social Democracy and for all democrats. Besides, I do not 
yet believe in democracy in Germany.” Mollet reiterated his opposition to the Directing Committee on 26 July 1950, 
a month after the Korean War had started. Comité directeur (CD), OURS. 
495 Grumbach told the Directing Committee on 17 January 1951 that, “Re-establishing the sovereignty of a Germany 
in which [the power of] Social Democracy is not at least solidified seems dreadful...The large industrialists of 
yesterday have their protector in Adenauer and in the German administration there is a Nazi infiltration that Social 
Democracy denounces,” CD, OURS.  
496 Léon Blum, “L’armement de l’Allemagne,” 1 December 1949 in L’Oeuvre de Léon Blum, 305-07. André Philip 
called for “the creation of a European army financed by a European fund fed by European taxes.” Loth, Sozialismus 
und Internationalismus, 281. 
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optimism about Adenauer’s policies and the results of the 1953 election, in which voters 
abandoned far-right parties for the CDU, opponents of the EDC portrayed Adenauer’s 
government in terms that aligned often verbatim with those of the SPD.497 The SFIO minority 
cloaked their arguments with internationalism by quoting at length from the SPD, German trade 
unionists and other West German opponents of rearmament, while also pointing to statistics 
confirming the prevalence of former Nazi officials in Bonn’s burgeoning bureaucracy.498 Anti-
EDC SFIO deputies saw signs of positive democratic currents within German politics but, in 
their view, these currents lay not in government, but rather flowed through the youth 
organizations, unions and those churches that were struggling against rearmament.499 For these 
French Socialists, Adenauer and West Germany could not be trusted with an army, whether 
under a European flag or not.  
In the wake of the invasion of South Korea, Adenauer publicly called for the Allies to 
permit the formation of a 150,000-person West German defense force, a proposal he linked in 
the next weeks to a demand that the Allies lift the Occupation Statute and restore full West 
German sovereignty. Drummond writes that, “More than anyone else Kurt Schumacher was 
responsible for the party’s intransigent opposition in the rearmament debate.”500 This claim 
needs to be revised. In order to understand the defense policy that Schumacher set for the SPD in 
summer to fall 1950, his actions must be placed in a wider context. Schumacher operated within 
a set of internal party constraints that encouraged him to be more rather than less intransigent on 
the issue of German rearmament. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the German public 
497 Le Bail said at the Congrès national extraordinaire, 29-30 May 1954, that, “For the first time in two centuries 
Germany is in the process of reconstituting itself around a different tradition, which gave rise to smiles just before, 
the Rhenish tradition, the liberal tradition, the German democratic tradition, the Western tradition, in a word.” 
OURS. Mayer, for his part, called Adenauer “the chief of German reaction” in internal SFIO discussions. CD, 16 
June 1954, OURS. Marceau Pivert said, “I disapprove of the illusion that by integrating Adenauer’s Germany we 
prevent the renaissance of Nazism and German nationalism.” CD, 4 March 1953, OURS.  
498 Grumbach and Ramadier both cited statistics about the presence of former Nazi members among the staff of the 
new German Foreign Office at the May 23 1952 party congress, as did Mayer at the May 1954 party congress. 
Mayer asked the Directing Committee, “If we are faithful to proletarian internationalism, is it necessary to take the 
part of German Social Democracy’s class enemies?” CD, 16 June 1954, OURS. See also Grumbach’s comments to 
the Directing Committee’s International Affairs Bureau, 29 January 1952, AGM 111, OURS.  
499 See, for instance, Mayer’s statement to the National Assembly, 13 February 1952, JO, 697. This is not to deny 
that there were French Socialists who saw the entire German body politics as hopelessly infested for the moment 
with the inheritance of militarism and Nazism. This was the view, for instance of French President and Socialist 
Vincent Auriol, but he represented a distinct minority view in the SFIO.  
500 Drummond, op cit., 91. In fairness, Drummond presents information that supports the revision outlined above. 
He writes that, “A study of the rearmament debate, however, shows that, whatever may have developed in the 
1960s, during the previous decade the SPD leaders responded to pressure from the rank and file; in fact, they had to 
accept a number of compromise resolutions before formulating a new policy position.” Drummond, op cit., 5. 
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was war-weary and suspicion towards the military was the highest in perhaps all of modern 
German history. Such sentiments were strongest within segments of the population with a history 
of anti-militarism or pacifism, that is, within the Social Democratic and Communist voting base. 
In addition, rearmament was unpopular with the German public taken as a whole in this period 
and one could expect the SPD to also oppose German rearmament for tactical purposes. As the 
public increasingly turned against rearmament, support for the SPD rose. In 1951, the SPD 
became the most popular party in Germany, with 36-38% support in several polls, a seven to 
nine point climb over its results in the 1949 election.501 Running often on explicitly pacifist or 
non-engagement platforms, SPD regional leaders scored a series of electoral successes in the fall 
of 1950.502 
More important was the clear expectation of the SPD rank-and-file that its leadership 
would vigorously resist German rearmament. Polling data, as well as the denunciatory climate of 
the 1954 and 1956 party congresses, demonstrate that the SPD base was more determined than 
its leadership to prevent German rearmament. When the SPD leadership sought approval at the 
1954 SPD congress for a constructive stance in parliamentary discussions about the shape of a 
future German army, while still maintaining its opposition in principle to German rearmament, 
21 of the 34 speakers on the subject argued against the leadership. Anti-militarist statements 
elicited the loudest applause. The intransigence of the SPD base does not appear to have 
diminished over time. As late as 1956, 80% of SPD respondents expressed their belief that the 
new German army would soon return to its past attitude.503  
In this context, it is a testament to Schumacher’s strength within the party that he was 
able to propound a “conditional yes” to German rearmament. Schumacher’s position, developed 
501 A November 1950 poll revealed that 40% of West Germans were in favor of German rearmament and 45% 
opposed. Another poll in December 1950, by which time the Korean War had shifted against the North Koreans, 
showed 70% of West Germans opposed German rearmament. A different poll showed 45% in fall 1950 and 50% in 
1951 opposed to rearmament, with support hovering between 22 and 26%. Those who declared themselves in favor 
of Adenauer’s policy shrank from 31 to 24% by fall 1950 and those opposed climbed from 24 to 32%, rising further 
to 39% by mid-1951. Edinger, op cit., 229-30; Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” 
in Foschepoth, ed., 349; Creswell, op cit., 36. 
502 In November 1950 the SPD benefitted from the CDU share of the vote falling from 31 to 19% in Hessen, with 
similar results in Baden-Württemberg. In Bavaria the CSU vote fell from 52 to 27%. Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die 
Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” in Foschepoth, ed., 352.  
503 Drummond writes that, “What most impressed observers in Berlin were the restrictions placed on the leadership” 
and “Rearmament sparked greater emotional resistance from the rank and file than did any other single issue.” The 
Munich Congress was a repeat of Berlin, with the SPD leadership pleading with its delegates to not allow the party’s 
anti-militarism to interfere with the SPD’s efforts to shape a German military the construction of which they could 
no longer prevent. Drummond, op cit., 127, 148, 280, 287. 
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at length in a press conference on 23 August 1950, sought to strike a synthesis between the 
party’s anti-militarism and the leadership’s goal of overcoming its Weimar legacy by having 
Social Democracy represent German national claims. First, for Schumacher, the Occupation 
Statute must end so as to ensure equality among the Western defenders. Further, aware of rumors 
that U.S. defense plans called for a withdrawal in the first phase to the Pyrenees and Britain, 
while the French were insisting on a defense along the Rhine, Schumacher demanded an 
“equality of risk,” which meant, for West Germany, an “offensive defense” that would push the 
front not only east of the Bundesrepublik, but east of East Germany as well, between the 
Weichsel and Njemen rivers, i.e., into Poland.504 Schumacher’s announcement triggered a war of 
words with SFIO Defense Minister Jules Moch, who condemned Schumacher for proposing such 
an aggressive policy. Schumacher countered that Moch would have Germans act as a shield for 
France because Moch envisioned that the main fighting of a ground war would occur between 
the Rhine and Elbe rivers.505  
Regardless of his verbal saber-rattling with Moch, Schumacher’s position in fall 1950 
was only acceptable to his party because it still refused the setting up of a German military under 
the current conditions.506 Only once the Allies, by which Schumacher meant primarily the 
United States, agreed to station sufficient troops in West Germany to allow a plausible defense of 
German borders from Soviet troops would the SPD consider a German defense contribution. 
Schumacher’s thesis was in line with the position of many former German generals, with whom 
Schumacher and the German government had been engaged in conversation. Hence 
Schumacher’s position allowed the party to court different constituencies. The former German 
generals, involved in secret defense planning with the U.S. and Bonn authorities, were quite 
impressed with Schumacher’s range of knowledge and interest in military affairs.507 He was 
504 Pamphlet from press conference, 23 August 1950, “Dr. Kurt Schumacher. Die deutsche Sicherheit: Die 
Sozialdemokratie zur Verteidigung Deutschlands,” KS 52, AdsD. Schumacher was explicit when speaking with the 
Central Committee a year later: “Train lines and air-landings in Poland must be destroyed in the first hours [of any 
war]...” Parteivorstand, 2-8 September 1951, PV 1951, AdsD.  
505 Dr. Kurt Schumachers Referat der gemeinsamen Tagung der SPD-Körperschaften am 17. September 1950 in 
Stuttgart, KS 52, AdsD. 
506 “Fritz Sternberg interviews Kurt Schumacher,” 9 September 1950. Schumacher told a Swiss paper on 25 
September 1950 that under current conditions the SPD remained opposed to West German entry into NATO. “SPD 
gegen Mitgliedschaft im Atlantikpakt,” 7 October 1950, KS 53, AdsD.  
507 The German generals were also eager to see the envisioned front moved eastward. For background on the 
German generals’ influence on the West German government, see Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West 
German Society and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003); and Manfred 
Meserschmidt, Christian Greiner and Nortbet Wiggershaus, “West Germany’s Strategic Position and her Role in 
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simultaneously satisfying the demands of the SPD’s anti-militarist base and securing a working 
relationship with the authorities who might one day lead a reconstructed German military. His 
position represented a tenuous intra-party compromise. 
 
4.5 GERMAN REARMAMENT ON THE WESTERN AGENDA:  
THE SEPTEMBER 1950 NEW YORK SUMMIT AND THE PLEVEN PLAN 
 
In September 1950, the U.S. government summoned its Allies to a conference in New York with 
the intention of securing their public support for a German contribution to Western defense. To 
sweeten this bitter pill, the U.S. offered to grant teeth to the skeletal NATO defense system on 
the continent: the U.S. would agree to appoint a Supreme Commander for NATO defense, 
station him in Paris, and accelerate its financial and manpower commitment to the continent. 
There is disagreement among historians about how willing Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
was to accept German rearmament at the time.508 Internal French sources seem to support the 
view that Schuman was caught off guard by the U.S. demand. Historian Michael Creswell argues 
that Schuman agreed to the principle of German rearmament as long as it was kept secret, but he 
does not examine internal French sources. Regardless of whether Schuman did in fact personally 
support German rearmament in September 1950, he was acutely aware that the government’s 
survival was dependent on the continued participation of the SFIO, which remained publicly 
hostile to the idea.509 Under these conditions, Schuman had little choice but to consult with 
Defense Minister Moch, who then travelled to represent the French government in New York.  
Defense Policy as seen by the German Military, 1945-1959,” in Power in Europe?, 354-61. For SPD discussions 
with the generals in summer and fall 1950, see Drummond, op cit., 60-63; Large, op cit., 73-4; Peter Merseburger, 
Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 480-4; 
and Weber, op cit., 442-443. 
508 Raymond Poidevin, Schuman’s biographer, argues that Schuman was firmly against German rearmament in 
September 1950 and tried as far as possible to prevent it. Raymond Poidevin, “Die europapolitischen Initiativen 
Frankreichs des Jahres 1950—aus einer Zwangslage geboren?,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG, 257-262. Wall 
writes that, “Schuman remained obstinately against any idea of German rearmament.” Wall, op cit., 198. Large 
writes that, “Schuman, for his part, refused to budge from France’s categorical rejection of any German 
rearmament.” Large, op cit., 85. Creswell argues that, “The records of these meetings paint a different picture. These 
documents show that Schuman did not object to rearming Germany. Rather, his primary concern was to keep the 
idea secret” and that “Although wanting to set limits on the growth of German power and independence, Schuman 
accepted the need for Germany to contribute to Western defense.” Creswell, op cit., 27.  
509 The U.S. government was also aware of the vital need to gain SFIO consent for German rearmament. Creswell 
writes that, “Acheson knew that Schuman was as forthcoming as he could be on the question of German 
rearmament. The secretary of state informed President Truman that French officials indicated that domestic politics 
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Much has been made of Jules Moch’s intransigence at the New York summit. No doubt 
Moch was among the most suspicious of French socialists about developments across the Rhine. 
The loss of his son at the hands of the Gestapo during the Second World War, and the presence 
of his wife, who is reported to have hovered by his side dressed in black during the New York 
summit meetings, provided the lens through which U.S. diplomats understood Moch’s obstinacy 
in refusing German rearmament. Though his tone was more strident than that to which diplomats 
tend to be accustomed, Moch was faithfully transmitting the views of both the SFIO and the 
French government.510 The Council of Ministers had met before his departure and empowered 
him to resist demands for German rearmament. At the New York summit, Moch proposed a 
financial or economic contribution of West Germany for Western defense, a proposal that 
conformed precisely with the view of SFIO leader Guy Mollet.511 Due to Moch’s position, an 
agreement among the Allies proved impossible and the summit adjourned without agreement.512  
With the future of the Atlantic Alliance seeming to be in jeopardy, French leaders knew 
that they had to craft a constructive counter-proposal or risk strengthening isolationist currents in 
U.S. politics or, perhaps even worse, risk witnessing the reconstruction of a German military 
without their involvement.513 Prime Minister René Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman also 
were aware that any French proposal must receive the support of the SFIO if it were to achieve a 
majority in the Assembly.514 In this critical hour, Monnet intervened to try an encore of the 
presented the major obstacle to agreement. The French Socialist Party (SFIO), which steadfastly opposed the 
rearming of Germany, controlled 99 of 622 seats in France’s parliament.” Creswell, op cit., 28. 
510 Moch reports that the Council of Ministers granted him “carte blanche” to oppose German rearmament. Jules 
Moch, Une si longue vie (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976), 411-12. When Bevin cut off Moch’s objection to German 
rearmament, telling him that France would be “alone” in its position, Moch thundered back that, “Then France will 
be alone yet again, like in 1870, 1914 and 1939.” Elgey, La république des illusions, 461.  
511 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 283. Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee on 26 July 1950 that, 
“I am deeply opposed to the remilitarization of Germany. To deny that is to truly ignore the reality of the German 
situation because a rearmed Germany will be at the service of whoever promises it unity. On the other hand, I do 
agree that Germany should be obliged to collaborate under a certain economic form to the defense of Europe.” CD, 
26 July 1950, OURS. 
512 Moch reports that under his pressure the communiqué issued from the summit read that the Allies favored “stages 
towards a more important participation of Germany in the preparation of European defense” rather than “stages 
towards the realization of the future objective, the creation of German units destined to serve within integrated 
forces for the defense of Europe.” Moch, Une si longue vie, 417. 
513 Hitchcock argues that at this time, “a divisive and unproductive debate over Germany’s contribution to European 
defense nearly destroyed the still fragile Western alliance.” Hitchcock, op cit., 133. 
514 Schuman met with his Belgian counterpart Paul van Zeeland in October and explained that the domestic political 
situation required him to gain the support of the SFIO before proposing any plan for Western defense. Creswell, op 
cit., 30-31. Pleven later recalled that, “Our discussions on the plan that carries my name took place with those whose 
adhesions were absolutely necessary (Jules Moch, Guy Mollet, the Socialist ministers), whom it was necessary to 
convince not because the plan was European, but because it proposed to resolve the problem of German 
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magic of his spring Schuman Plan proposal. Monnet presented a proposal for a European Army 
to Pleven, who quickly welcomed the idea. Over several weeks in October, the proposal went 
through dozens of drafts. Moch and Mollet were closely involved in the hasty effort to put 
together a proposal before a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers in late October. The final 
version of the plan called for German units of the smallest possible number under a European 
defense minister. There was to be a common budget and the community was to be subordinated 
to a European Parliament, which must come into existence before the training of any German 
troops.515  
On October 23, the French cabinet met to vote on what was now called the Pleven Plan. 
Just three days earlier at an international Socialist meeting, Mollet had praised the SPD for its 
opposition to German rearmament and called for a non-military German contribution to Western 
defense.516 It was clear in the French cabinet meeting that the Socialist ministers remained 
uneasy with the proposal. At one moment Mollet began sobbing during the tense discussion.517 
Finally the cabinet unanimously approved the proposal with the support of its Socialist ministers.  
Almost nobody liked the Pleven Plan.518 Paradoxically, the French Assembly’s approval 
of the Pleven Plan was motivated largely by opposition to German rearmament. Mayer’s speech 
laying out the SFIO’s decision to vote in favor is replete with dire warnings of the threat a 
recreation of a German military posed to German democracy and to Germany’s neighbors.519 
Moch’s speech made clear that the SFIO was only accepting the Pleven Plan because of the U.S. 
participation in the defense of Europe.” Philippe Vial, “De la surenchère atlantiste à l’option européenne: Monnet et 
les problèmes du réarmement occidental durant l’été 1950,” in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, Jean Monnet, 
L’Europe et les chemins de la paix: Actes du Colloque de Paris du 29 au 31 mai 1997 (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1999), 338-339.  
515 Large, op cit., 92-95. 
516 Mollet: “SFIO [is] against German rearmament. Lots of reasons...Great satisfaction over the SPD’s refusal of 
German rearmament...Socialist point of view:...must bring sacrifices, German contribution necessary, need not be 
military.” Stichwort-Protokoll der COMISCO-Sitzung in Paris vom 21./22./10.1950, 2/PVBT1, AdsD.  
517 Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 87-88. 
518 British representatives were nearly contemptuous in their attitude towards the Pleven Plan in a meeting of the 
NATO defense ministers in late October. U.S. Defense Minister George Marshall and Winston Churchill, who had 
proposed a European army in August 1950 to the Council of Europe, both also opposed the plan. Acheson called the 
plan “hopeless.” Adenauer’s initial reaction to the plan was “completely negative.” Although McCloy considered 
the plan unacceptable in its current form, he defended its basic principle and called on Adenauer to be mild in any 
public criticism of the plan. Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 193; Creswell, op cit., 142-
5; Large, op cit., 94; Trachtenberg, op cit., 110, 116-7; Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer und die 
deutsche Europapolitik: Konvergenz und Dissonanzen (1950-1957),” in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Interessen verbinden: 
Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 92-93. 
519 25 October 1950, JO, 7191-7195. 
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promise to reinforce its military presence in Europe.520 At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting 
on 26 October, Moch insisted that German units not exceed 1,000 men, a figure his counterparts 
thought to be ludicrous.521 France’s allies considered the Pleven Plan to be militarily impossible, 
but that may well have been the only reason it was able gain Socialist support and pass the 
French Assembly. Moch later wrote that his key objective at this stage was to delay German 
rearmament for as long as he could, ideally permanently.522   
The NATO leaders rejected the Pleven Plan, but the fear of world war in November 1950 
resulting from the Chinese government’s intervention in the Korean War led to an eagerness by 
all to compromise. Charles Spofford, representing the U.S. at the NATO talks, proposed 
integrating German “combat teams” of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers into a European Army that would 
fall within the NATO structure. German troops would not exceed 20% of the total force and 
West Germany would still be prohibited from producing heavy armament.523 The French cabinet 
met in a marathon session on 6 December to consider the new U.S. plan. With a mixture of 
despair and futility, Mollet pleaded with his colleagues to reject the proposal. The morning 
meeting adjourned so that Mollet could consult with the SFIO Directing Committee. 
At this meeting, Moch and Mollet made clear to their comrades that a rejection of the 
U.S. offer would mean a rupture in the Atlantic Alliance and a risk that the U.S. would refuse to 
set up a defense on the Rhine, which would leave France open to Soviet invasion.524 At this 
point, the SFIO remained largely united in its view. Grumbach, soon to become an ardent 
opponent of German rearmament, said at the meeting that, “At this moment, taking into account 
the collapse of the U.N.’s authority in Korea, I believe that a rupture with the Americans would 
be worse than German rearmament.” He called on Mollet to “make a last sacrifice for the party 
and for France.” Mayer lamented a “sensation of disarray and humiliation.” France, he said, “is a 
520 26 October 1950, JO, 7249. At the Council of Europe on 24 November 1950 Mollet talked of “the fear of a return 
of the U.S. to a traditional isolationist policy, leaving Europe abandoned to itself before the Soviet menace.” Pascal 
Delwit, Les Partis socialistes et l’intégration européenne: France, Grande-Bretagne, Belgique (Brussels: Éditions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles), 65-66.  
521 For Moch’s account of his involvement in Allied meetings from October to December 1950, see Jules Moch, 
Rencontres avec..., 217-19. 
522 Moch, Une si longue vie, 426.  
523 Large, op cit., 95-97; Wall, op cit., 200-04. 
524 The 1948 U.S. military plans for a Soviet invasion, entitled “HALFMOON” and, its 1949 replacement, 
“OFFTACKLE,” envisioned an Allied withdrawal to the Pyrenees and to Great Britain, to be followed by a re-
conquest of Western Europe. It was a goal of the SPD, the SFIO, and their governments to pressure the U.S. to 
revise these plans and defend their nations from invasion. See Wolfgang Krieger, “Die Ursprünge der langfristigen 
Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europe 1945-1951,” and Bert Zeeman, “Der Brüsseler Pakt und die 
Diskussion um einen westdeutschen Militärbeitrag,” in Power in Europe?, 382, 408-418. 
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small country and the Socialist Party is not influencing events.” With two negative votes and 
Mollet’s abstention, the committee voted to support the government.525 Mollet returned to the 
cabinet meeting to report the decision to vote in favor of the compromise. For his part, though, 
Mollet insisted he would rather resign than agree to German rearmament. It was only under the 
forceful pressure of President Vincent Auriol, himself a Socialist opposed to any German 
military contribution, that Mollet reneged on his resignation and remained in the cabinet.526 It 
was with deep reluctance that the SFIO backed the French government at this crucial hour. On 
19 December, the NATO Council approved the Spofford Plan and set up a parallel set of 
negotiations: one to take place under the auspices of the Pleven Plan for a European army, and 
the other under the Spofford Plan, to come into effect if the Pleven Plan negotiations failed. 
While Schumacher welcomed the news of a reinforcement of the U.S. military presence 
resulting from the New York summit, he rejected outright the idea of West Germany joining 
NATO.527 He considered the Pleven Plan to be a dangerous plot to achieve French hegemony 
over the new German republic at the cost of an effective defense, a view Adenauer also 
expressed in private.528 With words that could not but offend the French public and its leaders, 
Schumacher cast doubt on the French pretension to be a great power and spoke with barely 
concealed contempt of the impotence of the French military to counter the Soviet threat. A 
German-French-Italian military community would be an “alliance of the disabled.”529 
Schumacher looked to Britain and the U.S. to defend West Germany, rejecting what he 
considered to be a French-crafted scheme to use an intentionally feeble West German military as 
a shield behind which a French military would organize a national, rather than international, 
defense.530  
 
525 CD, 6 December 1950, OURS. 
526 Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 359-62. 
527 “SPD gegen Mitgliedschaft im Atlantikpakt,” 7 Oktober 1950, KS 53, AdsD.  
528 Adenauer told President Heuss on 2 March 1951 that, “The Pleven-Plan...is nothing more than a shameless 
attempt to reproduce French hegemony in Europe.” Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer und die 
deutsche Europapolitik: Konvergenz und Dissonanzen (1950-1957),” in Wilkens, ed., Interessen verbinden, 95. 
Auszug aus Rede und Schlusswort Dr. Schumacher in der Sitzung der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion von 
Mittwoch, den 1. November 1950, KS 53, AdsD.  
529 “Was man dem Volke verschweigt: Dr. Schumacher vor der sozialdemokratischen Presse,” Neuer Vorwärts, 7 
December 1951, KS 57, AdsD. 
530 “Schumacher erklärte: Ein Interview unseres Korrespondenten mit dem Führer der sozialdemokratischen 
Opposition von Ernst Leiser,” Overseas News Agency, 1950, KS 53, AdsD.  
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4.6 SOCIALIST SCRAMBLING: SFIO AND SPD RESPONSES TO THE 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY,  
1951—FEBRUARY 1952 
 
The SPD defense policy of 1951 was a hodgepodge of often conflicting demands designed to 
bring into harmony diverse party goals and to maintain party unity. In several Central Committee 
meetings, SPD regional leaders expressed confusion as to what the party’s defense policy was: 
did the party’s insistence that “equality” for a West German military including its participation in 
the highest organs of Atlantic defense mean that the party now supported West Germany’s 
inclusion into NATO?531 If the party leadership’s main criticism was that a German military 
would be discriminated against within a European army, were there any core principles that 
divided Schumacher from Adenauer on military issues?532 Time and again the party leadership 
condemned pacifist and neutralist elements in West German society, but local and regional SPD 
politicians continued to often campaign on explicitly anti-military platforms, a position with 
which the SPD’s second-in-command, Erich Ollenahuer, seemed to sympathize. It was not at all 
clear that, if the SPD won the next elections, Schumacher would have been able to convince the 
SPD to support his design for German rearmament.  
In fact, that the SPD remained in opposition at the federal level may be the only reason 
the SPD managed to avoid the searing divisions that were soon to afflict its fraternal party in 
France. In condemning Adenauer’s government, various SPD officials and candidates could 
stress that aspect of SPD policy that most conformed to their own views or to their perception of 
what their constituents wanted to hear. While at the local level, SPD organizations tended to 
531 French Socialist Lapie recalls in his memoirs that at the Council of Europe meeting in December 1950, “The 
German Socialists did not hide from us the fact that they would not admit German rearmament except on the 
condition of entering NATO and being assured that they would be entirely defended.” Lapie, op cit., 410. At the 26-
27 January 1951 foreign ministers conference, the West German government declared that it would not be willing to 
participate in the Pleven Plan unless West Germany was also brought into NATO and this demand was made public 
on 28 January. The French government immediately rejected this demand. Creswell, op cit., 75-76.  
532 At a Central Committee meeting on 20-21 January 1951, Henssler said, “The impression is dominating that the 
SPD represents a ‘jein’ [yes and no] stand point. The conditional No is often depicted as an absolute No. For 
political reasons the Central Committee must put forth a clear position.” Later the protocol reads, “[Fritz] Steinhoff 
confirmed Henssler’s declaration about the misinterpretation of the party line on the remilitarization question.” 
Confusion still marked the policy a year later, with one deputy telling the SPD faction that he was “not clear whether 
we fundamentally oppose a military contribution.” SPD-PV 1951; SPD-Faction, 15 January 1952, AdsD. When 
asked by a university student where the true difference between the German government and SPD policy on German 
rearmament lay, Carlo Schmid was unable to respond more than pointing vaguely to “various specific weight” 
granted to different aspects of policy. Weber, op cit., 444. 
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emphasize the threat that a German military posed to German democracy and a desire to stay out 
of the conflicts of the Cold War, Schumacher condemned Adenauer’s government for 
supposedly not defending West German national claims with sufficient assiduity.533 Schumacher 
insisted that, in the negotiations that took place in Paris for a European army, Adenauer had 
agreed to a “second-class” status for a West German army. Schumacher developed a narrative of 
a weak German government surrendering on issue after issue to the demands of French 
negotiators.534 According to Schumacher, Adenauer had to seize this moment when the Allies 
needed German troops to force the removal of the occupation controls.535 Showing again the 
strength of narratives derived from memories of the Weimar period, Schumacher argued that a 
German government subservient to foreign powers à la Weimar would only fuel a revisionist 
movement in Germany.536 The SPD campaign against Adenauer was at this time conducted at 
parallel levels, which would have contradicted each other had the SPD been charged with 
conducting actual policy.  
The historiography argues, though, that Adenauer was in effect doing exactly what 
Schumacher was asking, leading a hard-nosed, stubborn effort to remove the discriminatory 
features of the Pleven Plan and to ensure West German equality in its structures.537 SFIO leaders 
had the opposite reaction to that of the SPD: they feared that Adenauer had gained far too much 
from a French team negotiating on the defensive. Schumacher’s approach clearly irritated SFIO 
533 Drummond, op cit., 58-59. 
534 “The only person who it seems can rightly speak of a success at the Lisbon [summit] is French Foreign Minister 
Schuman because all the concessions that were made on the question of the European army were done due to French 
wishes. Because France wished it, the inclusion of Germany into NATO was refused. Because France wished it, it 
was agreed that before the signing of the pact on the German army by all the participating parliaments (which 
naturally includes the French) no German contingents should be recruited. Because the number of French divisions 
is limited to twelve, the number of German divisions must be limited to ten...And Schuman can finally bring from 
London and Lisbon back home the ‘success’ that German armaments production would not only be limited, but 
would also be supervised by the Western occupying powers.” “Herausforderung des Volkes,” Neuer Vorwärts, 29 
February 1952, PV 1952, AdsD. 
535 Rede Gen. Schumacher in R’laentern, 16 April 1951, KS 55, AdsD. 
536 Schmid told the Bundestag on 9 July 1952 that, “We must prevent the German people from again being forced 
into a cataclysmic foreign policy, as it was forced into after 1919. Therefore one should not sign any treaties for 
which one already knows at the signing that in the near future they cannot and will not want to maintain.” Carlo 
Schmid: Bundestags Rede, 145. Fritz Steinberg, an important politician and later Minister President of North-Rhine-
Westphalen, worried in a letter to Henssler that, “It could perhaps be considered an irony of fate if we as the national 
opposition play a similar role as that of the national right after the First World War with a different banner.” Fritz 
Henssler (FH) 5, AdsD. 
537 See, for instance, Horst Möller, “Von der Besatzungsherrschaft zur Souveränität: Aussenpolitische 
Weichenstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1955,” in Cahn et al., ed., L’Allemagne et la 
Construction d’Europe, 16; and Paul Noack, “EVG und Bonner Europapolitik” inVolkmann and Sprenger, eds., 
241-53. 
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leaders, who opposed his insistence on “equal rights” for West Germany within a European 
army.538  
The French negotiators achieved a “coup” in summer 1951 when Monnet gained NATO 
Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower’s support for the European army and the U.S. 
government abandoned the Spofford Plan negotiations, placing its policy firmly behind the 
negotiations in Paris.539 Over the fall of 1951, the French team made a series of concessions to 
the German government, the most significant of which were: German combat teams would 
include 13,000 troops rather than 6,000 (Moch had originally insisted on 1,000 as a maximum); 
all participating countries would integrate their armies into the single command, i.e., the French 
military would enter under the same conditions as a German military; West Germany would 
contribute a third rather than a fifth of the Community’s military personnel; a German Defense 
Ministry would be permitted; German authorities, rather than supranational officials, would be 
charged with recruiting German soldiers; and, finally, the Occupation Statute would end with the 
coming into force of the Defense Community.540  
Defense Secretary Moch now renounced the European army. His principal objection was 
that the combat teams would be large enough to permit autonomous German military action.541 
The SFIO had in the meantime abandoned the governing coalition and entered the opposition, 
where they would remain for much of the rest of the legislature.542 Discussions within the SFIO 
Directing Committee’s Bureau of Foreign Affairs revealed an incipient split as to how far the 
party might be willing to go to permit German rearmament.543 Like the SPD, though, being in 
political opposition allowed the party to paper over its differences and present a united front 
against the government. This unity was short-lived because the financial and political pressure 
538 Grumbach presented the conclusion of the Directing Committee’s Bureau of International Affairs as “opposing 
any interpretation of equal rights” for West Germany. CD, 17 January 1951, OURS. 
539 Fursdon, op cit., 115-18. In NSC-115 on 30 July 1951, President Truman officially granted U.S. support to the 
European army. Creswell, op cit., 232.  
540 Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, “Politische und militärische Faktoren bei der Planung des deutschen 
Verteidigungsbeitrages im Rahmen der EVG,” in Volkmann and Sprengler, eds., 288; Hitchcock, op cit., 163; 
Large, op cit., 130-32; Norbert Wiggershaus, “Überlegungen und Pläne für eine militärische Integration 
Westdeutschlands 1948-1952,” in Foschepoth, ed., 324-5. 
541 See Moch’s comments to the Foreign Affairs Commission on 8 February 1952 and to the National Assembly on 
12 February 1952. JO, 615-16; C/15591, Archives nationales (AN). 
542 Mollet told the Socialist parliamentary group about René Mayer’s investiture that, “A government directed by 
René Mayer would be in certain disagreement with the Party on the problem of German rearmament.” Groupe 
Parlementaire Socialiste (GPS) 20 July 1951, Archive d’histoire contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-po.  
543 Grumbach argued that the SFIO must do all it could to prevent the recreation of a German army, while Gérard 
Jaquet emphasized that a German military was inevitable and his principle concern was to construct European 
institutions. CD, 7 November 1951, OURS. 
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placed on the French government by its allies was so great that French leaders had no choice but 
to respond. As in 1950, there was no majority in the French assembly for German rearmament 
without the support of the SFIO. This distinguished the margin of maneuver of the SFIO from 
that of the SPD, the votes of which were not needed to establish a German military because the 
CDU-CSU had an absolute majority following the 1953 elections.  
On 19 February 1952, Prime Minister Edgar Faure put the principle of a European army 
with a German military contribution to a confidence vote in the National Assembly. In the days 
before the vote, Faure was aware that there was no majority to support the government’s policy. 
The votes could only come from the SFIO. For days Faure negotiated in private with a weary 
Guy Mollet. The result was that the National Assembly granted Faure confidence but only at the 
cost of approving a long list of SFIO conditions, without which Mollet promised the SFIO would 
vote against any treaty. The Socialist conditions were: there was to be no training of German 
troops before the ratification of the treaty; Germany would not be permitted to enter NATO; the 
U.S. and Great Britain must make guarantees against any violation of the treaty; the combat team 
size of German troops must be the smallest possible; there must be no German military 
command organization; and, crucially, the European army must be placed under a supranational 
political authority responsible to a supranational democratic assembly.544 Having placed the 
European army in a Socialist straitjacket, Mollet achieved a vote of 22 to 4 in the SFIO Directing 
Committee in favor of the confidence motion. Ominously, however, the four opponents were 
political heavy-weights (Grumbach, Mayer, Oreste Rosenfeld, and Robert Verdier) and they 
brought with them 18 SFIO deputies.545 In total, 20 SFIO deputies broke party discipline and 
voted against the government and their party leadership.  
 
4.7 THE STALIN NOTE: SPD AND SFIO PERCEPTIONS OF DÉTENTE  
AND COLD WAR, MARCH-DECEMBER 1952 
 
Over the course of 1951, the official SPD position had undergone a radical revision which would 
entrench the party in an intransigent policy of opposition against the West German government 
544 Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit: Die Haltung der französischen Regierung und 
Öffentlichkeit zu den Stalin-Noten 1952 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 96-100. 
545 CD, 19 February 1952, OURS. 
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and the western Allies.546 In fall 1951, Schumacher abandoned the principle of a German 
military contribution to western defense and argued that European integration and German 
reunification had become antithetical goals. It is not clear from the sources exactly when or how 
the SPD reached this decision, but signs were clear from October 1951 when SPD foreign policy 
expert Lütkens gave a contested speech to the Bundestag. Lütkens called German reunification a 
“precondition” of European integration and opposed the principle of “equality” for West 
Germany because this principle could block a successful outcome for negotiations with the 
Soviet Union.547 Although Ollenhauer then rejected Lütkens’ statements and said that they did 
not represent party policy, by December 1951, the content of Lütkens’ speech had in effect 
become the official party line, though the party dropped Lütkens’ reference to its opposition to 
“equality” so as not to provide a platform for attacks from the government.548 It remains unclear 
whether the revised policy was the result of Schumacher’s evolving conception of the 
geopolitical scene or a sign of his weakness, i.e., that after yet another period of prolonged illness 
Schumacher adapted his policies to underlying party currents.549 Only at this moment, a year 
after the party had determined its opposition to the Schuman Plan, did it place greater emphasis 
on an argument that the ECSC Treaty would also create a further obstacle to German 
reunification.550 While Schumacher’s and Lütkens’ statements appear to exclude any form of 
European integration, the statements were vague enough that the party later claimed that they 
546 Henssler made explicit reference to this shift in policy in his letter to Ollenhauer. 14 May 1952 letter, FH 5, 
AdsD. In September 1953 Ollenhauer told an interviewer that, “This policy of strength is nothing more than playing 
with fire. The policy of strength before 1914 resulted in the collapse of 1918 and the policy of strength in 1939 
resulted in the catastrophe of 1945.” Interview mit Erich Ollenhauer im RIAS am 3. September 1954, 22,15 Uhr, EO 
98, AdsD.  
547 16 October 1951, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 6926-6946. Schmid seems to have previously represented this view 
in a 26 August 1951 meeting with McCloy. He argued against the granting of full sovereignty to West Germany, as 
envisioned in the Allied talks on German rearmament. Weber, op cit., 447-8. 
548 Schumacher reminded Adenauer in a letter about the GDR proposal for German reunification in November 1951 
that West Germany was only a “provisional” state designed to prepare a path to German reunification. In a 28 
December 1951 article Ollenhauer explicitly rejected Adenauer’s “policy of strength.” Buczylowski, op cit., 149-54. 
549 Drummond writes that, “It is possible that after the severe stroke he suffered in December, 1951, Schumacher no 
longer possessed the strength to maintain his forward strategy against those who took over the reins of the party.” 
However, he considers it more likely that, “By the end of the first year of the rearmament debate Schumacher 
realized that the Western powers would not meet his conditions, and from the Washington conference of September, 
1951, he knew also that they would not wage a political offensive for German unity.” Drummond, op cit., 65, 76.  
Buczylowski also emphasizes the key role of the Washington conference for Schumacher’s position. Buczylowski, 
op cit., 146.  
550 See Schumacher’s letter to Gustav Heinemann, 11 December 1951, cited in Rogosch, op cit., 173. 
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considered only military, rather than economic integration, to be an obstacle to German 
reunification.551  
The SPD’s shift in policy was accompanied by a marked softening of tone towards the 
Soviet Union and East German initiatives to achieve German reunification. After the failure of 
the December 1947 Foreign Ministers conference in Moscow, the leading West German parties 
agreed that the Soviet Union seemed uninterested in permitting German reunification. They held 
to this view through 1950, with the SPD and CDU both depicting an East German note in fall 
1950 that called for an all-German constituent assembly as purely propagandistic. Lütkens 
argued in the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Commission that the note should be taken seriously, 
but his view was rejected not only by Chancellor Adenauer, but also by party colleague Herbert 
Wehner, whose stature was growing within the party.552 Statements by important SPD figures in 
1950-51 show that the temptation to take Soviet initiatives seriously was a powerful force within 
the party. The SPD leadership’s adoption of this policy seems to be a response to this 
undercurrent. As late as August 1951, Schumacher stated that he did not believe the Soviet 
Union would ever permit German reunification. After November 1951, though, the party began 
to demand that the government respond positively to a second East German note and seek a four-
power conference to achieve free elections for a reunified Germany.553  
In this context, it is no wonder that the SPD found encouragement for its new attitude in 
the Stalin Note of March 1952. On 10 March 1952 Soviet diplomats delivered a note proposing 
German reunification to the Allied powers. The note called for a united Germany independent of 
551 Hrbek provides two Ollenhauer quotes from spring 1952 that contradict each other as to whether the SPD 
considered all integration attempts, or only military integration, to be an obstacle to German reunification. Hrbek, op 
cit., 160. 
552 Wehner considered the East German note to be an attempt to influence the masses and increase Western 
insecurity. Bundestag Auswärtige Ausschuss (AA), 5 January 1951. Adenauer depicted the letter as a propagandistic 
attempt to block German rearmament and lead to German neutralization and the withdrawal of the occupying troops, 
which would facilitate an entry of a weak all-German government into the Soviet sphere of influence. AA, 19 
January 1951.  
553 Schumacher wrote, “For the Soviets a democratic unity that restores German unity [is]...a threat to its entire 
satellite system, in a political, propagandistic and military sense. Therefore they cannot want German unity unless it 
is a unity under Communist domination, a German instrument in Russian hands.” East German leader Otto 
Grotewohl called for negotiations for German reunification again on 15 September 1951 in a letter to the Bundestag. 
See Buczylowski, op cit., 159.  For the SPD response to the second East German note, see Drummond, op cit., 51; 
and Weber, op cit., 449. Ollenhauer said before the Stalin Note was publicized that, “The letter from the Soviet 
government to Grotewohl calling for the conclusion of a peace treaty can completely change the situation. The 
Western powers must take a position and the West German government must take up the pursuit of this offer. We 
must be prepared for the possibility that the Chancellor will yet again capitulate without conditions.” 22-23 February 
1952, SPD-PV, AdsD.  
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the two blocs, non-aligned militarily, which could have its own armed forces for self-defense and 
its own armaments industry; there would be no economic restrictions; Germany would enter the 
U.N.; and all those not convicted of crimes that took place during the Nazi period would have 
their full civil rights restored.  
The circumstances surrounding this note, its rejection by the Western allies with 
Adenauer’s willing consent, and the speculation about the real motivations of the Soviet 
leadership has made the Stalin Note of 1952 perhaps the most polemical subject of postwar 
German historiography. Disagreements between scholars who portray the note as naked 
propaganda and those who consider the Soviet leadership sincere in its call for détente and four-
power negotiations for German reunification have been long, bitter, and often overtly partisan.554 
It is not my intention to intervene in this debate, which, after all, involves controversies that 
center around interpretations of Soviet sources and one’s take on the politics and evolution of the 
early Cold War. However, it is of vital importance for a discussion of SPD policy to point out 
that neither now nor then is there a scholarly consensus on whether or not the Soviet leadership 
was serious in its March 1952 initiative for German reunification. Research has shown that 
within the Western foreign ministries, at least, many believed the note to be genuine.555 
554 Wilfried Loth places the Stalin Note within a long continuum of Soviet postwar policy, arguing that Stalin never 
intended to create a truncated East German satellite state, that he took great efforts to stem East German leaders’ 
pursuit of a “German path to socialism,” and that he tried time and again, within the Inter-Allied Control Council, 
during the period of the Berlin blockade, and then with his 1952 note to create the conditions for a reunited German 
state that would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: the Soviet Union, the 
German question, and the founding of the GDR (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998). The SPD shared much of Loth’s 
later analysis: In 1954 Ollenhauer said, “Up to now the Soviet government, against the pressure from the Pankow 
[East German] regime, has refused every attempt to turn the Soviet zone into a People’s democracy, to build it up as 
a self-standing state.” Erich Ollenhauer am 21.2.1954 vor sozialdemokratische Chefredaktüren und Verlegern im 
grossen Fraktionssaal. Wehner made the same point on 19 February 1954. PV, EO 101, AdsD. Rolf Steininger 
provides a close source analysis on the Stalin Note and concludes that the Soviet offer was genuine. He lambasts 
Adenauer’s government as responsible for the “missed opportunity” of German reunification. Rolf Steininger, The 
German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990, 1985). For an aggressive counterattack arguing that the Stalin Note was merely a “propaganda 
maneuver,” see Peter Ruggenthaler, “The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing Debate,” Journal 
of Cold War Studies 12, 2 (Fall 2011): 172-212. Thomas Alan Schwartz writes that, “Although the public nature of 
the Soviet proposal lends itself to the propaganda interpretation, both the timing and content of the Note indicate a 
serious Soviet imitative.” Schwartz, op cit., 263. Mastny agrees that the Soviets were serious about German 
reunification in the late 1940s, but he portrays the 1952 Stalin note as a tactical move to prevent German 
rearmament while Stalin privately encouraged the GDR leaders to pursue a path to socialism. Mastny, op cit., 21, 
52, 65, 137-40.Trachtenberg argues that, “In public, the allies dismissed this offer as a mere ploy designed to 
sabotage the process leading to Germany’s rearmament as part of the western bloc. It turns out that this claim was 
correct: the Soviet move really was essentially a maneuver. But western officials had no way of knowing that at the 
time, and were in fact alarmed...” Trachtenberg, op cit., 129.  
555 Large, op cit., 147; Meyer-Landrut, op cit., 42; Steininger, op cit., 52-53, 57. 
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Although the internal division of 1951 continued, the SPD argued that there were positive 
signs that the note was sincere. Party leaders argued that the Western powers should do all in 
their power to encourage the Soviet government in international talks and to determine as far as 
possible the degree to which it was prepared to make concessions. Some historians have claimed 
that the SPD was hesitant in its response, but the SPD press quickly celebrated the note as a 
vindication of SPD policy and the SPD parliamentary faction asked the western powers to give it 
serious consideration.556 The party knew that the weak point of any deal would be whether the 
USSR would accept genuinely free elections for a united Germany.557 While Soviet intentions 
remain shrouded in mystery, the same is not true for the Allied and West German governments’ 
responses to the note. The sources here are unambiguous: while the Allied and West German 
governments publicly expressed interest in the note to placate West German and international 
opinion, they adopted a policy of deliberate delay and obstruction. They would not allow a 
Soviet initiative to end the Cold War, genuine or not, to postpone negotiations on the European 
Defense Community.558  
The SPD correctly understood the Allies’ maneuver as a rejection of the Soviet initiative 
and excoriated Adenauer for not pressuring the Allies to take up the Soviet offer. The Allied 
556 Buczylowski, op cit., 161. 
557 The SPD appears to have been pulled in different directions by the conflicting views of some of its leading 
members. Orlow writes that the SPD’s “public response hid deep division within the party.” Orlow, op cit., 160-61. 
Ollenhauer, Schmid and others appeared to think there was a real possibility for German reunification, while Herbert 
Wehner believed it to be a ruse and sought to temper the SPD’s enthusiasm by insisting on conditions, namely free 
elections, that he believed the Soviet Union could not accept. Orlow reports that Wehner said as much in private to 
U.S. diplomats. Dietrich Orlow, “Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945-1966,” German 
Studies Review 16, 1 (Feb., 1933): 90-91, Weber, op cit., 454-5. Wehner preempted the efforts of a SPD deputy to 
call for mass protests for German reunification and direct SPD negotiations with the USSR. Drummond, op cit., 86. 
Ollenhauer, on the other hand, suggested the status of Sweden as a model for West Germany’s place in a bipolar 
world. AA, 2 April 1952. Henssler’s letter to Ollenhauer reflects the uncertainty prevailing in the SPD. He continued 
to reject the concept of all-German neutralization but imagined ways in which a possible reunification of a Germany 
outside of the two blocs could be achieved. 14 May 1952 letter, FH 5, AdsD.  
558 The dispute among scholars is not about whether Adenauer worked to kill the Soviet initiative, but rather whether 
he was wise in doing so. Gordon A. Craig writes, for instance, that Adenauer had “an obsessive conviction that any 
overtures to the Soviet Union were by their very nature dangerous, and any agreement potentially disastrous.” 
Gordon A. Craig, “Konrad Adenauer and the United States,” in Reiner Pommerin, ed., The American Impact on 
postwar Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 7. Hans-Peter Schwartz describes Adenauer’s rejection of 
the Stalin Note as “a German sacrifice for stability.” Hans-Peter Schwartz, “Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik 
in die westliche Welt,” in Power in Europe?, 601-02. The three major western governments all rejected the Soviet 
initiative, though there were some diverging voices in internal discussions. Adenauer facilitated the Western allies’ 
position by telling them that he opposed holding four-power elections. Over the next several years, as the Allied-
Soviet exchange of notes continued, Adenauer intervened at several points to block or temper momentary efforts by 
the French government and later by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to seriously engage with the Soviet 
Union to end the Cold War and to create the conditions for German reunification.  See Meyer-Landrut, op cit., and 
Steininger, op cit. 
180 
 
                                                          
response to the Stalin Note confirmed the SPD’s impression that the Western allies did not want 
German reunification under the present circumstances.559 Moreover, it confirmed its darker 
impression, which Ollenhauer had voiced as far back as 1950, that Adenauer preferred the status 
quo to braving the uncertainties of German unification. The impression grew within the SPD that 
Adenauer’s policy on German reunification and European integration was in part designed to 
secure the ascendancy of political Catholicism in West Germany and Europe by cutting off the 
Protestant East, which had been historically, not coincidentally, a large reservoir of SPD 
support.560  
The Allies and Adenauer made haste to conclude the negotiations for a European Defense 
Community in order to present the USSR with a fait accompli. The EDC and General Treaties to 
end the formal occupation period were signed on 27 May 1952. A “binding clause” had been 
inserted on Adenauer’s initiative, which asserted that a reunited German government was bound 
to the EDC Treaty. Although this clause was then removed, the Treaty still made explicit Allied 
approval necessary for German reunification, a severe check on German sovereignty.561 It is in 
this context that Schumacher’s temperamental harangue, “Whoever signs this Treaty ceases to be 
a German”562 is to be understood, though this renewed recourse to demagoguery again 
embarrassed the SPD.  The SPD believed that, in the two Treaties and the Allied responses to the 
Stalin Note, it was witnessing the end of any real possibility for German reunification. The Allies 
and the West German government, in its view, rather than the USSR, were to blame this time.563 
559 Wehner pointed out in a report to Adenauer that it had been the French government that had blocked the 
unification of the four zones in 1945, implying that the French government had always opposed German 
reunification. Wehner to Adenauer, 2 October 1952, EO 424, AdsD. 
560 Willi Eichler told the SPD Central Committee that, “Opponents of German unity are unfortunately not only in the 
Soviet Union. Opponents also sit in Bonn.” 30-31 January 1953, SPD-PV 1953, AdsD. 
561 See Ollenhauer’s criticism of this feature of the treaty to the AA, 27 March 1952. Volkmann states that the 
“binding clause” was inserted at Adenauer’s behest. Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Adenauer, Frankreich und die 
europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft,” in Interessen verbinden, 175. See also Ludolf Herbst, “Stil und 
Handlungsspielräume westdeutscher Integrationspolitik,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG, 15-16.  
562 United-Press Interview with Schumacher, Sozialdemokratische Pressedienst, 17 May 1952, KS 58, AdsD. 
563 Ollenhauer told the Central Committee on 8 April 1952 that the Western Allies reaction to the Stalin Note was 
“unfortunate.” 8-9 April 1952, PV 1952, AdsD. In a meeting with local SPD sections, Ollenhauer said that the initial 
reaction of the Western allies was “foolish, superficial reaction to the Note, it was a delaying tactic, that displayed 
bad will.” Die Rede Erich Ollenhauers vor den Betriebsgruppensekretären am 30.8.1952 in Bonn, EO 83, AdsD. 
Schumacher had suspected the French government of opposing four-power talks for German unification even before 
the Stalin Note. “Frankreichs Machtpolitk verhindert Europa,” 24 August 1951, PPP, KS 56, AdsD. In summer 
1953, Ollenhauer told a SPD audience that, “It is a regrettable fact that the West is delaying answering the latest 
Soviet note until after the Bundestag election on 6 September [1953]. I believe that the question of investigating the 
possibilities for German unification is more important and pressing than the Western allies providing election 
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As it became clear that under no circumstance would Adenauer allow negotiations for German 
reunification impede his policy of Western integration, SPD leaders asserted with unprecedented 
vehemence that the government’s priorities must be reversed.564 Schumacher even swore to 
renounce the Treaty should the SPD take power, a position Ollenhauer later softened with the 
promise that any revision of the Treaty would occur through negotiations with the Allied 
governments.565 
The cleavage that separated Adenauer’s government and the SPD over the politics of the 
Stalin Note ran right through the middle of the French Socialist Party. The SFIO had been the 
most vocal proponent of German reunification within French politics in the initial postwar 
period. Internal party discussions in January 1951 about the first East German note reveal that 
the SFIO was already divided on the subject of German reunification before the famous Stalin 
Note of March 1952. Whereas Grumbach, Édouard Depreux, and Mayer insisted that German 
reunification and four-power talks be given a clear priority over efforts to build a European 
army, Jaquet and Philip insisted that a neutralized, independent Germany must be prevented 
because it would likely fall under Soviet sway.566 In December 1951, Mollet threw his hat in 
with those who gave priority to the western integration of Germany, telling the Central 
Committee that, “I place the problem of integration before that of unification because I place the 
Russian danger before the German danger.”567 With the exception of Pineau, who at this time 
gave priority to unification but later became an important supporter of the EDC, the position that 
the participants took on this question of priorities in December 1951 corresponds to their vote for 
or against the EDC Treaty in August 1954.  
This disagreement within the SFIO contained within it a larger conflict of views about 
Western policy towards the Soviet Union. SFIO Cold War hard-liners like Léon Boutbien 
advocated a Western policy of strength that closely conformed to Adenauer’s foreign policy 
assistance to the present Adenauer-Coalition in Bonn.” Kundgebung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutshlands, 
Landesverband Berlin im Sommergarten am Funkturm am 14. August 1953, EO 97, AdsD. 
564 Wehner told the Bundestag that, “It is well known that the Chancellor set constraining factors for the Western 
powers’ answer.” 10 July 1952, Verhandlungen, 9873. See also Ollenhauer’s comment on Bavarian radio, 2 July 
1952, EO 82, AdsD. 
565 Edinger, op cit., 231; Ollenhauer to the Dortmund party congress, 28 September 1952, 39-41, AdsD. 
566 CD, 17 January 1951; B.A.I., 29 January 1951; Pontillon Réarmement ou neutralisation de l’Allemagne, AGM 
111, OURS. 
567 CD, 12 December 1951, OURS.  
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conceptions.568 Figures like Mayer and Alain Savary rejected this approach as dangerous war-
mongering and insisted that the SFIO, and by extension the French and Western governments, 
make serious efforts to create the conditions for four-power negotiations for détente, German 
reunification, and international disarmament. Soon after being replaced as Defense Minister, 
Jules Moch took on the assignment of special French ambassador to the U.N. for disarmament 
negotiations, a position he held until he resigned in 1960 due to President Charles de Gaulle’s 
decision to test a nuclear weapon.569 Flying weekly between New York and Paris, Moch 
consistently demanded that the party postpone German rearmament to give breathing space for 
the disarmament negotiations to bear fruit. In 1951, Mollet seized on Moch’s suggestion as a 
way of reconciling the conflicting positions within the party. Moch’s position became official 
SFIO policy by late 1951.570  
Opponents of German rearmament at this time within the SFIO argued in the same vein 
as did the SPD about the possibility of talks with the Soviet Union. Mayer had said as early as 
the first East German note that the Allied governments should “take [the East German 
government] at [its] word; it is well worth the effort.”571 In this context, one understands why 
Grumbach and others were dissatisfied with the hesitant response of the Western allies to the 
Stalin Note.572 Whereas those who prioritized German reunification and détente over four-power 
negotiations found their hopes confirmed in the Stalin Note, Mollet and others saw much cause 
for concern in the Soviet offer.573 Here the fear of a Russian-aligned neutralized Germany was 
important, but even more so was the inclusion within the Soviet plan of an autonomous German 
military separate from the blocs, a part of the Stalin Note that opponents of German rearmament 
568 Le Bail argued that the best path to peace would be to show Russia that they could not win a war. 26 July 1950, 
JO, 5260. This was Jaquet’s position as well. SFIO Congress, 23 May 1952, OURS. Mollet later adopted this view, 
telling a German interviewer that, “Russia will not accept discussion until the day when its policy of expansion has 
failed.” “Guy Mollet nous parle,” Tagesblatt, 23 October 1953, AGM 44, OURS. Grumbach, Mayer and Moch 
rejected this view. CD, 12 December 1951, OURS.  
569 Méchoulan, opt. cit., 463-68. 
570 Mollet insisted in December 1951 that Prime Minister René Pleven call a four-power conference before making a 
final decision to rearm West Germany, but Mollet’s initiative led nowhere. 6 December 1951, CD, OURS. At the 
SFIO National Council held just before the Stalin Note was issued, the party passed a resolution demanding that 
German rearmament be delayed until after the conclusion of the U.N. disarmament commission. 1-2 March 1952, 
Conseil National, OURS. This policy had just been approved by the Directing Committee by a vote of 37 to 18 with 
2 abstentions. CD, 1 March 1952, OURS. Jaquet, a tireless advocate for the EDC, told an interviewer later that, “In 
the middle of the Cold War the problem of disarmament was not on the agenda.” Interview conducted by Cyril le 
Guron, “La S.F.I.O. et l’Europe (1950-1958),” Mémoire de Maîtrise, Université Paris IV—October 1997. 
571 25 October 1950, JO, 7194. 
572 Congrès national, 23 May 1952, OURS. 
573 Gouin went so far as to compare the Stalin Note to the Nazi-Soviet pact. Congrès nationale, May 1952, OURS.  
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within the SFIO tended to pass over in silence. Mollet sought to reconcile the various currents 
within the SFIO around an insistence on four-power talks that included a series of conditions to 
avoid German neutrality, a position confirmed by the July 1953 SFIO congress.574  
With the Stalin Note, incipient divisions over Cold War politics, European integration 
and German rearmament within the SFIO and SPD, but, in particular, within the SFIO, calcified. 
Much of the battle-lines for the deep schism within the SFIO and for the SPD campaign against 
Adenauer’s defense policy were set in place by early 1952. Each subsequent Soviet initiative and 
change in the geopolitical situation gave buoyancy to the SPD leadership and SFIO opponents of 
German rearmament, and led them to repeat their insistence that the time had come for serious 
negotiations. SPD leaders and the SFIO minority began to emphasize the need to ensure Soviet 
as well as western security and lent legitimacy to a number of Soviet security claims.575 Jaquet, 
leader among the pro-EDC SFIO deputies, on the other hand, considered Soviet overtures to be a 
“change in tactics” rather than of “content.”576 Mollet agreed that the Soviet Union did not want 
a war in Europe, but he credited the deterrence provided by the presence of U.S. soldiers for 
Soviet moderation.577 In a report that he presented in July 1952, Mollet described the Stalin note 
as a “skilled maneuver.”578 The SFIO majority supported the principle of four-power 
negotiations, but insisted that they not be made a precondition for the EDC. It argued for a policy 
of “simultaneity” in the organization of western defense with German rearmament and the 
pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union.  
Those historians who argue that West Germany had a “missed opportunity” to reunite 
Germany in 1952 agree that at some point after Stalin’s death, either after the suppression of the 
East Berlin uprising in July 1953, or after the failure of the four-power Geneva negotiations of 
574 See the resolution of the SFIO Congress adopted July 1953 and CD, 17 November 1953, OURS.  
575 Moch opposed the U.S. policy of “Roll-Back,” claimed that the USSR was not pursuing an aggressive policy in 
Europe, and argued that the Soviets had legitimate security concerns concerning the U.S. military’s arms buildup. 8 
December 1953, GPS, AHC. In his memoirs Moch wrote that, “Russia seemed to distrust Atlantic policy as much as 
we did neo-Panslavic expansion.” Moch, Une si longe vie, 619. Mollet admitted that the Soviets had genuine 
concerns about U.S. “encirclement.” 20 November 1953, JO, 5350. In a meeting with SPD leaders, Rosenfeld and 
Jacques Brutelle were divided, with Brutelle, an advocate of the EDC, rejecting the anti-EDC Rosenfeld’s optimism 
about the prospects for four-power talks. Paris-London-Brüssel, 23-26 March 1953, EO 421, AdsD. See also Erler’s 
comments that the Western allies must not seek a Soviet capitulation in negotiations. 10 July 1952, Verhandlungen, 
9905.  
576 Commission des Affaires étrangères, 31 March 1954, AN.  
577 Congrès national extraordinaire, 29-30 May 1954, OURS.  
578 LES PROBLEMES EUROPEENS Rapport presenté par Guy Mollet au nom de la S.F.I.O., en vue de la réunion 
du Study Group de Bruxelles 11-12 Juillet 52, AGM 111, OURS.  
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July 1955, the Soviet leadership shut the door on the issue of German reunification.579 French 
Socialists and German Social Democrats were aware that the Soviet line had hardened, but did 
not believe this to be a reason to abandon their approach. After the failure of the Berlin four-
power conference in early 1954, proponents of the EDC within French and West German politics 
insisted that the SFIO minority and SPD now admit that four-power negotiations had failed and 
accept the creation of the EDC.580 To this the SPD leadership and SFIO minority responded that 
the Western allies, in particular, the U.S., were as responsible as the Soviets for the failure of the 
negotiations. Even after the incorporation of West Germany into NATO in 1955, the SPD 
clutched at any available straw that seemed to have the potential to reopen the door to 
discussions with the Soviet leadership on German reunification. From 1954 to 1959, the party 
put forth a series of proposals to incorporate the U.S. and USSR in a collective security system to 
which a reunited Germany would be member. It was only in 1960 that the SPD finally accepted 
the security system created by the western allies, but this did not include a repudiation of the 
SPD policy on reunification from the 1950s. Fritz Erler, one of the architects of the SPD turn 
leading up to 1960, insisted shortly before his death that the SPD had been right to oppose 
Adenauer in 1952 because, whether or not the Soviets had been serious in their proposal for 
German reunification, Adenauer and the Western allies had not bothered to find out.  
 
4.8: A WELCOMED DELAY: THE SFIO, SPD, AND THE STALEMATE OF  
JANUARY 1953-SEPTEMBER 1953 
 
January 1953 marked a turning point in French policy on Europe. René Mayer of the Radical 
Party formed a government that saw an opening to the political right, an inclusion of a number of 
Gaullists in the cabinet, and the eviction of Schuman from the foreign ministry. With the SFIO in 
opposition, French prime ministers made ratification of the EDC dependent on the support of 
579 Steininger, opt. cit., 16. Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that, “The Geneva Summit in July 1955 and the Kremlin’s 
invitation of Adenauer to Moscow to verify the thesis that critics were wrong when they argued that, after the 
ratification of the Paris Treaty, the Soviets would lose interest in negotiating with the Western powers. But actually 
the critics were right.” Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1948-1958: The 
Art of the Possible,” in Clemens Wurms, ed., Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European 
Integration (Washington: Berg Publishers, 1995), 68.  
580 Mollet and Spaak appealed to Ollenhauer in a Socialist International meeting on 28 February 1954 to revise SPD 
policy in the wake of the negative results of the Berlin Conference, which Ollenhauer refused to do. See Ollenhauer 
to Schiller, 17 March 1954, Karl Schiller 132 (BaK). 
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Gaullists, whose votes they needed to maintain governing majorities. The pendulum now swung 
in the other direction, with the French government insisting on a series of revisions to the EDC 
treaty that in effect reasserted a number of the discriminatory features of the Pleven Plan. The 
proposals’ intent was to emancipate the French army from many of the powers of the common 
defense authority while keeping German units muzzled to them. The interminable vacillations 
that followed provided a welcome delay to SPD and SFIO leaders. The situation allowed the 
parties to maintain a fragile unity around a principled “yes” to collective security and (from 
February 1954 on for the SPD) to western defense and a conditional “no” to the EDC treaty.  
Mollet and Ollenhauer, both rather colorless party operators, represented the median of 
their parties’ range of opinion on the EDC issue. That Ollenhauer was so much more effective at 
limiting the damage and extent of internal party squabbling is likely due to the Western 
governments’ recognition that, despite holding the allegiance of one-third of West German 
voters, not a single SPD vote was needed to ratify the Treaties. This situation can be symbolized 
by the short, curt, and frankly rude meeting that U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles held 
with SPD leaders in 1953. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats spent countless hours courting Mollet and 
the SFIO, which despite its scant 11% showing in the last election, remained pivotal for the 
creation of a majority in the French assembly on all European treaties. Ollenhauer was simply 
not subject to a similar amount of intense pressure and could adapt slowly to changing currents 
within his party.  
Mollet was not so lucky. While elements in the SFIO clamored for progress towards the 
ratification of the Treaties, Mollet adopted an attentiste attitude that often baffled domestic and 
foreign opinion. The dilemma facing the French government was that the SFIO and Gaullist 
parties’ conditions for supporting German rearmament were mutually exclusive, and the 
government had no confidence that either party’s leadership could in the end deliver the votes. 
The emergence of a new tendency within the SFIO opposed to the EDC in 1953 added to 
Mollet’s headaches. The initial vocal opponents of the treaty, besides Moch, had gone to lengths 
to present their opposition in internationalist rhetoric, by evoking their solidarity with pacifist, 
youth, and trade union elements within German society. These anti-EDC French Socialists 
eschewed essentialist depictions of “German” character.581 Delwit aptly describes Depreux, 
581 Mayer, as he had in 1943, called the “idea of defining Germany in terms of race” to be “absurd.” “If I ever 
committed the error that the Hitlériens committed with regard to those who are of the same origin as me [Jewish], it 
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Mayer, Marceau Pivert and others within this group as the SFIO “left,” a designation that has 
much to do with this group’s subsequent opposition to the Mollet government’s escalation of the 
war in Algeria, which led many of them to exit the SFIO between 1957 and 1959. In 1952, 
however, a different group of anti-cédistes emerged within the SFIO, many of whom had held 
administrative posts in the defense ministry, such as Pierre Métayer and Max Lejeune or, in the 
case of René Naegelen, had been involved as Pro-Consul in repression in Algeria in 1948. This 
group shared some of the mindset of the Gaullists, fretted over the disappearance of the French 
military in a supranational morass, and sometimes gave vent to widespread stereotypes of a 
fatally flawed German phenotype.582 They looked to the French military as the harbinger of 
French grandeur and as guarantee of their nation’s independence.583 The public opposition of 
leading French generals to the EDC in 1953 gave momentum to this group’s position. With the 
exception of Moch, they were later to count themselves among the most ardent defenders of 
l’Algérie francaise.  
Presiding over a severely divided party, Mollet took refuge in the official conditions for 
German rearmament approved by the 1952 SFIO congress. The pro-EDC SFIO center could hold 
the inter-party squabbling within acceptable bounds as long as it remained obvious to all that the 
SFIO conditions had not been realized. These conditions were: a legal guarantee from the United 
States to intervene in the event a member violated the treaty; a close association of Great Britain 
in the Community’s structures; and a European assembly elected on the basis of universal 
suffrage to which the EDC executive would be responsible. The last demand had helped spur 
Foreign Minister Schuman’s call for a European Political Community in fall 1952. Negotiations 
for the creation for this community added to the confusion surrounding the EDC, which 
eventually led Mollet to abandon his support for it.  
 
would mean that Hitler posthumously was right; we should condemn racism and never use it in the congresses or in 
personal conversations.” May 1952 Congress, OURS.  
582 Naegelen said to the SFIO congress in February 1955, “...I could have expected anything except to be chased 
[from the party] solely for not wanting to rearm the people who acclaimed Hitler, the people who plunged our 
country into the most awful  material and moral distress, the people who wished to destroy forever socialism and 
democracy!” Congrès national extraordinaire at Puteaux, 5-6 February 1955, OURS.  
583 Lejeune told the May 1952 SFIO congress that, “The army is silent, the army does not have the right to say what 
it thinks in the republic, but it is worried and there is enormous emotion in the army today.” He went on to describe 
the military’s worries to the congress. He then said that, “One is witnessing the liquidation of the French military 
apparatus. France is falling more and more under the military tutelage of the USA. France is completely losing its 
independence.” CD/GPS joint meeting on 18 November 1953, OURS.  
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4.9. REALPOLITIK VS. THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE IN SFIO AND SPD     
DEFENSE POLICY: THE SOCIALIST CONTRIBUTION TO THE FAILURE OF 
THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, SEPTEMBER 1953-AUGUST 1954 
 
The situation changed dramatically when Mollet attended a Council of Europe session in 
September 1953. For years the anglophile Mollet had sought British inclusion in an integrated 
Europe. There was a single area of agreement between the SFIO and SPD leaderships, and 
among the various factions of the SFIO: the desirability of British membership. As in the case of 
the ECSC, SPD leaders saw British participation as a safeguard against French hegemony in the 
community, while the SFIO believed French arms alone to be too stunted to smother the 
militarist attitudes of a renascent Germany on their own. Reluctantly from 1952 to 1954, the 
British government proceeded step by step to meet these concerns. In attachments to the EDC 
and Bonn treaties signed in May 1952, the British and U.S. governments stated their intention to 
maintain their troops on the continent and to consider any violation of the Treaties to be a threat 
to their own security. However, the two governments reserved the right to withdraw their troops 
if they saw fit to do so and there were no binding military commitments (i.e., no “automatic 
armed action” clause) in the EDC Treaty. The SFIO and French government made clear that they 
did not consider these Allied guarantees to be sufficient. 
Then a journalist announced that Mollet reported having achieved a personal diplomatic 
triumph in private meetings with British undersecretary of state Anthony Nutting in September 
1953. Eager to win the SFIO’s support for the EDC treaty, the journalist reported that Nutting 
had offered Mollet to strengthen the British “partnership” so that British officials would be 
represented in all the directing bodies of the EDC. In addition, the British military would 
cooperate in the training of the cadres, integrate its logistical services with the EDC, and 
maintain its troops on the continent.”584 In what seemed to be a quid pro quo, Mollet then 
announced publicly that the SFIO would be willing to provide the necessary votes to achieve a 
majority for ratification of the EDC, making the support of the Gaullist Party now seem 
unnecessary. With this British guarantee in hand, Mollet threw his hat in with Georges Brutelle, 
Jaquet and the other pro-EDC elements within the SFIO, though on the condition that the British 
keep their word and that the SFIO National Council approve his position. On 14 April 1954, the 
584 “Partnership” is in English in the original.  
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British government agreed to the Agreement regarding Co-operation between the United 
Kingdom and the European Defence Community, a treaty that closely followed the lines of what 
had been agreed between Mollet and Nutting.585  
Although Mollet claimed that the journalist had left out the qualifier “might” from his 
statement, Mollet’s comments unleashed open political warfare within the SFIO. Party unity 
completely broke down. Pro-EDC SFIO deputies voted against the Socialist nominee for French 
President, the anti-EDC firebrand Naegelen.586 In defiance of Jaquet and other pro-EDC SFIO 
deputies, anti-EDC Socialists accepted the support of anti-EDC deputies from other parties to 
seize the chairmanships of key National Assembly committees. These votes helped elect Daniel 
Mayer to the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Paul Couston to head the Industrial 
Production Committee, Max Lejeune to chair the Defense Commitee, and Moch as rapporteur 
for the EDC treaty. Pro-EDC Socialists voted against their own party comrades. Fifty-nine 
leading Socialists signed a brochure condemning the EDC treaty and, against the wishes of the 
Directing Committee, distributed it widely.587 At party congresses, Naegelen channeled the 
frustration of the smaller federations, which tended to oppose the EDC, that their voices were 
being rolled over by the large pro-EDC federations (Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Bouches-de-Rhône), 
the votes of which provided the base for Mollet’s longevity as secretary general.588 The 
Directing Committee struggled to hold a recalcitrant parliamentary group to the resolutions of 
the party congress. As early as 30 January 1952, the party applied sanctions on deputies violating 
party discipline on the subject.589 This schism was not the sole work of the division among SFIO 
leaders; it also reflected a deep division at the party’s base. In polls in spring 1954, 38% of SFIO 
supporters declared themselves opposed to the treaty and 35% in favor, a statistic that anticipated 
the result of the final vote in the National Assembly, in which 53 SFIO deputies voted against the 
Treaty and 50 in favor. In the vast majority of cases, the deputies followed the vote of their 
585 Fursdon, op cit., 253-5. 
586 Lapie, who also opposed the EDC, later wrote of Naegelen that he had, “a violent character...[He was] 
sentimental and patriotic...He sought out all occasions to preserve or create contacts with the right, especially the 
former Gaullists.” Lapie, op cit., 488. 
587 Laurent and Mollet were furious about the brochure. CD, 14 April 1954, OURS. 
588 Naegelen represented the smallest of the SFIO federations, the Basses-Alpes. See his comments to the SFIO 
Extraordinary congress, 5-6 February 1955, OURS. Also see Quilliot, op cit., 492. 
589 CD, 30 January 1952, and Conseil national, 1-2 March 1952, OURS. 
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federation on the EDC issue, signaling a deep-seated divide at all levels of the party 
organization.590 
The SPD lent cautious support to opponents of the EDC within the SFIO, even musing at 
one point about intervening behind the scenes to try to overthrow Mollet’s leadership.591 The 
SPD embraced the blumiste faction, which provided the bulk of what Delwit calls the SFIO 
“left,” praising the attitudes of Depreux, Mayer, Verdier, and even opening its press to Rosenfeld 
when he fell afoul of the SFIO leadership.592 The SPD leadership now also had a change in heart 
towards Moch, welcoming his efforts to achieve disarmament and referencing his opinions and 
expertise within Bundestag committees. It passed over in silence, though, the figures and 
statements of the anti-EDC SFIO “right.” The anti-EDC group within the SFIO, for its part, 
wrapped itself in the cloak of internationalism provided by the SPD’s embrace. The newspaper 
“Reconstruction” served as a vital liaison between the SPD and SFIO opposition, translating 
SPD texts on German rearmament into French and providing a forum for disseminating 
arguments against German rearmament.593 The pro-EDC SFIO majority exploited the SPD’s 
internal confusion on the issue. To counter his opponents, Mollet presented the SPD position as 
being far more coherent than it actually was. He said that the SPD was not opposed to the 
membership of a West German military in NATO, and that the anti-EDC SFIO members and the 
SPD were in fact working at cross-purposes. That internal SFIO discussions at times descended 
into vitriolic debate about the true policy of the SPD testifies to the moral weight each side 
assigned the SPD in this inter-socialist dialogue.594 
What Mollet and the pro-EDC SFIO leaders were referring to was the move by the SPD 
in the wake of the failure of the 1954 four-power Berlin Conference to accept in principle a West 
German contribution to a Western, rather than universal, collective defense system.595 At the 
1954 SPD Congress in Berlin, the SPD leadership managed to wrest a resolution in favor of this 
590 Castagnez, op cit., 298; Jean-Pierre Rioux, “Französische öffentliche Meinung und EVG: Parteienstreit oder 
Schlacht der Erinnerungen?,” in Volkmann, Schwengler, eds., 170-71.  
591 Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 76-82.  
592 Delwit, op cit., 68. 
593 Madeleine Singer, “Le groupe d’études politiques ‘Reconstruction’ et la C.E.D., Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 43, 1, (1996): 33-65. 
594 See the discussions in the Directing Committee, 7 May 1952, and at the May 1952 congress, OURS. For the 
SPD’s take on this tri-party Labour-SFIO-SPD meeting, see Heinz Putzrath’s letter to Ollenhauer, 17 June 1952, EO 
391, AdsD.  
595 See Mollet’s handwritten notes about his conversation with Ollenhauer at the Conférence des Partis Socialistes 
Européennes, 27-28 February 1954, AGM 111, OURS. 
190 
 
                                                          
principle from its reluctant party base but only by attaching to it a series of conditions that made 
clear that SPD support for German rearmament would not be forthcoming in any near term.596 
With a four-power conference behind them and after years of delaying tactics that included a 
series of petitions to the constitutional court, the SPD leadership was aware that all that stood 
between it and West German rearmament was a vote in the French Assembly. Voices from the 
regional branches of the party urging a pragmatic participation in the formation of the new West 
German military began to assert themselves. The mayors of Hamburg and Bremen, Max Brauer 
and Wilhelm Kaisen, economic expert Karl Schiller and, crucially, the mayor of Berlin, Ernst 
Reuter, and his dauphin, Willy Brandt, called on the party leadership to work constructively to 
shape West Germany’s contribution to western defense.597  
The most important figure in this development was Fritz Erler, who emerged as the 
party’s expert on defense issues. As early as 1950, Schumacher had tapped Erler, who had no 
previous expertise in defense issues, as his point-man on defense in the new Bundestag.598 In 
meetings with Schumacher and others, Erler built a working relationship with the former 
generals advising the government on defense. With the young Helmut Schmidt, future SPD 
Defense Minister and Chancellor, Erler formed a security committee within the party’s Central 
Committee to construct a positive security policy.599 It recommended an agreement with NATO 
that would allow West Germany to be freed from its obligations in the event German 
reunification became a concrete possibility. Like Schumacher, the committee argued that the 
SPD must consider each military official as an individual rather than collectively stigmatizing 
former officers, a practice that remained common within the SPD. If there was to be a West 
German military regardless of the wishes of the SPD, then the SPD must work to shape it in its 
596 Löwke, op cit., 182-83; Wilker calls Erler and Schmidt a “counter-elite” within the party. Lothar Wilker, Die 
Sicherheitspolitik der SPD 1956-1966: Zwischen Wiedervereinigungs- und Bündnisorientierung (Bonn: Neue 
Gesellschaft, 1977), 19. These conditions were: 1) reunification remained the first priority; 2) equality of rights; 3) 
that West Germany and Berlin be accorded equal security to the other nations; 4) that the defense organization 
include as many countries as possible, in particular Great Britain and Scandinavia; and 5) that military spending 
must not negatively affect spending on social welfare. They had been laid out as early as 1953; see Ollenhauer’s 
speech to the Bundestag, 19 March 1953, Verhandlungen, 12318-27.  
597 Brauer to 1954 SPD Parteitag, 74; Löwke, op cit., 123; Paterson, op cit., 96. 
598 Drummond, op cit., 84-85; Weber, op cit., 442. 
599 Drummond, op cit., 122-24. 
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image and build a relationship of trust. Should they fail to do so, they ran the risk that this 
“massive apparatus of power” would be wielded yet again against the democratic left.600  
In Schiller’s view, this was a “conflict between reason and sentiment.”601 When party 
reformers sought to de-stigmatize the German military for the SPD base and infuse it with 
democratic values, they provoked the ire of the pacifist and anti-militarist wing of the party. This 
internal conflict was not limited to the issue of the European army, but continued in dramatic 
form through the 1950s and into the 1960s, well after defense policy had been divorced from the 
European integration process. The SPD paired mass demonstrations to oppose German 
rearmament with a constructive participation in the debates concerning the military’s eventual 
formation. Erler, Schmidt, and others deeply immersed themselves in the detailed work within 
the Bundestag, forging alliances with members of other parties that allowed them to greatly 
influence the shape of the new German military that slowly emerged beginning in 1956. It is not 
correct to characterize Schumacher’s defense policy as one of intransigent opposition.602 To a 
large degree, Erler, Schmidt, and a radically reformed West German military are concrete 
legacies that can be traced back to Schumacher’s influence within the SPD between the summers 
of 1950 and 1951.603  
This battle between what Schiller termed “reason and sentiment,” perhaps better 
described as a conflict between Realpolitik and a policy of conscience, took place within the 
SFIO as well, with far more personal acrimony and bitterness. The stakes here were higher 
because the party knew that its deputies would cast the decisive votes in the National Assembly. 
Pro-EDC deputies argued that the party must be pragmatic and realize that the geopolitical 
600 Sitzung der Kommission zur Weiterführung der Parteidiskussion am 9. und 10.1.1954, Willi Eichler 163, AdsD. 
Helmut Schmidt told a SPD meeting that, “We must not forget the disastrous position of the party towards the 
Reichwehr under the Weimar state.” PV, PA, KK, Bezirksekretäre, Bundestagsfraktion und Länderminister, 17 
September 1953 in Bonn, PV 1953, AdsD.  
601 Schiller to the 1954 SPD Berlin Congress, 131; see also Schmidt’s comments, 138.  
602 Orlow writes that, “Schumacher, Ollenhauer, and the hardliners seemed unconcerned about...repeating [the 
party’s] mistake during the Weimar years when the mutual alienation of the SPD and the Reichwehr prevented the 
party from influencing Germany’s military policy and essentially left the Reichwehr independent of parliamentary 
control.” This claim is completely false as it pertains to Schumacher. Orlow, op cit., 137.  
603 Schumacher told the SPD Central Committee in November 1951 that, “In the event that we must say no to 
remilitarization, it will be necessary to undertake efforts to ensure that the officer circles do not built a front against 
us.”  2-3 November 1951, PV 1951, AdsD. Drummond argues that, “there is no question that without SPD 
collaboration the parliamentary controls established over the armed forces would have been less extensive.” 
Drummond, op cit., 184. Large writes that, “The Socialists’ Wehrexperten ensured that the SPD’s role would indeed 
be crucial. Overall, this development was extremely important because it meant that, for the first time in German 
history, the army’s shape and direction would be determined partly by the political opposition.” Large, op cit., 192-
93. 
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situation was such that the choice was limited to West German rearmament within or outside of a 
European organization, rather than a choice on the question of rearmament itself. The party must 
choose the “lesser evil” of a West German army under French supervision and without an 
autonomous command structure.604 The anti-EDC deputies, in their view, were playing with fire. 
Not only were they risking that West Germany would gain sovereignty over its military, but their 
refusal to vote for the treaties also jeopardized the survival of the Atlantic Alliance. SFIO 
intransigence might push the U.S. government back to a policy of isolationism and a peripheral 
defense of the continent.605  
As the EDC drama makes clear, however, politics is not always a rational exercise. 
Perhaps it is more accurate to state that politicians often draw from competing rationales. Despite 
some half-hearted objections, the anti-EDC deputies knew that the U.S. government would 
continue to insist on West German rearmament regardless of the outcome of the EDC Treaty in 
the French assembly. Yet they opposed it nonetheless. Mollet fretted privately about a factional 
conspiracy within the party to overthrow his leadership and to restore to power Mayer’s faction, 
which Mollet had deposed from leadership at the SFIO party congress of 1946.606 The anti-EDC 
opposition evoked the word “resistance” time and again, reviving speculations that Mollet had 
sat out the Second World War while the clandestine party leadership risked life and limb. There 
is no evidence though that such a conspiracy existed and, given the heterogeneous nature of the 
anti-EDC opposition, it would seem to have had little prospect of success.607 Also, neither side of 
the EDC battle had a monopoly on suffering: deportation and personal tragedy marked the lives 
of important SFIO figures of both persuasions.608 Nevertheless, the legacy of the Second World 
War and the resistance myth, which remained hegemonic in French political discourse in this 
period, loomed heavy in the internal SFIO debate.609  
604 Gouin to the Socialist group, 12 November 1953, GPS, AHC. Jaquet also called it the “lesser evil.” Denis 
Lefèbvre, ed., Gérard Jaquet: De Léon Blum à François Mitterrand: Entretiens avec Philippe Priol (Paris: Éditions 
Bruno Leprince, 2006), 65. 
605 See for instance Gouin’s, Mollet’s and Philip’s speeches to the May 1952 party congress, OURS.  
606 Lapie writes that, “Crazy with rage, Guy Mollet cried conspiracy. He denounced secret meetings...” Lapie, op 
cit., 479. 
607 In an interview decades later, Verdier, who opposed German rearmament, said that, “in general people were wise 
enough not to live based on personal rancor. For Alain Savary and myself, it was completely excluded.” Interview 
with Cyril le Guron, opt. cit.  
608 Two of the most fervent pro-EDC deputies, Jaquet and Pineau, for instance, had both been tortured and spent 
time in Nazi concentration camps. Lefèbvre, ed., 37-38.  
609 Pieter Lagrou writes that, “reference to resistance and persecution during the Second World War was a core 
element in the discourse of the Cold War and European integration, particularly in so far as both dealt with the 
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As children of the internal party purges that followed WWII, Socialists tended to consider 
the SFIO’s culture of personal honor, party integrity and their personal place before history 
through the lens of two events: the 1938 Munich Accords and the vote of full powers to Marshall 
Philippe Pétain in June 1940 following the French military defeat to the invading German 
armies. The word “Munich” surfaced time and again in the SFIO debates, and led to angry 
exchanges concerning the relevance of its lessons for the present decision.610 In summer 1954, 
French Socialists felt that the glare of history was once again focused upon them. Mayer justified 
his violation of party discipline in terms of “individual conscience”; Jean Bouhey called his 
opposition “a question of conscience”; Robert Gourdon spoke of his “real objection of 
conscience”; and Moch implored the Directing Committee to consider the “moral” aspect of the 
question and wrote later that the EDC Affair was “a case of conscience.”611 Evoking the failed 
Austrian Socialist uprising against the overthrow of democracy in Austria in 1934, Mayer told a 
party committee in private that, “Perhaps we will end nonetheless with German rearmament, but 
what I wish to save is the conscience of socialism, like in 1934...”612 At the time the “prudent” 
vote, the “pragmatic” vote in 1938 and 1940, seemed to have been to vote for the Munich 
Accords and for Marshall Pétain as the “lesser evils.” If West German rearmament was to occur 
regardless of their votes, then it should occur without their votes. On 30 August 1954, the anti-
SFIO deputies buried the EDC Treaty when it came to a procedural vote in the National 
Assembly.613 Had they voted in favor, the National Assembly would have had sufficient votes to 
ratify the EDC and General Treaties. 
 
 
 
German problem.” Also, “the notion of resistance was the point of reference, the norm against which to measure 
patriotic veracity and political merit.” Peiter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and 
National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15, 26. See also 
Henry Rousso, Le syndröme de Vichy: 1944-198... (Paris: Seuil, 1987). 
610 For the controversy over invoking “Munich” in the EDC debates, see Philip’s comments to the July 1953 
congress and Mollet’s speech to the National Council in November 1953, OURS. 
611 13 February 1952, JO, 697; 16 and 21 June 1954, CD, OURS; Moch to the Foreign Affairs Commission, 9 July 
1953, C/15592, AN. Jules Moch, Rencontres avec...Darlan, Eisenhower, 306-07.  
612 Mayer to the Directing Committee’s Bureau d’affaires internationales, 26 January 1953, AGM 111, OURS.  
613 The SFIO was by far the most important factor in the Treaty’s defeat. The enormous Communist and Gaullist 
parties were irrevocably hostile. The Radical party split its vote 33 in favor, 34 against. United, the Radical Party 
could have pushed the treaty over the bar but the Radical Party did not have the SFIO’s tradition of party discipline 
and commonly split its vote, which was not the case for the SFIO. Francis O’Neill, The French Radical Party and 
European Integration 1949-1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 77. 
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4.10 THE AFTERMATH: SFIO AND SPD REACTIONS TO THE  
PARIS ACCORDS OF 1954 AND WEST GERMANY’S INCORPORATION INTO THE  
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO, SEPTEMBER 1954-SPRING 1955 
 
In the aftermath of the EDC’s defeat, Chancellor Adenauer placed the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who had refused to make the Treaty 
subject to a confidence vote. In an interview Adenauer said that, “I regret to say that Mr. 
Mendès-France wanted to destroy the E.D.C.”614 In a reversal of roles, the SPD defended 
Mendès-France to the German public and insisted that the Western Allies not force the French 
government to accept a treaty on European defense against its will.615 In fact, Mendès-France’s 
premiership found a more enthusiastic welcome among the SPD leadership than it did in the 
SFIO. While the SFIO left wholeheartedly greeted his investiture as Prime Minister, eager to 
support his initiative to end the Indochina War and grant independence to the French 
protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, Mollet and others in his leadership circle argued that 
Mendès-France’s domestic policies contradicted the party’s economic and social goals.616 The 
SPD, for its part, was gratified to see a compelling personality from the left finally come to 
power in the French Fourth Republic.617 More so, the SPD leadership hoped that the success of 
the Geneva negotiations that concluded the Indochina War and Mendès-France’s supposed 
“neutralist” tendencies would open a back door to four-power negotiations for détente and 
German reunification. The same reputation that gave the SPD cause for praise led Adenauer to 
treat Mendès-France with an unmasked hostility. 
Although at first the SPD did not exclude a possible West German entry into NATO on 
the basis of an equality of rights, by September 1954, the party leadership made clear that it 
considered a new four-power conference and a Western initiative for German reunification to be 
614 Creswell, op cit., 159. 
615 See Wehner’s public praise of Mendès-France the day after the treaty’s defeat. Erklärung zur französischen 
Absage an die EVG, NWDR, 31 August 1954, 1/HWAA2072; Interview Erich Ollenhauer für JNS, 25 July 1954, 
EO 107. Also, see Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 58-62. 
616 In the SFIO parliamentary faction, the vote was 80 to 39 to vote for Mendès-France’s investiture in June 1953. 3 
June 1953, GPS, AHC. 
617 Jean-Paul Cahn, Le Parti social-démocrate et la fin de la quatrième république (1954-1958) (Berlin: Peter Lang, 
1996), 39-40. 
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a precondition for any SPD assent for West German rearmament.618 The leaders of the anti-EDC 
movement in the SFIO had a similar view, while the SFIO leadership continued its policy of 
pursuing “parallel” efforts for negotiations with the Soviet Union and Western defense. A new 
Soviet offer to restart negotiations for German reunification accompanied the most serious offer 
to date for a disarmament program under the U.N. Moch later recalled that he thought that, “the 
decisions in Paris and New York open[ed] a new path towards peace,” and he urged Mendès-
France in a letter to suspend an accord with the Allies for a defense system to replace the EDC 
until the French government had sounded out the Soviet offer.619 The SPD also sought direct 
contacts with Mendès-France through Mayer, which did not yield the desired result, and 
welcomed the assistance of leading anti-EDC SFIO members in its campaign for new 
negotiations.620 Alas, in this regard the opponents of German rearmament in French and West 
German politics were disappointed in the stance Mendès-France adopted. He and British Foreign 
Minister Anthony Eden quickly began a new round of negotiations to replace the EDC treaty, 
paying scant heed to Soviet entreaties.  
Historians have provided conflicting accounts of the outcome of the Paris Accords that 
provided a path for West German entry into the Western European Union defense pact as a 
means of integrating West Germany into the NATO alliance. Contrary to an older view that 
British and U.S. negotiators defeated Mendès-France in the September negotiations, newer 
research argues persuasively that Allied and West German governments satisfied nearly all of the 
French government’s demands.621 In the resulting Paris Accords, the parties agreed that German 
troops would not exceed twelve divisions, and that German military authorities would be subject 
to NATO decisions. Reviving a key French government demand, Adenauer agreed to elections 
618 Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und die europäische Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der 
sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik (Niebüll: videel OHG, 2003), 108-09. Ollenhauer laid out this position to the 
Bundestag on 7 October 1954, Verhandlungen, 2236-2242.  
619 Moch, Une si longue vie, 479-81; Méchoulan, op cit., 380-81. 
620 In a letter dated 23 August 1954, Mayer wrote that, “Like you, I think that it is necessary to place the problem of 
German unity before its rearmament.” L. Georges Picot, Chef-Adjoint du Cabinet de PM to Daniel Mayer, 29 
September 1954, responding to Mayer’s effort to organize a meeting between Markscheffel and Mendès-France. 
Günther Markscheffel 0, AdsD. For SPD internal discussions about contacts with the SFIO to create a common 
view, see the dispute within the SPD Central Committee, 18 September 1954, PV 1954, AdsD.  
621 Fursdon argues that Mendès-France was “defeated” in the negotiations. Fursdon, op cit., 324. Thomas Alan 
Schwartz writes that, “Mendès-France, having defeated an idea that had originated in Paris, found himself isolated 
and too weak to oppose the strong sentiment of the other European states.” Schwartz, op cit., 291. Hitchcock and 
Trachtenberg demonstrate that Mendès-France already favored an agreement along the lines of the London Accords 
before it was proposed by Eden, who claimed credit for the idea. Hitchcock, op cit., 197-98; and Trachtenberg, op 
cit., 123-24.  
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within a year on the “Europeanization” of the Saar territory, a position that dismayed SPD 
leaders who remained relentless critics of French authority in the Saarland. In addition, Adenauer 
offered of his own accord to renounce German production of atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons, though this did not preclude German possession of them. The Allies also took up a 
SFIO demand for a pooling of the WEU’s armaments production industries, a design meant to 
supervise German weapons firms. The SPD saw in this last demand a naked attempt to promote 
the French armaments industry at its neighbor’s expense.622  
Most importantly, the British and U.S. governments conceded to the French negotiating 
team far more extensive military guarantees than they had ever offered before. The price that the 
U.S. government paid for Mendès-France’s agreement to the Paris Accords was, in effect, a 
renunciation of Eisenhower’s grand strategy of massively reducing the U.S. troop presence in 
Europe. Eisenhower’s government issued a declaration asserting that it now considered NATO to 
be of indefinite duration, rather than the twenty years outlined in the 1949 treaty. French military 
leaders were ecstatic over the new U.S. commitment, believing that it “would ‘for the first time’ 
make an effective defense of Europe possible.”623 The British government had to go even 
further, promising to maintain four divisions and an air force on the continent for fifty years and 
subjecting their withdrawal to a majority vote of the countries in the WEU, a commitment 
unprecedented in British history.624  
These guarantees and a fear that NATO might dissolve without the Treaty’s ratification 
assured the SFIO leadership’s support for the Paris Accords. The pro-EDC faction around 
Jaquet, Mollet and Philip bemoaned the absence of supranational controls over a West German 
army and that the alliance structure would not be subject to a democratic assembly. They also 
criticized that the decisions of the envisioned common authority for arms production were non-
binding and violations would not result in automatic sanctions. The common authority was 
moribund in any case, and France’s allies discarded the idea in 1955. After hesitating and posing 
a series of conditions, Mollet announced that, though the treaty represented a “regrettable 
setback” from the EDC treaty, it constituted “a lesser evil.”625 As he told a meeting of the 
Socialist International in late December 1954, “For our attitude the guaranteed presence of 
622 Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 90-91. 
623 This new NATO policy, named MC 48, went into effect with the ratifications of the London Accords by the 
French National Assembly in December 1954. Trachtenberg, op cit., 175-76.  
624 Fursdon, op cit., 325. 
625  Mollet interview with Belgrade Nin, 17 November 1954, AGM 44, OURS. 
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American soldiers in Europe was decisive.” Facing an acute danger of French geopolitical 
isolation, he said that, “it is for negative reasons that SFIO policy changed” to supporting a 
system that included an autonomous West German military.626 
This time Mendès-France put the full weight of his office behind the Treaty and 
announced a confidence vote in the National Assembly. To nearly everyone’s astonishment, on 
Christmas Eve, it defeated the part of the Treaty allowing West German entry into the WEU by a 
vote of 280 to 259. SFIO opponents of the treaty had lost 33 of the 53 votes that they had cast 
against the EDC in August.627 Two factors account for this shift. It is clear that Moch and a 
number of other anti-EDC deputies voted for the treaty out of fear that continued French 
intransigence would destroy the Atlantic Alliance.628 Another important factor in their decision 
had nothing to do with the West German army or the Treaty itself. In a clear case of “issue-
linkage,” Mayer, Savary, Verdier, and others voted in favor in order to maintain Mendès-France 
at the helm of France’s government, in particular so that he could continue his project of reforms 
for the French Union and the French protectorates. Naegelen, who voted against the Treaty, told 
the February 1955 Party Congress that the number of opponents would have been significantly 
larger if the Treaty had not been attached to a confidence vote in Mendès-France’s government. 
Verdier reported to an interviewer later that, “We were not very proud of ourselves because we 
had placed ourselves in contradiction with ourselves...At that moment, we were very concerned 
to assure that the Mendès-France government survived.”629 Years later, Mayer also told an 
interviewer that he was still opposed to West German rearmament in December 1954 despite his 
626 Kurzbericht über die Sitzung des Generalrats der Sozialististischen Internationale im Amsterdam, 21./22. 
Dezember 1954, 2/PVBT12, AdsD. The SFIO Congress, held in November 1954, overwhelmingly approved the 
leadership’s position. The vote was 2,817 to 454 with 93 abstentions. Congrès extraordinaire in Suresnes, 10-11 
November 1954, OURS. For the internal party discussions, see the protocols of this Congress; the Directing 
Committee meetings of 6, 14, and 27, October 1954, and 7 December 1954; Mollet’s speech to the National 
Assembly, 8 October 1954; and Jaquet’s speech to the National Assembly, 22 December 1954, OURS, JO, 4642-44, 
6745-6. On 14 October 1954 Mollet reports having told Mendès-France in a private conversation that the SFIO 
expected to vote in favor of the treaties.  
627 Ollenhauer had considered ratification of the treaty in France to be “certain.” Karl-Ludwig Sommer, 
Wiederbewaffnung im Widerstreit von Landespolitik und Parteilinie: Senat, SPD und die Diskussion um die 
Wiederbewaffnung Bremen und im Bundesrat 1948/49 bis 1957/58 (Bremen: Bremen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), 
153-54. 
628 Singer, op cit., 52. Orlow writes that, “‘The anti-Cedistes’ change of heart resulted from a mixture of 
motivations, but foremost among them was the fear that another debate over German rearmament would lead to a 
split of the party.” This may well have been the case, but I have seen no real evidence of this in the available 
sources. Orlow, op cit., 172. 
629 Cyril le Guron, op cit. 
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vote in favor of the Paris Accords. He is worth quoting at length so as to reveal the mindset of a 
number of SFIO deputies who reluctantly switched their votes: 
[The vote for the Treaty] was the only vote of my life as a parliamentarian that I regret. 
One could not overthrow Mendès-France, who ended the war in Indochina and solved the 
EDC Affair. I voted in favor of the confidence [motion] for Mendès-France; I suppose if I 
had to do it again under the same circumstances, I would vote for it again but I still regret 
this vote which in practice resulted in the rearmament of Germany.630 
 
Yet the reduced group of twenty SFIO opponents represented a margin great enough to again 
sink the treaty. Lejeune and Naegelen were the most prominent among those who yet again voted 
“non.” Over the Christmas break, French deputies were subject to dire warnings from the French 
government and its NATO allies about the consequences of their refusal. Eden made clear that 
Britain would withdraw its military guarantees if the treaty was not ratified. Meanwhile, Konrad 
Adenauer pressured the Christian Democratic (MRP) leadership to swallow the bitter pill of 
voting confidence for their political nemesis, a pressure that yielded sufficient MRP votes to 
push the Treaty over the necessary threshold. In an atmosphere of great tension, a chastised 
French assembly met again on 30 December and approved the Treaty by the thin margin of 287 
to 260. Two socialists switched their votes and voted for the confidence motion and the Treaty. 
Eighteen SFIO deputies voted against West German rearmament for a third time. They faced a 
new round of party sanctions in the early months of 1955. 
SPD leaders considered the Paris Accords to be an improvement over the EDC Treaty, in 
particular because of the inclusion of Great Britain. However, the treaty also contained a 
“binding clause” that required Allied consent for the evacuation of western troops from 
Germany, denying the newly sovereign West German government the right to force them to 
leave. The clause had clearly been inserted to constrain the maneuverability of a future SPD 
government on the reunification issue.631 This clause alone would have sufficed to push the SPD 
into opposition, but the continued fear of the impact of a West German military on democracy 
remained central to the party’s attitude.632 As the SPD had expected, the Soviet government now 
signed a peace treaty with East Germany and incorporated it into an Eastern defense alliance, the 
630 Claude Juin, Liberté...justice...le combat de Daniel Mayer (Paris: Éditions Anthropes, 1982), 282. 
631 As the SPD revealed a new “German Plan” for a demilitarized zone to include a reunited Germany in 1958, 
Eisenhower said that he would not permit the U.S. to be “kicked out” of Germany. “If the Socialists did come to 
power in Germany,” he said, “we might have to put even more U.S. forces in that country.” Drummond, opt cit., 
126-27.  
632 For the SPD’s response in fall 1954, see Rede Gen. Ollenhauer Parteiausschusssitzung am 16.10.54 and PV 
Fraktionsvorstand 1 November 1954, EO 109, AdsD.  
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Warsaw Pact. The SPD launched a series of mass protests in 1955, riding a rising wave of 
popular opposition to West German rearmament. The SPD’s struggle against Adenauer’s defense 
policies now entered a new phase. With defense integration off the agenda in 1955, though, a 
path opened for a different SPD response to issues of European integration. 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY AND SOCIALIST CONSENSUS POLITICS: 
SFIO AND SPD DEPUTIES IN THE COMMON ASSEMBLY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL COMMUNITY, 1952-1957 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Historian of European integration Alan Milward famously wrote that the European governments 
of the Community “rescued” their nation-states in the 1950s by creating common institutions 
capable of resolving issues that had become intractable at the national level.633 His thesis has 
aged well over time. Once common institutions were in place, though, there were new venues for 
transnational political groups, in addition to transnational technocratic elites, to influence the 
Community’s institutional development. The ECSC Treaty created a judiciary, an executive 
High Authority, an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, and a supranational Common 
Assembly to supervise the Community’s activities. Parallel to Milward’s argument about 
national governments, the actions and policies of the SFIO and SPD within the Common 
Assembly make clear that they were also bringing to the supranational level issues that they were 
incapable of resolving at the national level. The SPD, in perpetual opposition, and the SFIO, in 
opposition for almost all of the period from 1951 to January 1956, came to consider the ECSC an 
alternate route for accomplishing policies rejected by their domestic political opponents and their 
own governments.  
By 1954, French Socialist and German Social Democratic deputies in the Common 
Assembly had achieved a working relationship increasingly marked by good will, cooperation, 
and a mutual respect for each other’s positions. This was a considerable achievement in the 
context of these parties’ bitter arguments surrounding the European Defense Community in this 
same period. The Socialists in the ECSC became the most effective practitioners of supranational 
party cooperation, and the most committed to reinforcing and extending the supranational 
633 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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features of the ECSC.634 Their efforts surpassed those of the other party groups within the 
Common Assembly, the Christian Democratic and Liberal factions, except on issues of 
constitutional designs, in which the Christian Democrats achieved greater transnational 
consensus in the failed discussions for the creation of a European Political Communty (EPC). In 
the process, the SPD was able to achieve an effective platform for policies and ideas that had 
been consistently blocked within Germany and, as a result, it completely abandoned its hostility 
to the ECSC, and became, in fact, one of its most erstwhile defenders.   
 
5.2 THE SFIO AND SPD COMMON ASSEMBLY DELEGATIONS 
 
The SPD sent to the Common Assembly its best and ablest. Ollenhauer and Wehner represented 
the party leadership. The mayor of Dortmund and the most important SPD figure in the Ruhr, 
Henssler, was also tapped. He may well have played a leading role in the new assembly had he 
not been too sick to attend its inaugural session in September 1952. He died on 3 December 
1953. The other three SPD deputies had long been steeped in the politics of coal and steel. 
Gerhard Kreyssig, recently elected to the Bundestag in a by-election, was a Bavarian with deep 
knowledge of the national impact of coal and steel policy. He was a spokesman for the coal-
importing regions of Germany. His son had married Ollenhauer’s daughter during the Second 
World War and he doubtless kept Ollenhauer abreast of developments in the assembly during 
their frequent dinner parties in the 1950s. Joachim Schöne, from the Ruhr territory, was perhaps 
the most knowledgeable deputy on the Ruhr’s coal and steel industries of anyone in the 
Bundestag, with the exception of Günter Henle, a Ruhr industrialist and CDU deputy. Heinrich 
Imig, a SPD deputy and leading figure in the IG Metall union, represented the union and Ruhr 
interests as well. Both Schöne and Imig had frequently been called upon to help formulate and 
articulate SPD policy on coal and steel during the debates on the ECSC and co-determination 
from 1949 to 1952. Willi Birkelbach, a leading expert in social policy, rounded out the 
delegation. Later, Heinrich Deist, an important official within IG Bergbau, the coal miners’ 
union, replaced the deceased Henssler. By the mid-1950s, Deist was perhaps the most important 
figure in SPD economic policy at the national level. Had it not been for his untimely death in 
634 This is Ernst Haas’ view as well. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 
1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 412-419. 
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1964, he likely would have been finance minister in Willy Brandt’s government. The SPD 
deputies’ collective expertise was to prove invaluable to the SPD in the new assembly.  
The Bundestag and French National Assembly elected their representatives through an 
unofficial, but collegial method that respected in part the proportional strength of each political 
group. This was not particularly democratic, however, as both assemblies made sure to exclude 
the far left and right from representation. Despite winning around a quarter of the vote in France, 
no communist was elected to serve in the Common Assembly. The proportional strength of the 
SPD in the 1949 German election (29%), compared to the meager results of the SFIO in France 
in 1951 (10%), was such that the SPD delegation was more than twice as large as the SFIO’s. 
Guy Mollet, Roger Carcassonne, and Gerhard Jaquet represented the SFIO. When Guy Mollet 
became Prime Minister in January 1956, they were replaced by Étienne Weill-Raynal, and Gilles 
Gozard, both economic experts, and Pierre-Olivier Lapie, who was later appointed by Charles de 
Gaulle as Commissioner to the ECSC’s High Authority. With the partial exception of 
Carcassonne, a Socialist senator who was not particularly influential within the party, the SFIO 
had no coal or heavy industry experts in the new assembly. Thus the SPD delegation that arrived 
in Luxembourg was more robust than that of the SFIO and had far greater technical expertise in 
the fields under the competence of the Community. This situation was to have great 
repercussions for the working relations within the Socialist faction of the ECSC, as well as for 
SPD attitudes towards the ECSC. 
 
5.3 SUPRANATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY POWER AND COOPERATION:  
THE SPD AND SFIO IN THE INAUGURAL PHASE OF THE COMMON ASSEMBLY 
 
Although they had all opposed the creation of the ECSC, the SPD deputies came to Luxembourg 
in spring 1953 ready to work. As in the case of German remilitarization, the SPD was determined 
to exert as much influence as possible within an institution the very existence of which it 
disapproved. Its first task, for which it received the full support of its SFIO colleagues, was to 
strengthen the powers of the Common Assembly vis-à-vis what the SPD at first considered to be 
a nearly all-powerful High Authority. The powers of the Common Assembly granted by the 
Treaty of Paris were paltry indeed, as it had neither legislative nor budgetary powers. Its only 
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source of power was that of censure. It could force the resignation of the entire High Authority 
with a vote of two-thirds of its deputies.  
With the other Socialist parties’ support, the SPD led the charge to increase the Common 
Assembly’s powers. The Socialist faction made clear its intention of turning the skeletal 
Assembly into a true parliamentary body capable of effectively supervising the High Authority 
and directing the course of the young Community. At the opening session, therefore, Wehner 
proposed the creation of eight parliamentary commissions against the official proposal of four.635 
He also insisted that the Community fund the activities of the party factions, so as to enable their 
work. On numerous occasions, Wehner, Mollet, and others complained that the information that 
the High Authority provided the Assembly’s commissions was insufficient to allow for effective 
parliamentary oversight.636 They also proposed that the Assembly exercise oversight of the High 
Authority’s personnel decisions. French Socialists and German Social Democrats demanded time 
and again that the High Authority inform the Assembly in advance or, better, make proposals to 
the Assembly before taking important decisions that resulted in faits accomplis, especially on 
matters related to investment and budgeting.637 Later a new SFIO deputy to the Common 
Assembly, Gilles Gozard, argued that the Assembly should be able to censure and remove a 
single commissioner, rather than having to censure the entire High Authority and risk thereby 
throwing the Community into turmoil.638 The ECSC Socialist faction was the most persistent of 
all the factions in trying to increase the powers of the ECSC Common Assembly.639  
635 The Christian Democratic and Liberal factions of the ECSC Common Assembly and the High Authority 
proposed to create four commissions: Transport, Investments, Workers’ Housing, and Supply and Requirements. 
Wehner proposed a committee for external relations, a rules commission, a commission on market questions and 
prices, a commission for questions of production, a commission for questions of provisioning and consumption, a 
commission for work and social questions, a commission for questions concerning exchange and transport, and an 
ad hoc commission charged with making general proposals on occasion. Common Assembly of the European Coal 
& Steel Community (CA-ECSC), 10-13 September 1953, Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of 
Pittsburgh. 
636 Mollet to the ECSC Common Assembly. CA-ECSC, 14 January 1954, AEI. See also Wirtschaftskommentar von 
Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 26. Jan. 1954, Gerard Kreyssig (GK) 26, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie 
(AdsD). 
637 See Die Organe der Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl und ihre Befugnisse laut Vertrag. Wehner sent this 
document to Ollenhauer, Schöne, Kreyssig and Birkelbach on 15 March 1954. GK 114, AdsD. See also Kreyssig’s 
remarks in the Commission de la compatabilité et de l’administration de la Communauté et de l’Assemblée 
commune. Compte-rendu analytique de la réunion du lundi 27 avril 1953 et du mardi 28 avril 1953, GK 129, AdsD. 
638 CA-ESCS, 8 May 1956, AEI. 
639 Note: when I refer to “Socialists” in this chapter I mean specifically the Socialist faction of the ECSC Common 
Assembly. In future research, I would like to integrate the activities of Belgian, Dutch, Italian and Luxembourgian 
Socialist representatives into these discussions. For the sake of simplicity, and to highlight the consensus that 
developed between the SFIO and SPD, I do not focus on the Socialist parties of the other four nations. This 
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In fall 1953, the work of the Common Assembly was truly underway. The protocols of 
the ECSC floor debates, of the various commissions, and of the Socialist faction all reveal a SPD 
delegation deeply engaged in the Common Assembly’s detailed technical work and policy 
debates.640 Schöne became chair of the Socialist faction and vice president of the investment 
commission, perhaps the most important of the Assembly’s commissions. He and other SPD 
deputies authored countless commission reports presented to the fully Assembly.  
The Socialists worked quickly to forge a transnational Socialist faction within the 
Common Assembly that would effectively coordinate policy among the parties.641 Although one 
historian argues that the Socialists failed to create a “supranational” atmosphere within the 
faction,642 the available sources suggest otherwise. Braving the derision of the supposedly more 
supranationally-inclined CDU, which denounced the SPD within Germany for casting aside 
national loyalties, the SPD elected to join its Socialist colleagues in voting for the Belgian 
Socialist, Paul-Henri Spaak, to be president of the Common Assembly rather than the German 
CDU candidate, Heinrich von Brentano.643 When the Assembly formed working groups on 
various policies, the SPD argued in the name of the Socialist faction that these working groups 
should be assigned on the basis of political affiliation rather than on nationality.644 The Socialists 
unanimously agreed to caucus together a half hour before the meeting of all commissions. 
Generally a Socialist speaker on the floor represented a unanimous Socialist position. For 
instance, in the ECSC Assembly session of late 1954, the Socialists were united in countering 
Christian-Democratic proposals with their own on a wide variety of issues.645  
The SPD and SFIO party leaders were quite aware of the collegial atmosphere within the 
Socialist delegation. Ollenhauer told a radio audience in June 1954 that, “This cooperation 
among the Socialists must be considered a joyous [development] and a very positive sign for the 
analytical focus is not meant to minimize the contributions of the other four parties, though even so, the strength of 
the SPD faction vis-à-vis its partners, with the partial exception of the Belgian Socialist Party, is clear in the sources. 
640 See, for instance, Ausschuss für Fragen des Gemeinsamen Marktes. Protokoll über die Tagungen vom Montag, 
den 8. Februar 1953, GK 125, AdsD. 
641 Wehner made this goal explicit in a letter to Ollenhauer on 17 January 1953. Bermerkungen zu den Richtlininen 
für die aussenpolitische Aktivität der SPD, Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 420, AdsD.  
642 Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und der europäische Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der 
sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik, 1949-1955. (Niebüll: videel OHG, 2003), 123. 
643 See Ollenhauer’s sarcastic rebuttal of CDU attacks at the SPD party congress. 25 September 1952, SPD Parteitag, 
42, AdsD. 
644 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 6 May 1955, AEI. 
645 See Groupe Socialiste à la CECA, Réunion du 27 Novembre 1954, 30 Novembre 1954 and 1er Decembre 1954, 
GK 116, AdsD. 
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future [erfreulich und zukünftsträchtig].” Mollet happily told an interviewer in June 1955 that, 
“The accent has been so often placed on the differences between the attitudes of the German and 
French Socialists...[but] I am very pleased to emphasize that, for the last several months, it has 
been in the name of an unanimous [Socialist] group that the Socialist speakers have expressed 
themselves at the podium of the Coal and Steel Assembly.”646 When they were authorized to 
speak in their own name, including during the height of the polemics surrounding the EDC, the 
Socialists agreed that they would consciously avoid emphasizing their internal divisions. SFIO 
and SPD speakers studiously adhered to this practice and there is hardly a trace in the 
Assembly’s records of the divisions that so marked the relations between the parties outside the 
Common Assembly. By 1956, the Socialists even launched a combined assault on the new 
President of the High Authority, René Mayer, a development analyzed below.  
This chapter examines the functional harmony that developed within the Socialist faction 
of the ECSC Common Assembly in order to demonstrate how inter-party cooperation at the 
supranational level created a form of consensus politics that contrasted with concurrent divisions 
taking place over European defense integration. It also argues that the experience of the SFIO 
and SPD deputies within the Common Assembly created a “spill-over” dynamic among the 
Socialists, which contributed to the SFIO and SPD’s responses to the Treaties of Rome.647 First I 
646 Une interview exclusive de M. Guy Mollet a “Paris-Presse-l’Intransigeant,” Paris-Presse-l’Intransigeant 
25/6/55, AGM 44, Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste (OURS).  
647 “Spill-over” is a term Ernest Haas borrowed from economics to develop his early theory of European integration. 
The term is central to neo-functionalist interpretations of European integration. It means, in effect, that sectoral 
integration develops internal dynamics that pushes the actors involved in the process to support a further extension 
of integration into neighboring policy fields. Haas’ theory is holistic; it makes claims concerning the forces driving 
the integration process as a whole. Challenges to Haas’ theory include Stanley Hoffman’s realism, and Andrew 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, to name the most important scholars in this debate. Here I make no 
general claims about the forces pushing forward or backward the European integration process, but rather I focus on 
how “spill-over” is a useful term for understanding the evolution of SFIO and, in particular, SPD policy towards 
European integration during the early period of the European Coal & Steel Community. Haas writes that, “Sectoral 
integration...begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group 
demands and their attendant ideologies.” This claim is controversial and open to criticism. However, when ideology 
is added to the mix, Haas seems to be correct at least in our case, but this does require qualifying his argument such 
that his central claims are in need of further adjustment. He is right to claim though that, “The ‘spill-over’ is real for 
[those with positive expectations], since basic ideological tenets even in the coal-steel sector seemingly cannot be 
attained without expanding the supranational task to additional fields. The demand pattern of ECSC Labour and of 
the Socialist Parties is the most striking case in point.”  However, in addition to ideological factors, I believe that 
Haas is correct to claim that, “the simple concern for the proper functioning of the integrated sector may also lead to 
a spill-over effect.” The SPD seems to be a case in point here. Ernst B. Haas, The United of Europe: Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 1968), 289-99. For criticism 
of Haas, see Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western  
Europe,” Daedalus 95, 3 (1966): 862-915; and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1998. 
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investigate the areas of consensus between the parties and how they effectively worked together 
to further these goals. Then I turn to an examination of how they managed issues that divided 
them, the most important of which was the cartel issue, and how they developed a common 
vision for the community’s policies towards coal and steel in favor of a more supranational 
institutional design.  
 
5.4 THE SFIO AND SPD AND THE PURSUIT OF AN  
ACTIVE COMMUNITY SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Housing policy had long been a domestic priority for French Socialists and German Social 
Democrats. The material damage inflicted by world war and a postwar economic policy 
dedicated to prioritizing the reconstruction of heavy industry had created an acute housing 
shortage that was exacerbated by the deterioration resulting from decades of prewar government 
neglect of this crucial sector. As early as December 1948, the SFIO made note of this dire 
situation and called for a vigorous program to build 20,000 housing units per month.648 While 
the party gave its full support to the Monnet modernization plan, it retroactively regretted that it 
had relegated housing to a subordinate role.649 Hence in the first years of the Common 
Assembly, housing became one of the party’s top priorities.650   
The Social Democrats put forth a similar view in West Germany. From the opening 
sessions of the Bundestag in 1949, the party emphasized the desperate need for increased 
investment in housing.651 As a sign of its importance, the party had formed a special committee 
on social housing under the SPD Central Committee. This special committee offered a technical 
report with quite specific guidelines for how much space a family needed to live comfortably, as 
648 Jean Minjoz to the National Assembly, 22 December 1948, Journal Officiel (JO), 7859.  
649 Édouard Depreux to the National Assembly, 8 August 1951, JO, 6258. Mollet called for an acceleration of the 
French housing program in his failed investiture debate, 6 March 1951, JO, 1765. For an overview of the situation of 
French housing under the Fourth Republic, see Jean-Pierre Rioux, The French Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 376-79. 
650 Pineau considered housing “the second most important issue” facing the French government. National Assembly, 
4 December 1952, JO, 3942. See also Mollet’s comment to the National Assembly, 6 January 1953, JO, 6. 
651 See the Bundestag speeches of Georg Stierle on 20 October 1949; Erich Klabunde, 28 March 1950; Erich 
Schoettle, 10 November 1950; and Fritz Erler, 1 and 8 March 1951, Verhandlungen,  275-77, 3654, 4676, 4752-53. 
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well as what amenities should be included.652 In October 1953, Ollenhauer designated housing as 
“one of the most pressing matters” facing the German government.653 Due to its economic 
importance for Germany’s war effort, North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), and the Ruhr in 
particular, was the epicenter of this attention. Nearly 50% of houses in that Land had been 
damaged during the war, and the percentage was considerably higher in the Ruhr industrial 
cities.654  
Regional SPD leaders had long called attention to the plight of workers’ housing, 
especially in the mining and steel communities. The NRW-SPD worked with Karl Arnold, its 
CDU coalition partner in 1947-50, to address this problem. But by 1949, it was clear that the 
Land government did not possess the financial means to meet SPD Reconstruction Minister Fritz 
Steinhoff’s ambition to build hundreds of thousands of new units by 1952. Steinhoff and the 
coalition turned to the other Länder for financial assistance to rescue their housing goals and to 
enact a large-scale housing program.655 On 23 October 1951, the Bundestag passed a law to 
invest in miners’ housing, which authorized financing for the construction of 90,000 houses by 
the end of 1954.656 Over the next years, the SPD criticized the government for building too few 
houses far too slowly. 
While the SFIO and SPD continued to pressure for larger investments in housing in their 
domestic politics throughout the 1950s, the ECSC offered the parties an alternative forum in 
which to pursue their housing objectives. They seized this opportunity. Under the impetus of the 
Socialist faction, housing achieved a predominant place in the Common Assembly’s discussions 
in 1953-1957.  SPD deputy Willi Birkelbach took the matter in hand. He led a delegation of the 
Assembly’s Committee for Social Questions through the principal mining communities, visiting, 
among others, the Lorraine, Luxembourg, the Saarland, Liège, and, of course, the Ruhr. He 
652 Entschliessung Der Ausschuss für soziales Bauen bei dem Parteivorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands hat in seine Sitzung am 10. Februar 1951 zur Frage der Schlicht- und Einfacht-Wohnungen Stellung 
genommen, GK 189, AdsD. 
653 Ollenhauer, 28 October 1953, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 43.  
654 Falk Wiesemann, “Flüchtlinge in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” in Gerhard Brunn and Reimar Hobbing, ed. Nordrhein-
Westfalen und seine Anfänge nach 1945/46 (Essen: Klartext, 1986), 165. In the Ruhr territory, 30% of housing 
owned by the mining companies was totally destroyed and an additional 22% suffered massive damage. Werner 
Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (Munich: C.H. Beck 1984), 34. 
655 Kurzprotokoll der 5. Sitzung des Sonderausschusses zur Behandlung von Fragen der Kohlenförderung am 
Dienstag, den. 22 März 1949, 10.00 Uhr in Frankfurt a.M.; Kurzprotokoll der 8. Sitzung des Sonderausschusses zur 
Behandlung von Fragen der Kohlenförderung am Mittwoch, den 22. Juni 1949, 10.00 Uhr. WIRTSCHAFTSRAT 
DES VEREINIGTE WIRTSCHAFTSGEBIETES Drucksachen 1606 Zusammenfassender Bericht des 
Sonderausschusess zur Behandlung von Fragen der Kohlenförderung, 5. August 1949, GK 67, AdsD. 
656 Abelshauser, op cit., 85.  
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reported that the delegation found conditions everywhere to be shocking. With SFIO support, he 
proposed a wide range of measures beyond simply constructing houses. These included: 
financing an improved water supply to the industrial regions, developing transport links to 
overcome the isolation of mining communities from surrounding areas; de-coupling workers 
from future housing contracts imposed by their employers; encouraging worker ownership; 
granting attention to the special situation of migrant workers; and reducing interest rates for 
housing investment.657   
The Socialists made housing a bell-weather for a successful Community social policy on 
coal and steel.658 In his private notes, Wehner celebrated that through housing and other social 
policies, “the political groups have risen above national frontiers.”659 The Socialist faction put 
unrelenting pressure on the High Authority to investigate and address the housing crisis in the 
coal and steel communities. In response to formal questions, the High Authority responded that 
at least 10% of workers’ dwellings were “very bad.”660 Monnet then promised a High Authority 
program that would build 50-60,000 houses per year. After receiving a lower loan from the U.S. 
government than he had expected, however, he disappointed the Socialist faction by reducing 
this estimate to 20-25,000 dwellings. Nonetheless, Monnet sought loans for this purpose 
elsewhere with some success and, with these loans, the High Authority reached agreement with 
the French and Italian governments to indirectly help finance low-interest investments in housing 
in late 1955. For the SPD, a subsequent program was an important success. Two-thirds of the 
houses to be built were in Germany, the vast majority of these in the Ruhr. After a slow start, the 
High Authority’s housing program gained momentum. By October 1957, 6,422 of the 7,406 
houses built were in Germany.661 By 1 April 1958, the High Authority had sponsored the 
construction of almost 30,000 houses in the ECSC member states.662 
657 Birkelbach, CA-ECSC, 13 May 1954 and 20 June 1956, AEI.  
658 See the section on housing in Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Arbeitsunterlage für 
die Gemeinsame Sitzung der Sozialistischen Fraktion der Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS und der 
Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, von 13. und 14. Oktober 1955, GK 118, AdsD.  
659 Vorschlag einer Gliederung für Broschüre: “Realistische Europapolitik,” 1/HWAA1033, AdsD. 
660 Réunion jointe entre la Haute Autorité de la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier et de la 
Commission des Questions sociales de l’Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, 29 January 1954, CEAB 
4/43, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BaK). 
661 Haas, op cit., 93.  
662 Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin. The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community: Supranationality in Operation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), 180-81, 322-25.  
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Birkelbach, who had been a fierce critic of the High Authority before the ECSC began 
operation, lauded the “good will” that the High Authority displayed on the housing issue. The 
SFIO and SPD deputies recognized that it was money, rather than will, that limited the High 
Authority’s intervention in this sector. By 1955, a united Socialist faction pleaded for an 
expansion of the High Authority’s powers beyond those granted in the treaty so that it could levy 
direct taxes on coal and steel enterprises to increase its finances.663 The practical experience 
within the ECSC Common Assembly had led the SPD deputies to undergo a remarkable 
transformation. After years of denouncing a “dictatorial” High Authority, SPD deputies now 
looked to the supranational institution as an ally in its pursuit of goals rooted in German 
domestic politics.664  
This was not only the case for housing. The SPD’s about-face is evident in all areas of the 
Community’s social policy. Socialists in the Common Assembly worked harmoniously, first to 
pressure the High Authority to exercise the full powers granted to it by the Treaty of Paris for 
social policy and, second, to pressure their governments to revise the treaty in order to expand 
the range of supranational powers. French Socialists also took their domestic struggle to the 
ECSC Common Assembly. For example, they appealed to the Assembly to rescue the French 
miners’ retirement system.665 Although the High Authority did not have jurisdiction over this 
field, it made proposals to the member states for a multilateral accord to harmonize the 
community’s retirement funds.666  
Under the chairmanship of Willi Birkelbach, the Commission on Social Questions 
developed into one of the Assembly’s most active commissions. Arguing that the measures taken 
by their governments to assist and re-train laid-off coal and steel workers were insufficient, the 
Socialist faction called for the High Authority to intervene directly and formulate its own 
663 Assemblée Commune Commission des Affaires Sociales Projet de Note au nom de la Commission en réponse à 
la lettre de M. R. Motz, Président du Groupe de travail, en date de 20 juin 1955 sur l’extension des competences de 
la Communauté dans le domaine sociale (1) par M. G.M. NEDERHORST rapporteur, juillet 1955, CEAB 1/1627, 
BaK.  
664 The SPD supported supranationalism in principle but opposed it when it believed intergovernmental 
arrangements might lead to the successful integration of Great Britain and Scandinavia. Moravcsik errs in writing 
that the “less supranational” features of the Treaties of Rome increased support for it in the SPD. Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 95. 
665 The former miner and SFIO deputy from the Nord, Paul Sion, argued for years for a national rescue of the 
miners’ retirement fund. 27 June 1952, 3284-85; 23 October 1952, 4344; JO, 801.  
666 Réunion jointe entre la Haute Autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier et de la 
Commission des questions sociales de l’Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, 29 January 1954, CEAB 
4/433, BaK.  
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programs.667 Under this pressure, the High Authority agreed to pay to help transport thousands of 
unemployed steel workers from the Centre-Midi to the Lorraine region of France.668 Community 
funds paid for half of this program. Rather than accepting mass displacements, Socialists 
pressured the High Authority to prioritize re-adaptation where the workers lived, in part because 
the Centre-Midi workers proved highly reluctant to leave their region.669 Overall French workers 
benefited the most from the ECSC’s re-adaptation fund.670 
When leading the tour of workers’ housing, Birkelbach also had the delegation visit 
research institutes in the Ruhr city of Bochum charged with fighting occupational illnesses. His 
commission worked closely with the High Authority to sponsor research into workers’ health, 
promote workplace compensation and safety, shorten working hours, harmonize vacation and 
overtime pay, and assist the plight of migrant workers who often suffered discrimination and 
neglect.671 Over the next years, the High Authority made significant investments in these fields, 
achievements warmly welcomed by the Socialist deputies.672 
French Socialists found an ally in the SPD on an issue of fundamental economic concern: 
equal pay for men and women, and the harmonization of the member nations’ wages and social 
costs. This would become a central demand and obstacle during the negotiations to create a 
European Economic Community, as the German government and industrial leaders vigorously 
opposed Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s demand for wage harmonization.673 In a speech at a 
Lorraine coal mine in 1956, Mollet told his audience that: 
It is necessary that our mines be competitive in the common market, that our sale prices 
be competitive. The problem of the harmonization of social charges and salaries in the 
countries of the ECSC is particularly important due to the considerable part that labor 
costs carry in coal pricing. It constitutes a constant worry for the government. In the 
667 Commission des Affaires Sociales, Projet de Note fait au nom de la Commission en réponse à la lettre de M. R. 
Motz, Président du Groupe de travail, en date du 20 juin 1955 sur l’extension des compétences de la Communauté 
dans le domaine social (1) par M. G.M. NEDERHORST rapporteur juillet 1955, CEAB 1/1627, BaK. 
668 Documentation en réponse aux questions posées par MM. Birkelbach et Nederhorst en vue de la réunion du 28 
avril de la Commission des affaires sociales de l’Assemblée commune, CEAB 2/457, BaK; Spierenburg and 
Poidevin, op cit., 183. 
669 Mollet to CA-ECSC, 13 May 1955, AEI; Haas, op cit., 229.   
670 Haas, op cit., 229. 
671 Birkelbach to CA-ECSC, 13 May 1954 and 29 November 1956, AEI.  
672 Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Arbeitsunterlage für die gemeinsame Sitzung der 
Sozialistischen Fraktion der Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS und der Beratendene Versammlung des 
Europarates, von 13. und 14. Oktober 1955, GK 118, AdsD. For a summary of the High Authority’s work in the 
field of social policy, see Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 325-35. 
673 Werner Bührer, “German Industry and European Integration in the 1950s,” in Clemens Wurm, ed., Western 
Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960 (Washington: Berg Publishers, 1995), 
102. 
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negotiations that are going to open for the general common market in Europe, this 
harmonization will be for us one of the essential conditions for an agreement.674  
 
In 1953, however, no one knew exactly what the comparative situation was. It was widely 
believed, though, that France had considerably higher wages and social costs than did Germany. 
Carcassonne considered this situation to be a distortion of free competition within the 
Community, a situation that encouraged “social dumping,” a claim that could have had wide 
implications for Europe’s economic and social organization had it been accepted.675 However, 
due to the different currencies and amorphous social charges, the High Authority’s first task was 
to develop reliable comparative statistics. After years of work, it found that France did indeed 
have higher wages and social costs than did Germany in the coal sector, though less so in steel. 
The total estimated difference was approximately 10%, though in certain areas it was 
considerably higher.676  
While German industry prospered from a lower cost of production that resulted from 
lower wages and social costs, the SPD and trade unions saw an opportunity to extract higher 
wages and benefits for German coal and steel workers. The SPD and the leading German trade 
union federation, the DGB, made common cause with French Socialists on this issue.677 
Socialists on the Commission on Social Questions made consistent demands that wages and 
social costs be harmonized on the basis of the high-wage nations’ rates and called for the 
introduction of a minimum wage, though they conceded that its level might have to vary from 
nation to nation.678 The High Authority argued that its legal powers in this area were limited. In 
his personal notes, Kreyssig wrote that the “competence or full power of the High Authority in 
674 Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil à l’occasion du centième anniversaire des Houillères 
de Lorraine Merlebach, le 23 juin 1956, AGM 68, OURS. 
675 Carcassonne to CA-ECSC, 14 May 1954, AEI.  
676 Ernst-Dieter Köpper, Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik: Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur 
wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die 
NATO (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus-Verlag, 1982), 156-57. The SFIO estimated that the daily wage for a French miner 
was 1559 francs while it was 1387 for German miners with the industry paying 1230 in social costs in France but 
only 733 in Germany. This represented a burden for each ton of French coal of approximately 610 francs vis-à-vis 
German coal. The situation was far better in the steel indusry where the costs were almost the same. Note de la 
délégation française sur l’égalisation des charges salariales, GK 115, AdsD. 
677 For the German trade unions’ view, see Köpper, op cit., 160-64, which includes a quote on this issue from Deist 
to the delegates of the IG-Metall conference in fall 1954.  
678 Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses für Fragen der Sozialpolitik über Kapitel V. des zweiten Gesamtberichts über 
die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft vom 13. April 1953 bis 11. April 1954 (Arbeitsfragen) vorgelegt von Herrn W. 
BIRKELBACH, Berichtstatter, CEAB 1/1626 BaK. Protokoll der gemeinsamen Sitzung vom 21. September 1955 
der sozialistische Mitglieder des Ausschusses für Fragen der Sozialpolitik der Gemeinsamen Versammlung und der 
Vertreter der 21er Auschusses, GK 118, AdsD.  
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the area of wage policy [is] of extraordinary importance.”679 He told the Common Assembly 
that, if “the High Authority cannot intervene against salary dumping when it sees that to be the 
case, we must recognize that the dispositions of the Treaty are ridiculously insufficient.”680 
French Socialists and German Social Democrats brought their national priorities on social 
policies to the Common Assembly and succeeded in creating a united front when dealing with 
the High Authority. In doing so, they often found themselves in direct opposition to their Liberal 
and Christian Democratic colleagues as well as to their own governments. They continued to 
insist that the supranational powers over social policy were far too meager, and they brought this 
position into the ECSC Common Assembly’s successor, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
European Economic Community.  
 
5.5 FROM BITTER DISPUTE TO CONSENSUS: THE SFIO AND SPD AND  
THE COMMUNITY’S POLICY ON CARTELS 
 
No issue related to coal and steel had so deeply divided the SFIO and SPD during the Schuman 
debates as that of cartels. There seemed to be little room for compromise. The two parties 
represented opposite positions within their domestic politics. The SFIO consistently argued for 
stronger legislation against cartels, while the SPD wanted to preserve certain forms of vertical 
integration in the Ruhr industry. The SFIO and French government’s intention to use the ECSC 
Treaty to dissolve the Ruhr coal sales cartel was the most substantive and irreconcilable 
disagreement between the two parties in this field of policy. In the first years of the ECSC, the 
SPD continued to argue that discrimination against German industry in the form of Allied de-
concentration and dismantlement during a period of French industrial concentration constituted 
the original sin of the community.681  
Yet even in this sphere the two parties were able to achieve a relative consensus within 
two years of the opening of the customs union. Considering the bitterness of the dispute from 
1948 to 1952, that they were able to do so is rather remarkable. It signaled a willingness to 
cooperate not only in the form of empty rhetorical solidarity, but also an ability to learn and 
679 GK 134, AdsD. 
680 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1956, AEI. 
681 Kreyssig for instance repeated this view in December 1953. Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig 
Dienstag, den 15. Dezember 1953, GK 25, AdsD. 
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empathize with the situation that each party faced within its domestic sphere. At first the 
fundamental cleavage on cartels continued to shape the SFIO and SPD discussions. However, 
although SFIO and SPD speakers put forth their diverging positions on cartel policy to the 
Common Assembly, the parties studiously avoided criticizing each other’s position. By 1955, 
this mutual respect had transformed into common proposals on cartel policy within the 
Community.  
What had happened? The most important development was that the cartel-busting High 
Authority proved to be a hesitant, even lame enforcer of the Treaty’s anti-cartel provisions. The 
six organizations that made up the Ruhr sales cartel (GEORG) operated in practice exactly as 
had its predecessor, the unitary DKV. More than half of the Community’s coal purchases 
occurred through this organization.682 After an initial effort to break cartels in 1953, Monnet 
signaled in spring 1954 that he would seek a compromise solution with Ruhr industry. Monnet 
was keen to ensure the political success of the ECSC, and his efforts to woo German political 
and industrial circles, including, crucially, the SPD and the industrial trade unions, dampened his 
eagerness to carry through an effective assault on the Ruhr coal sales cartel. The Ruhr industries 
took advantage of this breathing room and fortified themselves with a policy of intransigent non-
cooperation, a position supported by the German government.  
The SPD deputies in the Common Assembly took notice. Deist wrote to Schöne and 
Kreyssig in October 1954 that the High Authority was taking account of German views and had 
“without limitation recognized the particular situation of the Ruhr basin.”683 Also, contrary to the 
fears of French competition and discrimination that so marked SPD analyses in previous years, 
German steel was booming within the community. By 1954, German steel production had 
doubled since the Schuman declaration of May 1950.684 Dismantlements had in fact proved in 
part a blessing because they forced the German steel industrialists to modernize their methods 
and equipment once they were permitted to reconstruct their enterprises.  
Over time the SFIO deputies in the Common Assembly came to accept much of the 
SPD’s position on the Ruhr coal sales cartel. This position was summarized well by SPD coal 
expert Deist in a report that argued that the sales cartel ensured a stability for a coal market in 
682 Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski, Nordrhein-Westfalen, die Ruhr und Europa: Föderalismus und Europapolitik, 
1945-1955 (Essen: Klartext, 1990), 147-50.  
683 Deist letter to Schöne and Kreyssig, 25 October 1954, GK 116, AdsD. 
684 Sylvie Lefèvre, Les relations économiques franco-allemands de 1945 à 1955: De l’occupation à la cooperation. 
(Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière, 1998), 295-98. 
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which the norm would otherwise be alternating periods of overproduction and shortages linked 
to seasonal swings.685 In existence in some form since 1893, he asserted that the coal sales cartel 
was necessary to maintain a secure supply for consumers and to protect the employment of the 
industry’s workers. As coal supplies rose, a central SFIO concern from the Schuman Plan era—
that the Ruhr of its own accord would deny the French economy the coal that it needed to 
survive—no longer posed a problem. Coal was plentiful in the mid-1950s, in fact, dangerously 
plentiful for the industry’s future prosperity. It no doubt helped that the French steel-
transforming industries seemed quite pleased about the ECSC’s impact on the cost and 
availability of steel provisioning within France.686 
The SPD, in turn, leapt to the defense of the French governmental purchase agency, the 
Association Technique de l’Importation Charbonnière (ATIC), responsible for all coal imports 
into France. In part to give the impression of balance, Monnet targeted ATIC for violating the 
cartel provisions of the Treaty of Paris.687 French Socialist Lapie argued that there could no 
comparison between the cartelistic attributes of GEORG and ATIC. Unlike GEORG, ATIC 
made no attempt to control prices or the distribution of coal. Lapie pleaded for its maintenance, 
telling the Common Assembly that, “It is the basis of the entire French economy.” He suggested 
tentatively that a solution could be to extend this organizational form to the entire Community. 
At the same session, Kreyssig came to Lapie’s defense, rebuking the High Authority for its 
campaign against ATIC and urging it to consider Lapie’s proposal that it be used as a model for a 
Community-wide organization.688  
In November 1955, the High Authority finally announced its program to bring GEORG 
into conformance with the ECSC treaty. The proposed reforms were mild enough but even these 
were ignored by the Ruhr industries.689 The continued vitality of the Ruhr coal sales cartel was 
made clear when the individual sales agencies simultaneously announced identical prices 
685 Deist, 6.8.1954, Kurzbericht über die Problem des deutschen Kohlenverkaufs, GK 115, AdsD. Schöne made this 
same point in a speech to the CA-ECSC, 15 May 1954, AEI. 
686 Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen 
Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 334, 352. 
687 Deuxième réunion jointe des Membres de l’Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe et des Membres de 
l’Assemblée commune de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (20 mai 1954) Compte rendu in 
extenso des débats, CEAB 1/624, BaK; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 267-72. 
688 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 19 and 20 June 1956, AEI. 
689 Abelshauser, op cit., 82-83; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 90-99, 262-67. 
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increases in September 1957. The Ruhr industries had defeated the ambitions of the High 
Authority and the French government to stem cartel practices.  
That the High Authority was practicing a permissive policy on cartels is evident from its 
refusal to block mergers throughout the coal and steel industries.690 By 1956, German industrial 
re-concentration was fully underway, and no one appeared to have the will and power to stop it. 
Sixty-one mergers had come before the High Authority as of April 1958; it did not reject a single 
one.691 The German companies displayed a preference for vertical rather than horizontal 
concentration, with steel companies extending their grasp back into the coal industry and into the 
steel-transforming industries.692 By 1958, eight companies controlled 79% of the Ruhr’s pig iron 
production, 75% of its steel production, and 33% of its coal production.693 As one historian 
writes, “It is indeed ironic that the Schuman Plan, conceptualized by France to harness the West 
German steel industry once it had undergone deconcentration, was to become its liberator.”694  
In a marked shift, SPD deputies in the Common Assembly now began to worry that 
German industrial re-concentration had become too successful. After all, while they approved of 
the rationalization and production-of-scale features of concentration, the concern reemerged that 
the central importance of these industries to economic life gave their private owners 
disproportionate influence over the German economy. The ECSC Common Assembly became a 
testing ground for what would be a new SPD push in the late 1950s to craft legislation within 
Germany to prevent the abuse of large-scale industrial power, a campaign they carried into the 
1960s. 
This shift opened a door for a policy consensus between the SPD and the SFIO. As early 
as December 1953, Kreyssig had suggested that the High Authority’s control over the 
Community’s cartels was preferable to them continuing to fall under that of private capitalists. It 
was the SFIO, however, that in fact made the most significant move. In two detailed policy 
reports in 1954, the SFIO delegation stated that, “It does not appear to be demonstrated that the 
690 In 1956 five companies that had emerged from Thyssen’s deconcentration merged into two units. See 
Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 173-74. 
691 Haas, op cit., 82.  
692 Michel Freyssenet, La sidérurgie française: 1945-1979. L’histoire d’une faillite. Les solutions qui s’affrontent 
(Paris: Savelli, 1979), 70-71; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 289-94. 
693 Concentration in the French steel industry proceeded inexorably but at a much slower pace. The market shares of 
the three large French steel companies, de Wendel, Usinor and Sidelor, grew from 39.2% in 1954 to 45.4% in 1959. 
Kipping, op cit., 330-331. 
694 Isabel Warner, Steel and Sovereignty: The Deconcentration of the West German Steel Industry, 1949-54. (Mainz: 
Philipp von Zabern, 1996), 229. 
216 
 
                                                          
[coal] export cartel harms the general interest.”695 Pointing to the success of the centralized 
ATIC purchasing organization in France, the SFIO conceded that a centralized Ruhr sales cartel 
was perhaps preferable to the “anarchy” that would result from de-cartelization. Nevertheless, in 
their view, GEORG could pose potential harm to the community’s interests and therefore must 
be subordinated to the supervision and controls of the High Authority, which must be charged 
with monitoring its activities. SPD deputies, in close consultations with IG Bergbau, found that 
the miners’ union, while relieved that GEORG had in essence been preserved, now also worried 
that the employers would escape supervision.696 Only through the supranational power of the 
High Authority, they believed, could the workers’ organizations achieve some influence over the 
coal sales cartel’s policies.  
The SPD and SFIO came to an agreement in October 1954 that enabled the Socialist 
faction to present a united front on the cartel issue within the ECSC.697 In 1955, the Socialists 
attacked the High Authority, now presided over by René Mayer, for alleged derogation of duty. 
Countering “our proposal” to that of the High Authority, the Socialists argued that theirs had the 
merit of providing “real” powers of supervision, compared to the “ineffective” High Authority 
proposal that risked permitting the rise of an “international super-cartel” that would be “non-
transparent, uncontrollable.” They demanded that the High Authority work closely with a 
consultative body representing trade union and consumer interests, and that its deliberations be 
publicized.698 The Socialist campaign to pressure the High Authority to more vigorously assert 
its powers reached a crescendo in 1956 and was incorporated in the Socialist group’s refusal to 
approve a confidence motion in the Authority’s activities. In a united resolution, the Socialist 
faction argued that, “The policy of the High Authority has led to a weakening of its position as 
well as a weakening of the supranational character of the Community because the High 
Authority has not exercised its designated powers, with the result that national governments and 
695 Rapport de la délégation française sur la CECA; Vorschlag Gazier La Question des cartels dans la CECA. Projet 
de résolution, GK 113, 116, AdsD.  
696 Imig on IG Bergbau letterhead to Deist, Kreyssig and Schöne, 26 November 1954, GK 116, AdsD. See also 
Vertraulich! Betr. Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle Arbeitsunterlage, October 1955, GK 118, AdsD. 
697 Assemblée commune de la CECA: Groupe Socialiste Rapport sur la réunion de la Sous-Commission 
Économique du 6 October 1954, GK 116, AdsD. 
698 Sozialistische Fraktion Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS Bericht über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe für 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen, 21 March 1955, GK 117, AdsD. Emphasis on “real” is in the original. 
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producer groups have been exercising functions on coal pricing and cartelization that should be 
those of the High Authority.”699  
The SFIO and SPD ability to agree on cartel policy demonstrates how far the parties had 
come since the disputes of 1948-1952. At that time, both parties suspected the other of working 
to shape a postwar European economy in which its nationally-based heavy industry would 
achieve an economic hegemony on the continent through the marginalization of its cross-Rhine 
rival. SFIO-SPD rapprochement on cartel policy was the most overt sign that the parties had 
reached consensus on the essential aspects of the Community’s coal and steel policy. This 
consensus extended beyond the troublesome cartel issue.  
 
5.6 PLANNING, PRICES, AND INVESTMENT IN THE ECSC:  
SFIO AND SPD CONSENSUS ON COAL AND STEEL POLICY 
  
The SPD did not easily abandon its assertion that the ECSC was designed to perpetuate the 
discriminatory features of the initial postwar period. For several years this assertion co-existed 
with more favorable commentary about the Community’s evolution. For a while, French 
economic policy appeared to German Social Democats to be an effort to extract Ruhr coal for 
French heavy industry while permanently and artificially disabling German steel. The Monnet 
modernization plan’s investment goals for French steel during a period of dismantlement and 
then restriction in Germany, French governmental efforts to block an increase in German quotas 
for steel capacity through the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the rise 
in domestic German coal prices due to the elimination of double-pricing for the sale of German 
coal to domestic and foreign markets, and unilateral French taxes on German steel instituted on 
the eve of the opening of the ECSC, all boded poorly for a fair competitive common market in 
steel.700 SPD experts feared that a flood of French steel would wash through the open door 
699 Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Erklärung der sozialistischen Gruppe 22-6-56, GK 
119, AdsD. 
700 See Kreyssig to the Bundestag on the French steel import taxes, 5 May 1952, Verhandlungen, 12798; and 
Ollenhauer on double-pricing at the Bezirksfunktionärskonferenz der SPD am. 24.1.1953 in der “Hanomag”, 
Hannover, Bredenbeckerstrasse, EO 86, AdsD.  For an overview of the OEEC dispute, see Werner Bührer, 
Westdeutschland in der OEEC: Eingliederung, Krise, Bewährung 1947-1961 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 264-66; 
for the tax dispute, see Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 84-87.  
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provided by the customs union.701 The result would decimate the Ruhr industrial working class; 
SPD speakers estimated a loss of up to 50,000 jobs in German steel.702 Large-scale investment 
by French and other European enterprises in German coal and steel fueled conspiratorial 
thinking.703 The French government was also readying a heavy push to canalize the Mosel River, 
an endeavor designed to assist the land-locked Lorraine steel industry and facilitate French steel 
penetration of the southern German market by decreasing transport costs by up to 60%.704 SPD 
opinion can be summarized by Fritz Henssler’s caustic remark in a letter to Ollenhauer in spring 
1953 on developments in the Community: “I am extraordinarily mistrustful.”705  
The SPD had initially considered the High Authority to be a smoke-screen for French 
interests, and expected it to discriminate against German steel when authorizing investments in 
heavy industry. Nölting wrote in a letter that the Community’s “future investment policy will be 
the criteria” for judging the fairness of the ECSC.706 Initially, SPD deputies were convinced that 
this discrimination in steel and iron policy was taking place.707 Lorraine iron ore, one of the few 
products that German industry wished to import from France, was not made available in the 
expected quantities.708 Kreyssig pointed out in the summer of 1953 that German industry paid 
nearly half of the High Authority’s budget, yet a coherent investment policy was nowhere in 
sight.709 A downturn in the continental European steel market in 1953 made the ECSC an easy 
scapegoat, but this was the case in France as well.710 As late as April 1954, Kreyssig was 
701 That French steel exports to Germany rose from 243,000 tons in 1952 to 855,000 tons in 1954 likely confirmed 
the SPD’s initial suspicions. Kipping, op cit., 330.  
702  Schöne told the Bundestag that, “It is obvious that in this manner in a very short time from now a crushing 
import of French steel is to be expected.” He went to say that, “An attentive observer of the German economy would 
not dispute that the German iron industry will witness more and more the signs of work suppression and shortened 
hours. The machinery will lay still; mills will operate with half shifts.” 28 April 1952, Verhandlungen, 12786-87. 
703 For French investment in German heavy industry in 1952-53, see Lefèvre, op cit., 388-92. 
704 For this dispute, see Ludwig Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in 
den Montan-Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar. (Essen: Klartext, 2001).  
705 Henssler to Ollenhauer, 9 March 1953, Fritz Henssler 57, AdsD. 
706 Nölting to Direktor Rudolf Hannesen, 9 July 1953, Erik Nölting 27, AdsD.  
707 See also Birkelbach to the Gemeinsame Sitzung der Mitglieder der Beratenden Versammlungen des Europarates 
und der Mitglieder der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. 
Kurzbericht über den Verlauf Montag 22. Juni 1953, CEAB 1/624, BaK. 
708 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 24. Februar 1953, GK 25, AdsD. Wehner 
reported to the SPD Central Committee that within the High Authority, “[Iron] ore is being dealt with in far more 
favorable conditions for France.” 30-31 January 1953, Parteivorstand 1953, AdsD. 
709 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig Dienstag, den 7. Juli 1953, GK 25, AdsD. 
710 See Kreyssig’s remarks to CA-ECSC, 20 June 1953, AEI. For the situation in the steel market in 1953, see 
Freyssenet, op cit., 49; Lefevre, op cit., 300. 
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speaking of Monnet’s “stab-in-the-back policy (Dolchstossprogramm),” a remark that carries 
heavy undertones in German.711  
Events proved these fears for the future of German steel in the Community to be 
unwarranted. After stagnating in 1953, the ECSC steel market took off in 1954, experiencing 
seven consecutive years of impressive growth. From 1954 to 1960, the German steel industry 
expanded 68% against 63% in France; whereas French production was at 71% of German steel 
production in 1952, the figure in 1960 was 50%.712 The Community developed into a seller’s 
market as prices rose and, by 1955, the SPD found itself making common cause with the SFIO’s 
long-held view that low steel prices were necessary to aid the steel-transforming industries. As 
for the Community’s investment policy, of the $50 million loan from the U.S., $28 million was 
earmarked for Germany against $13.5 million for France.713 Looking back in 1957, Kreyssig 
stated that although the “Community never faced a hard test...all in all the Community has been a 
positive and worthwhile success for Europe.”714  
The success of the German steel industry erased concerns that German steel had faced 
discriminatory conditions when it entered the ECSC.715 In addition, the ECSC customs union 
opened at a moment when French politics took a turn to the right and successive governments 
sought to stem public investment in French heavy industry. SFIO deputies excoriated their 
government for first reducing, then delaying allocation of funds for the second modernization 
plan, pointing out that this had been a condition for their support of the Schuman Plan.716 
Representing the long-held SFIO postwar view, Christian Pineau criticized the government and 
industry for resorting to high tariffs on foreign steel rather than vigorously investing to make 
French steel more competitive, a policy that damaged the export potential of France’s steel-
transforming industries.717 Within German politics, the SPD was also constantly condemning 
711 Kreyssig, 29 April 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 1135.  
712 Freyssenet, op cit., 44-62. 
713 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 322-23.  
714 Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 21.11.1957, GK 27, AdsD. 
715 Haas writes that, “When interest group demands and expectations are paired off against the decisions made by 
the High Authority, it appears that the German steelmakers are by far the most successful group...The Charbonnages 
de France have fared only slightly less well.” Haas, op cit., 476. 
716 André le Troquer to the Conseil National, November 1952, OURS; Robert Lacoste, 18 December 1952, JO, 
6578.  
717 Pineau, 1 January 1952, JO, 11-12. 
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what it considered to be an inadequate public investment program in heavy industry.718 Whereas 
national investment levels had been cause for dispute between the SFIO and SPD in 1948-1952, 
they were able to make common cause on the issue within the ECSC and did so despite the 
SFIO’s assertion that the canalization of the Mosel “was fundamental for French steel.”719 The 
two Socialist parties together turned to the High Authority to press their claims for higher 
investment in heavy industry. Thwarted within their domestic political spheres, Socialists argued 
that the High Authority should develop a common investment policy and compensate for the 
neglect of their national governments.720 Their call had a distinct socialist hue: they argued that 
the High Authority should introduce an element of investment planning at the supranational 
level.721 
One can plausibly argue that the prosperity resulting from the steel boom of the 1950s 
created the conditions for a Socialist entente on steel policy. Coal, however, was a different 
story. Like steel, the community’s coal industries suffered a downturn in 1953. German Social 
Democrats and even some French Socialists placed the blame on the opening of the customs 
union.722 In its official report, though, the SFIO recognized that, “The opening of the common 
market was not the determining factor in the unfavorable evolution of the French coal 
market.”723 As the economic take-off accelerated, the coal industries experienced their last 
moment of euphoria as coal prices rose dramatically from the end of 1954 until the end of 
1956.724 Production in the Ruhr and Lorraine regions reached record levels.725 Coal became 
scarce and expensive.726 However, this was a momentary boom contingent on the specific 
circumstances of Europe’s postwar economic recovery.727  
718 For instance, see the Ruhr deputy and coal expert Paul Bleiss’ remarks 19 June 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 
1599.  
719 “Rapport de la délégation française sur la CECA,” GK 113, AdsD. 
720 Ollenhauer, 28 October 1953, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 40; Deist to CA-ECSC, 14 January 1954, AEI. 
721 Diskussionsentwurf von W. Birklebach Montan-Union VERTRAULICH!, GK 192, AdsD. 
722 SFIO deputy Roger Coutant, 15 November 1954, JO, 5032. Deist called the downturn in German ore production 
“a willful and logical result of the consequences of the interaction between the iron and steel industries within the 
Community.” 7 April 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 806. Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig 
Dienstag, den 20. April 1954, GK 26, AdsD. 
723 Rapport de la délégation française de la CECA, GK 113, AdsD. 
724 Freyssenet 56; Régine Perron, Le marché du charbon, un enjeu entre l’Europe et les États-Unis de 1945 à 1958 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), 230. 
725 Abelshauser, op cit., 85; Freyssenet, op cit., 50. 
726 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 253-61.  
727 Bührer in Wurm, ed., op cit., 89.  
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Rising imports of oil were to be the doom of the Community’s coal industry. Having 
grown an average of 6% per year from 1929 to 1950, oil imports rose between 16 and 20% from 
1953 to 1956.728 History was about to take an unexpected turn. After seven years of acute 
struggle between the French and German governments over scarce coal supplies in 1946-1952, 
by 1958 coal was too plentiful to sustain prices covering its costs of production, and was 
nonetheless too expensive to compete against a steadily rising influx of oil. Neither the coal 
industries, nor the national governments, nor the High Authority fully appreciated what was 
about to occur.729 Unlike the German government, French Socialists and the French government 
worked to shield France’s coal industry from oil competition, with one Socialist deputy pointing 
out in 1953 that, “95% or more [of the oil] comes from foreign sources situated in a region 
whose political stability and geographical situation gives rise to great concern.”730 The energy 
crisis resulting from the Suez invasion of 1956 greatly strengthened this sentiment. As a result, 
the increase in the Community’s consumption of oil was highest in Germany, rising 36.8% from 
1955 to 1957, as compared to 19.2% in France.731  
Prime Minister Mollet offered a vigorous defense of coal’s future in a speech to Lorraine 
workers in June 1956.732 The High Authority followed the French government’s request and 
reaffirmed that, “coal has been and will remain the principal source of energy for the 
Community.”733 It put in place a policy to store coal during periods of abundance. German 
Social Democrats were more circumspect about coal’s future. Schöne remarked that the 
industry’s future was “uncertain” in 1955.734 Deist called for vigorous measures by the High 
Authority to invest in new equipment to make coal competitive against oil imports.735 That 
neither the SFIO nor the SPD blamed the ECSC for coal’s collapse after 1958 demonstrates an 
appreciation for the deep structural challenge facing the industry.  
From 1955 to 1957, however, coal was booming. Rising coal prices gave occasion for yet 
another consensus to develop among the French Socialist and German Social Democratic 
728 Perron, op cit., 45. 
729 Abelshauser, op cit., 89; Perron, op cit., 169-70. 
730 Coutant, 24 March 1953, JO, 2266. France imposed a 9% tariff on oil products compared to 4% in Germany. 
Perron, op cit., 308. 
731 Ibid., 260-61. 
732 Discours prononcé par M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil à l’occasion du centième anniversaire des 
houillères de Lorraine Merlebach, le 23 juin 1956, AGM 68, OURS.  
733 Perron, op cit., 222-23. 
734 Schöne to CA-ECSC, 14 May 1955, AEI.  
735 Deist to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1955, AEI. 
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deputies of the ECSC Common Assembly. As early as 1954, Deist praised the High Authority 
for responding to the plea for assistance from the German trade unions for investment in the 
Ruhr’s iron ore industry in the face of German government neglect.736 By 1955, the SFIO and 
SPD were united in seeking a decrease in the rising price of coal and called on the High 
Authority to intervene to fulfill its treaty obligation of keeping coal prices low.737 When the 
German government lifted price controls on coal in April 1956, allowing them to continue to 
rise, the SPD condemned a liberal policy that they said would come at the expense of household 
consumers.738 The SPD had come around to the SFIO’s traditional position that coal prices must 
be kept low so as to benefit consumers and coal-consuming industries. The German 
government’s decision was of crucial importance for the SFIO as well, not only because it 
imported a great amount of Ruhr coal, but also because the Ruhr’s coal prices served as a 
benchmark for coal prices in general within the Community. Both parties turned to the High 
Authority in the hope that it would intervene and rectify the situation created by the German 
government’s liberalization of coal prices.  By November 1956, the SPD speakers expressed 
anger that the High Authority had chosen not to intervene.739 Yet again the SPD found that what 
it had once considered to be a supranational authority invested iwth tyrannical powers had in fact 
turned out to be an organization too weak to effectively counter policies set at the national level.  
 
5.7 SOCIALIST SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE ECSC: SFIO AND SPD VISIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1955-1957 
 
In summer 1956, SPD ECSC deputy Gerhard Kreyssig explicitly called for an alliance between 
the High Authority and the Common Assembly to sway public opinion and to force the national 
governments to accord more powers to the supranational institutions.740 A year earlier, Guy 
736 Deist, 7 April 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 807. 
737 Sozialistische Fraktion Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS Bericht über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe für 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen, 21 March 1955, GK 117, AdsD.  
738 Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 6. März and 19. Juni 1956, GK 27, AdsD.  
739 Deist to CA-ECSC, 28 November 1956, AEI. Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 
6. November 1956, GK 27, AdsD. The Socialists continued to pressure the High Authority to intervene in Ruhr coal 
pricing in October 1957. Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl Gemeinsame Versammlung Schriftliche 
Anfrage Nr. 51 gemäss den Bestimmungen des Artikels 41 der Geschäftsordnung der Gemeinsamen Versammlung 
am 17. Oktober 1957 von den Abg. W. Birkelbach, G. Bohy, J. Fohrmann, G. Kreyssig, P.O. Lapie, G.M. 
Nederhorst, J. Schöne und E. Vanrullen an die Hohe Behörde, GK 140, AdsD. 
740 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1956, AEI.  
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Mollet in the name of the Socialist faction, had said that, “The Treaty, if fully implemented, can 
become a remarkable instrument of social progress,” so long as the Community ceased to be 
constrained “by an overly strict limitation of its competence.”741 As examined above, the 
Socialist faction sought to have the powers of the Community enlarged in order to create a 
common social policy, as well as a common policy to plan investments in the coal and steel 
industries. Socialists frequently criticized the High Authority for excessive deference to national 
governments.742 Jaquet proposed reducing the powers of the intergovernmental Council of 
Ministers, but his proposal was defeated by the other factions of the Assembly.743 The Socialist 
position after 1955 is evidence that there was a tendency for policy “spill over” within the 
Socialist faction.744 A united Socialist faction called for the treaty modification so as to allow a 
far-reaching supranational social policy in the coal and steel sectors, as well as the extension of 
the treaty’s field of competence to the entire energy sector, in particular to cover oil and 
electricity.745  
German Social Democrats joined the French Socialists in criticizing the Messina report, 
which proposed the creation of a European Economic Community, for not granting sufficient 
supranational powers to the institution’s supranational bodies: the European Commission 
executive and the European Parliamentary Assembly. Wehner called for a common competitive 
policy, a common policy on investments, and a European Investment Fund.746 Although they 
remained critical of the High Authority, Socialists displayed pride in their accomplishments in 
the Common Assembly. In particular, they celebrated their success in converting the Common 
Assembly into an effective supervisory body capable of affecting the Community’s policy.747 
Schöne, for instance, wrote that: 
741 Mollet to CA-ECSC, 9 May 1955, AEI.  
742 Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 19. Juni 1956, GK 27, AdsD.  
743 Commission des affaires étrangeres, 28 January 1953, C/15592, Archives Nationales.  
744 Haas, op cit., 292, 299-301. 
745 CECA Assemblée commune, Commission des Affaires Sociales. Avis sur quelques aspects juridiques de 
l’éxtension des compétences de la Communauté dans le domaine sociale présenté au nom de la Commission par M. 
H.J. Merkatz Rapporteur, 15 November 1955, CEAB 1/1627, BaK; Mollet letter as leader of ECSC Socialist group, 
5 May 1955, GK 117, AdsD; Une interview exclusive de M. Guy Mollet, Paris-Presse-Intransigeant, 25/5/55, 
AGM 44, OURS.  
746 Wehner to CA-ECSC, 24 juin 1955, AEI.  
747 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 26. Januar 1954, GK 26, AdsD; Gemeinsame 
Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Arbeitsunterlage für die Gemeinsame Sitzung der sozialistischen 
Fraktion der Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS und der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, vom 13. 
und 14. Oktober 1955, GK 118, AdsD. 
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The history of the ECSC parliament clearly shows how much influence an active 
parliament can be assured of. For the development of the institutions of the EEC-Treaty, 
there are no more natural allies than the Commission and the Parliament.  
 
He argued that experience demonstrated that supranationalism would grow and that the “transfer 
of sovereignties will quietly take place of its own accord.”748 Hence the SPD had abandoned the 
view that one of its economic experts had expressed towards the Schuman Plan in 1951: 
We know well that it is not possible to be independent from the development of 
economic conditions in the other land and pursue a sort of “Socialism-in-one-country-
policy.” But we are convinced that the present power struggle can only be carried through 
in a promising manner on the internal German level.749 
 
Much of the credit for the SPD’s change of heart towards the Community must go to the 
President of the High Authority and the guiding force for the Community from 1952 to his 
resignation in 1955, Jean Monnet, who voted Socialist in French elections. French Socialists had 
long collaborated with Monnet within French domestic politics and he enjoyed close relations 
with SFIO leaders, including with Guy Mollet.750 The SPD deputies in the Common Assembly 
also fell under his impressive powers of political seduction. No doubt they noticed how Monnet 
“without cease solicited the advice of the trade unions which gave them a weight greater than 
that foreseen by the Treaty.”751 As the only major history of the ECSC states, “Monnet 
consistently showed himself independent of the governments of the [French] Fourth 
Republic.”752 Monnet spent many hours in private meetings with the SPD deputies, as well as 
with representatives of the German industrial unions, who were perhaps even more enthused 
about Monnet than were the SPD deputies.753 The DGB chairman Walter Freitag told Monnet in 
late 1954 that: 
748 Joachim Schöne, “Wirtschafts Zusammenarbeit in Europa?,” Die Neue Gesellschaft 4. Jahrgang-Heft 5-
September/October 1957. Kreyssig said that the “Experience of the ECSC is positive and encouraging” for the 
powers of the European Parliament. CECA Assemblée commune Commission du Marché commun Commission de 
la Comptabilité et de l’Administration de la Communauté et de l’Assemblée Commune Groupe de Travail 
Mémorandum sur la révision du traité par M. G. Kreyssig, rapporteur, September 1957, GK 134, AdsD.  
749 Fritz Baade, “Professor Baade zum Schuman-Plan,” 5.5.1951, GK 111, AdsD. 
750 Lapie reports that he frequently met with Monnet during the Second World War. Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon 
Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 407-08. 
751 Sylvain Shirmann, “Syndicats français et questions européennes 1949-1954,” in Hélène Miard-Delacrois and 
Rainer Hudemann, eds., Wandel und Integration: Deutsch-französischen Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 325-26. 
752 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 57. 
753 Bayreuther Tagblatt, 10 January 1953, EO 12, AdsD; Walter Paterson, The SPD and European Integration 
(Glasgow: Saxon House Lexington Books, 1974), 115. 
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We have had occasion to closely watch the work of the High Authority in these last years 
and we trust you because you do what you say and you say what you do. Go forth, build 
Europe, and we will follow you.754  
 
That Freitag had such a view is quite significant because, with SPD support, he had recently 
ascended to the DGB chairmanship following a coup against Christian Fette, who had supported 
the ratification of the ECSC treaty against Freitag’s opposition in 1951-52. Over time the SPD 
turned to the High Authority as a counter-weight to the power of German industrial groups and 
of its own government.755 One gains the impression that when Deist called Monnet his “friend” 
in a speech to the Common Assembly, his terminology represented more than a political 
nicety.756 Although SPD deputies regretted that the German government designated the trade 
unionist Heinz Potthoff rather than Deist as one of its two representatives on the High Authority 
in 1952, Potthoff proved capable and provided an effective link for informal contacts with the 
DGB and SPD.757  
It is clear that French Socialists and German Social Democrats alike regretted Monnet’s 
departure from the High Authority in spring 1955. Their criticisms of his successor, the liberal 
René Mayer, often read as pleas that he act like his predecessor, who often showed blatant 
disregard for the views of the national governments in the Council of Ministers.758 Mayer’s 
appointment was in part an effort by the national governments, in particular the French 
government, to reign in the supranational powers of the Community, a development resisted by 
the Community’s Socialist faction.759 In addition, neither the SFIO nor the SPD liked Mayer. 
Kreyssig called him a “new managerial fellow” who was suspect due to his alleged affinity with 
the liberal German Economic Minister, Ludwig Erhard.760 As the High Authority began to 
increasingly demur to the national governments under Mayer, the Socialists constituted 
themselves into an organized opposition in 1956 within the Common Assembly against the 
Liberal-Christian-Democratic majority. Although they did not go so far as calling for a censure 
motion, the Socialists faction launched a coordinated political attack against the new approach of 
754 Köpper, op cit., 171-76. 
755 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 26. Januar 1954, GK 26, AdsD.  
756 Deist to CA-ECSC, 16 January 1954, AEI. 
757 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 28. August 1952, GK 25, AdsD; Köpper, op cit., 
153; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 53. 
758 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 60. 
759Ibid., op cit., 338. 
760 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 2. August 1955, GK 26, AdsD. 
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the High Authority.761 The Socialist initiative brought a new vitality to the Common Assembly 
by, in effect, beginning the process of supranationalizing the mechanisms of parliamentary 
democracy.  
Due to their experiences and changing perceptions, SPD deputies in the ECSC Common 
Assembly became lobbyists for the ECSC integration model within the SPD. As early as August 
1953, Ollenhauer acknowledged that the SPD had “won a quite substantial influence” within the 
Assembly.762 At its 1954 party congress, the SPD dropped its official opposition to the ECSC 
and merely called for its extension to other European nations, a nod to its preference that 
European integration not to take the form of a six-nation “Small Europe.”763 Favorable 
comments from Schöne and Kreyssig had such an impact within the party’s Political-Economic 
Committee that, in 1958, a number of delegates considered the ECSC model to be a better means 
than socialization to achieve the party’s goals in heavy industry.764 Such a stance would have 
been unthinkable as recently as 1954. Party reformer Karl Schiller, for his part, praised the ECSC 
for its innovative “combination of planning and competition.”765 It is clear from these statements 
that the ECSC contributed to the SPD’s path towards moderation in the late 1950s, rather than 
vice versa. Praise of the ECSC model coincided with intensive efforts to reformulate the party’s 
program, an effort that reached fruition in the 1959 Bad Godesberg program.766 
The SPD deputies in the ECSC developed an institutional loyalty that reflected their 
belief that they had achieved concrete accomplishments during their tenure in the Common 
Assembly. This view, in place by 1954, shaped their reception of the 1955 Messina report, which 
recommended a supranational common market to cover all fields of the Community’s economic 
activity. Wehner announced the ECSC Socialist faction’s tenuous support for the project, 
criticizing only the fact that the project appeared to be less supranational than its ECSC 
761 Assemblée commune de la CECA, Groupe Socialiste, Revue de la presse d’expression française, Combat, 25 
June 1956, GK 119, AdsD. 
762 Ansprache von Erich Ollenhauer am Sonntag, dem 2. August 1953, 11,45 Uhr, im Sitzungssaal der SPD-Fraktion 
(Stadthalle-Hannover), EO 96, AdsD. 
763 Paterson, op cit., 119. 
764 Protokol der Sitzung vom 7./8. März 1958 des Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschusses bei Parteivorstand der SPD, 
Heinrich Deist 12, AdsD. 
765 Karl Schiller, “Wettbewerb und Planung in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen,” Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie, 1956, Karl Schiller 264, BaK. Emphasis in original. 
766 Though the party had begun discussing programmatic reform in 1952-54, it was only after the loss of the 1957 
Federal German election that an acceleration of this process took place.  
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predecessor.767 This standpoint led the SPD deputies in the ECSC into a conflict with other 
foreign policy experts within their party, in particular with those who had been delegated to serve 
in the Council of Europe. Gerhard Lütkens, Helmut Kalbitzer and Heinz Putzrath continued the 
party’s traditional critique of the ECSC in fall 1955, and called for integration to occur under the 
auspices of the intergovernmental Council of Europe and the OEEC.768 However, the SPD 
leadership was well aware that the Council of Europe, which issued non-binding resolutions, was 
often paralyzed when it came to crafting concrete initiatives.769 In an embarrassment for the 
party, this intra-SPD dispute played out in the open before the SFIO and other Socialist deputies 
in a joint meeting of the Socialist deputies of the ECSC and the Council of Europe. At the 
meeting, Deist decisively rejected the anti-ECSC position of Kalbitzer and Lütkens.770 All SPD 
deputies agreed that in the future the Community should be as large as possible, but the ECSC 
deputies, including the political heavy-weight Wehner, were no longer willing to make this a 
precondition for supporting an extension of the six-nation Community’s powers. The battle-lines 
had been drawn for the internal SPD debate on the Treaties of Rome.  
  
767 Wehner to CA-ECSC, 24 June 1955, AEI.  
768 Helmut Kalbitzer, 27.10.1955, Bemerkungen zu den gegenwärtigen Möglichkeiten der wirtschaftlichen 
Integration Europas. See Kreyssig’s marginalia on Kalbitzer’s text. GK 118, AdsD.  
769 See, for instance, Ernst Paul’s comments, 19 March 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 705. 
770 Analystischer (Kurz-)Bericht der Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe Wirtschaft der Sozialistische Fraktion in der 
Gemeinsamen Versammlung (EGKS) erweitert um Mitglieder der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates am 11. 
November 1955 in Luxemburg, GK 118, AdsD.  
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6. A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
FRENCH SOCIALISTS, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND  
THE TREATIES OF ROME, 1955-1957 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a fundamental revision of our understanding of the role of the French 
Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties in the formulation and ratification of the 
Treaties of Rome. The current scholarship does not provide adequate explanations of why the 
SPD decided to support the Treaties of Rome in 1957, nor does it explain why Guy Mollet’s 
government pushed the treaties through the French administration and National Assembly 
despite a reluctant French political climate and a seemingly unfavorable economic context. 
Struck by the contrast between the SPD leadership’s virulent denunciation of the Schuman Plan 
and the European Defense Community, scholars overlook important continuities in the SPD’s 
position on European economic integration that go back to the interwar period. Likewise, the 
historiography on the policy of Mollet’s government towards the Treaties fails to take into 
account how long-held SFIO advocacy of a European preferential trade system as a means to 
increase living standards and to compete with the colossal united economic zones of the United 
States and Soviet Union was the economic and ideological mindset through which Mollet 
approached the idea of a common market.  
 In this chapter, I contest claims of scholars that the SPD’s decision to support the Treaties 
of Rome constituted a “reversal” of its previous position.771 Some historians have viewed the 
SPD decision to support the Treaties of Rome as a result of the party’s increasing moderation in 
tone and policy over the course of the 1950s. This view suggests that the SPD’s approval of the 
Treaties was a victory for the new generation of economic experts within the party, who were 
771 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 95. Gabriele d’Ottavio calls the SPD’s vote in favor of the Treaties of 
Rome a “shift” and a “revirement.” Gabriele d’Ottavio, “The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in 
SPD’s European Policy,” Journal for European Integration History 13, 2, (2007): 103-114. 
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pushing the SPD away from a program of socialization and towards Keynesian economics.772 
Simultaneously, some argue that the vote for the Treaties was a victory for party reformers, who 
wished to turn the SPD into a “catch-all” party through a public renunciation of the party’s 
attachment to Marxism.773 These elements crowned their success with the transformational Bad 
Godesberg party program of 1959, which “modernized” the party by renouncing key elements of 
the SPD heritage. However, support for trade liberalization in general transcended the conflict 
between party reformers and traditionalists. Though the 1950-51 German balance of payments 
crisis in the European Payments Union (EPU) seemed to expose a conceptual divide on this issue 
between these groups, the conflict was a temporary reaction to a complex set of circumstantial 
challenges. Fritz Baade, one of the most important SPD economic reformers, was among the 
staunchest opponents of the treaty for a European Economic Community (EEC). Trade 
liberalization had little to do with the subterranean party struggle that shaped the SPD of the 
1950s. Rather than marking a victory on the road to Bad Godesberg, the shift of the European 
integration process towards the SPD’s policy on economic integration was likely itself a 
contributing factor for the creation of a West German foreign policy consensus on European 
integration. Ollenhauer offers evidence for this thesis when he told the Central Committee in fall 
1956 that, in European policy, Chancellor Konrad “Adenauer has come to adopt certain things 
that Social Democracy has represented since 1950.”774 
 Moravcsik and other scholars present the SPD’s support for the Treaties of Rome as 
rooted in an increasing acceptance of West German foreign policy.775 That this was not the case 
is clear from the bitter public campaigns that the SPD continued to organize against West 
German foreign and domestic policy in 1958-59, after the ratifications of the Treaties of Rome in 
summer 1957. In 1958, the SPD launched a “Fear Atomic Death” campaign to combat 
Adenauer’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1959, the SPD called for a new European 
security pact in which West Germany would leave NATO and join a neutral zone with Poland 
772 Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2003); Michael Held, Sozialdemokratie und Keynesianismus: Von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum 
Godesberger Programm (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1982). 
773 Gabriele d’Ottavio sees SPD support for the Treaties as a sign of “internal maturation,” and as indicative of “the 
phenomenon of de-ideologization and modernization of the party, leading to the turning point of Bad Godesberg in 
1959.” Gabriele d’Ottavio, op cit., 105. 
774 PV, PA and KK, 18 October 1956, SPD-Parteivorstand (PV) 1956, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD). 
775 Moravcsik, op cit., 95; Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europe: die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum 
Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1957) (Bonn: Europa Union, 1972). 
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and the Czech Republic that would be guaranteed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. These initiatives 
demonstrate that it was not a desire to attain a comprehensive foreign policy consensus with the 
CDU that led the SPD to support the Treaties of Rome in 1957. It was only in 1960 that Herbert 
Wehner gave his famous speech announcing the SPD’s desire to operate within the foreign 
policy contours created by Adenauer and the Allied governments. In 1957, though, Wehner 
urged the SPD to abstain in the vote on the common market.  
 Nor had the SPD embraced Adenauer’s version of a “policy of strength” towards the 
Soviet Union. A new round of Geneva negotiations on the German question failed in November 
1955. Wehner, who was present at the negotiations, reported to the SPD Central Committee that 
the German government had made no real effort to achieve reunification.776 The party defended 
the spring 1956 initiative of Mollet’s government to try to achieve a breakthrough on the German 
question with the Soviet Union against the public opposition of Adenauer, who at the time 
mistrusted Mollet’s intentions.777 The failure of French-Soviet discussions and a realization that 
German reunification was becoming increasingly unlikely in the near or medium term may have 
facilitated the SPD’s decision in 1957 to support the Treaties of Rome.778 However, there is no 
direct evidence that this was the case. Ollenhauer had already agreed to join Jean Monnet’s 
Action Committee for the United States of Europe months prior to the November 1955 Geneva 
negotiations, as discussed below.  
 As impractical as it may appear, it seems that SPD leaders hoped to divorce West 
Germany’s integration into NATO from proposals for economic and atomic energy 
integration.779 Reunification was a concern (among others) during the internal SPD debates on 
the Treaties of Rome.780 However, in protocols attached to the Treaties, negotiators went a long 
776 Wehner writes in the report that, “It is no longer possible to successfully push through the fundamental idea of 
the ‘policy of strength’ in relation to German reunification.” Wehner, Zum Ergebnis der Genfer 
Aussenministerkonferenz vom 27.10 bis 16.11.1955. See also Ollenhauer’s comments to the PV and 
Fraktionsvorstand, 29 November 1955, SPD-PV 1955, AdsD. 
777 Wehner interview, 8 February 1956, 1/HWAA1065, AdsD; 3 April 1956, PPP, Mollet-Vorstoss ein Weg aus der 
Sackgasse: Widersinn des Nebeneinanders von Abrüstung und deutscher Aufrüstung, 1/HWAA886, AdsD. 
778 SFIO interlocutors kept the SPD abreast of these developments and informed them of the failures of the bilateral 
talks. Bericht von der Reise nach Paris im Auftrag des PV (27.-29.5.56); and Pontillon to Ollenhauer, translation 
22.6.1956, Fritz Heine (FH) 144 and 147, AdsD. 
779 Fritz Erler speech in Bonn, 11 April 1957, Fritz Erler (FE) 13, AdsD; and Deist to the WPA Protokoll der 
Sitzung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD, stattgefunden am 26.10.56 im “Haus 
der SPD”, Bonn, Brüno Gleitze (BG) 158, AdsD. 
780 8 and 9 February 1957, SPD- PV-1957; Jacques Hiver, “Foreign Policy of the German Social Democratic Party. 
Interview with Erich Ollenhauer,” L’Observateur, 4 April 1957; “Ollenhauer in Kiel: ‘Keine Atomwaffen weder 
jetzt noch später,’” Schleswig-Holsteinische Volkszeitung, 29 June 1957, EO, 132 and 133, AdsD.  
231 
 
                                                          
way towards accommodating SPD demands that the EEC not be designed to further cement the 
division of Europe, regardless of whether they did so with the purpose of attaining SPD 
support.781 The six nations agreed that there would be no tariff barrier between the customs 
union and the German Democratic Republic, and that the treaties could be revised if German 
reunification appeared on the international agenda.782 Under these conditions, only a small 
minority of SPD deputies objected to the EEC on the grounds that it could stymie German 
reunification.  
 Scholars have also minimized the socialist contribution to the creation of the EEC, as I 
discuss below. This may be in part the result of investigating the postwar period through 
contemporary lenses. The European left in the last decades has generally had a reputation for 
approaching trade liberalization with suspicion, and “liberals” who support the concept of free 
trade are often portrayed as being on the right-wing of socialist parties.  In the 1950s, however, 
there is hardly any evidence of a left/right divide on trade liberalization in the SFIO and SPD. 
While socialists had to account for the unique economic context of their own nation-states, this 
chapter argues that French Socialists and German Social Democrats shared a basic conception of 
the merits of trade liberalization that was rooted in party traditions and historical narratives that 
bear a great deal in common.  
 The same was true of atomic energy integration about which the two socialist parties 
agreed on a common design, although the realities of coalitional government forced Mollet to 
break with his SPD partner and continue France’s program to build atomic weapons. However, 
the parties did have different traditions on agriculture, which proved to be one of the most 
difficult policy areas during the negotiations. Yet even in this fraught policy area, SFIO and SPD 
policies were closer to one another than they first appear. While national and party demographics 
made the SFIO far more attuned to the needs of the French countryside, SPD determination to 
stabilize German democracy and reduce its long-standing antagonism with German farmers led it 
to support guaranteed minimum incomes for farmers, a principle that became the basis for the 
EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
781 William E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (Lexington: Saxon House, 1974), 127. 
782 Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “The Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC-Treaty,” in Enrico Serra, ed., Il rilancio 
dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma: Actes du colloques de Rome 25-28 mars 1987 (Milan: Guffrè, 1989), 504-05; Henri 
Ménudier, “Le chancelier Adenauer et l’unité allemande,” in Jean-Paul Cahn, Gérard Schneilin, Henri Ménudier, 
eds., L’Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 1949-1963 (Paris: Éditions du Temps, 2000), 289-90. 
232 
 
                                                          
 My argument is not that the EEC should be considered a “Socialist” invention, nor do I 
deny the influence and importance of other parties, demographic constituencies, and economic 
interests in its creation. Treaties of this nature represent compromises, and there was much in the 
Treaties that each party would have preferred to cast aside. Rather I argue that much more of the 
content and spirit of the Treaties of Rome than is currently recognized reflected socialist policies 
rooted in SFIO and SPD party traditions on economic policy and historical narratives. That these 
traditions and narratives emerged from a similar conception of historical exigency and trajectory 
allows one to speak of a French Socialist-German Social Democratic approach to European 
economic integration that created opportunities and conditions necessary for the success of the 
Treaties.  
 The Treaties of Rome were the most profound effort in European history to that date to 
achieve a comprehensive economic integration of the principal economies of Western 
continental Europe. The Treaties of Rome were in fact two treaties, one to create a supranational 
European atomic energy authority (Euratom) and the other to create a preferential European 
common market with a common external tariff within a European Economic Community that 
combined supranational and intergovernmental features. Their impact promised to deeply affect 
nearly all aspects of the participating nations’ economic structures and to fundamentally remake 
these nations’ relationships with non-participating states, in particular with Great Britain and 
Scandinavia, the United States, and the French overseas territories. In order to demonstrate how 
core features of the Treaties of Rome reflected a socialist approach to European integration, it is 
necessary to investigate SFIO and SPD traditions and responses to each major policy field which 
fell under the purview of the proposed European institutions. This chapter therefore starts by 
discussing Jean Monnet’s proposals for a European atomic energy organization, which provided 
a forum for a SFIO-SPD consensus on European integration, and then proceeds to investigate the 
parties’ conceptions of the merits of trade liberalization and the conditions they believed to be 
necessary to ameliorate some of its potentially negative social and economic repercussions. It 
concludes by examining the impact of French proposals to integrate France’s overseas territories 
into the new communities, as well as the parties’ traditions on agricultural policy and their 
responses to proposals for a preferential zone for the proposed community’s agriculture.  
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6.2 SFIO-SPD NUCLEAR ENERGY ENTENTE AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF 
MOLLET’S COALITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY 
 
Eager to re-launch the European integration process after the EDC debacle, Jean Monnet 
announced a program for a supranational authority to oversee an integrated European atomic 
energy program in February 1955.783 Monnet struck at an opportune moment. In 1954, U.S. 
President Dwight Eisenhower had famously announced a program of “Atoms for Peace,” in 
which he proposed an international atomic energy authority to assist nations in the peaceful 
development of nuclear energy.784 Historians have written of an “atomic euphoria” striking 
Europe in the mid-1950s, as governments contemplated the prospect of a seemingly 
inexhaustible fuel supply.785 After initially resisting Monnet’s proposal, Prime Minister Edgar 
Faure ceded to the advice of the French Atomic Energy Agency, which supported the plan.786  
French Socialist leaders were among the first to promote an atomic energy future. In the 
National Assembly in 1947, Prime Minister Paul Ramadier placed a box of colored crayons in 
the hands of his Socialist colleague, Pierre-Olivier Lapie. Inside were uranium crystals. “Voilà, 
the future,” Ramadier told him.787 Anticipating Jean Monnet’s 1955 proposal, in 1954, French 
Socialists proposed detailed legislation to build an “international super-laboratory” to train 
researchers and promote “an “indispensable international scientific collaboration in the field.”788 
In June 1954, French Socialist René Naegelen was named rapporteur for the discussion on a 
“European organization for nuclear research” in the National Assembly. 
While France’s nuclear program had broad support, in large part due to its potential to 
lead to a French nuclear arsenal, in Germany the SPD was by far the party most enthusiastic 
about the potential benefits of atomic energy. Professor Walter Weizel, a leading SPD scientific 
expert, told an internal SPD audience that nuclear energy was akin to “the transition from bodily 
783 The idea of Euratom was suggested to Jean Monnet by a U.S. diplomat, Max Eisenberg. Peter Weilemann, Die 
Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Gründungsgeschichte von EURATOM 1955-1957 (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1983), 25. 
784 Weilemann, op cit., 17.  
785 Ibid., 13; Petra Weber, Carlo Schmid: Eine Biographie (1896-1979) (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1996), 556. 
786 Christian Pineau, Christiane Rimbaud, Le grand pari: l’aventure du traité de Rome (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 162; 
Mathieu L. Segers, Deutschlands Ringen mit der Relance: Die Europapolitik der BRD während der Beratungen und 
Verhandlungen über die Römischen Verträge (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2008), 105-06. 
787 Pierre-Oliver Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 170. 
788 Moch, 6 June 1954, Journal Officiel (JO), 3229. 
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energy to fire, which was the transition from animal to man.”789 The SPD was at the forefront of 
efforts to create the foundations for a German nuclear energy program despite a formal ban on 
German nuclear activities, which was only lifted with West Germany’s ascension to formal 
sovereignty in 1955. As early as 1948, SPD North-Rhine-Westphalia Economic Minister Erik 
Nölting had allocated 500,000 marks for “future energy” and, due to his influence, the Land 
government set up a Research Council in February 1949.790  
The SPD was able to call upon a well of support within the scientific community. This 
was in part because a group of leading scientific researchers were associated with the SPD 
leadership circles, whose expertise the SPD Central Committee cultivated in crafting its policy 
on science. The most important figure in this process was Dr. Leo Brandt, who became the 
primary author of the SPD’s 1956 Atomic Program.791 Brandt was such a prominent figure 
within the scientific community that, in 1956, the German government appointed him second in 
command of the German Atomic Commission despite his political affiliation.792 The SPD 
leadership also received counsel from affiliated scientists, who kept the SPD abreast of the most 
advanced trends in their fields and offered their views on research policy.793 This network of 
professional contacts allowed the SPD to present itself as a plausible mouthpiece for segments of 
the scientific community frustrated by what they considered to be the relative neglect displayed 
by Adenauer’s CDU-led government.  
In addition to believing in the merits of atomic energy, the SPD leadership saw a political 
opening to attack the government. Leo Brandt spoke to the SPD Central Committee of “the 
passivity of the federal government in questions of research and training” and encouraged it to 
make research an electoral issue.794 His influence combined with that of Professor Carlo Schmid 
to make nuclear policy a principal plank of the 1956 SPD party congress’ theme: “The Second 
789 Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Aussschusses für Frage der Atomenergie beim Partievorstand der 
SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. Rudolf Pass wrote to Wehner that, “this energy is inexhaustible as far 
as the mind can imagine and in a general sense its ubiquity is the same as [when humans] moved from wood to 
extracting energy from coal and oil.” Pass letter to Wehner, 1/HWAA82, AdsD. 
790 Thomas Stamm, “Leo Brandt,” in Walter Först, ed., Zwischen Ruhrkontrolle und Mitbestimmung (Cologne: 
Kohlhammer, 1982), 184-85.  
791 For Brandt’s biography, see Ibid., 184-98. 
792 Ibid., 191. 
793 Gewerkschaft Brundhilde letter to the SPD Central Committee, 28 March 1955; Rudolf Pass letter to Deist, 7 
April 1955, Heinrich Deist (HD) 83, AdsD. 
794 Ergebnisprotokoll der Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD am 4. 
Mai 1956 im Raum F 11 des Bundeshauses, Bonn. Protokoll einer Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der 
Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD stattgefunden am 15. März 1957 im Bundeshaus Bonn, 1/HWAA853, 
AdsD. 
235 
 
                                                          
Industrial Revolution.” The SPD’s decision to join Jean Monnet’s Action Committee in 1955 
allowed the SPD to present itself as the party of science. In December 1955, Ollenhauer called 
on the party “to develop its point of view on all questions of atomic energy” with the intention of 
presenting a coherent policy to the 1956 congress.795 The Central Committee called upon experts 
and party leaders to lead sub-committees charged with various aspects of nuclear energy policy, 
all of which conducted their work at a furious pace through January 1956.796 In the resulting 
drafts for the SPD Atomic Plan, the party regretted that, “the current federal government, like its 
predecessors under this Chancellor, has shown little understanding for scientific research.”797  
Professor Weizel presented a detailed proposal to the SPD deputies in January 1956. An 
atomic energy program, he wrote, required a budget of three million marks for the atomic 
research itself, two million for the training and salaries of physicists, chemists, and engineers, 
one million for the expansion of existing capacities, and an additional two million for associated 
personnel.798 He also pointed to the need to seek foreign assistance. Within weeks the SPD 
Bundestag faction presented proposals to drastically increase funding for nuclear research by 
creating a German Atomic Commission and an Albert Einstein Foundation.799 At the 1956 party 
congress, the party spent hours laying out a vision for Germany’s scientific future. It was a 
successful propaganda coup. Leo Brandt and Carlo Schmid’s widely-reported speeches were 
printed and distributed in brochures throughout Germany.800 The SPD followed up this success 
with a series of proposals to fund a German Research Council and other programs.801  
Even prior to Monnet’s announcement of the Euratom initiative, the SFIO and the SPD 
were advocates of their nations’ participation in an international atomic energy body. SPD 
experts believed that only the assistance of other nations would allow Germany to make up the 
ground it had lost due the isolation of the Nazi and occupation periods.802 French Socialists, for 
795 Protokoll der konstituierende Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 
5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD.  
796 Among the members of the Central Committee’s Committee for Atomic Energy were Leo Brandt, Heinrich 
Deist, Willi Eichler, Fritz Erler, Hellmut Kalbitzer, Ludwig Rosenberg, Carlo Schmid, Joachim Schöne, Hermann 
Veit, Herbert Wehner, and Walter Weizel. 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
797 “Entwurf für einen Atomplan der SPD,” 27 April 1956,1/HWAA83 AdsD. 
798 Entwurf Prof. W. Weizel an die Bundestagsfraktion der SPD, 7 January 1956, AdsD. 
799 20 January 1956, Antrag der SPD im deutschen Bundestag, HD 83, AdsD.  
800 Weber, op cit., 560-61. 
801 Der Deutsche Forschungsrat und seine Aufgaben Referat von Staatsekretär Professor Dr. Med. Hc. Dip. Leo 
Brandt. Antrag zum Bundeshaushalt 1957/58, Karl Schiller 73, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BaK). 
802 Vorschlag zur Änderung des von Leo Brandt vorgelegten “Entwurf für einen Atomplan der SPD,” 27 April 1956, 
1/HWAA82, AdsD. 
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their part, shared a general assessment that an isolated French program would prove far too great 
a burden for France’s budget.803 In addition, both nations needed to import the uranium 
necessary to create nuclear energy.804 A purely national atomic energy program was therefore 
not possible for either Germany or France.805 That the two nations would seek an alliance on 
nuclear energy with one another, however, was not foreordained. Rather, both nations, and their 
socialist parties, had originally looked to Great Britain for partnership. Yet again, the British 
government disappointed its continental allies, refusing French and later German overtures for 
atomic cooperation that it feared would jeopardize its privileged relations with the United 
States.806  
Absent British cooperation, French Socialists and German Social Democrats concluded 
that a French-German partnership was necessary if their nations would ever be able to compete 
with the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of atomic energy production. Leo Brandt 
and Hellmut Kalbitzer were the only prominent opponents of close collaboration with the French 
on atomic energy.807 The views of Weizel and Wehner won the day. During a time of rapid 
economic change, Weizel told the SPD’s atomic committee that, “there are only two options: 
swim or drown...”808 The French nuclear program was, after all, third among the Western 
countries in technology, had the largest production of enriched uranium, and employed twice as 
many atomic technicians as all the other Western-continental nations combined.809 While 
dismissing concerns that German science would experience “colonization” by the French nuclear 
program, Weizel reminded the SPD of the “backwardness of our technical capabilities,” which 
makes “[our] number one problem [our] participation in the new development[s].”810 Erler 
explained his support for Euratom by stating that, “I am convinced that each European power 
803 Thomas Rhenisch, Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrie und die Gründung 
der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 19; Weilemann, op cit., 42. 
804 The SPD recognized its dependence on foreign sources for raw materials. Zeitafel, Tageordnung und Thesen für 
die Entwicklung der Atomenergie, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
805 Ludwig Rosenberg told the SPD Atomic Energy Committee that he “does not believe that on the national level 
what Monnet proposes can be achieved.” Protokoll einer gemeinsamen Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der 
Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand und der Mitglieder der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für europäische Zusammenarbeit, 6 
February 1956, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. For France, see Weilemann, op cit., 113. 
806 Ludwin Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in den Montan-
Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 319; Weilemann, op cit., 21-24, 41. 
807 13-14 January 1956, SPD-PV 1956, AdsD. 
808 Protokoll über die am 31. Mai (Fronleichnam) im “Haus der SPD”, Bonn. Stattgefundene Tagung des 
“Ausschuss für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD,” 1/HWAA82, AdsD. 
809 Weilemann, op cit., 39-42. 
810 Protokoll über die am 31. Mai (Fronleichnam) im “Haus der SPD”, Bonn. Stattgefundene Tagung des 
“Ausschuss für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD,” 1/HWAA82, AdsD. 
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alone—with the exception of England—will be incapable of catching up with the advance of the 
Americans and Russians...”811 Though Kalbitzer continued to advocate for a looser integration of 
atomic energy under the auspices of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), Wehner concluded succinctly that, “The OEEC-Framework will not suffice for us.”812  
Monnet’s initiative helped to create the basis for a SFIO-SPD entente on the European 
integration process. In conversations from April to June 1955, Monnet and his allies won Guy 
Mollet to the Euratom cause. Mollet was eager to seize upon the positive attitude the SPD had 
begun to display within the ECSC Common Assembly to overcome the inter-party tensions from 
the EDC period. He posed two conditions for his party’s support: that the SFIO remain free to 
support or reject other integration initiatives besides nuclear energy and, crucially, that Monnet 
make intensive efforts to woo the SPD and gain its adherence.813 Monnet sprung at the 
opportunity. He asked Mollet to use his contacts with the SPD to arrange interviews on the 
subject with party leader Ollenhauer and Wehner.814 After a series of personal interviews, 
Monnet succeeded in winning the SPD leadership to his cause, which was prone for the reasons 
above to support an atomic energy initiative.815 After years of conflict, the party was also eager 
to escape a sense of domestic and international isolation.816 By August, Gerhard Kreyssig, a key 
SPD deputy in the ECSC Common Assembly, was publicly praising the Euratom concept as 
“excellent” and as an “immediately workable solution.”817 He warned against proposals to water 
down the initiative and limit its competences, instead advocating for the transcendence of 
national programs and the development of “a European Common Program” for atomic energy.  
811 Fritz Erler, “La politique extérieure de la république fédérale,” Politique étrangère, July/August 1956, FE 13, 
AdsD. 
812 Kalbitzer, Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim 
Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD; Wehner to PV13-14 January 1956, PV 1956, AdsD. 
813 Mollet letter to Monnet, 16 July 1955, AGM 113, OURS. Mollet announced his support for the project in a series 
of interviews from 25 to 26 June 1955. Hanns Jürgens Küsters, “Jean Monnet et les chanceliers de Konrad Adenauer 
à Helmut Schmidt,” in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, eds., Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la paix: 
Actes du colloque de Paris du 29 au 31 mai 1997 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), 233-37. 
814 Monnet to Mollet, 22 July 1955, AGM 113, OURS. 
815 Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—
Convergence et discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 189.  
816 Wehner wrote in his notes that among the “political consideration[s] for the SPD’s attitude on the atomic energy 
question” was that the “positive attitude of the SPD-leadership to Jean Monnet in terms of the Action Committee for 
the United States of Europe has greatly paid off because the SPD has been freed in the western press from its alleged 
position of isolation.” Pariser Diskussion, 17.-18.1.56, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
817 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 30. August 1955, Gerhard Kreyssig (GK) 26, 
AdsD. 
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Monnet was ecstatic to have the Social Democrats’ support. Keeping a promise he had 
made to Ollenhauer, Monnet made a conscious decision to give the Action Committee a left-
leaning hue by actively seeking the collaboration of trade unionists, and not inviting the 
Community’s liberal parties, industrial organizations or business associations to participate. 
Ollenhauer reported having consulted and gained the support of Walter Freitag and Heinrich 
Imig, both important DGB officials, for Monnet’s proposal before giving a concrete response to 
Monnet’s entreaties.818 Monnet tapped the trade unionist Ludwig Rosenberg to preside over the 
Action Committee’s sub-committee in charge of law, administration, and finances. When 
Monnet announced the composition of his committee in 1955, Christian Democrats found 
themselves outnumbered by Socialists and trade unionists, the latter of whom constituted around 
50% of the committee’s total membership.819 
The SPD became the most enthusiastic supporter of Euratom within German politics. In 
January 1956, the Central Committee agreed to the SPD’s formal representation in Monnet’s 
Action Committee, and Ollenhauer and Wehner became ubiquitous at the Committee’s meetings. 
Wehner constantly gave favorable reports of the Committee’s work to the SPD’s internal 
committees,820 and he publicly accused the government of “half-hearted” support for Monnet’s 
Committee, a claim that was broadly true.821 Over the course of 1956, the SPD seemed to relish 
in the embarrassment of Adenauer’s government that the SPD had seemingly outflanked them on 
Monnet’s initiative. After a unanimous vote of support from the SPD Bundestag faction, the SPD 
launched a public campaign to pressure Adenauer’s government to sign a treaty to create 
Euratom.822  
The SPD also celebrated its détente with the SFIO leadership.823 In early 1956, 
Ollenhauer made a habit of meeting with Prime Minister Mollet in Paris to coordinate Socialist 
818 13-14 January 1956, PV 1956, AdsD. 
819 Hanns Jürgens Küsters, “Jean Monnet et les chanceliers de Konrad Adenauer à Helmut Schmidt,” in Bossuat and 
Wilkens, eds., 234-45; Weilemann, op cit., 71. 
820 Zeitafel, Tageordnung und Thesen für die Entwicklung der Atomenergie, 1/HWAA83, AdsD; 13-14 January 
1956, PV 1956, AdsD.  
821 Wehner, “Nicht Appelle-Tatsachen entscheiden,” Die Freiheit, 28 September 1956, 1/HWAA2933, AdsD.  
822 Ollenhauer to the PV and PA, March 10 1956 in Bergueinstadt, PV 1956, AdsD; Genosse Selbmann, 
Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der 
Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion Oktober 1 1956, 
Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlugen über die Bildung 
einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD. 
823 Ollenhauer to the PV and PA March 10 1956 in Bergueinstadt, PV 1956, AdsD. 
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policy before sessions of Monnet’s Action Committee.824 Marking their new-found harmony, the 
six Socialist parties of the ECSC publicized a common resolution favoring atomic energy 
integration. The Socialist parties presented a united front within Jean Monnet’s Committee and 
were frequently at odds with representatives of the CDU and French Radicals.825 Prime Minister 
Mollet asked his German colleagues to pressure the reluctant CDU-leadership to prioritize 
Euratom.826 The SPD also supported a principal demand of the French SFIO-led coalition 
government: that the Euratom proposal be divorced from the negotiations for a common market. 
Ollenhauer went so far as to write German Foreign Minister von Brentano in October 1956 
concerning the impasse between the French and German governments: “I do not mistake the 
importance of a quick conclusion of an agreement on the Common Market, but I would consider 
it very unfortunate if one makes it a precondition for the building of the European Atomic 
Community.”827  
The SPD became a firm advocate of Euratom in large part because it viewed its 
transnational contacts and a supranational community as alternative means to contest German 
government policy on nuclear energy. Within Germany, the SPD proposed a “German Organ for 
Fissile Materials and Supervision of their Application,” under a federal scheme that would allow 
SPD Land Minister-Presidents the power to observe and influence the launching of an atomic 
energy program in Germany.828 Frustrations within the SPD boiled over when the German 
government appointed a leading chemical industrialist to oversee Germany’s nuclear program, 
which the party interpreted as a clear sign that the German government intended to encourage 
private companies’ involvement.829 Its powers stymied within German domestic politics, the 
SPD used its transnational contacts to attempt to influence the design of Germany’s nuclear 
824 Protokoll einer gemeinsamen Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand und der 
Mitglieder der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für europäische Zusammenarbeit, 6 February 1956, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
825 Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des 
Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion 
Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlugen 
über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD; Andreas 
Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—Convergence et 
discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 190. 
826 BERICHT ÜBER DIE EURATOM, unterbreitet von GUY MOLLET, Generalsekretär der Sozialistischen Partei 
Frankreichs (S.F.I.O.), AGM 11, OURS. 
827 Ollenhauer to von Brentano, 18 October 1956, EO 412, AdsD. 
828 Entwurf für einen Antrag der SPD, 23 January 1956, Errichtung des “Deutschen Organs für Kernbrennstoffe und 
die Überwachung ihrer Verwendung,” HD 83, AdsD; Gegenüberstellung Monnet-Entwurf, Messinabericht und 
OEEC-Bericht, 6 January 1956, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
829 Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 6 November 1956, GK 27, AdsD. 
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program by ensuring two central goals: that uranium and atomic energy be kept under public 
control, and that the program remain peaceful. SPD leaders knew that the CDU-government 
opposed public ownership, wishing to open the field to its supporters in German industry, and 
they suspected, correctly, that Adenauer’s government was interested in acquiring nuclear 
weapons.  
The SPD offered a multitude of reasons for opposing private involvement in atomic 
energy policy, including that: uranium was not a normal commodity; atomic energy was 
inherently monopolistic; private industry did not possess enough capital to launch a nuclear 
program and should not profit from the results of public investment; and state supervision of 
dangerous chemicals was necessary for public health.830 Most ominous, one SPD leader noted in 
a letter to the Central Committee, was the possibility of the private production of atomic 
weapons and the arming of private militias.831 German Social Democrats insisted that atomic 
energy was different from a nationalization policy in general because a vast majority of people 
supported the nationalization of electricity, and the United States and Great Britain had decided 
to bar private companies from acquiring fuels needed for atomic energy production.832  
The SPD found firm allies in Monnet and the SFIO when it came to keeping nuclear 
energy out of the hands of private industry. As Monnet attempted to gain Mollet’s support for 
Euratom in spring 1955, Mollet insisted that its institutional design be that of a “public 
authority.”833 The SFIO and SPD brought their demand for an exclusively public atomic energy 
authority to the ECSC Common Assembly, to the Council of Europe, and to Monnet’s Action 
Committee, as transnational networks buzzed in the excitement of the European relance. A 
united ECSC Socialist faction presented its proposal in spring 1956, which was met by 
counterproposals from the Christian Democratic and Liberal factions, both of which insisted on 
the possibility of private involvement in this new energy field.834 SFIO deputy Lapie represented 
830 Stenographisches Protokoll über die Wahlkundgebung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 16. Juni 
1957 in Dortmund, Westfalenhalle; Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der 
Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955; Protokoll einer Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen 
der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD stattgefunden am 15. März 1957 im Bundeshaus Bonn, 1/HWAA83, 
AdsD. 
831 Georg August Zinn to Fritz Heine, 2 August 1956, BG 154, AdsD; and Rudolf Pass letter to Deist, 7 April 1955, 
HD 83, AdsD.  
832 Ollenhauer to SPD Congress 1954, 68, AdsD.  
833 Antonio Varsori, “Euratom: une organisation qui échappe à Jean Monnet?,” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 347. 
834 Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistant, An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des 
Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion 
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the Socialists’ view in the Council of Europe, where he insisted that the intergovernmental 
committee chaired by Belgian Socialist Paul-Henri Spaak, which was charged with making 
recommendations for the design of the Community, explicitly exclude private enterprise, while 
the Christian Democrats sought to weaken the Spaak committee’s formulation to open the door 
to the private sector.835 The Socialists’ failure to achieve a ban on private industry’s participation 
in atomic energy within the intergovernmental Council of Europe dashed SPD hopes that it or 
the OEEC might prove a propitious venue for the new community. The SPD therefore chose to 
privilege public ownership and a strict oversight of the distribution of fissile materials over the 
involvement of non-ECSC countries, which had also been a long-held party demand concerning 
European integration.  
Ollenhauer became the most ardent ally of Jean Monnet in his efforts to achieve an 
exclusive supranational control of the proposed Community’s fissile materials with oversight 
from a European parliamentary body.836 Many within the Action Committee resisted these 
strictures, but Monnet lobbied the governments negotiating the treaties to support public 
ownership. SPD leaders recognized that the problem, in their view, had been the position of the 
German government, rather than that of the French government or of Prime Minister Mollet.837 
The U.S. government emerged as a decisive factor in the negotiations because it insisted that 
Euratom possess full powers over the use and distribution of any uranium delivered from the 
U.S.838 Though the German government, under pressure from the chemical industry, attained the 
right of industry representatives to attend certain meetings of Euratom’s supranational executive, 
the combined efforts of Monnet and the French and U.S. governments were able to attain a key 
SPD and SFIO demand: Euratom’s ownership and supervision of all fissile materials.839  
Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlungen 
über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD. 
835 Weilemann, op cit., 87.  
836 Hans Furler, “Notizen über die Sitzungen des Aktionskomitees für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa 
(Atomgemeinschaft—Monnet) am 17. und 18. January 1956 in Paris,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Interessen 
Verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 
403-05; Weilemann, op cit., 72-73. 
837 Fritz Erler, Stichworte zum Referat Aussen- und Wehrpolitik auf der Freiburger Konferenz June 1957, FE 13, 
AdsD. Ollenhauer to the Gemeinsame Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, Parteiausschusses und der Kontrollkommission 
am 18. Oktober 1956, PV 1957, AdsD. 
838 See Ollenhauer’s positive reaction to this news. Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 7./8.3.1957 in Berlin, PV 1957, 
AdsD. 
839 Mollet celebrated this achievement in an April 1957 statement. Declaration de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du 
Conseil, à la Revue “INDUSTRIES ATOMIQUES,” Avril 1957, AGM 70, OURS; Weilemann, op cit., 164. 
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As in the case of public ownership, the SPD also found support in the SFIO for its second 
key demand: that the member states’ nuclear programs remain exclusively peaceful in nature. 
Mollet had repeatedly made this objective clear to Monnet and, in part with an eye to attracting 
SPD support, Monnet included a ban on any military application for Euratom from the outset.840 
Wehner, one of Monnet’s principal interlocutors within the SPD, cited Monnet’s support for the 
SPD’s demands as a primary reason for the SPD’s decision to join the Action Committee, noting 
that the OEEC proposals took heed of neither of the SPD’s conditions.841 The SPD was 
particularly concerned that a constant demand that they had supported in the postwar period, that 
West Germany be granted “an equality of rights” in all European integration initiatives, might be 
exploited by the West German government to create a nuclear weapons program if France 
decided to develop an atomic weapons arsenal. Mollet assured Ollenhauer that his government 
would limit its efforts to peaceful atomic energy,842 and thanked Ollenhauer for the SPD’s 
assiduous opposition to nuclear weapons. At the January 1956 meeting of Monnet’s Action 
Committee, which was held days before Guy Mollet was elected Prime Minister, opposition to 
the ban on nuclear weapons emerged from Christian Democrats, French Radicals, and others in 
the Action Committee. Together Mollet and Ollenhauer, in alliance with Monnet, defeated 
efforts to water down or eliminate a ban on nuclear weapons. The ban was then reiterated in the 
Committee’s public resolution.843  
The next month, though, Mollet found himself leading a coalitional government that 
included a number of prominent politicians who had expressed their “reservations” about the ban 
within the Action Committee. Though he and his party formally opposed a French nuclear arms 
program, his position faced an overwhelming coalition of political and administrative 
opponents.844 The French nuclear weapons program, launched under Pierre Mendès-France’s 
840 Hans Furler, “Notizen,” in Wilkens, Interessen Verbinden, 403-05; Weilemann, op cit., 76. 
841 Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der 
SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe: Session des 17 et 18 janvier 1956, Résolution, 1/HWAA83, 
AdsD. This transnational political standoff emerged as well within the Common Assembly of the ECSC, where the 
Socialist faction proposed a resolution against the construction of atomic weapons. Genosse Selbmann, 
Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der 
Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion Oktober 1 1956, 
Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlugen über die Bildung 
einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD.  
844 The SFIO congress in June 1956 passed a resolution demanding “for a long period an exclusively pacifist 
character for the European atomic industry.” OURS. 
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government in fall 1954, was continuously making progress and promised to produce a nuclear 
weapon within a few years.845 The French military, the Atomic Commission, and, more 
surprisingly, the Socialist Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, all favored an atomic weapon to 
strengthen France’s geopolitical position.846 Pineau argued that France should give up its 
program only if the world’s nuclear powers agreed to multilateral disarmament proposals being 
pursued by Socialist Jules Moch at the U.N.847 Most crucial of all was the insistence of centrist 
ministers within the coalition, including Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, and 
Félix Gaillard and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who each threatened to bring down the government 
if Mollet hit the brakes on the weapons program.  
The impasse continued until summer 1956 as Mollet continued to resist making a French 
nuclear weapons’ exception a demand in the negotiations for Euratom. However, the math in the 
National Assembly was clear. There was no majority for Euratom, let alone for a common 
market, if Mollet insisted on abandoning the nuclear weapons program. Eager for a foreign 
policy success as the violence in Algeria accelerated, Monnet relented.848 He accepted a 
compromise worked out by Pineau and Spaak that the French government agree not to test a 
bomb for a trial period of four to five years, but reserve for itself the decision to build and deploy 
a bomb thereafter.849 On 11 July, Mollet announced the moratorium to the French National 
Assembly. He gutted much of the substance of Euratom in order to ensure the Assembly’s 
support in principle for the Euratom treaty under negotiation. The French government would 
845 For a discussion of the geopolitical motivations that gave rise to France’s nuclear weapons program, see Jean 
Delmas, “Military Power in France 1954-1958,” in Enrico Di Nolfo, ed., Power in Europe? II Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC, 1952-1957 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1992), 239-
250.  
846 Weilemann, op cit., 103-104. 
847 Pierre Guillen, “La France et la négociation des traités de Rome: l’Euratom,” in Serra, ed., 520-22. 
848 Jean Delmas writes that Guy Mollet revised his position on 25 June. He then writes, oddly, that the Suez Crisis 
gave the final impetus to Mollet’s decision. Delmas in Di Nolfo, Power in Europe II, ed., 242. However, Mollet 
presented his new proposal to the National Assembly for debate from 5 to 11 July, weeks before Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s surprise announcement that Egypt would nationalize the Suez Canal on 26 July. It would be 
more accurate to say that Nasser’s announcement probably helped to cement Mollet’s new position. Berstein writes 
that Mollet “pursued the policy of his predecessors, against his party’s wishes.” Serge Berstein, “The Perception of 
French Power by the Political Forces,” in Di Nolfo, ed., Power in Europe II, 247-48. This statement is true, but only 
after June 1956. It is also important to point out that there is little evidence at that time that Mollet’s convictions had 
changed, though they likely did in November 1956, following the French government’s geopolitical isolation and 
sense of abandonment following the failure of the Suez invasion.  
849 For Pineau’s efforts to achieve a compromise, see René Dabernat, “La querelle de l’Euratom risque de réveiller 
les passions de la C.E.D. Le gouvernement est divisé sur la fabrication d’armes thermo-nucléaires,” Paris Presse, 21 
March 1956. Spaak initially suggested such a solution in February, and after a period of hesitation, Pineau stated at a 
conference in Venice presided by Spaak that he would seek a compromise along these lines. Weilemann, op cit., 
105-06.  
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continue military research during the moratorium, and would assign only a limited amount of its 
atomic budget and scientific resources to Euratom, thereby ensuring a parallel weapons 
program.850 The National Assembly massively approved the Socialist resolution. 
The SPD leadership was distraught and disappointed, but its reaction was relatively 
muted, especially when compared to its past rhetoric concerning the intentions of the French 
government in the European integration process. Public reports of the internal French divisions 
had no doubt already caught the attention of the SPD, and a document from September 1956 
demonstrates that the SPD had knowledge of much of the internal political dynamics within 
Mollet’s government.851 Wehner lamented in a memorandum that, “Guy Mollet had sacrificed 
the central core of the Committee’s resolution on Euratom” and, by doing so, “he had 
endangered the whole raison d’être of the Committee.” He went on to state that now, “The SPD 
would have to explain why it had endorsed the January resolution [of Monnet’s committee to 
support Euratom] and how this resolution had been thwarted” as well as “contend with the 
argument that Germany was being discriminated against.”852 The latter was a real concern 
because the German government had made clear in the negotiations that it reserved the right to 
create a nuclear weapons program if France did so. In fact, by September, Adenauer was actively 
seeking to launch a German nuclear program.853 Nonetheless, the SPD continued to actively 
support Euratom within Monnet’s Committee and within German domestic politics.  
Historians have pointed to the SPD’s enthusiasm for the possibilities of atomic energy, 
and a move to pragmatic politics as “proof positive that the party had lost all taste for 
‘opposition’ on European matters.”854 The latter claim is a bit overstated, as the internal debates 
on the Treaties of Rome would reveal. In general, these claims, while plausible, are speculative. 
A sense of fatalism and the presence of a French Socialist at the helms of government in France 
no doubt helped quell agitation within the SPD. The SPD was acutely aware of the precarious 
situation facing the SFIO-led government and, in the summer of 1956, it feared that its potential 
850 Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—
Convergence et discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat, Wilkens, eds, Interessen verbinden, 93.  
851 Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des 
Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion 
Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlugen 
über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, written 30 September 1956. HWAA/1607 AdsD. 
852 Paterson, op cit.,125-26. 
853 Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—
Convergence et discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat, Wilkens, eds., 196-97. 
854 Ibid., 194; Paterson, op cit.,126.  
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fall portended ominous consequences for democratic stability in France.855 Ollenhauer privately 
summed up the SPD’s reaction in September 1956: “Mollet’s collapse [on Euratom] has made 
our participation much more difficult but we should continue to try to make the best of it.”856 
Wilkens errs therefore in his claim that, “It was in effect the Euratom project and not a certain 
abstract idea of European integration with the perspective of installing a Common European 
market that incited the German SPD to pronounce itself in favor of the Treaties of Rome in July 
1957.”857 The source of the SPD’s decision to support the common market in 1957 must be 
sought elsewhere. 
 
6.3 FREE-TRADE SOCIALISM: SFIO-SPD CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERALIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 
 
This section seeks to explain why the SPD voted to ratify the Treaty instituting the European 
Economic Community (EEC) after having vigorously opposed the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC). I disagree with 
scholars who argue that, “it was unmistakable that the party had experienced a conversion.”858 In 
turn, this chapter analyzes why Prime Minister Mollet gave the green light for a European 
common market despite a wide-reaching perception in French political and economic circles that 
the French economy was incapable of successfully competing with West Germany. 
Neither French Socialists nor German Social Democrats viewed trade liberalization and 
economic liberalism as synonymous. In fact, French Socialists were quite explicit that a dirigiste 
internal economy based on planning could exist quite harmoniously with a progressive removal 
of trade barriers.859 SPD official Rudolf Pass echoed the SFIO view, instructing SPD economics 
855 It was only after the Suez Crisis and the emergence of an internal SFIO opposition that the SPD began to 
tentatively criticize Mollet’s government in late 1956.  
856 Ollenhauer, 17-18 September 1956, PV 1956, AdsD. 
857 Besides, by this time Euratom had been gutted of much of its substance (see above). The quote is from Andreas 
Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—Convergence et 
discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 201.  
858 Hrbek, op cit., 257. Paterson writes that, “All that remained of the Schumacher legacy [on European integration] 
was a bitter distrust of the French on the part of some members.” Paterson, op cit.,127. This claim is misleading 
because Schumacher embraced the pro-liberalization stance of his party’s economics experts.  
859 Gorse as rapporteur for the Blum-Byrnes accord, 1 August 1946, JO, 2889; Pineau, 6 August 1954, JO, 3927. 
Blum called for the lowering of tariff barriers and trade restrictions within “a united and planned economy between 
the states of Western Europe.” “À Washington,” 3-4 September 1949, Le Populaire in Léon Blum, L’Oeuvre de 
Léon Blum (1947-1950) (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964), 321-24.  
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experts to make a clear distinction between “liberalization,” which the party supported, and 
“liberalism,” which it rejected. The party report he distributed with his letter stated that, 
“Liberalization is a technique for import policy,” rather than a program for domestic economic 
policy.860 “Liberalism,” on the other hand, was represented as Economic Minister Ludwig 
Erhard’s efforts to “lift controls” against the SPD’s policy of “planning and steering.” Baade also 
asserted that, “the liberalization of trade does not mean a recognition of liberalism.” 
Foreshadowing SPD support for a European common market, he argued that, “Liberalization is 
in reality an internal European preference system.”861 At a time of acute dollar shortage among 
all Western European states, Baade linked West Germany’s recovery to increased trade with the 
Marshall Plan states and noted that increased trade with them would save Germany from having 
to spend precious dollar reserves to purchase U.S. goods. 
Free trade was not a doctrinal issue for socialists.862 Rather, the lessons of history and the 
European continent’s economic and political eclipse by the gargantuan United States and Soviet 
Union made Socialists believe that a liberalization of European trade was an economic 
imperative. SFIO and SPD leaders pointed to the large internal market of the United States as the 
source of the success of the U.S. economy because it permitted “a division and specialization of 
labor which are essential factors” for “mass production.”863 The SFIO’s most fervent supporter 
of trade liberalization, André Philip, denounced the “excessive protectionism” of the interwar 
period as responsible for “an inevitable decline in the standard of living” and “generalized 
misery.” “The result,” according to Pineau, at the time President of the National Assembly’s 
Finance Committee, “is an outmoded [industry] and outdated equipment.”864 SFIO speakers in 
the initial postwar period constantly lambasted the poverty of the “France alone” slogan and, like 
their SPD counterparts, insisted that the French economy required a steady stream of imports in 
860 Pass to members of the WVA, 6 October 1950, GK 188, AdsD. 
861 Protokoll zur Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands am 17.4.50, BG 158, AdsD. 
862 In a response to a questionnaire of the Socialist International, the SPD replied that, “The Party is neither 
dogmatically inclined to total free trade nor towards protectionism (or other forms of import restrictions). From our 
newly formed Action Program, there is a demand for the increase in social production through a rise in productivity 
that logically leads to an approval of an international division of labor. Therefore the party tends fundamentally 
towards the side of free trade. That does not exclude that, especially from the point of view of securing jobs, that 
party from time to time approves protective measures for a more or less limited time.” FRAGEBODEN Die Technik 
der staatlichen Wirtschaftsplanung Direkte Kontrollen, Karl Schiller 72, BaK.  
863 Gouin, 17 November 1953, JO, 5222; Pass to members of the WVA, 6 October 1950, GK 188, AdsD; Deist letter 
to Heinrich Tröger, 8 January 1957, HD 42, AdsD. 
864 Pineau, 1 August 1946, JO, 2908. 
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order to prosper.865 The German trade unions shared this economic vision, though it received 
markedly less enthusiasm within the Force Ouvrière and other French unions.866 
The solution for the French Socialist Party was to prepare the French economy for 
competition by increasing productivity and lifting tariffs that shielded marginal businesses at the 
expense of economic growth.867 Philip, the chief French negotiator for the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, succeeded in creating the legal basis for the later 
European Economic Community by inserting a clause into the GATT treaty that permitted 
regional customs unions or free trade zones.868 Such a regional customs union would represent 
part of Europe’s effort to decrease its reliance on imports from the United States, which 
continued to exacerbate Western Europe’s balance of payments crisis with the dollar zone.869 
The economic theories of Jacques Levy-Jacquemin, who argued that Europe faced a structural, 
rather than temporary, trade crisis with the USA, encouraged French Socialist economic thinkers 
to privilege a European, rather than global, framework for trade liberalization.870 This did not 
mean that French Socialists favored lowering tariffs in all cases.871 All factions of the party 
supported an “organization of markets” to prevent the “anarchic character” of unbridled trade 
liberalization and some elements of the party were particularly concerned that French businesses 
865 Gorse as rapporteur for the Blum-Byrnes accord, 1 August 1946, JO, 2875; Gouin, JO, 2905. 
866 Ernst-Dieter Köpper, Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik: Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur 
wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die 
NATO (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus-Verlag, 1982), 105-06.  
867 See Pineau, 4 December 1952, JO, 5959; Philip to the SFIO 46ème Congrès National in Asnière, 1-4 July 1954. 
Bossuat writes that, “Guy Mollet’s rapport to the SFIO National Council in February 1949 was without ambiguity: 
He accepts sacrificing certain industrial branches to arrive at a specialization that would realize the political union of 
Europe...” Gérard Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944-1954 (Paris: Ministère 
des Finances, 1992), 636.  
868 Conférence du commerce et de l’emploi: Procès Verbal de la deuxième séance du Vendredi 11 Avril 1947 au 
Palais des Nations à Génève, André Philip 17, Archives nationales (AN); Pierre Guillen, “Le projet d’union 
économique entre la France, l’Italie et le Benelux,” in Raymond Poidevin, ed., Histoire des débuts de la 
Construction européenne, Mars 1948-Mai 1950. Actes du colloque de Strasbourg 28-30 Novembre 1984 (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 1986).  
869 See Philip’s discussion of the necessity to decrease imports from the United States in, “European Movement: 
Second Economic Conference of Westminster Draft Introductory Report by André Philip,” 1953. Schiller 67, BaK.  
870 Léon Blum, “A Washington,” 5 September 1949, Le Populaire. L’Oeuvre, op cit., 324-26. Philip hammered this 
point throughout the early 1950s.  
871 As Economic Minister Philip opposed removing tariffs in exchange for U.S. aid and Prime Minister Ramadier 
approved Philip’s stance. William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for 
Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 66. 
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would not be able to successfully compete against their European, and in particular, German 
neighbors.872  
The first serious proposals for French inclusion in a customs union came in discussions 
with Italy in 1947-48, which were later extended to include the Benelux countries in 1949. As 
the Dutch government made the inclusion of West Germany a condition of any Western 
European customs union in 1949, the French government scuttled negotiations with its Italian 
and Benelux partners. Philip, who favored Germany’s inclusion against opponents within his 
own party, went so far as to call the moribund custom union proposals “a liberal Europe that 
carries many dangers for the near future.”873 German Social Democrats, on the other hand, 
expressed enthusiasm in 1949 at the idea that a customs union, often referred to as “Fritalux,” 
might be expanded into an “Alfritalux” with the inclusion of Germany (Allemagne).874 Demands 
to include West Germany became the primary obstacle to the creation of a European customs 
union. 
German competition appeared formidable indeed. After the French and German 
governments negotiated a series of short-term trade deals in 1950-53, Germany became France’s 
largest trading partner. This trade, however, took an ominous allure as German exports to France 
drastically outstripped French exports to West Germany in the early 1950s. This imbalance 
further exacerbated a French trade deficit that helped throw France into the mercy of the 
European Payments Union, a multilateral clearing house set up in 1949, just shortly after West 
Germany began to show export surpluses and re-embark on trade liberalization.875 The West 
German economy grew an average of 8.6% per year from 1950 to 1960. Although the French 
economy also showed impressive growth, it lagged considerably behind West Germany with an 
average of 4.6% growth.876 French trade deficits appeared chronic, and so successive French 
872 Leenhardt and Lacoste to the Groupe parlementaire socialiste (GPS), 10 November 1949, Archive d’histoire 
contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-po; Leenhardt, 24 November 1949, JO, 6215-17; Tanguy-Prigent, 1 December 
1949 to the GPS, AHC.  
873 Undated document from 1949, AHC.  
874 Kreyssig, 15 November 1949, “Kontinentaleuropa im Werden,” GK 23, AdsD. 
875 Sylvie Lefèvre, Les relations économiques franco-allemands de 1945 à 1955. De l’occupation à la cooperation 
(Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de l’Economie, Finance et de Industrie, 1998), 337-341. 
876 Bernard Polani, “Facteurs économiques: Bilan de la reconstruction économique,” in Hélène Miard-Delacrois and 
Rainer Hudemann, eds., Wandel und Integration: Deutsch-französische Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2005), 102. 
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governments re-imposed restrictions on trade, culminating in the “super tariff” of March 1954.877 
As the West German government and others clamored for trade liberalization in the early 1950s, 
all serious proposals to advance European integration by this means met the implacable 
resistance of French governments. Nonetheless, French policymakers were well aware that their 
export growth was increasing at a far greater rate with Western Europe than with any other part 
of the world, including with France’s overseas territories, and that, to protect this trade, it might 
be necessary to placate its neighbors’ wishes to avoid the creation of a preferential European 
trading bloc that excluded France.878  
 
6.4 THE SPD APPPROACH TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
CONTINUITY AND PARTY TRADITIONS 
 
I argue that the SPD leadership and its economic experts remained consistent in their support for 
the principle of lowering or eliminating tariffs in the 1950s because they believed that an 
expanded single market was the best means of accomplishing the party’s economic goals of full 
employment and a higher standard of living. In addition, they viewed multilateral negotiation in 
a European organization, whether it be supranational or intergovernmental, as the best means of 
assuring reciprocity in European trade agreements. The SPD did not need to be converted to the 
wisdom of trade liberalization in 1957. The principal economic issue debated within the party 
concerning the EEC was whether it would lower trade barriers not only within the Community, 
which was assured, but outside of it as well. Despite the possibility of agricultural tariffs and 
barriers against the British-initiated Free Trade Area, in the end SPD economic experts 
determined that the EEC was the only means available at the time to attain any extensive form of 
trade liberalization. The SPD’s policy in favor of lowering or eliminating tariffs contributed in 
large measure to the party’s vote to ratify the EEC.  
SPD leaders presented their views through the prism of a party narrative that had its 
origins in the critiques that SPD theorists had constructed back in the Kaiserreich period. Bitterly 
divided on party tactics as well as on strategy, the competing factions within the SPD before the 
877 Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 182-83. 
878 Wendy Asbeek Brusse, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration 1947-1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), 162. 
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First World War agreed on at least one thing: protectionism was a form of economic nationalism 
that facilitated monopolization and contributed to the imperialist tensions between the European 
powers. A year into the First World War, the SPD formulated and publicized a set of “war aims” 
designed to pressure the German government to abandon visions of a punitive peace in favor of a 
Wilsonian-style settlement. The SPD demands for a postwar order make clear their analysis of 
what had led to war: in addition to international meditation and a peace free of annexation, the 
SPD demanded an “open door” in international economic relations, including the adoption of 
“most-favored-nation” trade clauses within the peace treaty, a comprehensive removal of tariffs 
and restrictions on transport, and “freedom on the seas.” Their demands were largely ignored 
within the domestic politics of an Imperial German government at war; their vision was stymied 
again after the war by the victorious Allied powers. Nonetheless, the SPD consistently put forth 
trade liberalization as a principal means of attaining a peaceful international order. The party 
went to so far as to call for the member states of the League of Nation to delegate to the 
international organization the authority to approve or refuse tariffs enacted at the national level, 
in effect calling for a supranational regime to regulate inter-state trade.879 As the 1929 New York 
stock market crash turned into a world-wide economic depression, the SPD decried the wave of 
tariff barriers and trade restrictions that marked the national governments’ responses to the 
Depression on both sides of the Atlantic. Its 1931 party congress resolution re-asserted the 
economic vision of peace the party had pursued during and after the war: 
The German economy is very closely intermeshed with the world economy, which has 
become completely disorganized due to the war, the peace and reparations treaties, the 
armaments nonsense, economic protectionism, and a lacking will of the peoples for 
peaceful cooperation. Therefore there is a necessity for a policy to secure peace, 
international disarmament, a cancellation or reduction [the term Streichung is ambigious, 
its closest translation is “striking”] of the international war debts and reparations, the 
removal of all obstacles to an international exchange of goods, the elimination of tariff 
walls, the conclusion of long-term trade agreements, an international regulation of capital 
flows, and measures against capital- and tax-flight.880 
 
 In his travels through Germany in 1945-48 (though he was not initially permitted in the French 
or Soviet zones), Schumacher time and again re-asserted the validity of the SPD’s traditional 
narratives about protectionism and trade liberalization. He argued that the concentrated power of 
879 Stefan Feucht, Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zur Aussenpolitik während der 
Weimarer Republic (1918-1933) (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1998), 60-61, 71. 
880 Ibid., 80-81. 
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the industrial and Junker agricultural classes were responsible for the ascent of German 
militarism in the late nineteenth century. Presenting a partisan version of the Sonderweg, he 
assigned the lion’s share of the blame to a bourgeoisie that had not fulfilled its historic task of 
political liberalism and economic liberalization after the defeat of the Frankfurt Assembly in 
1848, but had instead entered into alliance with the Junker class in the Iron-Rye Pact, a pact that 
marked Germany’s move towards protectionism in 1879. This narrative had a special 
significance for SPD policy on tariffs. As Schumacher told a crowd in October 1946, “If one 
searches for the strongest expression of modern imperialism in Germany...then one must 
consider the years that followed the [erection of] agricultural protective tariffs [in 1879] as the 
true birth of German misfortune.”881 
This analysis of the role of high tariffs for the concentration of power among reactionary 
classes combined with a belief among a number of Social Democratic leaders that an economic 
space larger than the European nation-state was necessary to assure optimal economic growth. 
This view, prevalent among leading European politicians of various political affiliations, seemed 
to mark the resurgence of support for trade liberalization in Europe as an answer to the 
marginalization of western and central European power that resulted from the Second World 
War, and to the autarkic economic doctrines of Nazism and Soviet Communism. Erik Nölting, a 
leader on the left-wing of SPD economic thinkers, called for a United States of Europe in 1947, 
with the purpose of facilitating increased production and a more specialized division of labor 
within a larger economic space.882 Fritz Erler, who was to become one of the most important 
SPD politicians of the 1950s, gave a speech in August 1949 in which he argued that modern 
transportation made small states economically anachronistic. On the eve of the creation of a 
federal West Germany, Erler supported the erection of a European Bundesstaat that would 
follow the model of the Zollverein (the customs union that preceded the founding of the German 
state), thereby instituting a framework for economic integration that would lead inevitably, in his 
view, to a political union. He envisaged a customs union and a common currency, though he saw 
881 Referat Dr. Schumacher am 18. Oktober 1946 im Renaissance-Theater in einer Versammlung von 
Wissenschaftlern und Geistesarbeitern, Berlin, Kurt Schumacher (KS) 39, AdsD.  
882 “Das deutsche Problem,” Ansprache des Prof. Dr. E. Nölting an die Verwaltungen der dem N.V.V. 
angeschlossenen Fachverbände am 12. November 1947, Eric Nölting (EN) 37, AdsD. 
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this as a long-term project predicated on first attaining a relatively equal standard of living 
between the European states.883 
Much of the basis for national SPD economic policy was determined within a special 
committee under the party’s Central Committee: the Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschuss (WPA) or 
Political-Economic Committee. The WPA brought together important and powerful figures of 
postwar SPD politics. Its membership shifted over time but included, among others: WPA Chair 
Hermann Veit, the SPD vice president of the Bundestag Economic committee; Fritz Baade, 
Director of the Institute for World Economics in Kiel; Willy Birkelbach, chair of the SPD 
Bundestag faction from 1956-1964; Heinrich Deist, Veit’s successor as WPA chair and leading 
SPD economic expert from 1957 to his death in 1964; Hellmut Kalbitzer, former trade unionist 
and SPD representative to the Council of Europe; Gerhard Kreyssig, economics editor for the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung; Georg Kurlbaum, Veit’s successor as vice president of the Bundestag 
Economic Committee; Erik Nölting, Economic Minister for North-Rhine-Westphalia; Karl 
Schiller, Senator in the Hamburg Land and later Minister for Economics and Finance under 
Willy Brandt’s government; Joachim Schöne, another of Veit’s successors as vice president of 
the Bundestag Economic committee and a coal expert; and Gerhard Weisser, Finance Minister 
for North-Rhine-Westphalia and professor in Cologne. Charged with presenting 
recommendations on economic policy to the party’s Central Committee and giving expert advice 
to the Bundestag delegation, the range and influence of the WPA’s work rose steadily in the 
period leading up to the Treaties of Rome. The purpose of the inaugural meeting was to debate 
what would be the foundations of the party’s economic policy while in opposition. At a time 
when efforts for European economic integration in the OEEC had ground to a halt, it is striking 
just how important the SPD economic experts considered efforts for European economic 
cooperation.884  
There was a widespread consensus in the committee in support of trade liberalization. 
The four goals that the committee laid out for SPD policy for the legislative session were: 
liberalization of trade; (an increase in) foreign trade; socialization; and Mitbestimmung (co-
determination in industry). Members considered closer European economic cooperation to be 
essential for the realization of Social Democratic policy. One member argued that the larger the 
883 Erler, “Bundesstaat Europa,” 24 August 1949, FE 6, AdsD. 
884 Protokoll zur Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands am 25. und 26. November 1949, EN 27, AdsD. 
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economic area, the greater the possibilities for a state-directed economy; another pushed for a 
free trade policy that would facilitate Germany’s entrance into a common European economic 
program. While a debate ensued about what name to assign the SPD’s economic vision, the 
liberalization of foreign trade provoked no controversy at the meeting. The only indication of the 
debate that would break out within the committee in 1950-51 during the balance of payments 
crisis was one member’s comment that, though the party should maintain freedom of 
consumption and not erect price controls, state aid might be necessary to promote exports. In a 
speech a month later, Carlo Schmid argued that European integration could proceed by sectors 
and he called for a European union with sovereignty over national tariffs [Zollhoheit].885 
When the WPA convened on 24 January 1950, Schumacher followed a criticism of the 
Council of Europe’s shortcomings with the assertion that Europe should assign itself four tasks: 
the creation of a common currency; a united dollar pool; a general agreement to lower tariffs; 
and a policy for a European division of labor.886 The party congress of May 1950 confirmed this 
policy. An amendment to the party program, accepted by the delegates, firmly set SPD tariff 
policy.887 It stated that though liberalization of foreign trade was a welcome goal, it must be 
conditional upon the reciprocity of the trading partners and a long-term amelioration of 
Germany’s trade deficit. 
As socialist parties continued to seek a seemingly elusive consensus on economic and 
European integration issues, Ollenhauer went to the 13 September COMISCO (Socialist 
executive group) meeting armed with a technical report on the situation of the German economy 
and European trade. This report stated that Germany needed more imports to ensure economic 
recovery, but that a balance of payments would be impossible over the long term if restrictions 
on German industry remained in force.888 The report made clear that the SPD was more liberal in 
its trade policy than the German government, which it accused of protecting unnamed special 
interests (almost certainly the agricultural sector). It went on to state that the SPD wanted to 
lower tariffs with any country willing to reciprocate and would welcome groups of European 
Recovery Program (ERP) countries agreeing to lower or eliminate tariffs on whole sectors of 
885 Referat Schmids 1949, Carlo Schmid 470, AdsD. 
886 Bundesfraktion 1, AdsD. 
887 SPD Congress 1950, 273-274, AdsD. 
888 Die Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft b. Aussenhandel von dem Parteivorstand der Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands zusammengestelltes Material für die Konferenz sozialistischer Wirtschaftsexperten (COMISCO) in 
Strassburg 11.-16. September 1950,” Fritz Henssler (FH) 43, AdsD. 
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goods. West Germany would eliminate agricultural tariffs if nations like France would do the 
same for their industrial tariffs. The goal was to prepare Western Europe for a customs union. 
Though there were already signs of the economic expansion to come, low standards of 
living for most Germans remained the norm when Konrad Adenauer carried the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) to victory in the September 1949 elections. A marked increase in food 
consumption in 1949, so important for Germans eager to physically and psychologically escape 
the scars of the hungry winters that had come before, itself worsened the trade situation because 
it was largely built on increased imports.889 In 1950, West Germany began to experience a trade 
deficit with its European neighbors as well. The resulting balance of payments crises of 1950-
1951 exposed divisions within the SPD’s team of economic experts concerning the wisdom of 
immediate trade liberalization. 
However, despite the Social Democrats’ vehement denunciation of Erhard’s liberalization 
programs in the context of worsening trade deficits, the official SPD position on the merits of 
European economic integration remained the same as before the payments crisis. This was 
evident when WPA Chairman Veit prepared the SPD’s report for an upcoming Socialist 
International meeting. Dated 10 December 1951, two days after Nölting publicly denounced the 
German government’s liberalization plan, Veit stated that though the SPD firmly opposed West 
Germany’s remilitarization and its inclusion in a supranational military body, the party remained 
committed to “the building of a united European economic region, the removal of customs and 
different currencies, the free movement of labor and capital, a division of labor and 
specialization in a large internal trade market that would multiply the economic power of 
Western Europe, markedly increase real income, and raise workers’ standard of living.”890 The 
1952 SPD congress approved a program that made these demands party policy, a result that the 
1954 congress reconfirmed.891 
The shock and disappointment of the SPD’s 1953 loss to Adenauer’s CDU unleashed a 
battle between liberal-leaning SPD leaders and traditionalists within the party that was only 
resolved years later by the clear victory of the liberals in the programmatic renovation contained 
889 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London: Routledge, 1987), 312. 
890 “Memorandum der Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands zu Punkt 8 der Sitzung des Generalrats der 
Sozialistische Internationale: Methoden der Produktivitätsteigerung bei Aufrechterhaltung des gegenwärtigen 
Lebensstandards v. Dr. H. Veit, M.D.B. u. Wirtschaftsminister v. Württemberg-Baden,” 10 December 1951, FH 43, 
AdsD. 
891 “Aktionsprogramm SPD. Beschlossen auf dem Dortmunder Parteitag am 28. Sept 1952, erweitert auf dem 
Berliner Parteitag am 24. Juli 1954,” Willi Eichler 114, AdsD. 
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in the 1959 Bad Godesberg program. However, one should bear in mind that support for the 
principle of liberalization of trade was in place well before 1953, let alone 1959, and was not 
disputed after the payments crisis ended. In 1954, the SPD faction was pressing the government 
for an across-the-board reduction in tariffs of at least 20%; by 1957 the party had increased this 
demand to 40% and proposed empowering the Economic Minister to make further reductions 
without requiring Bundestag approval.892 During the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome, SPD 
economic experts held tariffs responsible for high prices for consumers and hoped to raise living 
standards by permitting an influx of consumer goods.893 The SPD noted in a response to the 
Socialist International in 1955 that its policy on trade liberalization had not changed since 
1945.894 Given this evidence of the SPD’s long-standing position on trade liberalization, it is 
time that historians recognize the importance of the SPD’s traditions and party narratives on 
trade liberalization for the position the SPD developed on the common market. There was no 
“conversion” in SPD policy; rather, the party’s policy represented a long-held position.  
For this reason, Wehner warmly greeted the Messina Resolution for a European common 
market in the name of the Socialist Group of the ECSC Common Assembly on 24 June 1955. 
Erler called Spaak’s presentation of the Messina Resolution “excellent,” and praised it for 
showing how and why Europe must move to a common market.895 Schöne peppered Spaak with 
a series of technical questions at a 19 December 1955 working group meeting of the ECSC 
Common Assembly, but the tone of his comments and questions suggest that he was quite warm 
to Spaak’s proposals.896 The next day, Herbert Wehner wrote Ollenhauer about a meeting with 
Spaak.897 He stated that the SPD must look into the political and economic consequences of 
Spaak’s proposals and move quickly to agree on a party position. He recommended that 
Ollenhauer write Spaak to clarify certain aspects of the resolution and that the SPD make a 
public statement. Though cautious and conditioning its support on what proposals would 
ultimately emerge, it is clear that the SPD was favorably inclined to support European economic 
892 Kalbitzer to the Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 17 December 1954, 3280; Material zur Wirtschaftspolitik: Wichtige 
wirtschaftspolitische Fragen beantwortet vom Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschuss beim Parteivorstand der SPD, PV 
1954, AdsD. 
893 Deist letter to Heine, 23 November 1956, HD 10, AdsD. 
894 FRAGEBODEN Die Technik der staatlichen Wirtschaftsplanung Direkte Kontrollen, Schiller 72, BaK.   
895 Erler and CDU-deputy Kurt Georg Kiesinger on Südwestrundfunk, 25 October 1955, FE 11, AdsD. 
896 “Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl Gemeinsame Versammlung Arbeitsgruppe Kurzbericht der 
Sitzung vom Montag, 19. Dezember 1955 Brussels,” 1/HWAA888, AdsD. 
897 Wehner to Ollenhauer, 20 December 1955, 1/HWAA888, AdsD. 
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liberalization initiatives. These proposals were, after all, much more in line with what the party 
had envisaged in 1949 to early 1950 (and earlier) than the ECSC and EDC proposals had been.  
 
6.5 SOCIALIST DEMANDS FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN A 
 EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET  
 
From the outset, French Socialists made trade liberalization conditional upon a series of social 
demands that took the term “social harmonization” in contemporary parlance. French Socialists 
shared the common perception in France that French labor costs were considerably higher than 
those in Germany and Italy, a situation that could lead to “social dumping” and a race to the 
bottom for wages within a common market.898 French Socialist speakers in 1949 called for a 
“special system of unemployment insurance,” a “European fund for the reconversion [of 
marginal businesses] and investment,” and a “unification of taxation, salary legislation, and 
social security legislation” in order to create “a sort of equality of the...operating costs [prix de 
revient]” among the participating nations.899 Demands for social harmonization bridged the gap 
between those Socialists who were optimistic about France’s ability to compete in a customs 
union and those who feared social displacement and industrial damage.900 French Socialists 
denounced their government for not being more aggressive in the pursuit of social harmonization 
during negotiations for a customs union with the Benelux countries and Italy in the late 1940s, as 
well as in discussions on trade liberalization within the OEEC.901  
This position found expression in the approach of Mollet’s government to negotiations 
for the creation of a European common market. First, the French administration, business 
associations, and many leading politicians of other parties generally shared the SFIO’s demand 
for social harmonization out of a fear about the prospects of French businesses within a 
European economic community.902 This consensus within French politics was reflected in the 
French government’s initial reaction to the Messina resolution, which proposed a common 
898 Blum wrote that, “I’ve arrived precisely at this conclusion that customs barriers become legitimate to the extent 
that they constitute, from one country to another, a compensation between difference working conditions...” 
L’Oeuvre, op cit., 343. 
899 Philip, 6 July 1948, JO, 4350-51; and Leenhardt, 24 November 1949, JO, 6216. 
900 See the statements of pessimists like Leenhardt and Tanguy-Prigent, GPS, 1 December 1949, AHC. 
901 Pineau and Leenhardt, 6 August 1954, JO, 3927, 3933. 
902 Such demands were taken up by the French government as early as 1950. Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, 
op cit., 691, 732-33.  
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market in 1955. French demands increased over the course of 1955. Having begun with a 
demand for the extension of French legislation guaranteeing equal salaries for male and female 
workers, by September 1955, the French government insisted that the labor costs of France’s 
partners be raised to French levels simultaneously or prior to a reduction of internal common 
market tariffs.903  
Mollet’s expensive determination to pursue an active social domestic policy to guarantee 
healthcare and social security for seniors, add a third paid vacation week for French workers, and 
create a guaranteed annual minimum wage while escalating the French military effort in Algeria 
made the pursuit of social harmonization on the European level appear all the more 
imperative.904 As negotiations entered a critical phase in fall 1956, the French delegation tabled 
far-reaching demands for social harmonization: in addition to equal wages for men and women, 
the French team demanded that its partners adopt France’s generous paid vacation system, create 
a European fund for investment, the reconversion of businesses and the retraining of displaced 
workers, and pay overtime for all labor above 40 hours per week, in effect instituting a 40-hour 
European work week.905 A number of historians have questioned the sincerity of the Mollet 
government’s demands, yet they were clearly in line with the SFIO’s long-standing policy in this 
field.906 The German government split over how far its negotiators should go to accommodate 
the far-reaching French demands, with Erhard insisting that the German negotiators refuse to 
903 Edelgard Mahant, Birthmarks of Europe: The Origins of the European Community Reconsidered (Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 98-101.  
904 The Socialist Party’s social policy adopted by Mollet’s government was set forth at its 1955 party congress. 
43ème Congrès national Asnières 30 Juin-3 Juillet 1955 PROJET de PROGRAMME ÉCONOMIQUE et SOCIAL 
présenté par la COMMISSION NATIONALE D’ÉTUDES (Section AFFAIRES ÉCONOMIQUES), AGM 12, 
OURS.  
905 Mollet marked “Important” on the margins of an internal memorandum discussing the demand to create a 
European Investment Bank. NOTE OBJET: État Actual des négociations sur le Traité du Marché Commun, AGM 
11 OURS; Mahant, op cit., 79-80. 
906 For skepticism as to the sincerity of demands for social harmonization, see Laurent Warlouzet, Le choix de la 
CEE par la France: L’Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle (1955-1969) (Paris: Comité 
pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 39-42; and Guido Thiemeyer, Vom “Pool Vert” zur 
Europäischen Integration, Kalter Krieg, und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpoitik 1950-1957 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 176. Warlouzet demonstrates, though, that studies within the Secretariat of Economic 
Affairs concluded in May 1956 that French prices were 10% higher on average than those within Germany. He and 
others argue that the French government could have resolved this issue by devaluating the franc vis-à-vis the Mark, 
but this argument ignores the great priority Mollet placed on avoiding devaluation during the entire length of his 
premiership. This also had precedence within the SFIO tradition, as Blum’s government worked hard as well to 
avoid devaluation. Mahant, on the other hand, recognizes this situation. Mahant, op cit., 43-44. Lise Rye Svartvatn 
also cites devaluation, in addition to a need to gain a majority in the Assembly by protecting French industry, to 
argue that the French government’s pursuit of social harmonization was sincere. Lise Rye Svartvatn, “In Quest of 
Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic 
Community, 1955-1956,” Journal of European Integration History 8, 1, (2002): 85-102. 
258 
 
                                                          
compromise on social policy.907 The SPD and trade unions, in line with the consensus that they 
had built with the SFIO in the ECSC, as described in the preceding chapter, aligned themselves 
with SFIO demands for social harmonization because they believed that this would lead to higher 
wages for German workers. Willi Birkelbach represented an exception to this Socialist 
consensus, as he channeled the German business community’s fears that higher social costs 
could hamper German competitiveness.908  
At their meeting on 6 November, Mollet and Adenauer each displayed a willingness to 
compromise on social harmonization that broke the long-jam in the negotiations.909 Historians 
generally present Mollet as having made the more far-reaching sacrifices because he dropped the 
demand for equal social charges and allowed it to be replaced by a vague appeal that all nations 
pursue higher living standards as a matter of policy.910 In exchange, Adenauer confirmed 
Germany’s agreement to harmonize vacation times and to institute equal wages for men and 
women, which an internal French memo had considered the “essence of the causes of 
disparity.”911 The forty-hour week fell by the wayside. In its place the French government 
received safeguards that would allow it to continue to implement certain discriminatory measures 
against countries that did not adopt overtime pay at French levels.912 The less controversial 
French proposals for a re-adaptation and social investment fund also received satisfaction in the 
compromise.  
 
6.6 THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL WILL AND SFIO PARTY TRADITIONS ON 
THE TREATIES OF ROME 
 
Mollet’s readiness in November 1956 to compromise on core social objectives indicates that 
political will was a decisive element in the successful conclusion of the negotiations for a 
907 Mahant, op cit., 87; Rhenisch, op cit., 149-53. 
908 Jean-Paul Cahn, Le parti social-démocrate allemand et la fin de la quatrième république (1954-1958) (Berlin: 
Peter Lang, 1996), 275; Mahant, op cit., 60. 
909 For German Economic Minister Erhard’s campaign against this agreement, see Segers, op cit., 288. The contours 
for the agreement on social issues were drawn up by advisers (Karl Carstens and Robert Marjolin) under the 
direction of the two leaders. See Thiemeyer, op cit., 218, 250.  
910 Rhenisch, op cit., 155, 183; Mahant, op cit., 102-105, 130. Segers, on the other hand, presents Adenauer as 
having made far-reaching concessions at the November meeting. Segers, op cit., 272. 
911 “Problèmes rélatifs aux charges salariales,” AGM 11, OURS; See also the preliminary work done by Foreign 
Ministers Pineau and von Brentano in the October 1956 negotiations and the impasse reached over the issue of the 
40-hour week, op cit., 261-63; Thiemeyer, op cit., 218. 
912 Warlouzet, op cit., 89-90. 
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European economic community. Historians have increasingly recognized the crucial importance 
of Mollet and his foreign minister, Christian Pineau, first, in giving impetus to the stalled 
negotiations in September 1956, and second, in intervening at decisive moments to break the 
intransigence of certain French positions crafted within the higher echelons of the Foreign and 
Economic ministries.913 Pineau goes so far as to retrospectively call the signing of the Treaties of 
Rome “a personal victory” for Guy Mollet.914 French President René Coty’s decision to 
designate Guy Mollet, rather than fellow Front républicain leader Pierre Mendès-France, as 
prime minister was a direct consequence of Mollet’s reputation for favoring European 
integration, a reputation Mollet did much to cultivate during the 1955 election. Mollet 
campaigned in support of European initiatives by placing the policy within SFIO tradition by 
referring back to Blum’s policy of reconciliation on the German question. Though the SFIO was 
by no means united in support of a common market when Mollet became prime minister, his 
influence sufficed to overcome the reticence of Socialist Economic Minister Paul Ramadier, who 
channeled his ministry’s fear that France could not compete within a liberalized market.  
On New Year’s Eve, nearly a year into his government’s tenure, Mollet spoke on 
television and claimed that “my last year’s resolution” was to “liquidate all Franco-German 
misunderstanding.”915 Though this claim was made in retrospect, it accords well with his 
government’s actions over the course of 1956, which began with a determined and successful 
effort to resolve the Saar issue by returning the territory to German control in return for 
guaranteed exports of Saar coal and other economic guarantees. Mollet’s efforts were crowned in 
the November 1956 meeting with Adenauer. The Prime Minister and his team succeeded in 
building on the party’s traditional support for European integration. A poll taken at the end of 
1957 reveals that effective support for European integration had filtered through all levels of the 
party: 77% of SFIO voters were in favor (compared to a 70% average within France) and only 
11% were opposed.916  
913 Warlouzet writes that Mollet’s “work in the matter of [European] integration has long been ignored.” Warlouzet, 
op cit., 34-35. Parsons argues that, “The EEC and its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)...arose only because 
Mollet opened and leapt through this window.” Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 92. 
914 Le grand pari, op cit., 278. 
915 SCHEMA de déclaration télévisée de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, à la National Broadcasting 
Corporation, 31 December 1956, AGM 69, AdsD. 
916 Cyril le Guyon, “La S.F.I.O. et l’Europe (1950-1958),” Master’s thesis, Université de Paris IV. 
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In addition, Mollet appointed a team of advisers outside the traditional French ministerial 
structure to allow him to exercise direct control over the negotiations at crucial moments. 
Alexandre Verret was tapped to lead an Inter-ministerial Committee on Issues of European 
Economic Cooperation that served as a virtual annex to the Prime Minister’s office.917 In January 
1956, Mollet asked Radical leader Pierre Mendès-France if he would permit the appointment of 
an additional Radical deputy to Mollet’s cabinet. Mollet tapped Maurice Faure and charged him 
in summer 1956 with leading the French negotiating team on the common market.918 Mendès-
France agreed to Mollet’s request, remarking that, “Now I understand” to Mollet, a comment 
reflecting Faure’s reputation as a proponent of European integration.919 Robert Marjolin, who 
became Pineau’s cabinet chief in May 1956, and Emile Noël, Mollet’s cabinet director, both 
supporters of the European project, rounded out the Mollet’s team of experts on European 
affairs.920 In addition, Mollet replaced powerful opponents of the common market within several 
leading French ministries, leading to the retirement of the secretary general of Foreign Affairs, 
René Massigli, and Economic Ministry expert Olivier Wormser.921 These personnel decisions 
created the conditions for Mollet’s government to overcome entrenched opposition to the 
common market within the principal French ministries. Verret, Marjolin, and Noël were able to 
use their direct line to Mollet to overcome obstructionism that seemed at times to be coming 
from all corners of the French bureaucracy.922  
Nonetheless, some historians have argued that there is little to no evidence of the 
government’s support for the European common market until summer 1956. That rapid progress 
on negotiations for the common market coincided with the dramatic geopolitical events of fall 
1956 has led a number of historians to construct a causative link between the two developments. 
917 Although the committee recommended a rejection of the customs union, it represented an effort to curtail 
ministerial opposition and centralize decision-making under the Prime Minister’s office, which facilitated the 
overcoming of entrenched opposition. Mahant, op cit., 78.  
918 Thiemeyer considers Maurice Faure’s appointment to head the French negotiating team to have been “decisive” 
for the success of the negotiations. Thiemeyer, op cit., 206. 
919 Faure in Serra, ed., 286-87. 
920 For Marjolin and Noël’s backgrounds see Bruce D. Graham, Choice and Democratic Order: The French 
Socialist Party, 1937-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 175-77; Sylvie Guillaume, 
“Convergences dans la volonté politique des principaux acteurs face à la construction européenne, 1952-1963,” in 
Miard-Delacrois and Hudemann, eds., 115-20; and Theimeyer, op cit., 206-07.  
921 Warlouzet, op cit., 38. See for instance Massigli’s reaction to the Schuman Plan, quoted in Alfred Grosser, “Le 
Traité de l’Elsyée est-il un mythe fondateur? La création du 9 mai 1950 et la gloire du 22 janvier 1963. Un 
Témoignage,” in Rainer Marcowitz and Hélène-Miard Delacroix, eds., 50 ans de relations franco-allemands (Paris: 
Nouveau Monde, 2012), 35.  
922 René Girault, “Decision Makers, Decisions and French Power,” in Power in Europe II, 69-70; Moravcsik, op cit., 
115-116. 
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Scholars have made a rather persuasive case that the geopolitical context of the Anglo-French-
Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Soviet intervention in Hungary fueled Adenauer’s suspicion 
that the United States was not an ally to be trusted to defend long-term European interests vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union. The geopolitical context seems to have been an influential factor in the 
German government’s willing to compromise at key moments in the negotiations.923 Adenauer 
saw confirmation for his view in Eisenhower’s ultimatum that the French and British 
governments abandon their military operations in Egypt or face the prospect of Soviet retribution 
without U.S. assistance. No doubt Mollet deeply appreciated Adenauer’s decision to brave 
Soviet threats to bombard the French capital by coming to Paris on 6 November for a pre-
planned meeting. Adenauer’s decision to demonstrate such solidarity in such a fraught climate 
was controversial within Germany. The SPD leadership objected to the timing of the visit 
because it feared German association with what appeared to be a neo-colonial endeavor.924  
Many scholars have hence concluded that Mollet’s determination to break the impasse in 
the negotiations was the result of geopolitical reasoning.925 Facing international opprobrium and 
isolation, so this argument goes, Mollet wrapped himself in Adenauer’s open embrace and 
sought to carve out a new venue for French power through an economic integration with 
France’s European neighbors so as to strengthen France’s international clout between the two 
blocs. Indeed this was the geopolitical line Mollet’s government came to adopt as it struggled to 
923 Segers, op cit., 273-85. 
924 SPD leaders condemned Egyptian President Nasser’s decision to nationalize the canal but called for peaceful 
negotiations to resolve the impasse and reopen traffic at Suez. They condemned the French-British-Israeli invasion. 
Günther Markscheffel reports that Ollenhauer called Mollet by phone on the eve of the invasion to plead with him 
not to proceed. See Parlamentarischer Zwiegesprach Kiesinger und Erler, 8 October 1956, FE 12, AdsD; Gen. 
Ollenhauer Fraktionssitzung auf September 11.9.56, EO 125, AdsD; “Stärkt die Vereinten Nationen! Entschliessung 
PV 1956,” SPD-Pressedienst, 8 November 1956; “Interview mit Wehner,” 5 December 1956, 1/HWAA1065, AdsD; 
and Jean-Paul Cahn, Le Parti social-démocrate allemand, op cit., 286-89. 
925 Mahant argues that, “the world geopolitical situation strongly influenced the negotiations, and indeed it is likely 
that without these geopolitical factors the treaties, and more especially the European Economic Community, would 
not have been created in 1957...” Mahant argues that “history rescued the negotiations.” Mahant, op cit., 102, 128. 
Küsters writes of the “decisive impact the Suez crisis of November 1956 would have on the success of the 
negotiations of the governments in Brussels.” Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Jean Monnet et les chanceliers allemands de 
Konrad Adenauer à Helmut Schmidt,” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 206. Rosato also argues for a central role for 
geopolitics, though he then states that the Suez Crisis “strengthened a preexisting determination to establish a 
centralized West European entity.” Rosato, op cit., 121, 186. Thiemeyer sees the compromise emerging prior to 
Küster and Mahant in the weeks leading up to the meeting between Adenauer and Mollet. Like these scholars, 
though, he argues that, “only because of the world-political crisis of the summer 1956 did a wide-ranging German-
French congruence of interests emerge which was necessary for a quick agreement and that made technical 
questions of detail appear secondary.” The “Suez crisis changed the political goals of the French regime on Europe” 
by reversing the priority accorded to Euratom and the customs union, with the former no longer having priority for 
the French government. Thiemeyer, op cit., 220-22.  
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hold onto French Algeria and to stand up to a U.S. government increasingly impatient with the 
damage France’s colonial war was inflicting on the Western alliance within the “Third World,” a 
concept that emerged in this period in the aftermath of the 1955 Bandung conference of Asian-
African states.926  
Nonetheless, there is almost no evidence that this type of geopolitical reasoning had any 
decisive influence on Mollet’s policy towards European integration. Geopolitical arguments are 
compelling on their surface, yet their evidence relies almost entirely on conjecture. The only 
evidence that I have found for this argument is a public message from Mollet in late October 
1956, in which he said that he looked forward to resolving differences with Adenauer in their 
upcoming meeting. He stated that, “Recent international developments, whether it be Suez or the 
transformations in the satellite countries [meaning Hungary and Czechoslovakia], make all the 
more evident the necessity of European construction,” adding that, “The Suez affair has made 
manifest the insufficient cooperation of the policies of the European states.”927  
Much of the scholarly controversy over the motivations of Guy Mollet’s government in 
signing the Treaties of Rome revolves around differing depictions of Foreign Minister Christian 
Pineau’s policy in spring 1956.928 It is true that in public Pineau was circumspect about the 
proposed common market, a view that reflected the official government position.929 Also, it was 
only after the successful debate on Euratom in July 1956 that the French government set concrete 
objectives for its negotiations with its European partners, which lead to an acceleration of the 
negotiations in September-October 1956. In statements at an academic conference on the EEC in 
1986, Pineau expressly rejected what seemed at the time to be an emerging scholarly consensus 
that Mollet’s government agreed to the EEC due to geopolitical considerations. Cutting to the 
heart of a discipline whose epistemology rests on the collection and interpretation of primary 
documents, Pineau warned historians to “mistrust” historical archives because at times they 
conceal more than they reveal. Pineau gave an account that, shortly after he became Foreign 
926 For a good analysis of these developments, see Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, 2001).  
927 MESSAGE de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil aux Journées d’études de la Gauche Européenne 
BORDEAUX 26./27./ Octobre 1956, AGM 69, OURS.  
928 Segers writes that Pineau was “moderately pro-European.” Segers, op cit., 176. Orlow argues that, “Both in the 
cabinet and the party Pineau supported the Common Market as enthusiastically as he had the EDC.” Dietrich Orlow, 
Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1969 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 219.  
929 See for instance his comments to the April 1956 SFIO party congress, OURS; and to the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Compte rendu officiel de la sixième séance mercredi, 18 avril 1956, CEAB 5/449/1, BaK. 
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Minister in February 1956, he approached Jean Monnet to help plan a strategy to achieve the 
ratification of the common market by the French National Assembly. He reported that Monnet 
rejected Pineau’s appeal to pursue the common market for the moment because he believed it 
was unattainable given prevailing political sentiments in France. Rather, he urged Pineau to 
focus exclusively on Euratom, a statement that Pineau claims profoundly disappointed him.930  
Pineau went on to tell a surprised academic audience that he, Guy Mollet, and the French 
President, René Coty, had met secretly early in Mollet’s tenure to plot a course to achieve the 
common market. They resolved, he claimed, to use Euratom as a “smoke screen” behind which 
they would build majority support for a European common market. Given widespread opposition 
in the French ministries, industrial circles, and among political elites, the pro-European 
integration conspirators concealed their intentions from all around them until a propitious 
moment appeared. The Suez crisis created the necessary “shock,” according to Pineau, “to 
accelerate the process.” The government had not changed its method, but rather public opinion 
rallied to the Common Market as a means to create a certain independence for France vis-à-vis 
the United States.”931 While some scholars have adopted Pineau’s account, others have 
responded with incredulity.932  
It remains an open question whether we should accept an oral account given by a 
participant thirty years after the events transpired and for which there exists no archival 
evidence. Pineau had also long been proud of his role in the EEC negotiations, a political success 
that countered some of the tarnish left by his role in the series of disasters in North Africa. One 
can understand Thiemeyer’s rejection of the account as a “retrospective self-interpretation.”933 
As veterans of the EDC debacle, though, it is credible that Pineau and Mollet perceived a need 
for secrecy and caution. Pineau’s account, in my view, remains plausible and compelling because 
it does explain the French government’s public about-face on the common market performed 
between August and October 1956 after having secured parliamentary support for Euratom in 
July. In addition, Emile Noël backed Pineau’s story at the conference, adding additional weight 
to his account.934 Though not decisive proof, Lapie’s report in his memoir that Noël had told him 
that Mollet “did not want to precipitate things” by calling for both political and economic 
930 Pineau in Serra, ed., 282-86. 
931 Ibid., 525-30. See also Le grand pari, op cit., 194-210, 222-26. 
932 Moravcsik gives credence to Pineau’s account, Moravcsik, op cit., 119-20. 
933 Thiemeyer, op cit., 185. 
934 Noël in Serra, ed., 526-30. 
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integration, before ratifications of the treaties in order “to not openly reveal the opposition [to 
European integration] that could be born in France” reveals a mindset and strategy along the line 
of Pineau’s claims.935 
Without relying on Pineau’s account, it is possible to come to similar conclusions. It may 
be that the Suez Crisis was a necessary prerequisite for the successful ratification of the Treaties 
of Rome, but it does not appear to have been the decisive factor in the government’s decision to 
support a common market. Mollet’s statement above on geopolitics can easily be reconciled with 
Pineau’s argument that they behaved like Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince in their plot to gain 
support in France for the common market. Historians who reject the geopolitical narrative grant 
varying weight to ideological and economic factors to explain the European policy of Mollet’s 
government.936 There is no reason to see these factors as mutually exclusive. In fact, Mollet and 
his party’s long-standing policy to make France competitive through an industrial modernization 
of the country and to liberalize markets as a means of creating a peaceful postwar order can be 
understood as rooted in ideological and economic concerns. The same can be said for the SPD. 
That this trade liberalization should take place within a closed common market for the SFIO, 
rather than a more open free trade zone, can be traced back to the economic vision repeated ad 
nauseum by Philip in the 1950s, a vision reliant in large part on Jacques Levy-Jacquemin’s 
economic analysis of the late 1940s about the need for a European preferential trade zone, a 
concept which received Blum’s stamp of approval.  
Scholars have downplayed or rejected the influence of socialist ideas on Mollet’s policies 
by emphasizing divisions on the common market within the SFIO.937 Though the SFIO apparatus 
935 Lapie, op cit., 726. 
936 Milward and Moravcsik have been the main proponents of the economic thesis, arguing that the government 
came to see some sort trade liberalization as imperative as the French economy became increasingly reliant on the 
European market. Moravcsik, op cit., 103-122, 137; Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State 
(London: Routledge, 1999). Yet Moravcsik provides space for the influence of the pro-European ideology of key 
members of Mollet’s government, including Mollet himself, though he views ideology as a “secondary” factor. 
Moravcsik, op cit., 121-22. Parsons and Bossuat have most forcefully put forward European ideology as a decisive 
factor for the successful negotiations. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe; Gérard Bossuat, Les fondateurs de 
l’Europe unie (Paris: Belin, 2001). Warlouzet also lends weight to “idealism as well as realism” in Mollet’s policy. 
Warlouzet, op cit., 36. 
937 Parsons writes that, ‘Support in [Mollet’s] own party remained weak, especially for the Common Market...” and 
“Nor did farmers, technocrats, business, or Socialists coherently lead the way. All these groups were consistently 
divided on the EEC’s appeal.” Parsons, op cit., 108, 115. Newman writes that, “In this sense it can be claimed that, 
although the SFIO was in office during the negotiations for the establishment of the EEC, socialism exercised little 
influence over the ‘European’ policy of the French Government. By now, socialist rhetoric was hardly more than a 
rationalization, of an increasingly tortuous kind, for politics determined by other forces.” Michael Newman, 
Socialism and European Unity: The Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France (London: Junction Books, 1983), 12. 
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was largely left out of the decision-making process, Mollet’s approach to the common market 
clearly reflected the economic and ideological traditions of the party leadership as crafted after 
the Second World War, which in turn reflected a large degree of continuity with the party’s 
interwar stance. Trade liberalization within an organized market with social provisions was a 
central policy of the French Socialist Party and, though the EEC did not contain the extent of 
social protections that the party desired, the influence of the French Socialist tradition was a 
decisive element in the government’s policy towards a European common market during the 
negotiations for the Treaties of Rome. While scholars have noted that the SFIO was among the 
most pro-European of parties and that its votes were necessary for any treaty for European 
integration in the 1950s, it is time now to recognize that SFIO traditions were important elements 
in the European policy of Mollet’s government.  
 
6.7 SOCIALISTS AND THE ASSOCIATION OF THE FRENCH OVERSEAS 
TERRITORIES WITH THE EEC: ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN AFRICA 
AND THE IMPERIAL LEGACY 
 
For Mollet’s government, the Suez invasion was an outgrowth of its increasingly desperate effort 
to keep Algeria French. As the negotiations for a common market sped towards a successful 
conclusion, the French government took advantage of its reputation for reluctance on trade 
liberalization to extract from its partners an association agreement between the European 
Economic Community and France’s overseas territories. After years of confusion about the place 
of the French Union within the European integration process, Mollet’s Socialist government 
resolved this dilemma by turning to Europe to save the remnants of France’s empire in Africa 
and the Caribbean. Christian Pineau first broached this subject in the negotiations with his 
European partners in April 1956, and the French team put forth concrete proposals for the 
association in the weeks following Mollet’s November meeting with Adenauer.938 The French 
delegation demanded a privileged place for French African agricultural imports into the common 
market, and a substantial financial commitment from Germany and the other nations to invest in 
France’s African territories with the goal of raising living standards there by 4% per annum. In 
938 Thiemeyer, op cit., 250. 
266 
 
                                                          
exchange French negotiators offered to open the French African market for trade with France’s 
European partners.  
The German government received these proposals with a marked lack of enthusiasm 
because German businesses and politicians feared being associated with what seemed to be the 
dying woes of French colonialism, though the negotiations also revived hopes among some 
German businesses eager to penetrate the French African market.939 Others worried that trade 
privileges with French Africa would threaten German trade with Latin America.940 Nonetheless, 
the French team’s insistence that an association for the overseas territories was a condition sine 
qua non for the National Assembly’s ratification of any agreement, and Adenauer’s sympathy for 
the French investment program in Africa led German negotiators to swallow this bitter pill after 
a series of tough negotiations in winter of 1956-57.941 Mollet personally presided over the final 
set of negotiations on the association of the overseas territories, and the last obstacles were 
cleared in a private meeting between him and Adenauer.942 The final agreement promised a large 
investment in the overseas territories of the participating states, 90% of which would go to 
French territories. The German government agreed to match the French contribution to this fund, 
providing 34% of the total funding for the program.943 Mollet celebrated his success, arguing that 
without this agreement “the disaffection of the overseas population” threatened to continue to 
grow because “we will not be capable of bringing the aid that they expect.”944 
The SPD would have greatly preferred that the overseas territories be left out of the 
Treaties of Rome. Though public statements remained tempered, opposition to Mollet’s policy in 
Algeria was beginning to reach a boiling point within the party. Many German Social Democrats 
worried that the French proposals threatened to tie Germany to the sinking ship of French 
imperialism.945 Nonetheless, important figures like Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler sympathized 
with the economic investment and social programs envisioned by Mollet and his Socialist 
939 See Martin Rempe, “Decolonization by Europeanization? The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-
African Relations,” Working Paper, KFG The Transformative Power of Europe, No. 27, May 2011. 
940 Mahant, op cit., 63-64; Rhenisch, op cit., 202. 
941 Mahant, op cit., 115. 
942 Segers, op cit., 307-08. 
943 Mahant, op cit., 119; Segers, op cit., 308. 
944 Declaration de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, pour le numéro special du journal “DEMAIN” consacré 
au MARCHE COMMUNE EUROPEEN, 27 mars 1957, AGM 70, OURS. 
945 Deist commented that, “As long as France does not find a solution to the difficult problem in North Africa, any 
activity in this region will be considered as a contribution to the consolidation of colonial domination—whether 
rightly or wrongly, it will not matter.” Cahn, op cit., 275-76.  
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Minister for Overseas Territories, Gaston Defferre. They argued that if constructed properly, a 
European investment program for French Africa could reap social benefits for the African 
populations without taking on the trappings of an outdated colonial project.946 After making their 
determination to avoid associating with French imperialism clear and explicitly calling for a 
move towards independence for the French overseas territories, the SPD acquiesced to the 
territories’ association with the common market.947  
 
6.8 THE DECISIVE TARIFF QUESTION: THE SPD DEBATE ON 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND 
THE BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR A FREE TRADE AREA 
 
In a meeting with Erich Ollenhauer, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower expressed surprise when 
he learned that the worries about Germany colluding with French imperialism were not the 
SPD’s principal concern about the treaties under negotiation.948 Ollenhauer stressed that the SPD 
was most worried that the French government would insist on a high common external tariff that 
would substantially raise German tariffs with non-EEC countries. As the treaty negotiations 
entered their final phases, the SPD leadership scrambled to gather information about the content 
of the treaty in order to reach a consensus on its position. Birkelbach delivered a report entitled 
“Realistic European Policy” to the WPA meeting held on 8 and 9 February 1957.949 Birkelbach’s 
response provides an essential clue to the eventual SPD decision to support the EEC. He stated 
that the party had abandoned its objection to “Small Europe” and that the British proposal of a 
Free Trade Area (FTA) had only surfaced due to British and Scandinavian fears of facing trade 
discrimination from a common market they were determined not to join. The relationship 
between the EEC and FTA proposals was central to the SPD debate that ensued in the next 
months. Birkelbach’s assessment that the dynamic of the EEC negotiations had propelled other 
states to pursue their own form of closer economic cooperation (which is of course what had 
946 Gestern-heute-morgen Interview mit Präsident Robert Schuman und MdB Fritz Erler, SPD, über Fragen der 
europäische Zusammenarbeit. Interviewer Dr. Carl Helfrich, Hessicher Rundfunk, 2 December 1957, FE 13, AdsD. 
947 The SPD countered the CDU’s resolution calling for more “autonomy” for French overseas territories with a SPD 
resolution calling for “independence.” Entschliessung der Fraktion der SPD 4 July 1957, Bundestag—Europäische 
Abteilung 0903, AdsD. 
948 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 7./8.3.1957 in Berlin, PV 1957, AdsD. 
949 Protokoll über die Sitzung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD am 8./9. Februar 
1957 im Bundeshaus zu Bonn, BG 158, AdsD. 
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happened) provides a crucial lens through which to analyze the SPD’s subsequent decision to 
support the EEC. 
On 6 March 1957, Ollenhauer announced in a radio address that the SPD would reserve 
its vote on the treaties until it possessed more information.950 After the signing of the Treaties, 
the SPD Bundestag delegation voted in support of the government’s resolution to begin 
parliamentary consideration of the European atomic energy organization and the common market 
on 22 March.951 On 30 March, the SPD leadership had its first serious discussion about whether 
to approve the common market.952 Crucially, the subject of tariffs appeared to be largely 
neutralized for the moment due to a general optimism that the FTA and EEC would reach an 
agreement, an optimism that did much to shape the debate on the Treaties within the SPD. 
Influential leaders such as Wehner and Karl Mommer noted that tariffs would fall once the EEC 
signed an accord with Great Britain and Scandinavia, though Wehner noted that agriculture 
would remain excluded. A few members expressed opposition to the Accords, but it appears 
clear that a consensus was forming that recalled in large part the party’s position in 1949 about 
the necessity for an enlarged economic space as a means to realize the party’s economic and 
foreign policy goals. Birkelbach argued that full employment was not possible by national means 
alone and that the EEC Treaty set the preconditions for its accomplishment. His WPA colleague 
Schöne saw the Treaty as a worthy platform for a policy of competition within a larger market. 
Wehner asserted that the party must support a European economic community and a common 
market, though it should continue to insist on its present conditions.  Several members expressed 
confidence that the treaty was acceptable and could later be amended. While Ollenhauer and 
Wehner both asserted that the party remained free to reject or abstain on the EEC, Ollenhauer 
argued that the EEC rectified those aspects of the ECSC that the party had criticized. 
Announcing that it would be a shame to vote against European economic integration after having 
campaigned for years in support, Ollenhauer told his party comrades that the SPD should 
publicize its objections and then vote in favor.  
In a press release on 4 April, the SPD demanded that the EEC remain open to eastern 
European states and that a reunified Germany be free to decide whether to join the EEC. In a 
950 Sozialdemokratische Bundestagsfraktion Pressestelle, 6 March 1957, Ollenhauer, Süddeutsche Rundfunk, EO 
131, AdsD. 
951 Hrbek, op cit., 257. 
952 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 30. Mai 1957 in Bonn, PV 1957, AdsD. 
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speech on 11 April, a passing comment on the EEC during a discussion on East-West relations 
by Erler seems to show that he had determined that the EEC was not an obstacle to German 
reunification. He said that, if the European states could offer guarantees to Soviet security, “a 
reunified Germany would thus be able to belong to a common market and to a European atomic 
community.”953 Though this seemed to signal that the SPD would not raise the reunification 
issue to oppose the EEC, support for a common market open to, rather than closed from, the 
world market remained. Erler told an international audience the week prior to his 11 April speech 
that the SPD did not want the EEC to develop into a form of European nationalism and that it 
should facilitate rather than prevent a greater exchange of goods within a free world economy.954 
With the first Bundestag reading of the Treaties of Rome less than a week away, the 
WPA met on 3 May to formulate its advisory opinion for the Central Committee.955 After 
instructing its members to only discuss the economic aspects of the treaty, Chairman Veit noted 
that not all of the SPD’s conditions had been satisfied and announced that he was undecided. He 
worried that a free market in labor might lead to the depopulation of underdeveloped economic 
areas, to which Schöne responded that the structural adjustment and investment funds should 
provide adequate safeguards. The members discussed a number of other potential problems, 
including that the EEC, in Veit’s view, confirmed West Germany’s increasing economic 
orientation towards the West and would negatively affect reunification. However, he stated that 
none of these were sufficient reasons to reject the treaty. The central question facing the WPA, 
he said, was how the new tariff situation would affect West Germany. 
Kurlbaum asked whether there was any guarantee that tariffs would sink after Germany 
gave up sovereignty in this area. Schöne and Birkelbach responded that the treaty would cause 
tariffs to sink, but they seem to have been referring to tariffs within the common market. After 
Veit noted that 75% of West German trade lay outside of the six-nation bloc, he argued that this 
was no reason to reject the treaty, but rather meant that the treaty’s effectiveness was dependant 
on an agreement to create the FTA. All members clearly agreed that an EEC-FTA accord was of 
vital importance, but the debate turned around the question of whether to make the SPD’s vote 
conditional upon a prior agreement on the FTA. As Kurlbaum noted, though, the party faced an 
953 Fritz Erler speech, Bonn, 11 April 1957, FE 12, AdsD. 
954 Erler, 4-7 April 1957, Erler 12, AdsD. 
955 Protokoll der Sitzung vom 3.und 4. Mai 1957 des Wirtschaftspolitischen Auschusses beim Parteivorstand der 
SPD im Bundeshaus, Bonn, BG 158, AdsD. 
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upcoming vote and needed to immediately formulate a stance. It seems the discussion reached a 
crucial turning point when Birkelbach stated that there was an argument to be made that, without 
a preexisting common market, there would be no FTA because Britain would then refuse to join 
it. This was the view of Mollet’s government as well.956 Veit’s earlier suggestion that the SPD 
try to gain time by reserving its vote until a FTA agreement appeared promising was not a 
realistic option. Perhaps realizing this, Veit later amended a comment by Birkelbach that perhaps 
the SPD should demand that the FTA and EEC come into effect simultaneously to state that the 
party should instead demand that this happen as soon as possible, a crucial distinction indeed, as 
subsequent events would show. Birkelbach argued that Great Britain’s position towards the FTA 
would depend upon the U.S. position at the GATT negotiations and that agriculture would 
remain a stumbling block to any EEC-FTA accord. Concluding the meeting, Veit declared that 
the discussion had raised no reasons to justify a negative attitude and that, “we consider the 
treaty acceptable [brauchbar] if it is filled with our spirit and takes our ideas in hand.” 
Two days before the first parliamentary reading, the WPA met again to confirm its 
position.957 The members discussed a number of issues, the most important of which was the 
prospect of increased prices, the specter of further agricultural protectionism, and a perceived 
need for a common currency. Despite these potential problems, the result seemed pre-ordained 
after Veit’s introduction. Stating that the party could still make its vote conditional upon an EEC-
FTA agreement, Veit then revived Birkelbach’s point from the previous meeting. Veit 
commented, “However, we cannot fully ignore the multiple arguments brought forward that the 
greatest possibility is that without the erection of a common market the Free Trade Area will 
under no circumstance be built.” At the meeting’s conclusion, the WPA constructed the 
following advisory opinion: 
The Committee Chair affirms with the agreement of those present that none of the points 
discussed should lead to a ‘No’ [vote]. The treaty is fundamentally acceptable 
[grundsätzlich brauchbar] as long as it is properly executed.  
 
Therefore it seems clear that the primary consideration for the SPD’s approval of the six-nation 
EEC may be summarized thus: although the party’s economic experts determined that the EEC 
might itself be an obstacle to the creation of a wider Free Trade Area, given the attitude of the 
956 Zone de libre echange, AGM 11, OURS. 
957 “Erste Stellungnahme des Wirtschaftspolitischen Auschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD zum “Vertrag zur 
Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG),” 7 May 1957, BG 158, AdsD. 
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British government, they considered it also to be the only present means available to possibly 
attain it. When it came down to it, the SPD leadership recognized that if it wanted to advance its 
goal of increased European economic cooperation, the EEC was the only game in town. And so 
the SPD’s economic experts counseled the approval of the EEC. The SPD delegation voted in 
favor of the ratification of the Treaties of Rome in the treaty readings from May to June 1957, 
recording their first votes in the Bundestag in favor of a European integration treaty in the 
postwar period.  
 
6.9 THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICAL WILL: GUY MOLLET’S GOVERNMENT AND 
THE SIGNING OF THE TREATIES OF ROME 
 
The French government’s decision to proceed with the Treaties of Rome despite a new balance-
of-payments crisis in spring 1957 is further testament to Mollet’s will and determination to 
achieve a common market.958 Negotiations accelerated quickly in the winter of 1956-57 and, 
along with the overseas territories, the negotiators agreed to French demands that trade 
liberalization proceed in stages over a twelve- to fifteen-year period and be subject to various 
safeguards.959 These clauses in the Treaties of Rome included the possibility of continuing 
French export subsidies, as well as a list of other types of regional or social aid to assist those 
negatively affected by trade liberalization. In an interview nearly twenty years after these events, 
Mollet claimed that he had tried to create a common production and investment program for 
Europe but had to give this up because his European interlocutors were “partisans of a liberal 
economy.”960 Despite the liberal features of the EEC, the Treaty was in line with much of the 
French Socialist conception of economic relations for the postwar period. Mollet revived the 
party’s vision from the late 1940s that modernization needed to be imposed on a reluctant, 
Malthusian, French economy. He told the SFIO congress in May 1957 that, “We shall be 
attacked since the employers, craftsmen and farmers will not move at the necessary speed in 
958 For internal debates as to how to react to the balance-of-payments crisis, see Alexandre Verret’s 5 March 1957 
NOTE pour Monsieur le Président du Conseil; his 7 March 1957 NOTE pour Monsieur le Président du Conseil; and  
Marjolin’s 12 April 1957 NOTE sur le déficit extérieur de la France et les méthodes de redressement, AGM 74, 
OURS. 
959 Tarif extérieur, AGM 11, OURS. Mollet marked “Very Important” next to a section of the document discussing 
the transitional stages. NOTE OBJET: Etat actual des négociations sur le Traité du Marché Commun.  
960 INTERVIEW DE Mr. Guy MOLLET LE 26/6/75, AGM 115, OURS.  
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order to adjust to the new world we are launching ourselves into...”961 Overshadowed by the 
polemics surrounding the Algerian War, no Socialist publicly objected to the Treaties of Rome 
and the party congress unanimously approved of its government’s performance in the 
negotiations.962 Mollet and Pineau accomplished a coup by convincing the influential anti-EDC 
deputy, Alain Savary, to become rapporteur for the Treaties in the National Assembly.963  
With the Radical Party split on the issue of ratifying the Treaties of Rome, the unity of 
the SFIO provided the necessary difference between the EDC’s 1954 defeat, and the success of 
the EEC in 1957.964 In Germany, as mentioned above, the SPD for the first time provided the 
decisive votes to push the European integration process forward. With the CDU’s coalitional 
ally, the FDP, opposing the Treaties of Rome, the government relied on SPD support to create a 
pro-EEC majority.965 French Socialists and German Social Democrats votes were necessary in 
both countries to achieve a majority for the EEC and Euratom.  
Given their support for trade liberalization, though, why did provisions for an 
“agricultural exception” and the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy that portended the 
maintenance of high food prices for consumers not elicit more opposition within the SFIO, and 
more importantly, within the SPD? It is to this question that the next section turns. 
 
6.10 RECONCILING TOWN AND COUNTRY, RURAL DEMOGAPHICS AND 
SOCIALIST POLICY TOWARDS THE “AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTION” 
 
Recent revisionism in the historiography of the foundation of the EEC’s “agricultural exception” 
has complicated our understanding of the political, ideational, and economic factors that 
influenced the motivations and policies of the governments negotiating the Treaties of Rome. 
961 Quoted in Pierre Guillen, “Europe as a Cure for French Impotence? The Guy Mollet Government and the 
Negotiations of the Treaties of Rome,” in Di Nolfo, ed., Power in Europe II, op cit., 516. 
962 Pascal Delwit, Les partis socialistes et l’integration européenne: France, Grande-Bretagne, Bélgique (Brussels: 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1995), 74. 
963 Pineau reports that he asked Savary to take on the role. In Le Grand Pari, the account is that, “Due to his 
influence, his decision guaranteed in an almost certain manner the adhesion of a good number of deputies of his 
group, who were uncertain until then.” Le Grand Pari, 266. 
964 In July 1956, 29 Radicals voted for EURATOM and 27, under Pierre Mendès-France’s influence, voted in 
opposition. Nineteen voted against the Treaties of Rome. Francis O-Neill, The French Radical Party and European 
Integration (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 87, 99. 
965 The FDP leadership criticized French protectionism and preferred a free-trade zone within the OECD with a free 
convertibility of currency without the creation of a common external tariff. Cahn, op cit., 152. It also began to call 
Western European integration an obstacle to German reunification. 
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The most convincing of these revisions, espoused in the landmark works of Ann-Christian 
Knudsen and Guido Thiemeyer, argue that ideational factors and the cultural weight granted 
agriculture within European social and political consciousness were determining factors in the 
decision to create a European preference zone for agriculture.966  European governments decided 
to engage in redistributive politics to align lagging salaries for farmers with the rising salaries 
that marked the launch of Europe’s postwar economic boom, a phenomenon Knudson has 
provocatively labeled “farmers on welfare.” As these programs became increasingly costly to 
maintain at the national level, the French government in particular looked to the European 
integration process to alleviate costs to the French budget.967  
As studies intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the factors contributing to the 
creation of Europe’s infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), these works tend to 
amalgamate varying social and political factors within the welfare consensus that contributed to 
postwar European social stability. An examination of SFIO and SPD policy on agriculture 
reveals that, in their cases, the welfare factor was a preponderant, but not isolated factor in both 
parties’ decisions to accept or acquiesce to the agricultural components of the Treaties of Rome. 
The welfare factor was indeed important for the SFIO, but Mollet’s government deferred to 
agricultural interests in large part because it knew that their support would be decisive for the 
Treaties’ ratification. The government did so only after unsuccessfully attempting to restrain 
agricultural subsidies in spring 1956.968 The SPD had even less ideational affinity for the 
conservative ideal of a traditional agricultural community based on family farms and small-scale 
production. Its decision to accept the agricultural exception was much more an affair of the head 
than of the heart: it wanted to diminish a cultural-political antagonism between the urban SPD 
and a rural farm-base that had long destabilized German democratic politics.969 In addition, the 
Junktim between agricultural exceptionalism and European internal trade liberalization was 
likely more important for quelling doubts within the SPD leadership than it was for the CDU-led 
966 Thiemeyer emphasizes the importance of a “tradition of historical mentality,”  writing that, “Behind the agrarian-
political decision of the 1950s stood a complex system of social-political values and rationalizations, whose 
legitimacy in the wider public as well as in the political system were not in question.” Thiemeyer, op cit., 26-30. See 
also Ann-Christian L. Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare: The Making of Europe’s Agricultural Policy (Cornell: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
967 Moravcsik writes that, by 1955, French subsidies covered 64% of the total value of French agricultural exports. 
Moravcsik, op cit., 111; Thiemeyer, op cit., 262-63.  
968 Moravcsik, op cit., 111-12. 
969 There is more, therefore, to the SPD’s decisions on agriculture than the “emphasis on the farm-income objective” 
discussed by Knudson. Knudson, op cit., 68. 
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government, within which the liberal Economic Minister Erhard unsuccessfully sought to defeat 
the powerful German agricultural lobby. 
Agricultural policy had long been a thorn in the SPD’s side. The vitriolic internal SPD 
debates of the 1890s on the place of agriculture in an industrial capitalist society pitted SPD 
leaders from northern German cities, where trade union influence was strong, against southern 
German and, especially, Bavarian moderates who called for a positive SPD platform for agarian 
reform in the countryside. The belated SPD policy on agriculture after the First World War, 
constructed in the twilight of the Weimar Republic, did little to mask the SPD leadership’s 
general lack of concern for developments in German agriculture.970 By history, temperament, 
and personnel the SPD had always been an urban-based party.971 It was in the interests of the 
target SPD constituency, the industrial working classes, that food prices be kept as low as 
possible. The issue was so important that when its allies proposed to triple the price of grain in 
October 1922, the SPD left the Weimar coalition government.972 The SPD’s emphasis on the 
interests of consumers was part and parcel of the SPD’s traditional policy, and German farmers 
were well aware of the SPD’s position. Hellmut Kalbitzer was the principal spokesman in the 
postwar era for the faction of the party that continued to put forth an aggressive campaign to 
sacrifice the interests of Germany’s agricultural community in order to obtain lower food prices 
for consumers. He argued that the tariff wall behind which German agriculture had shielded 
itself since the introduction of high tariffs in 1879 had stunted the modernization of that sector. 
In his view a government program to encourage rationalization and modernization, rather than 
protection, was the only plausible policy.973  
Postwar German electoral results continued to reflect this dynamic: 57% of farmers 
supported the CDU in a poll taken in 1955, and 15% supported the FDP. The SPD trailed its 
competitors with a meager 10%, approximately a third of its national average.974 Even as the 
SPD began its slow transition to a “catch-all” party, one can conclude from these statistics that 
970 Claudia Nölting, Erik Nölting: Wirtschaftsminister und Theoretiker der SPD (1892-1953) (Essen: Klartext, 
1989), 105-107; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1993), 30-31. 
971 Orlow, op cit., 66. 
972 Thomas Raithel, Das schwierige Spiel des Parlamentarismus: Deutscher Reichstag und französischer Chambre 
des Deputés in den Inflationskrisen der 1920er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), op cit., 144.  
973 13 September 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 3163; and 27 January 1955, Verhandlungen, 3333. 
974 Werner Bührer, “Agricultural Pressure Groups and International Politics: The German Example,” in Richard T. 
Griffiths and Brian Girvin, eds., The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1995), 80. 
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the farming constituency was largely out of the SPD’s reach. The party had only a partial 
electoral incentive to ingratiate itself with this demographic group in decline. The SPD 
leadership, however, was aware that its policy had done much to contribute to the historical 
antagonism between the SPD and rural Germany. Ollenhauer conceded at the SPD’s 1947 
congress that, “We all know from experience that before 1933 we did not grant agricultural 
policy the attention that was necessary.”975 The postwar SPD was not only concerned with votes; 
it also feared for the future of the republic and the democratic system. As in the case of military 
officials discussed in chapter three, the SPD did not expect groups that had long opposed social 
democracy to adopt the red flag. Nonetheless, its leaders believed that only through engagement 
with hostile groups like German farmers could German democracy gain a measure of stability. 
The SPD’s willingness to make concessions to German agriculture, however warily, was crucial 
for its acquiescence to the “agricultural exception” in the Treaties of Rome and, in the following 
decades, to the longevity of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy.  
Fortunately for the postwar SPD leadership, it had the counsel of two figures with a deep 
knowledge of the politics and economics of agriculture: Fritz Baade and Herbert Kriedemann.976 
Baade had been the President of the German-Polish Rye Commission and the co-author of the 
SPD’s agricultural program during the Weimar Republic. During the Nazi period, he went into 
exile and served as an agricultural adviser to the Turkish government.977 Kriedemann was a 
trained agronomist from Bavaria who held hopes of one day becoming minister of foreign 
trade.978 He became the main SPD spokesman on agricultural policy in the Bundestag. He 
lamented that he continued to hear people say in the postwar period that, “the SPD [wa]s proving 
once against that it is against agriculture.”979 Under his influence, the SPD recognized that 
German agriculture must be able to sell its goods at “sufficient prices” and farmers must receive 
a “just wage” for their work.980 These two SPD experts became instrumental in the SPD’s efforts 
to balance the conflicting interests of rural and urban Germany. 
The SFIO had a quite different relationship with French farmers. French socialism had 
never been as tied to the industrial working classes as was German social democracy. The 
975 SPD Congress, 2 July 1947, 198, AdsD. 
976 Baade’s expertise was so appreciated in postwar Germany that he was at times consulted on agricultural policy 
by Walter Hallstein and other CDU officials.  
977 “Biographical Notes on Dr. Fritz Baade,” Fritz Baade 5, AHC; 2/PVBT9, AdsD.  
978 Weber, op cit., 393. 
979 28 February 1951, Bundestrag, Verhandlungen, 4644. 
980 Kriedemann, 1 June 1950, Bundestg, Verhandlungen, 2403; and 16 March 1951, Verhandlungen, 4885. 
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industrial working classes were smaller as a percentage of the population in France and tended to 
vote Communist in the postwar period. During the Fourth Republic, the SFIO gradually took 
over part of the Radical Party’s base in small towns and villages as support for the SFIO shifted 
to the more agrarian east and south.981 While far from the most popular party in rural France, the 
SFIO had always had a noticeable presence in rural politics. France had a higher proportion of 
farmers than Germany (28 to 22%) and the number of SFIO deputies with roots in agriculture, 
17%, was an impressive figure.982 
Not only did the party have expertise in the sector, but it also had a clear pretension to 
capture the rural vote, a pretension that was largely absent in the case of the SPD. François 
Tanguy-Prigent, a peasant who served as agricultural minister in President de Gaulle’s postwar 
government, formed the Confédération générale de l’agriculture (CGA), which attempted to 
unite French agriculture under a left-wing umbrella organization.983 Although this organization 
gradually lost clout before the right-leaning Fédération National des Syndicats d’Exploitants 
Agricoles (FNSEA), the influence of Tanguy-Prigent, as well as Michel Cépède, Kléber Loustau, 
and Gérard Vée provided the party with a fountain of experience in agricultural policy upon 
which to draw. Unlike the SPD, the SFIO also had practical experience in instituting agricultural 
reform. Blum’s Popular Front government had established a Wheat Office to assist small farmers 
by guaranteeing minimum prices for wheat and centralizing its import under government 
auspices.984 Loustau and Tanguy-Prigent evoked the success of the interwar Wheat Office as a 
counter-model to liberal approaches to agricultural policy in the Fourth Republic.985  
Like French political elites in general, the SFIO never fully resolved contradictions 
within its agricultural policy. The SFIO prioritized the modernization of French agriculture, but 
it also called for the maintenance of small and medium farms, which generated markedly lower 
rates of productivity.986 The romantic imagery of the family farm was an idealization that 
transcended French political boundaries. Mollet evoked this imagery as prime minister in a 
981 Orlow, op cit., 67. 
982 Christian Buchheim, “Ökonomischer Strukturwandel in Frankreich und Deutschland im europäisichen und 
transatlantischen Zusammenhang,” in Miard-Delacrois and Hudemann, eds., 166-67; Noëlline Castagnez, Socialistes 
en République: Les parlementaires SFIO de la IVe République (Rennes: Presses de Rennes, 2004), 120-21.  
983 Gilbert Noël, “French Agricultural Pressure Groups and the Project for a European Agricultural Organization,” in 
Griffiths and Girvin, eds, 51-52. Tanguy-Prigent identified himself as a “peasant” because he had farmed for twelve 
years. 20 July 1949, JO, 4881. 
984 Graham, op cit., 38. 
985 Tanguy-Prigent, 28 September 1946, JO,  4128; and Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC.  
986 Loustau, 6 August 1954, JO, 3935. 
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public speech and promised to defend the livelihoods of small landowners, a promise his 
predecessors in government had made during negotiations for the common market in October 
1955.987 The official policy of the SPD and the trade unions, in contrast, was to “revise the size 
of the holdings and to consolidate the fragmented land...”988 SFIO agricultural experts also hoped 
to stop or at least stem a rural exodus that they feared would have devastating social implications 
for French society.989  
Both the SPD and SFIO explicitly rejected a “liberal” approach to agricultural policy, 
but, as in trade in general, their policies on “liberalism” referred more to a need at times to adopt 
price controls rather than to tariff policy. In the initial postwar period, both parties focused on 
restraining food prices, which soared in the context of the devastation of war and the great freeze 
of winter 1946-47. Tanguy-Prigent as agricultural minister decreed maximum and minimum 
prices on wheat and other essential foodstuffs, a policy extended by the governments of Léon 
Blum and Paul Ramadier.990 As food shortages turned into food surpluses by the early 1950s,991 
the French and German governments extended minimum prices to protect agricultural sectors the 
costs of which would otherwise prove uncompetitive before an onslaught of international 
imports.992 In this context, the French and German governments made the policy decision to 
protect domestic agriculture through high tariffs, seasonal and non-seasonal import restrictions 
and, in particular, equalization taxes on importers that forced the price of imports up to the 
domestic level.993 German agriculture was less competitive and smaller than French agriculture, 
which allowed the German government to subsidize and protect its agriculture at a level that 
would have been unsustainable for the French budget.994 Under Christian Democratic leadership, 
German agriculture thus became the most protected agricultural market within Western Europe.  
These measures were met with some resistance within both the SFIO and SPD. Despite 
its customary reticence, the SPD approved the German government’s erection of sweeping 
987 Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil à l’occasion d’inaugurations d’écoles à Hazebrouck, 
Dimanche, 23 September 1956, AGM 74, OURS; Mahant, op cit., 106.  
988 “The Integration of European Agriculture. Reply to the Questionnaire by the Socialdemocratic [sic] Party of 
Germany,” 2/PVBT6, AdsD; for the trade unions, see Mahant, op cit., 62-63.    
989 Tanguy-Prigent, 20 July 1949, JO, 4866; Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC. 
990 Guido Thiemeyer, “Jean Monnet, Pierre Pfimlin und das Projekt einer Europäischen Agrargemeinschaft,” in 
Wilkens, Intressen verbinden, 142-43; Vée, 16 May, JO, 1615-20.  
991 By 1954 French wheat production was 25% above domestic consumption. Griffiths and Girvin, eds., xxvii. 
992 Thiemeyer, op cit., 22-23.  
993 Griffiths and Girvin, eds., xxx. 
994 Mahant, op cit., 61-62. 
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protections for agriculture in summer 1950 and adopted into its 1952 party platform much of the 
demands of Germany’s leading farm organization, the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV).995 
Though the party continued its support for minimum prices, by 1952 Kalbitzer and others had 
launched a new offensive against tariffs on basic foodstuffs. The SPD sought to be the voice of 
consumers, using a rhetoric that evoked the difficulty of “house-wives” to balance the family’s 
food budget.996 Agricultural protection was controversial within the SFIO as well.  Philip, Moch, 
and Max Lejeune complained that wheat prices seemed to be rising without constraint and 
insisted that French agriculture would have to be competitive on the world market in the near- to 
medium-term future. Like Kalbitzer in Germany, Philip blamed the 1892 French law instituting 
tariffs on agricultural imports for the backwardness of France’s agricultural sector.997 
Nonetheless, the party approved the call of its agricultural experts to extend minimum prices and 
made it official policy to create a National Fund for the Stabilization of Agricultural Prices.998   
The concept of modernization, so important in French Socialist rhetoric for economic 
policy in this period, served to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints within the SFIO, while 
leading the party in fact to support the implanting of a protectionist regime for agriculture.999 All 
factions of the party agreed that in order to overcome protectionism and make French agriculture 
capable of competing on the world market, the sector needed government support to modernize 
its practices and infrastructure. Therefore the moment of reckoning for French agriculture was 
pushed into an indeterminate future, a future further postponed by the creation of a Common 
Agricultural Policy under the auspices of the EEC. Such a modernization was necessary because 
agriculture played a central role in the Planning Commission’s design for achieving a balance of 
payments within Europe and with the dollar zone, an imbalance that continued to plague French 
995 See Kalbitzer’s comments about his party’s approval of temporary tariffs in 1950 and why they were no longer 
appropriate in 1951. 21 September 1951, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 6723-25. Kriedemann announced the SPD’s 
continued support for a minimum price for wheat in 1953. 24 June 1953, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 13641. See 
also Ulrich Kluge, “‘Du pool noir au pool vert: Wirtschafts- und Sozialprobleme des ‘Marché Commun Agricole de 
l’Europe’ 1949-1957 aus deutsche Sicht,” in Serra, ed., 252; and Werner Bührer, “Agricultural Pressure Groups and 
International Politics: The German Example,” in Griffiths and Girvin eds., 80.  
996 See, for instance, Kriedemann’s comments to the Bundestag, 21 January 1953, Verhandlungen, 11707; and Käte 
Strobel’s comments, 1 February 1957, Verhandlungen, 10758. 
997 Philip to the 46ème Congrès National—Asnières, 1-4 July 1954, OURS. 
998 See the comments of Vée, Lejeune, Philip and Moch in the GPS, 30 May 1950, AHC; and Tanguy-Prigent, 24 
May 1950, JO, 3858. 
999 For the SFIO agricultural modernization program, see Tanguy-Prigent, 7 March 1947, JO, 1529; and Kléber 
Loustau, 8 July, JO, 3691-2. 
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currency reserves into the 1950s.1000 As U.S. exporters continued to deliver enormous exports of 
wheat and other products to the European and even, at times, to the French market, French 
Socialists joined French governments in viewing agriculture as the principal means to escape 
chronic trade deficits. French policy for agriculture became as ambitious as its industrialization 
program. The goal was to convert France from a food-importing nation to a gigantic fount of 
exports, a program without which advocates of agricultural modernization would have come up 
against a stiff wall of resistance to their efforts to promote greater productivity in the 
countryside.1001 
The key to this strategy was the guarantee of foreign markets, ideally in the form of a 
European agrarian union. Tanguy-Prigent announced his support for such a plan in February 
1949, more than a year before the French government announced its first proposal for European 
agricultural integration.1002 SFIO agricultural experts knew that there was a key flaw in this 
strategy: French agricultural goods were on average 25 to 30% above world market prices.1003 
Therefore, the only chance of success for such a policy was to convince France’s neighbors to 
accept huge imports of goods at prices high enough to sustain French agricultural ambitions, 
with the support of French export subsidies to reduce the price disparity.1004 Monnet and other 
leading officials first turned to Great Britain, but the British government yet again disappointed 
its French counterpart by refusing to take part.1005 British officials continued to resist French 
government overtures through the 1950s, including efforts by Guy Mollet’s government to make 
the British proposal of a Free Trade Zone more palatable by reaching a compromise that would 
remunerate French farmers. British stonewalling led the French government, and SFIO 
agricultural experts, to turn to Germany as the only plausible market for French agricultural 
surpluses. This policy began to come to fruition in a 1955 French-German trade agreement, when 
1000 Loustau in the name of the party’s Agricultural Commission to the SFIO congress, 2 July 1954, OURS; 
Sécretariat d’Etat aux Affaires économiques. Direction des relations économiques extérieures, confidentiel, Paris, le 
15 Janvier 1957. Note pour le ministre, AGM 74, OURS; Thiemeyer, op cit., 128. 
1001 Richard T. Griffiths and Fernando Guirao, “The First Proposals for a European Agricultural Community: The 
Pflimlin and Mansholt Plans,” in Griffiths and Girvins, eds., 3-4; Thiemeyer, op cit., 37.  
1002 Tanguy-Prigent, 25 February 1949, JO, 953. In addition, in April 1949 SFIO agricultural expert Michel Cépède 
brought this initiative to the transnational Socialist pressure group Mouvement Socialiste des Etats-Unis d’Europe, 
which recommended the creation of a European Agricultural Committee. Gilbert Noël, “French Agricultural 
Pressure Groups and the Project for a European Agricultural Organization,” in Griffiths and Girvins, eds., 55-56.  
1003 Tanguy-Prigent, 27 July 1950, JO, 6073; Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC. 
1004 Loustau in the name of the party’s Agricultural Commission to the SFIO congress, 2 July 1954, OURS. 
1005 Guido Thiemeyer, “Jean Monnet, Pierre Pfimlin und das Projekt einer Europäischen Agrargemeinschaft,” in 
Wilkens, Interessen Verbinden, 144.  
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the German government agreed to double its imports of French wheat and markedly increase 
consumption of other French agricultural goods.1006  
This Franco-German bilateral agricultural deal came about in large part due to the failure 
of French proposals for European agricultural integration. A month after Schuman announced his 
plan for coal and steel integration, French agricultural minister, Pierre Pflimlin, launched an 
initiative for a Green Pool to create an internal European market for wheat, sugar, milk, and 
wine, and a supervisory body to oversee production and marketing.1007 Under pressure from Guy 
Mollet, cabinet minister for the Council of Europe, the French government decided in February 
1951 to submit the Green Pool initiative to the intergovernmental Council of Europe, rather than 
adopt the supranational approach favored by Jean Monnet.1008 In fall 1950, Mollet was still 
determined to have the British government directly engaged in the European integration process 
and was willing to sacrifice its supranational features in order to obtain British allegiance. The 
SFIO-aligned farmers’ organization, the CGA, however, supported a supranational agricultural 
community and pressured subsequent French governments to strengthen the powers of that 
community.1009 The French Peasants Party and the conservative FNSEA, on the other hand, 
opposed a supranational authority and tended to prefer bilateral agreements, rather than the 
multilateral accords favored by the SFIO and CGA. British resistance to an agricultural deal with 
France meant that the Pflimlin Plan arrived moribund in Strasbourg. Four years of tortuous, and 
ultimately futile, negotiations ensued before the Pflimlin Plan died in 1954, after having been 
transferred for consideration to the OEEC.1010 During the life of the Pflimlin Plan, the CDU-led 
German government displayed an evident lack of enthusiasm for the proposal, a reticence that 
resulted in large part from the CDU’s reliance on the German farmers’ vote. The powerful 
German farm organization, the DBV, believed that an influx of French agricultural goods would 
destroy German agriculture, which had substantially higher operating costs.  
1006 This August 1955 agreement between Adenauer and French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France at La Celle-
St. Claude guaranteed for three years the import of 500,000 tons of French wheat per year and 200,000 tons of other 
agricultural goods without substantial French concessions on the import of German industrial goods. Thiemeyer, op 
cit., 136; Lefèvre, op cit., 397-98. 
1007 Pfimlin announced his plan on 12 June 1950. Bossuat, op cit., 787. 
1008 Guido Thiemeyer, “Jean Monnet, Pierre Pfimlin und das Projekt einer Europäischen Agrargemeinschaft,” in 
Wilkens, Interessen Verbinden, 151-156. 
1009 Gilbert Noël, “French Agricultural Pressure Groups and the Project for a European Agricultural Organization,” 
in Griffiths and Girvin, eds., 61-64. 
1010 Lefèvre, op cit., 312-313.  
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The SFIO used its transnational contacts through the COMISCO organization to place 
agricultural integration on the international socialist agenda. In a confidential memo to its 
fraternal parties, the SFIO argued for a harmonization of Europe’s agricultural policies, and for a 
European fund to organize import and export taxes to compensate domestic farmers for 
“competition to which the producers are not in a position to quickly adapt.”1011 The SPD 
leadership turned to Fritz Baade to formulate the SPD’s response to the SFIO’s initiative.1012 
Baade responded with a 76-page report, outlining a comprehensive overview of the state of 
German agriculture and the prospects for agricultural integration. Drawing upon the example of 
the single market in the United States, Baade rejected the DBV’s central argument. He argued 
that German farmers, like farmers in the northern United States, were capable of maintaining 
production rates in the face of imports from the south. Agricultural integration along the lines of 
the Pflimlin Plan did not constitute an existential threat to German farming. Nonetheless, the 
Pflimlin Plan was clearly constructed to benefit French interests and, therefore, the German 
government should demand an opening of the French market to German industrial goods as a 
recompense for such a “concession.”1013  
In the subsequent COMISCO meeting, European socialist representatives debated 
agricultural integration. Though Kriedemann called the results of the meeting “hazy,” the 
conference was able to issue a united resolution that laid out a socialist perspective on 
agriculture.1014 The resolution did not resolve the issue of French exports, nor did it convince the 
British and Scandinavian parties to support agricultural integration, but the conference did 
delineate a set of principles that paved the way for the SFIO to support, and the SPD to 
acquiesce, to an exclusionary common market for agriculture. The parties accepted that 
“production must be increased,” supported the creation of “a clearing-house for European 
imports and exports,” and called for the governments to give preference to multilateral 
agreements with “a real guarantee of a market for the produce.” Most important, the parties 
embraced what historian Knudson has called “welfare for farmers” through the use of “price 
1011 The French Plan, 14 April 1951, Braunthal to Member Parties and Delegates of COMISCO, 2/PVBT6, AdsD. 
1012 Pass letter to Baade, 6 January 1951, 2/PVBT4, AdsD; and Baade to COMISCO secretary Julius Braunthal, 5 
January 1951, 2/PVBT5, AdsD. 
1013 Die deutsche Landwirtschaft als Partner in einer europäischen Agrargemeinschaft. Ihre Leistungsfähigkeit und 
ihre Lebensbedürfnisse. General-Gutachten erstattet im Auftrag der DEUTSCHEN DELEGATION bei dem 
Vorbereitungen Arbeitsausschuss der Konferenz für die Organisation der Europäischen Agrarmärkte durch 
Professor Dr. Fritz Baade, 2/PVBT6, AdsD. 
1014 Aktennotiz Betr. Europäische Agrar-Union, 5. Mai 1952, 2/PVBT6, AdsD. 
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control[s].” The resolution states that, “We have to ensure a stable and reasonable standard of 
living for agricultural producers, and a stable and reasonable cost of living for consumers. 
Neither of these aims can be secured in a free market.”1015 
A rejection of a “free market” in agriculture became the departure point for the French 
government’s call for an agricultural exception in the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome.1016 
As Prime Minister, Mollet took up his predecessors’ position on agriculture and made the tactful 
move of vigorously courting the agricultural lobby, a courtship that French negotiator Maurice 
Faure credits with securing the votes needed in the National Assembly for the Treaties of 
Rome.1017 French agriculture offset the opposition to the common market emanating from 
French industrial interests, which tended to fear European competition. Facing a vigorous new 
export policy of wheat from the U.S. and other leading exporters, the French government 
demanded a European preference zone for agriculture with a common external tariff to combat 
“agricultural dumping from third countries.”1018 After the French government had made a clear 
commitment to carry the common market negotiations to a successful conclusion, it laid out a set 
of conditions to be resolved for agriculture in October 1956. These demands reflected in large 
part the objectives to which the Socialist parties had agreed in 1951 as well as those of the 
domestic French agricultural lobby: a rise in farmers’ standards of living; guaranteed long-term 
contracts for imports/exports within the Community; an agricultural modernization fund; a 
common external tariff (not in the Socialist resolution); and price supports/compensatory taxes to 
equalize prices within the community.1019 As in the case of industrial tariffs, the French 
government demanded a weakening of the supranational features of the community and a 
1015 International Socialist Conference, 12 June 1951, Circular INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE 
REPORT of the SIXTH INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIC EXPERTS CONFERENCE met at 
Sonloup, Switzerland, 24-26 April 1951, 2/PVBT6, AdsD. 
1016 Thiemeyer, op cit., 244. 
1017 Maurice Faure in Sera, ed., 289; historian Thiemeyer agrees with Faure, Thiemeyer, op cit., 209; see also 
Moravcsik, op cit., 112-13.  
1018 Agriculture, AGM 11, OURS. In summer 1955, U.S. agriculture began its largest export push of the 20th 
century, offering wheat and other exports in local currencies, rather than demanding payment from dollar reserves. 
At this time the combined efforts of the U.S., Canada, Argentina, and Australia had created a record surplus in 
international wheat reserves. Ulrich Kluge, “Wege europäischer Agrarintegration 1950-1957,” in Ludolf Herbst, 
Werner Bührer, Hanno Sowade, eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in die westliche Welt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 310.  
1019 NOTE OBJECT: Etat Actual des négociations du Traité du Marché Commun, AGM 11, OURS; Mahant, op cit.,  
107-108.  
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strengthening of intergovernmentalism.1020 These demands had nothing to do with the 
ideological considerations of Mollet’s government, but rather reflected a conviction that 
maintaining national control over the reach and level of agricultural liberalization was necessary 
to secure the support of the powerful FNSEA for the Treaties of Rome.  
However, the Treaty left it to future negotiations to determine the means by which the 
EEC would realize these goals.1021 This ambiguity likely served to stem what might have been 
greater objections from German Social Democrats. The SPD continued to pursue a flexible 
policy on agriculture over the course of the 1950s, insisting on lower prices for consumers whilst 
approving the CDU-sponsored legislation in 1949-50 and 1955 to shield German farmers from 
the full impact of market forces. In the aftermath of the COMISCO conference, the SPD Central 
Committee called a meeting to debate SPD policy towards the Pflimlin Plan. There the battle 
lines between Kalbitzer and Kriedemann reemerged. Against Kalbitzer’s remonstrances, 
Kriedemann welcomed the principle of an agricultural union, as long as it did not develop into an 
“agrarian cartel.”1022 When debating the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the WPA, while approving 
the treaties, stated its wish that, “the European Economic Community not degenerate into 
agricultural protectionism.”1023  
The Treaties of Rome included a provision promising reasonable prices for consumers. 
European negotiators took little heed of this clause during the foundational negotiations for a 
Common Agricultural Policy from 1958-1964, when they set up a system that protected 
European agriculture behind a high tariff wall at the expense of consumers. However, when 
voting for the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the SPD did not know the gargantuan role the CAP 
would come to play in EEC affairs. The SFIO supported an “agricultural exception” because it 
had an ideational attachment to guaranteeing income standards for farmers, but also because it 
was the only means to gain support for the common market within the fractured French political 
scene. The SPD’s acquiescence, in turn, was more the result of its desire to stabilize German 
democracy by lessening the historical antagonism between German farmers and social 
democracy, and the German government’s success in linking French agricultural exports to 
1020 Thiemeyer, op cit., 212, 247-56. The most important element of this was to prolong the period in which 
minimum prices would require a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers, rather than a majority or qualified 
majority.  
1021 Knudson, op cit., 59; Moravcsik, op cit., 147; and Thiemeyer, op cit., 258. 
1022 Doc: Aktennotiz Betr. Europäische Agrar-Union 5. Mai 1952, 2/PVBT6, AdsD. 
1023 Erste Stellungnahme des Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD zum “Vertrag zur 
Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG)”, BG, 73 AdsD.  
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industrial trade liberalization. Both parties’ vote in favor of the Treaties in effect sacrificed the 
linkage between productivity gains and governmental support for farming, a linkage that had 
previously contributed to blurring internal party conflicts on agriculture within the SFIO and 
SPD.  
 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how French Socialists and German Social Democrats approached 
European economic integration with similar party traditions and historical narratives about the 
virtues of free trade for the maintenance of peace and for economic expansion and prosperity. 
With the partial exception of agriculture, the policies of the SFIO and SPD towards the 
negotiations for a common market and an atomic energy agency bore more in common with each 
other than with their national governments, at least until Mollet became Prime Minister in 
January 1956. Even then, key SFIO ministers promoted policies along the line of the consensus 
that they had developed with the SPD under the auspices of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee.  
 Nonetheless, the challenges of leading a fractured coalitional government forced Mollet 
to sacrifice parts of this consensus, namely the exclusively peaceful nature of the French nuclear 
program, in order to assure the success of other areas of the Socialist consensus, in particular the 
common market. In addition, Mollet’s government made further demands on the conditions for 
the association of the Community’s overseas territories, the length of transitional periods for 
lowering tariffs, and various economic escape clauses, demands that the SPD would have 
preferred not be included in the Treaties. The concessions on these issues by the German 
government were necessary to create a majority for the treaties in the French Assembly. In turn, 
SPD acquiescence to this compromise was needed to create a majority for the Treaties within the 
Bundestag. As happened later when the SPD entered government, the realities of governance 
created constraints within which party leaders were forced to sacrifice or compromise on key 
party goals. Mollet’s government faced immense geopolitical, economic, and colonial challenges 
during its sixteen-month tenure. That he and his team were able to wrest the Treaties of Rome 
through the morass of late-Fourth Republican politics is a testament to the power of political will 
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and to how, through a balance of cunning and dexterity, leaders can carve out space within the 
constraints posed by coalitional governance in times of national and international crisis.1024  
  
1024 Here I am inspired in part by the thesis laid out in Richard Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their 
Legacies in Italy and Japan (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has shown how a postwar generation of French Socialist and German Social 
Democratic leaders brought similar visions and concerns to the process of European integration 
from 1948 to 1957. The parties were not always in agreement, and at times their relations 
devolved into acrimony. However, as demonstrated above, these inter-socialist conflicts were 
often due to a clash in domestic goals that, while not internationalist in nature, were nevertheless 
rooted in the parties’ socialist traditions or in party narratives about how to avoid the errors of 
the interwar period. Even in cases of inter-party conflict, SFIO and SPD leaders had many 
policies in common, and when their leaderships disagreed, there continued a transnational 
Socialist discussion that at times bypassed the mediation of the party executives. 
By the time of the ratifications of the Treaties of Rome, the power of the traditions and 
narratives that had emerged prior to the Second World War had begun to wane as German 
economic prosperity and the traumas of French decolonization led to a transcendence of 
concerns rooted in the interwar experience. A new set of geopolitical and economic challenges 
rooted in postwar realities asserted themselves. With these changes, there appeared new party 
narratives that have since then shaped French Socialist and German Social Democratic responses 
to European integration initiatives. In this conclusion I examine how the SFIO and SPD reacted 
to the changing context of the 1960s, and how much of the substance of current debates about 
European integration among French Socialists and German Social Democrats have their origin in 
the generational shift of the 1960-1970s.  
The SFIO and SPD were among the political groups most supportive of the NATO 
alliance through the 1960s. SFIO leaders denounced President Charles de Gaulle for pulling out 
of the military system erected by NATO. As the rechristened Parti Socialiste (PS), led by 
François Mitterrand, looked to create a rassemblement of the left to challenge right-leaning 
287 
 
candidates for the presidency of the Fifth Republic, it adopted a more critical view of NATO. It 
began to call for a simultaneous dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts along the lines of 
the SPD’s vision from the 1950s. This stance was an explicit rejection of Guy Mollet’s 
leadership and its supporters, who continued to support the NATO alliance against de Gaulle’s 
politique de grandeur through the 1960s.  
Far more than the SPD’s decision to support the Treaties of Rome, the SPD leadership’s 
decision to unambiguously announce its support for NATO in 1960, and to fully participate in its 
ancillary transatlantic political and security committees, marked a definitive caesura in the 
history of postwar German social democracy. The party’s first concession was to give assurances 
in 1958 that a SPD government would not unilaterally disengage from NATO, in effect giving 
the Western allies a veto over changes to West Germany’s participation in the NATO system. 
Then, in summer 1960, Herbert Wehner gave a heralded speech to the Bundestag in which he 
announced the party’s full support for West Germany’s defense integration in NATO, and for 
further economic and political integration within the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Wehner called for a policy of common ground (Gemeinsamkeit) between the CDU-government 
and the SPD-opposition. His move signaled the party’s intent to end the dispute on foreign policy 
that had plagued relations between the CDU and SPD through the entire period of our study.   
The pursuit of Gemeinsamkeit had an international dimension that at times came into 
conflict with the pursuit of Gemeinsamkeit within German domestic politics. In a twist of history, 
the SPD found more common ground in foreign policy with the new Democratic administration 
in the United States under President John F. Kennedy than it did with Adenauer’s government. 
Unlike Adenauer, who did not hide his preference for Republican candidate Richard Nixon in the 
1960 U.S. presidential election, the SPD leadership shared in the wave of excitement 
surrounding Kennedy’s inauguration and worked hard to ingratiate itself to the new U.S. 
administration.1025 It quickly reaped rewards, as SPD leaders developed close ties with important 
U.S. officials, found a new forum to receive information about international developments, and 
exchanged points of view with a sympathetic U.S. government.1026 When French President de 
1025 Joachim Hütter, SPD und nationale Sicherheit: Internationale und innenpolitische Determination des Wandels 
der sozialdemokratischen Sicherheitspolitik 1959-1961 (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1975), 113; Frank A. 
Mayer, “Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust in German-American Relations?,” German Studies Review 17, 
1 (1994): 83-104. 
1026 Lothar Wilker, Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD 1956-1966: Zwischen Wiedervereinigungs- und 
Bündnisorientierung (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1977), 163, 171, 219-220. 
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Gaulle launched his campaign for a “European Europe” as a challenge to what he saw as the 
dangers of a hegemonic U.S. ally, the U.S. government had no firmer defender of the 
transatlantic relationship over the course of the 1960s than the SPD. As early as the weeks 
leading up to the Mollet-Adenauer entente of November 1956, the SPD warned against the 
“political nonsense” of any effort to construct European integration against the United States.1027 
The SPD supported the Cold War defense strategy of the new U.S. government, which 
sought to replace the Eisenhower-doctrine of “massive retaliation” with a “flexible response” 
approach in which the Allied governments would build up conventional forces in order to have a 
range of options short of nuclear war available in the event of international crises. In addition, 
the SPD was quite content that the new U.S. administration abandoned President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s complacent acceptance of the prospect of a nuclear-armed West Germany in favor 
of pursuing an international postwar settlement with the Soviet Union to stabilize “the German 
Question.” That issue still had the potential to destabilize international relations, as demonstrated 
again during the Berlin crises of 1959-62. This international postwar settlement, brilliantly 
outlined by historian Marc Trachtenberg, constituted a deal between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in 1963 to confirm the status quo of a two-nation Germany, allow Western military 
forces to remain in West Berlin and guarantee a long-term U.S. troop presence on the European 
continent, and, in effect, force the West German government to sign on to the new nuclear non-
proliferation treaty.1028 Adenauer did all he could to prevent such a settlement, but the 
combination of support from the SPD and CDU dissenters sufficed to overcome Adenauer’s 
opposition. After a decade of conflict between the SPD and the U.S. government over foreign 
policy, the Kennedy administration compelled the German government to renounce nuclear 
weapons, much to the relief of the SPD.1029 
Whereas the conflict between government and opposition was the principle fault-line for 
German foreign policy debates in the 1950s, the 1960s was marked by a dispute that transcended 
party lines between, in contemporary parlance, German “Gaullists” and “Atlanticists.”1030 This 
clash over the basic tenants of West German foreign policy included polemics surrounding the 
1027 Gemeinsame Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, Parteiausschusses und der Kontrollkommission am 18. Oktober 
1956, Erich Ollenhauer 125, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD).  
1028 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
1029 Wilker, op cit., 197-99. 
1030 Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1958 bis 1969 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1996), 184. 
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failure of negotiations between the EEC and the British-sponsored European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) in 1958-59, and de Gaulle’s subsequent veto of Great Britain’s application to join the 
EEC in 1963.1031 The SFIO and SPD were united in their support of an EEC-EFTA accord, and 
both parties enthusiastically embraced Great Britain’s EEC application, though Guy Mollet also 
warned against allowing Great Britain to “dilute” integration in the EEC and challenge the six-
nation compromise on agriculture.  
Tensions came to a head when President de Gaulle announced that Great Britain 
represented a “Trojan horse” for U.S. intervention in the European integration process at a press 
conference in January 1963, and vetoed Britain’s application to the EEC. Adding fuel to the fire, 
he and Konrad Adenauer concluded a French-German Friendship Treaty eight days later that 
seemed to create a bilateral alliance that could, as Emile Noël pointed out in a memo to Guy 
Mollet, undermine the prerogatives of the EEC. The most incendiary feature of the Treaty was 
that its text studiously avoided any mention of the NATO alliance. A transnational alliance of 
“Atlanticists,” including the SFIO and SPD, kicked into motion in response to these dramatic 
series of events. CDU dissidents and Herbert Wehner met with an irate Jean Monnet to plot a 
response. SPD leaders also consulted with U.S. officials on the issue.1032 In a direct rebuke to 
Adenauer and de Gaulle, CDU Atlanticists, with SPD support, inserted a clause into the Treaty’s 
preamble that reconfirmed the German government’s attachment to NATO.1033 Under these 
conditions, the SPD voted in favor of the Treaty. In France, the SFIO proclaimed its appreciation 
of the SPD’s position and, then, in part because no comparable addition was inserted into the 
Treaty in France, voted in opposition. Guy Mollet presented the party’s vote as a means of 
reasserting its preference for the EEC and NATO over a bilateral Franco-German alliance.1034 
Two years later, when de Gaulle announced an “empty chair” policy to force France’s EEC’s 
1031 For an overview of these events, see Mathieu Segers, “De Gaulle’s Race to the Bottom: The Netherlands, France 
and the Interwoven Problems of British EEC Membership and European Political Union, 1958-1963,” 
Contemporary European History 19, 2 (2010): 111-132; and Laurent Warlouzet, “De Gaulle as a Father of Europe: 
The Unpredictability of the FTA’s Failure and the EEC’s Success (1956-1958), Contemporary European History 
20, 4 (2011): 419-434. 
1032 Matthias Schulz, “Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die 
Präambel zum Elysee-Vertrag,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed. Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische 
Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 318-19; and Trachtenberg, op cit., 377-78. 
1033 Petra Weber, Carlo Schmid 1896-1979: Eine Biographie (Munich: C.H. Beck), 665-666. 
1034 Le débat sur la ratification du traité de Gaulle-Adenauer, Guy Mollet: Vous porterez devant l’histoire la 
responsabilité de l’échec de la construction européenne, extract from Journal officiel, AGM 58, Office universitaire 
de recherche socialiste (OURS).  
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partners to accept a national veto of Community policy, the SFIO and SPD united again to 
denounce this affront to the supranational features of the Treaties of Rome.  
Hence the SPD settled into a form of consensus politics within the German domestic 
sphere, within European integration bodies, and within the western alliance. Internationally, the 
party accepted that German reunification was not a realistic possibility in the near- or medium-
term, and it adopted much of the Western Cold War rhetoric that placed the blame for the East-
West conflict squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet government.1035 Picking up on subterranean 
currents within the party, Egon Bahr, a close adviser to Willy Brandt, coined the term Ostpolitik 
in 1963 to describe a SPD policy of “small steps” to achieve a rapprochement with East German 
authorities so as to facilitate daily interactions between the two countries. Domestically, the 1959 
Bad Godesberg program signaled the party’s abandonment of a program to enact revolutionary 
social and economic changes. The party would henceforth campaign on the slogan that the SPD 
was the “better party” to manage West German economic and foreign policy within the postwar 
system as it existed. The pursuit of consensus politics was not unconditional. Many issues 
continued to divide the government and opposition, but the SPD leadership went to great lengths 
to de-polemicize political conflict and to employ a moderate tone in its critiques. Hence, after 
dire warnings about Adenauer’s authoritarian tendencies, warnings that continued until the end 
of the 1950s, the party hardly reacted to the tumultuous “Spiegel Affair,” which broke out after 
the German government raided the popular weekly’s office following an unfavorable article 
about the status of the German military.1036 In addition, the party formulated a constructive 
response to the CDU leadership’s insistence that the Bundestag add an “emergency powers 
decree” to the German Basic Law, a policy that would have sounded furious alarm bells just a 
few years earlier.1037 The SPD’s relations with the German military also steadily improved over 
this period, as the party’s executive and security experts effectively sidelined rank-and-file 
agitation against the German military.  
This new political approach signaled the transcendence of the party narratives and 
policies rooted in interwar experiences that had so shaped the SPD’s postwar policy. The parties’ 
power brokers from 1945 to 1950 had almost all died or were in semi-retirement. By the time 
1035 Hütter, op cit., 99. 
1036 Beatrix Bouvier, Zwischen Godesberg und Grosser Koalition: Der Weg der SPD in die 
Regierungsverantwortung: Aussen-, sicherheits- und deutschlandpolitische Umorientierung und gesellschaftliche 
Ördnung der SPD 1960-1966 (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1990), 120. 
1037 Hütter, op cit., 86. 
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party leader Erich Ollenhauer died in 1963, much of the power in the party had already passed to 
the “troika” of Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid, and Herbert Wehner, and was in the process of passing 
further to a newer generation of party leaders, in particular to Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, 
whose power at the center of the party’s affairs solidified only after the ratification of the 
Treaties of Rome. The prosperity of the German economy and a new perception of the stability 
of West German democracy led to a decline within the SPD leadership in the valiance of 
narratives informed by the traumatic experiences of the interwar period. The SPD of the 1960s 
represented a generational shift away from the driving concerns of the postwar period. That shift 
brought with it a new set of issues, a new set of leaders with markedly different temperaments, 
and a new approach to politics. Voters rewarded the new party leadership, which saw a 
consistent rise in its levels of national support until 1966, when the SPD entered a coalition 
government with CDU Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. In 1969, Willy Brandt formed a 
government with the liberal FDP party, and he and his SPD successor as Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, presided over fourteen years of uninterrupted SPD-FDP coalition governments.  
Although in a markedly different fashion, the postwar generation of leaders in the French 
Socialist Party came to an end as well. The disastrous policy of Guy Mollet’s government in 
Algeria, the ascension of Charles de Gaulle to power, and the creation of the Fifth Republic 
caused a sea-change within the French left and a massive political realignment. Tensions 
between Mollet and his opponents within the party, so evident in the EDC period, reached a 
boiling point in fall 1956, and again with de Gaulle’s investiture in 1958, culminating with a 
schism in the party and the creation of the Parti socialiste autonome (PSA), later rechristened the 
Parti socialiste unifié (PSU). The quickening dissolution of the once hegemonic French Radical 
Party created the conditions for a rapprochement between mendésistes formerly of the SFIO and 
the radical followers of Pierre Mendès-France. While Guy Mollet kept an iron-clad grip on the 
SFIO over the course of the 1960s, he presided over a party that was broken ideologically and 
electorally.1038  
The constitution of the French Fifth Republic replaced an electoral system that favored 
centrist coalitions with a left-right form of majoritarian politics similar in some ways to the 
“winner-take-all” British and U.S. electoral systems. The SFIO was a stunted, marginalized party 
1038 See Mathieu Fulla, “La gauche socialiste et l’économie: querelle des Anciens et des Modernes ou mue 
réformiste délicate (1958-1968),” Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société 13 (2011). 
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during the period of de Gaulle’s presidency. The power once embodied in the party became 
diffused, and the SFIO had to engage with left-wing political clubs and reconcile itself to the rise 
of François Mitterrand in its elusive quest for a left-wing majority. For the first time since the 
Second World War, the leaders of the French government could effectively ignore the French 
Socialist Party, and so they did. The heavy baggage of Mollet’s tenure as prime minister, in 
addition to the tumult in Algeria and France surrounding the Algerian War in the early years of 
the Fifth Republic, led to the political eclipse of the postwar generation of French Socialist 
leaders, even while the atrophied party suffocated under Mollet’s tight grasp during the 1960s.  
The SPD, on the other hand, celebrated one political success after another. Though the 
party’s stance on French designs for the Ruhr and the Schuman Plan had earned the party 
international opprobrium, its efforts were an important step in the party’s quest to gain the 
allegiance of the Ruhr industrial workers. Its efforts in this regard were successful; in the words 
of one historian, “the heart of the SPD [today] beats in the [Ruhr] valley.”1039 From its base in 
the Ruhr, the SPD steadily chipped away at the CDU’s majority in North-Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW), the largest Land of the postwar German republic. In 1956, the SPD formed its first 
government in NRW under Minister-President Fritz Steinhoff in coalition with the FDP. 
Although the coalition lost its majority due to FDP electoral losses in 1958, the SPD increased its 
share of the vote in NRW by nearly five points to reach 39.2%. In 1962, it bit at the heels of its 
CDU rival, winning 43.3% to the CDU’s 46.4%. In July 1966, the SPD won a stunning 49.5%, 
and remained in government in NRW for the next twenty-five years.1040 
The SPD’s 1966 victory in NRW represents a pertinent epilogue to this study’s narrative 
of SPD policies towards heavy industry in the postwar period. The vote was a clear rejection of 
the policies of Konrad Adenauer’s successor, CDU Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. For ideological 
reasons, Erhard opposed government intervention in the crises of heavy industry that broke out 
across the European Coal & Steel Community in the years after 1958. In 1958, the first lay-offs 
of mine workers began in the Ruhr valley, in France, and in Belgium. As oil imports exploded on 
the domestic market and U.S. coal became competitive due to a drastic decline in transatlantic 
1039 Dieter Düding, Zwischen Tradition und Innovation: Die sozialdemokratische Landtagsfraktion in Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1946-1966 (Bonn: J.H.Dietz, 1995), 218-19. 
1040 Ibid., 11, 162, 201. 
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freight rates, Western Europe’s coal industries began a slow, painful decline. By 1965, West 
Germans’ attention was fixated on a dramatic collapse of the Ruhr coal industry.1041 
It is indicative of the change of heart towards the supranational coal and steel community 
that SPD leaders focused their harsh criticism of the handling of the crisis on the governing 
authorities in Bonn, rather than on those in Luxembourg/Brussels.1042 Millions of industrial jobs 
were at stake. SPD and DGB leaders, as well as their counterparts in the SFIO, recognized that 
Western Europe was suffering a structural, rather than temporary, crisis in coal, and in European 
steel as well.1043 As it had in 1948-51, the regional and national SPD worked to defend their 
constituency in the Ruhr, and they looked, in part, to the ECSC High Authority for help despite 
the lackluster performance of the High Authority successors to Jean Monnet.1044 Though 
insufficient, ECSC re-adaptation assistance disproportionately aided German industrial 
workers.1045 The SPD and SFIO called for a more ambitious ECSC intervention program to help 
industrial restructuring. Under the pressure of structural decline, the High Authority, with SPD 
(and usually with SFIO) support, sanctioned the (re-)concentration of industry and the 
maintenance of the Ruhr sales and French purchase cartels for coal.1046 In power at the regional 
level, the SPD devoted a vast amount of resources to the industrial reconversion of the Ruhr 
valley over the course of several decades. Historian Stefan Goch credits SPD leadership for the 
Ruhr’s relatively smooth transition to a postindustrial economy. Although indeed difficult, the 
Ruhr suffered far less from social dislocation than did other areas hit by the Western de-
industrialization wave of the 1960-1980s.1047  
1041 Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1984), 291-93; Werner Abelshauser, “Wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau an Rhein und Ruhr: Weichenstellung in die 
Strukturkrise?,” in Gerhard Brunn and Reimar Hobbing, eds., Nordrhein-Westfalen und seine Anfänge 1945/46 
(Essen: Klartext, 1986), 102-107. 
1042 See “Erklärung der SPD-Regierungsmannschaft zur Europa-Politik,” 29 July 1965, Gerhard Kreyssig (GK) 152, 
AdsD.  
1043 Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau, 93-94. 
1044 PA-Sitzung, 24 October 1958, Parteivorstand (PV) 1958, AdsD.  
1045 More than two-thirds of the 64,312 workers who received ECSC re-adaptation aid by January 1964 were 
German and they received 60% of the total allotment. Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The History of the 
High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994), 548. For a critical overview of the ECSC’s program for de-industrialization of  European heavy 
industry, see Anthony Ferner, Ewart Keep and Jeremy Waddington, “Industrial restructuring and EU-wide social 
measures: broader lessons of the ECSC experience,” Journal of European Public Policy 4, 1 (1997): 56-72. 
1046 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 438-43, 520-23, 616-19. 
1047 Stefan Goch, “Betterment without Airs: Social, Cultural, and Political Consequences of De-Industrialization in 
the Ruhr,” International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 47 (2002): 87-111. 
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One of the region’s hit the hardest by de-industrialization was the Lorraine industrial 
basin.1048 Massive layoffs that began in 1962 shook the region, and workers responded with 
factory occupations. By the early 1970s, the mono-industrial region was depopulating at a rapid 
rate, yet still unemployment continued to grow. Social unrest forced government intervention, 
but the centralized French republic, under right-leaning governments through the 1960s and 
1970s, forced through industrial consolidations that provided far less compensation for laid-off 
workers than their counterparts in the Ruhr received.1049 French society is still reeling from the 
consequences of the French government’s response to de-industrialization. Yet the French 
economy as a whole did quite well during this period, growing at rates equal to or greater than 
West Germany through the 1960s. This was in part due to the strength of the steel-transforming 
companies that, with auto manufacturers in the lead, were able to compete successfully against 
their German neighbors in the 1970s to a far greater extent than ever before or after. With the 
steel-transforming companies collapsing in today’s France, there seems to be less immediate 
economic recompense for contemporary economic losses. 
As the EEC came into operation after 1958, French Socialists and German Social 
Democrats generally put forward a common vision of the direction that they wanted the 
European integration process to take. The Socialist faction was the most united of the EEC’s 
political groups, and voted unanimously in almost all cases from 1958 to 1964. As Adenauer and 
de Gaulle reached a closer rapprochement from 1958 to 1963, the SFIO and SPD provided a 
common front against the Gaullist vision for Europe. They called for a steady expansion of the 
powers of the European Commission and the European Parliament, for the Commission and 
Parliament to have their “own [revenue] resources,” for parliamentary control over the 
Community’s budget, and for universal suffrage to elect a future European Parliament, rather 
than having the Euro-deputies delegated by the national parliaments. By 1965, the SPD was 
1048 Daryl Holter, The Battle for Coal: Miners and the Politics of Nationalization in France, 1940-1950 (Dekalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), 194-96. 
1049 See Michel Freyssenet, “Crise de la sidérurgie lorraine et échec de la diversification industrielle,” Archivo di 
studi urbani e regionali 16, (1983): 67-81; Michel Freyssenet, La sidérugie franciase: 1945-1979. L’histoire d’une 
faillite. Les solutions qui s’affrontent (Paris: Savelli, 1979); Eline Poelmans, “The Emergence of the 'Coastal 
Steelworks' in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1952-1967” (2009). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393722 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393722; and Bernard Sinou, “La Lorraine face à 
la crise sidérurgique,” Economie et statistique 92 (1977): 29-36. 
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calling for an expansion of the Community’s powers into the fields of foreign, defense, and 
cultural policy.1050  
The two parties supported De Gaulle’s surprise proposal in 1959 to lower tariffs within 
the Community at a faster rate than the stages envisioned in the Treaties of Rome, but the SFIO 
was more lukewarm towards the SPD’s desire to significantly lower the Community’s common 
external tariff, which particularly affected relations between EFTA and the EEC.1051 As a 
number of the SPD’s economic experts had feared, the common external tariff erected was 
considerably higher than the prevailing German tariffs had been.  During the period when the 
European Commission was formulating the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), both parties 
supported the idea of European-level subsidies for agriculture and the principle that farmers 
should earn incomes similar to those of other economic sectors.1052 Although both parties wanted 
the CAP to privilege the modernization of the agricultural sector and also assure that prices for 
consumers not be allowed to exceed certain levels, for the most part they acquiesced in the 
creation of an exclusionary EEC-zone for agriculture. Rather than attack the CAP-system as 
Chancellor, Willy Brandt’s government oversaw its consolidation.1053 
From the first days of the EEC to the present, demands for a more comprehensive 
Community social policy have been a commonplace Socialist critique of the European 
integration process. As early as November 1959, the SFIO leadership warned against the 
“majesteuse slowness” of the Commission’s initiatives in this field.1054 The Socialist faction 
called for social harmonization through an active regional policy to raise living standards and to 
promote a convergence of such standards throughout the Community, as well as proposing a 
European social law to cover working hours, vacation periods, and social insurance.1055 It also 
promoted the idea of a European minimum wage, with the caveat that it might be preferable for it 
1050 “Erklärung der SPD-Regierungsgemeinschaft zur Europapolitik,” 29 July 1965, GK 156, AdsD.  
1051 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 1.4.1960, PV 1960, AdsD; Segers, op cit., 117. 
1052 Herbert Kriedemann, “Stellungnahme der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SPD) zur Agrarpolitik im 
Gemeinsamen Markt,” 16 September 1958, GK 150, AdsD; “Entwurf Dr. Diest an den Vorstand der 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände e.V.,” 16 August 1961, Heinrich Deist 8, AdsD; and “Note sur le 
redressement économique et financier,” AGM 32, OURS. 
1053 Claudia Hiepel, Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou: Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch 
und Krise (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 58. 
1054 “L’Europe en marche: Marché commun, An II,” 25 November 1959, AGM 115, OURS.  
1055 Verbindungsbüro der Sozialistischen Parteien der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 
Luxemburg, 5. Kongress der Sozialistischen Parteien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Paris, 5. und 6. 1962, 
“Bericht über die Tätigkeit der sozialistischen Fraktion des Europäischen Parlaments (16. April 1960-14. Oktober), 
von Willi Birkelbach, Vorsitzender der sozialistischen Fraktion, 1/HWAA560, AdsD.  
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to be set at different rates in each country due to economic disparities between the member 
states.1056 Fifty years later, none of these socialist demands concerning social policy have 
become EU law.1057 That has in part been due to an undercurrent of reluctance among German 
Social Democrats to take measures that might negatively affect the competitiveness of German 
exports. While factions within the SPD have consistently called for some form of social 
harmonization at the EU level, the governments of Willy Brandt and, especially of Helmut 
Schmidt, worked to defeat such measures.  
The paucity of social accomplishments in the EEC contributed to a decisive shift in 
French Socialist attitudes towards the European integration process. From its foundation in 1971 
to the present, today’s PS has had an ambiguous policy towards Europe that seeks to reconcile 
the contradictory policies of its various factions. In addition to the assertion of a new generation 
of voices within the diffuse Socialist movement, globalization emerged as a contested issue 
within the French left due to the de-industrialization process that was in full steam by the mid-
1960s. By 1964, the SFIO was becoming increasingly strident in its demands for a more active 
EEC social policy. But the party’s choice for president in the 1965 election, Francois Mitterrand, 
who founded the Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste (FGDS), continued to support 
the traditional SFIO demands for a relance of the European integration process, the incorporation 
of Great Britain, and the “loyal” respect of the Treaties of Rome against de Gaulle’s revisionist 
policies. As calls for a new umbrella party of the socialist left gathered strength, the SFIO and 
Mitterrand had to negotiate not only with one another, but also with left-wing political clubs 
hostile to a European integration process that they perceived as benefitting newly emerging 
multinational corporations and the United States.  
The strength of a new generation of political figures on the left who viewed the EEC as a 
tool of “capitalist Europe” forced the PS leadership to compromise and to temper the enthusiasm 
of its predecessor, the SFIO, for trade liberalization. The PS of the 1970s and thereafter was a 
different party responding to different pressures than had the party of Guy Mollet and André 
Philip in the 1950s. Eager for French Communist support to create a left-wing majority in 
presidential elections, the PCF and Mitterrand reached a deal in 1968 in which the PCF 
1056 Konferenz der Sozialistischen Parteien der Gemeinschaftsländer über die Probleme der “Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, Konferenzdokument Nr. 5, “Die Revision des Verträges über die Gründung der 
EGKS,” von Gerhard Kreyssig, GK 120, AdsD.  
1057 See, for instance, George Ross, “The Revenge of Neglected Issues: EU Founders and Social Policy,” French 
Politics, Culture & Society 29, 2, (2011): 90-103. 
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recognized the “reality” of European integration and Mitterrand’s FDGS highlighted the 
“capitalist nature” of the EEC. Michel Rocard, latter a major figure in the party, opposed 
universal suffrage to the European Parliament and co-authored a book in 1973 titled The 
Common Market against Europe. Mitterrand and the PS also had to deal with pressures from 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Centre d’études, de recherche et d’éducation socialistes  (CERES), 
which argued that socialist goals had to be defended at the national level, rather than at the 
supranational level, which he claimed represented capitalist interests.  Chevènement was a 
prominent figure in French Socialist debates from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. His critique 
blended curiously with Gaullism, and helped to establish a political consensus in France that is 
generally suspicious of further supranational integration. Under this pressure, Mitterrand 
switched his position to support a de facto right to a national veto, the principle of which had 
been established in the Luxembourg compromise that resolved the crisis in the EEC that had 
resulted from Charles de Gaulle’s “empty chair” policy.1058  
When the PS came to power in 1981 with the presidential victory of François Mitterrand, 
the new government, which contained Communist ministers for the first time since 1947, 
attempted to accomplish a wide-reaching program of socialist reforms at the national level. The 
collapse of Mitterrand’s agenda in response to capital flight and other economic pressures led 
Mitterrand to turn to European integration as an alternative policy. He thus supported the 
creation of the Single European Act, negotiated in large part by French Socialist Jacques Delors. 
That Act further liberalized economic relations through the creation of a single market and gave 
the Community a name to match its new ambitions, the European Union. Yet Mitterrand’s 
actions did not resolve the underlying conflict within his party between proponents of trade 
liberalization and critics of globalization. This division has led to a great deal of policy paralysis 
since the PS won the parliamentary elections of 1998, and again following François Hollande’s 
recent presidential victory. Pressures on the left for an alternative “Social Europe” were so great 
that the PS split over the proposed European constitution in 2005. Sufficient PS voters joined 
with the right-wing Front National to defeat the treaty. Due to these deep, underlying divisions 
1058 Pascal Delwit, Les Partis socialistes et l’intégration européenne: France, Grande-Bretagne, Belgique (Brussels: 
Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles), 77-92. 
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on the impact of European integration and globalization, French Socialist Party policy on 
European integration since the 1970s has often been schizophrenic and incoherent.1059 
Similar pressures have at times affected the German Social Democratic Party, but 
significantly less so. The party has declared its support for a “Social Europe,” but it has not 
pushed particularly hard for these goals at the European level and at times has been an 
impediment. By the time it came to power in the late 1960s, the SPD was a party that favored the 
European integration process. During Willy Brandt’s tenure as Chancellor, monetary integration 
emerged as the primary item on the EEC’s agenda. The origins of the Euro and the present-day 
debates on the merits and demerits of monetary integration lie in this period. Although 
discussions of a common currency were present as far back as the late 1940s, the impact of U.S. 
President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system 
created a context of monetary instability and uncertainty that forced European governments to 
consider a common response. Then, as now, despite a rhetorical commitment to currency 
integration, the SPD’s Finance Minister, Karl Schiller, favored a national approach based on the 
maintenance of a hard currency and low inflation that was in line with the tradition established 
by his CDU predecessors. Due in part to Schiller’s opposition, Brandt’s proposal of a European 
currency reserve fund emerged moribund.1060 Mitterrand, for his part, criticized the French 
government for not pursuing a common currency in response to Nixon’s actions in 1971. Only in 
the early 1990s did President Mitterrand extract the promise of a common currency from German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl during negotiations for German reunification following the collapse of 
the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union.  
The famous “French-German duo,” which has commonly been considered the “motor” of 
European integration, has survived through the geopolitical and economic changes of the past 
fifty years in various incarnations: Willy Brandt (SPD) and George Pompidou (Gaullist), Helmut 
Schmidt (SPD) and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Independent Republican), François Mitterrand 
(PS) and Helmut Kohl (CDU), Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Jacques Chirac (Gaullist), and 
Nicolas Sarkozy (center-right Union pour le mouvement populaire) and then François Hollande 
(PS) and Angela Merkel (CDU). At no time in the postwar period have there been both a French 
1059 See, for instance, Clément Desbos and Frédéric Royall, “Globalization and political posturing on the Left in 
France in the 1990s,” French Politics 9, 2 (2011): 139-157. 
1060 Hans-Jürgen Küsters, “Jean Monnet und die deutschen Bundeskanzler von Konrad Adenauer bis Helmut 
Schmidt,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer und die deutsche Europapolitik: Konvergenz 
und Dissonanzen (1950-1957) (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 259-65; and Hiepel, op cit., 136-140. 
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Socialist President and a German Social Democratic Chancellor. In all stages of the European 
integration process, when French Socialists and German Social Democrats have come to power, 
they have had to negotiate with the rival of their cross-Rhine fraternal party. Generally they have 
established cordial and productive relationships with their right-leaning counterparts. It is 
impossible to know whether a French Socialist-German Social Democratic “duo” would have 
had a decisive impact on the form European integration has taken since its inception in 1950. 
Nonetheless, as this study has shown, their participation in the process has been crucial for the 
origins, evolution, and longevity of today’s European Union.  
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